Randy J. Pinkerton vs. Jeld-Wen, Inc. D/B/A Wenco of Iowa, Mark King, Chris Simon, and Bill Maschmeier

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 267 / 97-1049
Filed December 23, 1998
RANDY J. PINKERTON,
Appellant,
vs.
JELD-WEN, INC. d/b/a WENCO OF
IOWA, MARK KING, CHRIS SIMON,
and BILL MASCHMEIER,
Appellees.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Poweshiek County, Richard J. Vogel, Judge.
Appeal from adverse decision in action brought by discharged employee on a statutory claim under Iowa
Code section 730.5 (1997). AFFIRMED.
David S. Wiggins of Wiggins, Anderson & Conger, P.C., West Des Moines, for appellant.
Stephen T. Brennecke of the Brennecke Law Office, Grinnell, for appellees.
Considered by Harris, P.J., and Larson, Carter, Neuman, and Ternus, JJ.
HARRIS, Justice.
We agree that an employer did not violate an Iowa statute, since revised, that protected jobs for certain
persons undertaking drug treatment. We also agree that an administrative law judge’s unemployment
compensation decision was not res judicata on the issue now in dispute. So we affirm rejection of a
discharged employee’s claim.
Although the legal issues are vigorously disputed, we would be hard-pressed to criticize this long-
suffering employer’s progressive and benevolent reaction to its employee’s struggle to address a serious
drug abuse problem. In March 1993, Jeld-Wen, Inc. d/b/a Wenco of Iowa hired plaintiff, Randy Pinkerton,
to work in the company’s window factory. Pinkerton represented on his job application that he had only
one (in 1991) felony criminal conviction for OWI. The truth was strikingly worse. Pinkerton deliberately
omitted revealing at least two third-offense OWI convictions prior to the one in 1991.
A year after taking the job, Pinkerton went to Bill Maschmeier, the production manager of the factory, to
report he had again been arrested for OWI. After freely discussing his alcohol and drug abuse problems,
Pinkerton acceded to Maschmeier’s suggestion that he seek help. The company then arranged for
treatment at a local substance abuse treatment facility known as Substance Abuse Treatment Unit of

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Central Iowa (SATUCI). Pinkerton reported to SATUCI for evaluation and then initiated a course of
treatment that was to last eleven months. Treatment was funded by insurance provided through Wenco.
To say the least the treatment program was not conspicuously successful. Pinkerton overdosed on
methamphetamine in November 1994 and, by April 1995, started drinking again. Pinkerton was fired, but
Wenco still did not give up on him. His supervisor said his job would be available when he completed the
treatment program, still in progress. The promise was kept. He was rehired and passed a pre-
employment drug screen at that time. Pinkerton was assigned to operating forklifts, moving glass window
products in the factory. Because forklifts are dangerous, operators must use good judgment and extreme
care to avoid accidents.
Notwithstanding Wenco’s patience and the responsibilities demanded by the job, Pinkerton was
intoxicated when he reported for work on October 25, 1995. When he began operating a forklift, it
became obvious that he was a threat to his fellow workers. Because of his behavior and appearance
Pinkerton’s coemployees suspected that he was under the influence of alcohol or drugs. On Wenco’s
demand, a drug screen was conducted, the only one to which Pinkerton did not voluntarily submit. He
tested positive for codeine, morphine, and opiate metabolites.
Pinkerton was again fired and thereafter applied for unemployment benefits. A job service representative
denied unemployment benefits but an administrative law judge reversed on appeal. The reversal was
based on a finding that Wenco discharged Pinkerton solely because he tested positive for drugs on the
specimen taken October 25, 1995. The administrative law judge found Wenco failed to comply with Iowa
Code section 730.5(3)(f) (1997) and determined Pinkerton should receive unemployment benefits.
Pinkerton later filed this petition against Wenco and individual officers for relief under Iowa Code section
730.5. Because the claim against the individuals is derived from their association with Wenco, all
defendants will be referred to in the singular as Wenco. The matter is before us on Pinkerton’s appeal
from the district court’s rejection of this suit following a bench trial.
I. Our review of the challenged legal determinations of the district court is on error. Iowa R. App. P. 4.
Pinkerton also sought injunctive relief which would be a matter in equity which we review de novo. Iowa
R. App. P. 4; State ex rel. Department of Human Servs. v. Antle, 433 N.W.2d 42, 43 (Iowa App. 1988).
II. Pinkerton challenges the trial court’s refusal to hold his claim was already established in the
unemployment compensation proceeding because the favorable decision of the administrative law judge
was res judicata as to this suit.
A final adjudicatory decision of an administrative agency is regarded res judicata the same as if it were a
judgment of the court. State ex rel. Department of Natural Resources v. Shelley, 512 N.W.2d 579, 580
(Iowa App. 1993). Iowa law regarding claim preclusion closely follows the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments. Shumaker v. Department of Transp., 541 N.W.2d 850, 852 (Iowa 1995). Res judicata
principles however have exceptions. On the basis of the scheme-of-remedies exception we affirm the trial
court’s refusal to apply res judicata principles here. It is explained in Restatement (Second) of Judgments
section 83(3) this way:
An adjudicative determination of a claim by an administrative tribunal does not preclude
relitigation in another tribunal of the same or a related claim based on the same
transaction if the scheme of remedies permits assertion of the second claim
notwithstanding the adjudication of the first claim.
(Emphasis added.) We applied the scheme-of-remedies exception In re Kjos, 346 N.W.2d 25 (Iowa
1984), noting

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that by establishing one administrative remedy for challenging the discharge and a
separate remedy for seeking unemployment compensation the legislature has provided a
scheme of remedies in which an adjudication of one claim will not bar the other. This
case thus falls within the common scheme of remedies exception in Restatement
(Second) of Judgments § 83(3).
Id. at 29.
It would be poor policy to depart from that view in the present case, and we decline to do so. Employers
should be encouraged to yield readily to an administrative award of unemployment benefits. Hardship
would result to unemployed workers if employers, out of fear of unanticipated collateral consequences,
felt impelled to exhaust all appeals in what should be a simple and largely informal administrative inquiry.
The trial court correctly rejected Pinkerton’s res judicata argument.
III. Pinkerton’s theory of recovery is based on Iowa Code section 730.5.[1] In its ruling, the trial court
succinctly described the provision this way:
As originally enacted, section 730.5 provided in relevant part that if a drug screen is
returned positive the employer shall provide substance abuse evaluation and treatment
with costs apportioned as provided under the employee benefit plan or at employer
expense. If an employee whose drug test indicates the presence of alcohol or a
controlled substance undergoes substance abuse evaluation and successfully completes
substance abuse treatment, if recommended by the evaluation, [the] employer shall take
no disciplinary action against the employee. This section does not restrict an employer’s
ability to prohibit the use of alcohol or controlled substances during work hours or to
discipline employees for being under the influence of alcohol or controlled substances
during work hours. This section may be enforced through a civil action. . . . An employee
discharged, disciplined, or otherwise discriminated against in violation of this section shall
be compensated by the employer in the amount of any loss of wages and benefits arising
out of the discrimination and shall be restored to the employee’s previous position of
employment.
Noting that it considered the statutory scheme conflicting and confusing, the court continued.
Section 730.5 sets forth general requirements for employers concerning drug testing.
730.5(3) categorizes instances in which an employer may require testing and what is
required if test results are positive. It also sets forth testing obligations and the
requirement for evaluation and treatment and the results if treatment is successfully
completed. Subsection 4 refers to the type of drugs for which testing may be required.
Subsection 5 states:
This section does not restrict an employer’s ability to prohibit the use of
alcohol or controlled substances during work hours or to discipline
employees for being under the influence of alcohol or controlled
substances during work hours.
Pinkerton contends Wenco did not comply with section 730.5 when it did not again offer drug evaluation
and treatment after the testing on October 25, 1995, the only time he tested positive on an employer-
requested drug screen. To subscribe to this view would effectively ignore Wenco’s statutory right under
Code section 730.5(5) to fire him for being under the influence of alcohol or controlled substances while
on the job. It would also require us to punish, rather than reward, Wenco for its benevolent approach in
helping Pinkerton face up to his frailties.

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We have already spurned such a strange and unreasonable view of code section 730.5. In Reigelsberger,
we found that a blood test of an employee was not needed because the impairment was not disputed by
either party. Reigelsberger, 500 N.W.2d at 66. The same is true here.
We conclude Wenco complied with Iowa Code section 730.5 by funding Pinkerton’s first evaluation and
treatment and by reserving his employment for him until he was finished with such treatment. The second
occurrence on October 25, 1995, was not subject to the same protections. The trial court was correct in
so holding.
AFFIRMED.
NOTES:
[1] This section has since been extensively revised. See 1998 Iowa Acts ch. 1011, §§ 1, 2. This
controversy arose prior to its revision and is governed by the statute as it existed then.

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