IDHW v. John Doe

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 51609

In the Matter of: Jane Doe I and John )
Doe I, Children Under Eighteen (18) )
Years of Age. )
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF )
HEALTH AND WELFARE, ) Filed: July 11, 2024
)
Petitioner-Respondent, ) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
)
v. ) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
JOHN DOE (2024-12), ) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
)
Respondent-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial
District, State of Idaho, Bannock County. Hon. Anson Call, Magistrate.

Judgment terminating parental rights, affirmed.

Merrill and Merrill, Chartered; Mary E. Shea, Pocatello, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Jason R. Chandler, Deputy Attorney
General, Pocatello, for respondent.
________________________________________________

HUSKEY, Judge
John Doe appeals from the magistrate court’s judgment terminating his parental rights to
his children, Jane Doe I and John Doe I (Children).1 Doe argues the magistrate court erred in
finding he neglected Children, failed to discharge his parental responsibilities, and that it is in the
Children’s best interests to terminate Doe’s parental rights. The magistrate court’s judgment
terminating Doe’s parental rights is affirmed.

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Children’s biological mother’s rights were also terminated. She appealed from the
judgment terminating her parental rights in Docket No. 51608.
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I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In November 2021, the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (Department) received a
referral from law enforcement declaring Children in imminent danger. A Department worker went
to Doe’s residence and reported that, “Upon entering the home, it was found in deplorable, filthy,
and unsanitary conditions.” A temporary safety plan was implemented where Children would live
with a family member until the residence could be cleaned. Subsequently, a petition was filed for
legal custody or protective supervision of the Children under the Child Protection Act. Following
a hearing, Children were placed under the protective supervision of the Department in the custody
of their parents. The magistrate court approved and adopted the previously filed case plan for Doe
in February 2022.
In June 2022, the Department filed a motion for removal of Children from Doe’s home
based on Doe’s lack of progress on the case plan and his refusal to allow the Department into his
residence since May 2022. The magistrate court ordered removal of Children, and they were
placed in the legal custody of the Department in June 2022. A second case plan was filed,
approved, and adopted by the magistrate court. After Doe made progress on the second case plan,
Doe was granted an extended home visit in June 2023. However, the Department ended the
extended home visit after twenty-one days because of Doe’s inability to recognize safety threats
to Children. In September 2023, the Department filed a petition for termination of Doe’s parental
rights. The matter proceeded to a termination trial at which multiple witnesses testified. Following
the trial, the court issued a written decision finding that Doe neglected Children, was unable to
discharge parental responsibilities, and it is in Children’s best interests to terminate Doe’s parental
rights. Doe appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal from a decision terminating parental rights, this Court examines whether the
decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence, which means such evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Doe v. Doe, 148 Idaho 243,
245-46, 220 P.3d 1062, 1064-65 (2009). The appellate court will indulge all reasonable inferences
in support of the trial court’s judgment when reviewing an order that parental rights be terminated.
Id. The Idaho Supreme Court has also said that the substantial evidence test requires a greater

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quantum of evidence in cases where the trial court’s finding must be supported by clear and
convincing evidence than in cases where a mere preponderance is required. State v. Doe, 143
Idaho 343, 346, 144 P.3d 597, 600 (2006). Clear and convincing evidence is generally understood
to be evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain. Roe
v. Doe, 143 Idaho 188, 191, 141 P.3d 1057, 1060 (2006). Further, the magistrate court’s decision
must be supported by objectively supportable grounds. Doe, 143 Idaho at 346, 144 P.3d at 600.
III.
ANALYSIS
Doe argues the magistrate court erred in finding that: (1) he neglected Children; (2) he is
unable to discharge his parental responsibilities; and (3) it is in the best interests of Children to
terminate his parental rights. The Department argues the evidentiary burden was satisfied as to
each argument.
A. Grounds for Termination
A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with his or her
child. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 760, 53 P.3d 341,
343 (2002). This interest is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 839, 842, 172 P.3d 1114, 1117 (2007). Implicit in the
Termination of Parent and Child Relationship Act is the philosophy that, wherever possible, family
life should be strengthened and preserved. I.C. § 16-2001(2). Therefore, the requisites of due
process must be met when terminating the parent-child relationship. State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 383,
386, 146 P.3d 649, 652 (2006). Due process requires that the grounds for terminating a parent-
child relationship be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Because a fundamental liberty
interest is at stake, the United States Supreme Court has determined that a court may terminate a
parent-child relationship only if that decision is supported by clear and convincing evidence.
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982); see also I.C. § 16-2009; Doe v. Dep’t of Health &
Welfare, 146 Idaho 759, 761-62, 203 P.3d 689, 691-92 (2009); Doe, 143 Idaho at 386, 146 P.3d at
652.
Idaho Code § 16-2005 permits a party to petition the court for termination of the parent-
child relationship when it is in the child’s best interests and any one of the following five factors
exist: (a) abandonment; (b) neglect or abuse; (c) lack of a biological relationship between the child
and a presumptive parent; (d) the parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities for a

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prolonged period that will be injurious to the health, morals, or well-being of the child; or (e) the
parent is incarcerated and will remain incarcerated for a substantial period of time. Each statutory
ground is an independent basis for termination. Doe, 144 Idaho at 842, 172 P.3d at 1117. Upon
finding a statutory ground for termination, the court must also find that it is in the best interests of
the child to terminate the parent-child relationship. I.C. § 16-2005(1). Both findings must be
established by clear and convincing evidence.
In this case, the magistrate court found alternate statutory bases for which Doe’s parental rights
could be terminated. First, the magistrate court found that Doe neglected Children by failing to
exercise proper parental care and control and by failing to complete the case plan tasks. Second, the
magistrate court found that Doe was unable to discharge parental responsibilities.
1. Neglect
Doe argues the magistrate court erred in finding he neglected Children.2 The Department
argues the finding of neglect is supported by substantial and competent evidence. Pursuant to I.C.
§ 16-2005(1)(b), neglect is a statutory ground for terminating parental rights. Idaho Code § 16-
2002(3)(a), in part, defines “neglect” as any conduct included in I.C. § 16-1602(31). Section 16-
1602(31)(a) provides, in pertinent part, that a child is neglected when the child is without proper
parental care and control, or subsistence, medical or other care or control necessary for his or her well-
being because of the conduct or omission of his or her parents, guardian, or other custodian or their
neglect or refusal to provide them. Neglect also exists where the parent has failed to comply with the
court’s orders or the case plan in a Child Protective Act case and the Department has had temporary or
legal custody of the child for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months and reunification has not

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For all his neglect arguments, Doe makes bare and conclusory claims without proper legal
support. This Court generally does not address issues not supported by cogent argument and
citation to legal authority, even in a case terminating parental rights. Idaho Dep’t of Health &
Welfare v. Doe (2018-24), 164 Idaho 143, 147, 426 P.3d 1243, 1247 (2018). The Court, however,
may address certain narrow issues involving due process violations despite the absence of
supporting, cogent argument or citation to legal authority. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v.
Doe (2017-32), 163 Idaho 536, 538, 415 P.3d 945, 947 (2018); State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 534, 536,
164 P.3d 814, 816 (2007). For example, the Idaho Supreme Court has previously addressed due
process errors affecting parents’ fundamental rights, including procedural errors and the
application of an incorrect standard of review. Doe (2017-32), 163 Idaho at 538, 415 P.3d at 947
(addressing procedural error); Doe, 144 Idaho at 536, 164 P.3d at 81 (addressing application of
incorrect standard). In his brief, Doe does not cite any relevant authority or articulate how the
magistrate court erred in applying relevant authority to his case, which generally results in a waiver
of the issue of appeal.
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been accomplished by the last day of the fifteenth month in which the child has been in the temporary
or legal custody of the Department. I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b).
Regarding proper parental care and control, the magistrate court found that although Doe
had shown some improvement in his ability to exercise proper care and control, he failed to
demonstrate he could continually and consistently do so. The magistrate court noted that Doe
could not maintain appropriate home conditions for Children, had incurred new criminal charges,
and continued to use illegal substances, all of which demonstrated Doe had not developed the skills
necessary to exercise proper parental care and control. The magistrate court found the cleanliness
of the home varied greatly throughout the case and noted that home conditions had improved at
times and at the time of the final day of the termination trial, Doe’s residence appeared clean. The
magistrate court noted that the conditions of the home had been dangerous and unhealthy for the
children and any subsequent cleanliness addressing the safe and sanitary conditions of the home
occurred only after significant effort by the Department to help Doe understand how to care for
Children’s home environment. Similarly, while the magistrate court found that Doe was initially
inconsistent with visitation, at the time of the termination trial, Doe had become very consistent in
his visits with Children but Doe’s “late efforts” regarding visitation did not convince the court that
Doe could maintain that positive direction. Finally, the magistrate court concluded it appeared
that this late in the case, Doe had not internalized the lessons necessary to have Children returned
to his custody or to preserve his parental rights.
On appeal, Doe argues the magistrate court erred in concluding Doe could not properly
exercise parental care and control because the history of the case did not demonstrate that the
conditions of Doe’s home were dangerous and unhealthy for Children and were minimally
sufficient only just before the termination trial. Doe maintains that although the Department
provided testimony of his inability to maintain a safe and clean home environment, the Department
did not admit any photographic evidence of uncleanliness, and neither was any testimony provided
about the home conditions being “minimally sufficient.” Doe also argues the magistrate court
erred in concluding that he was inconsistent in his visitation with Children because the testimony
about Doe’s visits indicated he was appropriately engaged unless he was working or sleeping due
to his work schedule.
To begin, Doe does not cite any authority that photographic evidence is required to
establish clear and convincing evidence of neglect, so he has waived that argument. Idaho

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Department of Health & Welfare v. Doe (2018-24), 164 Idaho 143, 147, 426 P.3d 1243, 1247
(2018). Regarding his remaining arguments, multiple witnesses testified at the termination trial
that the condition of Doe’s residence was dangerous and unhealthy for Children. There was
testimony that just prior to the termination trial, the home conditions had improved. However,
Doe acknowledged at the termination trial that he had problems with keeping his residence clean.
He testified that he lacked motivation to address issues around the house, including doing the
laundry, doing the dishes, maintaining the cats’ litter boxes, cleaning the floors, and cleaning the
bedrooms.
There was also testimony from LaShae Peck, a Department worker assigned to the case,
that Doe was inconsistent with visiting Children. Doe testified he missed quite a few visits with
Children because of scheduling conflicts, he was not prepared for some of the visits, or he was
asleep at the beginning of the visit and it affected his ability to interact with Children. During his
testimony, Doe provided reasons for some of his missed visits.
In this case, the magistrate court was in the best position to consider the evidence. The
magistrate court determined that Doe failed to exercise proper care and control of Children. The
magistrate court ultimately concluded that Doe’s efforts were too late to be meaningful.
Substantial and competent evidence supports this finding. Doe’s arguments essentially ask this
Court to reweigh the evidence presented to the magistrate court. We decline to do so because
appellate courts in Idaho do not reweigh evidence. Doe, 144 Idaho at 842, 172 P.3d at 1117. In
this case, as noted above, substantial and competent evidence supports the magistrate’s court
determination that Doe failed to exercise proper parental care and control of Children.
Next, Doe asserts the magistrate court erred in finding that he neglected Children by failing
to comply with the case plan within the statutory period. Tasks from both the initial and second
case plans included: (1) keeping the home clean, organized, and free of clutter and garbage;
(2) regularly scooping and cleaning the cat litter box; (3) having one of the children clean her
bedroom; (4) engaging in Department approved parenting classes; (5) refraining from using illegal
substances and submitting to random drug tests; and (6) attending mental health appointments and
following up with recommendations.
The magistrate court found that Doe did not maintain a safe home for Children, obtained
new criminal charges, did not complete a parenting class, and did not maintain his sobriety. The
magistrate court also found Doe had difficulty maintaining mental health services because,

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although his case manager left, once Doe began services again, he did not provide the Department
with a release of information so they could verify his participation, even after being asked to do so
multiple times. Additionally, the magistrate court found that Doe did not complete a substance
abuse assessment or treatment, initially refused to participate in drug testing, and then twice tested
positive for marijuana.
On appeal, Doe asserts that: (1) he should not be faulted for failing to complete a nurturing
parent program because he was relieved of the obligation; (2) it was impossible for him to complete
the nurturing parent program as Children were not returned to his care; and (3) he sufficiently
maintained his sobriety.
We note that Doe does not address his failure to complete a mental health assessment or
his failure to refrain from using illegal substances. Either, or both, of those failed tasks would
justify a finding of neglect. Because Doe does not challenge that he failed to complete those case
plan tasks, the magistrate court’s finding of neglect must be affirmed on those grounds. Doe v.
Doe, 159 Idaho 461, 464, 362 P.3d 536, 539 (2015). Nonetheless, the magistrate court’s
determination that Doe failed to complete a parenting class and maintain sobriety is supported by
substantial and competent evidence.
The magistrate court heard conflicting testimony about Doe’s participation in a nurturing
parenting program. Norma Ramirez, the person who supervised the nurturing parenting program,
testified that Doe did not explain why he was unable to participate in the program. She also
testified that Children did not need to be in Doe’s care for Doe to complete the program. She
testified that Doe did not respond to her calls and Doe never had more than one conversation with
her.
Doe argues he could not complete the program because Children were not in his care.
However, Doe did not provide any factual support for his belief that the program could only be
completed if Children were in his care, and a review of the record, including the testimony of
Ramirez, does not support his position. Again, the magistrate court was in the best position to
consider the evidence and determined Doe failed to complete the parenting program. There is
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate court’s finding that Doe failed to
complete a nurturing parenting program as required by Doe’s case plan.
Regarding Doe’s sobriety, Doe concedes that he relapsed by using marijuana. Doe testified
that he used marijuana before the termination trial began. As such, there is substantial and

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competent evidence to support the magistrate court’s determination that Doe did not maintain
sobriety.
Based on the above, there is substantial and competent evidence supporting the magistrate
court’s determination that Doe neglected Children; thus, the court did not err in finding this
statutory basis for termination.
2. Discharge of parental responsibilities
As a separate and independent statutory basis for termination, the magistrate court found
Doe failed to discharge parental responsibilities and would be unable to do so for a prolonged
period of time pursuant to I.C. § 16-2005(1)(d). As evidence, the magistrate court looked to Doe’s
failure to complete the case plan and to maintain a safe and healthy home environment. As detailed
above, the magistrate court concluded that while Doe completed parts of his case plan at different
times, he never fully committed himself to complete his case plan, and despite Doe having a
substantial amount of time to comply with his case plan, Doe’s efforts to participate were non-
existent, half-hearted, or too late. Finally, the magistrate court found that while Doe demonstrated
he could clean up the home without Mother and Children there, Doe did not take the steps
necessary to have Children returned to his custody.
Doe argues the magistrate court erred in concluding that he was unable to discharge his
parental responsibilities. Doe reiterates that the Department did not prove by clear and convincing
evidence that, at the time of the termination trial, the conditions of the home were so bad that
Children could not be returned. Doe argues that the Department’s testimony on this issue was
subjective and non-specific. Finally, Doe asserts that the Department never communicated to Doe
what he needed to do to reunify with Children.
Preliminarily, we note that Doe’s arguments on this issue are not supported by cogent
arguments with citation to the record and authority, which generally results in a waiver of the claim
on appeal. Doe (2018-24), 164 Idaho at 147, 426 P.3d at 1247. Regardless, Doe’s arguments for
discharge of parental responsibilities fail. As addressed above, the magistrate court’s findings
regarding Doe’s failure to maintain a safe and healthy home and failure to complete the case plan
are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Doe provides no citation to the transcript to
support his claim that the testimony was subjective and nonspecific, and we decline to search the
record for support of his claim. See Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 150 Idaho 103, 113,

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244 P.3d 247, 257 (Ct. App. 2010) (noting that appellate courts will not search record on appeal
for error).
Regarding Doe’s notice argument, the record demonstrates that Doe received notice of the
requirements for him to reunify with Children. As described above, the case plan tasks at issue
were specific and understandable. Doe testified that he was aware of the case plan tasks and
believed he completed most of them appropriately. Therefore, apart from failing to cite any cogent
authority for his claim, a review of the record demonstrates Doe was aware of the case plan tasks
and those tasks were specific and understandable. Therefore, the magistrate court did not err in
finding that Doe was unable to discharge his parental responsibilities by virtue of failing to
complete the case plan tasks.
B. Best Interests of the Children
Once statutory grounds for termination have been established, the trial court must next
determine whether it is in the best interests of the child to terminate the parent-child relationship.
Tanner v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 120 Idaho 606, 611, 818 P.2d 310, 315 (1991). When
determining whether termination is in the child’s best interests, the trial court may consider the
parent’s history with substance abuse, the stability and permanency of the home, the
unemployment of the parent, the financial contribution of the parent to the child’s care after the
child is placed in protective custody, the improvement of the child while in foster care, the parent’s
efforts to improve his or her situation, and the parent’s continuing problems with the law. Doe
(2015-03) v. Doe, 159 Idaho 192, 198, 358 P.3d 77, 83 (2015); Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare
v. Doe, 156 Idaho 103, 111, 320 P.3d 1262, 1270 (2014). A finding that it is in the best interests
of the child to terminate parental rights must still be made upon objective grounds. Idaho Dep’t
of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 152 Idaho 953, 956-57, 277 P.3d 400, 403-04 (Ct. App. 2012).
The magistrate court found that terminating Doe’s parental rights is in the best interests of
Children because: (1) Doe failed to comply with his case plan; (2) Doe has not demonstrated the
ability to care for Children and his inability is likely to continue for an extended period of time;
(3) Children were thriving in their current foster placement; (4) the current foster family provided
significant stability for Children; and (5) Children will benefit by stability in their lives that Doe
refused to provide. Doe’s only challenge to the magistrate court’s best interests analysis is to assert
that the court’s legal conclusion regarding best interests was premised on the above purported
factual inaccuracies concerning whether the home met sufficient cleanliness standards so as to be

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safe and sanitary for Children. Because, as discussed above, the magistrate court’s factual findings
regarding the conditions of the home were supported by substantial and competent evidence, Doe’s
argument fails. As a result, the magistrate court did not err in finding that termination of Doe’s
parental rights is in the best interests of Children.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Substantial and competent evidence supports the magistrate court’s conclusions that Doe
neglected Children, was unable to discharge parental responsibilities, and that termination of Doe’s
parental rights is in the best interests of Children. The judgment terminating Doe’s parental rights
is affirmed.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge LORELLO CONCUR.

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