IDHW v. John Doe

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 51601

In the Matter of Jane Doe I, John Doe I, )
and Jane Doe II, Children Under )
Eighteen (18) Years of Age. )
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF ) Filed: August 19, 2024
HEALTH & WELFARE, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
Petitioner-Respondent, )
)
v. )
)
JOHN DOE (2024-09), )
)
Respondent-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial
District, State of Idaho, Twin Falls County. Hon. Thomas D. Kershaw, Jr.,
Magistrate.

Judgment terminating parental rights, affirmed.

Benjamin P. Andersen, Chief Twin Falls County Public Defender; Adam J. Ondo,
Deputy Public Defender, Twin Falls, for appellant. Adam J. Ondo argued.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Briana Allen, Deputy Attorney General,
Lewiston, for respondent. Briana Allen argued.
________________________________________________

LORELLO, Judge
John Doe (2024-09) appeals from the judgment terminating his parental rights. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Doe is the father of the three minor children in this action. The Idaho Department of Health
and Welfare first filed a petition to place a fourth child in the Department’s custody on
November 19, 2021. That child was placed in foster care on November 22, 2021. The three
younger children involved in this case were left in the home at that time. In January 2022, the

1
magistrate court approved a case plan following a hearing at which both parents were present. In
May 2022, the magistrate court ordered the three younger children removed from the home and
placed them in the custody of the Department. The magistrate court approved an amended case
plan and conducted several review and status hearings while the children were in the Department’s
custody. Ultimately, a petition to terminate parental rights was filed, and a termination trial was
held in December 2023. The magistrate court terminated Doe’s parental rights after finding that
clear and convincing evidence showed he had neglected his children and that termination is in the
children’s best interests.1 Doe appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal from a decision terminating parental rights, this Court examines whether the
decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence, which means such evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Doe v. Doe, 148 Idaho 243,
245-46, 220 P.3d 1062, 1064-65 (2009). The appellate court will indulge all reasonable inferences
in support of the trial court’s judgment when reviewing an order that parental rights be terminated.
Id.
Constitutional questions are questions of law over which this Court exercises free review.
Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (2010-28), 150 Idaho 563, 566, 249 P.3d 362, 365 (2011).
III.
ANALYSIS
Doe contends that the petition for termination was insufficient as it failed to allege neglect
under I.C. § 16-1602(31) and, as a result, the magistrate court erroneously based its termination
decision on that code section. Doe also contends that there is insufficient evidence in the record
to support the magistrate court’s termination decision for two reasons: (1) there was insufficient
evidence that he had notice of the case plan tasks which he was to complete; and (2) there was
insufficient evidence that he neglected the children.2 Finally, Doe contends that I.C.

1
The magistrate court also terminated the mother’s parental rights. The decision to
terminate the mother’s parental rights is at issue in a separate appeal.
2
Doe does not present any argument that termination is not in the children’s best interests.

2
§ 16-2002(3)(b) is unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this case. For the reasons set forth
below, we reject all of Doe’s arguments and affirm the magistrate court’s termination decision.
A. Sufficiency of Petition
We first address Doe’s argument that the petition was insufficient to provide notice as to
the legal grounds for termination. Doe contends that the magistrate court erred in finding that he
engaged in neglect as defined by I.C. § 16-1602(31) because the “petition never specifically alleges
neglect” as defined in that code section. The record does not support Doe’s claim.
Idaho Code Section 16-2006 provides that a “petition for the termination of the parent and
child relationship shall include, to the best information and belief of the petitioner” the “grounds
on which termination of the parent and child relationship is sought.” I.C. § 16-2006h. In
termination proceedings, it is not necessary to allege precisely which of the six subsections of
I.C. § 16-2005 under which the Department is proceeding; rather, a simple and concise statement
of facts is all that is necessary. Doe v. Doe (2020-49), 169 Idaho 170, 178, 492 P.3d 1129, 1137
(2021). The petition for termination in this case alleges, in relevant part:
[Doe] was ordered to perform his case plan to reunite himself with his children by
providing for his children’s physical, educational, medical and safety needs. His
neglect thereof is show [sic] failure to successfully complete a parenting class,
provide a stable home environment and demonstrate parenting skills to provide for
his children’s physical, educational, mental and safety needs. He was to complete
a parenting class and demonstrate skills he was supposed to learn. He was to engage
in family counseling and follow the recommendations. He was to demonstrate that
he could provide financially for his family and address the children’s medical and
mental health issues. He was to complete an anger management program and
follow the recommendations. He was to complete a pyscho-sexual [sic] assessment
and follow the recommendations. [Doe] has completed the assessment but has not
completed his case plan nor recognized safety concerns for the children.
These factual allegations were sufficient to put Doe on notice of the grounds for
termination. That the factual allegations recite the requirements of the case plan does not limit the
petition to alleging termination based only on the failure to comply with the case plan pursuant to
I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b). Moreover, Doe’s failures vis-à-vis the case plan requirements demonstrate
neglect as defined by I.C. § 16-1602(31) because they demonstrate Doe’s children were without
proper parental care and control, or subsistence, medical or other care or control necessary for their
well-being. The factual allegations in the termination petition were sufficient to put Doe on notice
that his parental rights were subject to termination based on neglect as defined in I.C.

3
§ 16-2002(3)(a) and or (b). Importantly, from a due process perspective, Doe has failed to allege,
much less establish, that he did not have notice of the grounds on which the Department sought
termination such that he was unable to prepare for trial.
Doe also argues the termination petition was inadequate because “nowhere does it state
that [he] failed to provide proper care and control while the children were in his custody, as
opposed to in the State’s custody.” This argument is without merit. Doe’s children were in the
Department’s custody because of his conduct, and he failed to address the concerns that resulted
in the children’s removal from his home. Doe’s argument that the termination petition was
inadequate based on his after-the-fact claim of inadequate notice is disingenuous at best. Doe’s
claim that neglect was not adequately pled in the termination petition fails.
B. Sufficiency of Evidence
Doe contends there is insufficient evidence in the record to support the magistrate court’s
termination decision because, he argues, there was a lack of evidence that he had notice of the case
plan tasks he was required to complete and there was insufficient evidence that he neglected the
children. Doe is incorrect.
The magistrate court terminated Doe’s parental rights based on a finding of neglect due to:
(1) the children being “without proper parental care and control, or subsistence . . . necessary for
the children’s well-being because of the conduct or omission,” and (2) Doe’s failure to comply
with the case plan. The magistrate court further found that, for a period of “well over two years,”
Doe failed to comply with his case plan in “central and important ways” and that the children had
been in the Department’s custody for more than fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months.
Idaho Code Section 16-2005 permits a party to petition the court for termination of the
parent-child relationship when it is in the child’s best interests and any one of five enumerated
bases exist, which include neglect or abuse. I.C. § 16-2005(1)(b). Idaho Code Section
16-2002(3)(a) defines “neglect” as any conduct included in I.C. § 16-1602(31). Section
16-1602(31)(a) provides, in pertinent part, that a child is neglected when the child is without proper
parental care and control, or subsistence, medical or other care or control necessary for his or her
well-being because of the conduct or omission of his or her parents, guardian, or other custodian
or their neglect or refusal to provide them. Neglect also exists where the parent has failed to
comply with the trial court’s orders or the case plan in a Child Protective Act case and the

4
Department has had temporary or legal custody of the child for fifteen of the most recent
twenty-two months and reunification has not been accomplished by the last day of the fifteenth
month in which the child has been in the temporary or legal custody of the Department. I.C. §
16-2002(3)(b). The grounds for terminating a parent-child relationship must be proved by clear
and convincing evidence. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982); State v. Doe, 143 Idaho
383, 386, 146 P.3d 649, 652 (2006).
1. Evidence of knowledge of case plan
Doe first argues the evidence was insufficient to support the magistrate court’s termination
decision because, he contends, there was no evidence that he had knowledge of the case plan,
which he asserts is an implied element of I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b). According to Doe, because the
case plan admitted into evidence at the termination trial lacked a file stamp and was not signed by
him and because no order adopting the case plan was admitted, there was insufficient evidence to
prove that he was aware of his obligations under the case plan. Doe’s argument that there was no
evidence that he had knowledge of the case plan is specious.
When a child is placed in the Department’s custody, the Department must prepare a case
plan that “set[s] forth reasonable efforts that will be made to make it possible for the child to return
home.” I.C. § 16-1621(3). The case plan must be filed with the trial court and copies of the case
plan must be delivered to the parents. I.C. § 16-1621(1). The case plan must be approved by the
trial court and, after approval, the plan is entered as a court order that includes a requirement that
reasonable efforts be made to reunify in a timely manner in accordance with the case plan. I.C.
§ 16-1621(6). The case plan is then subject to review every six months. I.C. § 16-1622(1).
All three versions of the case plan that existed throughout the child protection case were
admitted at the termination trial. In addition, there was testimony as to the circumstances
surrounding each case plan and the reasons for the amendments to the case plan. The provisions
of the case plan and Doe’s performance on the case plan tasks were discussed in detail throughout
the trial, including by Doe. That the actual case plans admitted at trial were not file stamped or
signed by Doe does not mean he did not have notice of the case plan or its associated tasks. Doe
has cited no authority to support the proposition that file stamps or signatures are required to
demonstrate either validity of the plan or any notice requirement. We do not generally address
issues not supported by cogent argument and citation to legal authority, even in a case terminating

5
parental rights. Idaho Dep’t of Health and Welfare v. Doe (2018-24), 164 Idaho 143, 147, 426
P.3d 1243, 1247 (2018); see also Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (2015-01), 158 Idaho
764, 768-69, 351 P.3d 1222, 1226-27 (2015) (declining to consider parent’s argument “that he
‘substantially complied’ with the case plan” because the parent failed to provide legal authority).
Moreover, Doe did not object to the admission of the case plans at trial. As such, any challenge
to the admission of the case plans at the termination trial, including any objection based on
relevance or foundation, is unpreserved. Doe v. Doe, 149 Idaho 392, 398, 234 P.3d 716, 722
(2010) (explaining appellate court does not consider claims of error raised for the first time on
appeal). Doe’s claim that there was insufficient evidence that he was aware of his obligations
under the case plan is without merit. Doe’s claim of lack of notice is also inconsistent with his
acknowledgment, discussed below, that he did not complete all of his case plan tasks.
2. Evidence of neglect
Doe argues there was insufficient evidence to support the magistrate court’s finding of
neglect. Regarding Doe’s failure to comply with the case plan as a basis for neglect, he argues
“the standard is failure to comply, not failure to complete.” Doe acknowledges he did not complete
every goal of the case plan but argues: (1) the tasks were ongoing throughout the case; (2) some
of the tasks were vague; and (3) the recommendations were not clear.
Doe cites no legal authority to support his position that, under I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b),
occasional compliance without completion of a case plan prevents a finding of neglect.3 As noted,
this Court generally does not address issues not supported by cogent argument and citation to legal
authority. See Doe (2018-24), 164 Idaho at 147, 426 P.3d at 1247. Further, to the extent Doe
thought there was a lack of clarity in relation to the case plan, he was required to raise those claims
in the child protection case. See Idaho Dep’t of Health &Welfare v. Doe (2019-31), 166 Idaho
357, 360-61, 458 P.3d 226, 229-30 (Ct. App. 2020).
As to the evidence presented with respect to Doe’s failures relative to his case plan tasks,
there was sufficient evidence to support the magistrate court’s finding of neglect on that basis. A
caseworker testified that Doe engaged in some anger management counseling but did not complete

3
Doe does not contest the magistrate court’s finding that the Department had temporary or
legal custody of the children for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months preceding the
termination and that reunification had not occurred.

6
it. The caseworker also testified that Doe obtained a mental health assessment, which
recommended that he have treatment for “antisocial personality disorder” as well as “psychosexual
treatment.” However, Doe failed to complete treatment for either. The caseworker also testified
that further treatment was necessary for the children to be safe around Doe. The magistrate court
found that Doe “did not assert that he finished family counseling or anger management or anything
else other than meeting the minimum requirements of the parenting class.”
Doe also argues that there was insufficient evidence of neglect under I.C. § 16-1602(31)(a).
Because we conclude there was sufficient evidence of neglect based on Doe’s failure to comply
with the case plan under I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b), which is an independent and sufficient ground for
termination of his parental rights, we need not address Doe’s argument that there was also
insufficient evidence of neglect as defined by I.C. § 16-1602(31)(a).
C. As-Applied Constitutional Challenge
Doe contends that I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b) is “unconstitutional as applied to the facts in this
particular case and thus the minor case plan violations cannot be utilized as a basis for
termination.” Doe’s constitutional challenge is without merit.
To succeed on an “as-applied” challenge, a party must demonstrate that the statute operated
to violate his or her rights under the specific circumstances of the case. Doe I v. Doe II (2022-06),
170 Idaho 901, 909, 517 P.3d 830, 838 (2022). Doe appears to contend that I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b)
is unconstitutional as applied because his failure to complete his case plan tasks did not establish
“unfitness.” And, according to Doe, “unfitness” is a constitutional prerequisite to termination of
parental rights. Doe cites Santosky in support of this argument.
The issue before the Supreme Court in Santosky was what standard of proof was required
before a parent’s rights could be terminated. Santosky, U.S. at 490-51. The New York statute on
review permitted termination by only a preponderance of the evidence. The Court held a
preponderance standard is constitutionally insufficient and that a clear and convincing standard
“adequately conveys to the factfinder the level of subjective certainty about his factual conclusions
necessary to satisfy due process.” Id. at 769. In determining the proper standard, the Court used
the word “unfit” to generally describe what occurs in a termination of parental rights case. For
example, the Court’s first reference to “unfitness” was the following: “Victory by the State not
only makes termination of parental rights possible; it entails a judicial determination that the

7
natural parents are unfit to raise their own children.” Id. at 760. This statement is accompanied
by a footnote that the Court in that case “expressly refused to terminate petitioners’ parental rights
on a ‘non-statutory, no-fault basis’ and that it was unclear whether the state “constitutionally could
terminate a parent’s rights without showing parental unfitness.” Id. at 760 n.10. The Court’s
footnote in Santosky does not impose a constitutional standard, much less define what that standard
might be. Even so, “unfitness” is required in order to terminate a parent’s rights in Idaho as
reflected in the statutory criteria set forth in I.C. § 16-2005, which includes neglect. Nevertheless,
Doe seems to suggest that “neglect” can only be defined according to its plain language, and cannot
include neglect as defined in I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b)--the failure to comply with the court’s orders
and the case plan in the child protection case while the Department has had temporary or legal
custody of the child for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months and reunification has not
been accomplished within that time. Doe cites no authority for this proposition. That Doe does
not think neglect should be defined in this way does not make it so. Doe’s conclusory assertions
unsupported by any cogent argument are both unpersuasive and insufficient for appellate review.
Doe’s as-applied challenge to I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b) fails.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Doe has failed to show the allegations in the termination petition were insufficient. Doe
has also failed to show there was insufficient evidence to support the magistrate court’s
determination that he neglected his children as defined by I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b). As such, we need
not address whether there was also sufficient evidence of neglect as defined by I.C.
§ 16-1602(31)(a). Finally, Doe’s as-applied challenge to I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b) fails. Accordingly,
the judgment terminating Doe’s parental rights is affirmed.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge HUSKEY, CONCUR.

8