People v. Davis

1
2026 IL App (5th) 250155-U
NOS. 5-25-0155, 5-25-0158, cons.
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Macon County.
)
v. ) Nos. 23-CF-1053, 23-CF-1054
)
RAHEIM D. DAVIS, ) Honorable
) Thomas E. Griffith Jr.,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE VAUGHAN delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Boie and Hackett concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: Defendant’s conviction is affirmed where sufficient evidence was submitted to
meet the elements of the crime and defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel failed to show either deficient performance or prejudice.
¶ 2 Defendant, Raheim D. Davis, appeals the trial court’s judgment of guilt. On appeal,
defendant contends that insufficient evidence was presented to prove him guilty of murder and that
he received ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel (1) failed to request the accomplice
witness jury instruction, (2) failed to challenge expert testimony linking the guns defendant threw
in a lake to the murder, (3) stipulated to cell phone records that did not comply with Illinois Rule
of Evidence 902(11) (eff. Sept. 28, 2018), (4) failed to object to Detective Weddle’s testimony due
to a lack of qualifications, and (5) failed to object to testimony stating that a witness met defendant
NOTICE
This order was filed under
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed
under Rule 23(e)(1).
NOTICE
Decision filed 10/14/26. The
text of this decision may be
changed or corrected prior to
the filing of a Petition for
Rehearing or the disposition of
the same.

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in prison and portions of defendant’s videotaped interview addressing his access to a gun. For the
following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 On August 1, 2023, in case No. 2023-CF-1053, defendant was charged, by information,
with three counts of first degree murder in violation of sections 9-1(a)(1) and 9-1(a)(2) of the
Criminal Code of 2012 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (2) (West 2022)) following the homicide of
Karlondus D. Thomas Jr. on July 21, 2023. On the same day, in case No. 2023-CF-1054, defendant
was also charged, by information, with three counts of first degree murder in violation of sections
9-1(a)(1) and 9-1(a)(2) of the Code following the homicide of Andrell D. O’Neal on July 21, 2023.
¶ 5 On December 6, 2024, the State filed a motion for joinder. No objection was raised, and
on December 9, 2024, the court granted the motion and issued a docket entry order stating that
case Nos. 23-CF-1053 and 23-CF-1054 would be tried together. The jury trial was scheduled for
December 16, 2024.
¶ 6 On December 10, 2024, defense counsel filed two motions in limine. The first motion
stated that three firearms were found and the firearm found in Kadeeja Graves’s vehicle was not
involved in the shooting. The motion requested the court bar evidence related to the weapon which
was found in Kadeeja’s vehicle. The second motion in limine stated that defendant was on parole
at the time of his arrest, and this fact was mentioned during defendant’s police interview. The
motion requested the court bar the State from introducing that evidence at trial.
¶ 7 A third motion in limine was filed by defense counsel on December 13, 2024. This motion
alleged that Brittany Taylor was the girlfriend of Karlondus at the time of his death and that
Brittany told police during her interview that defendant pulled a handgun on her, Karlondus, and
her children one month before the shooting because defendant believed someone stole his cell

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phone. The motion requested the court prohibit the State from having Brittany provide that
information at trial. The State filed a motion in limine on December 13, 2024, requesting
permission to address defendant’s criminal convictions if defendant chose to testify.
¶ 8 Defense counsel filed a fourth motion in limine on December 16, 2024. That motion noted
that the State provided 53 power point slides related to Dr. Denton’s autopsy, some of which were
duplicative. The motion requested that the court prohibit the State from presenting photographs of
the victims prior to being cleaned and from introducing more than one photograph per wound
during Dr. Denton’s testimony.
¶ 9 The motions were heard on December 16, 2024. As to the firearm found in Kadeeja’s
vehicle, the court clarified that no witness would state there were three guns involved in the
shooting, that defendant had Kadeeja’s gun, or that defendant used that firearm in the past. The
State responded that the weapon would only be brought up in defendant’s interview. Thereafter,
the court granted the motion as to the firearm found in the vehicle and stated, “Then, counsel,
you’ll have to get together as to whether or not you want to delete that portion of the interview.”
The State responded, “Fair enough” and defense counsel said, “Thank you.” Regarding
defendant’s parole status, the State advised the court that those statements had already been
removed from the interviews in anticipation of trial, which defense counsel stated was satisfactory.
The motion in limine related to Brittany Taylor’s testimony was granted based on the agreement
of counsel that Brittany was not going to be a witness at trial. The motion in limine based on
autopsy photographs was granted with the State ordered not to introduce duplicative autopsy
photographs. The State’s motion was held in abeyance until after the State rested its case.
¶ 10 The following evidence was presented at trial. Travon Brown-Nelson testified that he had
previous convictions for robbery in Cook County, Illinois, and retail theft in Kenosha County,

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Wisconsin. He also had pending charges that included aggravated battery, armed habitual criminal,
felon in possession of a weapon, and reckless discharge of a firearm in Macon County, Illinois. He
stated there were no promises made to him as to the pending cases in exchange for his testimony
at the trial. He agreed that he was hopeful that his testimony would be helpful in his pending cases.
Travon clarified that the pending charges stemmed from events that occurred after the murders
and that he had no charges pending at the time of the murders.
¶ 11 Travon testified that he met defendant in prison in 2017. Thereafter, Travon confirmed that
he himself was in prison. He stated that he was originally from Chicago, Illinois, but moved to
Decatur, Illinois, to be near his girlfriend. Travon explained that while living in Decatur, he ran
into defendant at a barbecue, stating, “we was in the joint together, you know that’s how we met,
like, that’s how we locked in, too.” Thereafter, Travon and defendant began hanging out.
Defendant introduced Travon to Karlondus and told Travon “this little bro, look after him, you
know what I’m saying. He be getting into some trouble, look after him, keep him out of trouble.”
Travon agreed to do so. Travon stated that he met Andrell through Karlondus.
¶ 12 Travon testified that on July 21, 2023, he went to a barbeque with Andrell and Karlondus.
The barbeque was hosted by Ashley Assanow, who lived on the south side of town. He, Andrell,
and Karlondus left the barbeque to go to a few bars and to play cards at Karlondus’s house but
eventually returned to Ashley’s house. Travon and Karlondus later drove to defendant’s house in
Travon’s rented orange Dodge Charger. Karlondus was in the front passenger seat. Andrell stayed
behind because he was talking to someone outside. Travon testified that defendant’s house was on
the west side of town and after they arrived, defendant came out to the car. Defendant and
Karlondus shook hands. They all went into defendant’s house and talked. Travon received a call
from Andrell who wanted to know where Travon was and if he would come get him. Travon and

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Karlondus went back to Ashley’s house to pick up Andrell. Andrell walked to the driver’s side
door and Travon told Karlondus to get in the backseat. Karlondus got in the back passenger side
seat and Andrell sat down in the front passenger seat. They drove back to defendant’s house and
parked just past the driveway of defendant’s house.
¶ 13 Travon testified that as soon as he parked, defendant came out and sat behind Travon in
the car. They were listening to music and just chilling. Travon was drinking and defendant said he
needed to grab his drink. Defendant left and came back. Travon stated that he was not really paying
attention because he was drunk. However, the light came on when defendant opened the back
driver’s side door. Travon saw sparks and heard gunshots. Travon got out of the car to get away
from the gunshots. Travon looked at defendant and said, “You good” and defendant said, “no you
good” and then went around to the other side of the car. Travon testified that defendant was
standing in the open rear doorway of the car when he spoke to Travon. They were less than five
feet apart and had only the rear door between them. Defendant then told Travon to “take them to
the hospital.”
¶ 14 Travon testified that he heard Karlondus trying to breathe and get out of the car. He did not
know that Andrell had been shot until he got back in the car. He was unsure how many gun shots
he heard but heard more than one before he got out of the car. He then heard more gunshots after
exiting the vehicle. Once Travon was out of the car, he saw defendant firing the shots. Travon
stated that he heard a click and then saw defendant reach for a second gun. Travon thought
defendant was going to shoot him next, but defendant went to the other side of the car. Travon
only saw the motion of defendant’s arm getting another gun and then he heard more shots. After
defendant told Travon to take the victims to the hospital, defendant got into a white SUV that
Travon believed belonged to defendant’s girlfriend and drove away.

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¶ 15 Travon testified that, at that point, he froze in shock but quickly got back into the car
because he was afraid defendant would come back, change his mind, and shoot him. After Travon
got back in the car, he also left. He stated that he did not go to the hospital because he was scared.
He did not know what to do and contemplated suicide. He started calling people asking what he
should do. Travon eventually returned to Ashley’s house, knocked on the door, told her to be calm,
and then told her what was going on. Ashley thought Travon was kidding but put her shoes on and
came outside. She went to the car, opened the door, freaked out, and called the police. Travon
panicked and took Andrell’s car keys. Travon explained that when Andrell got into the Charger,
he put his Jeep keys in the console cupholder. Travon then drove to his girlfriend’s house, which
was right around the corner, and brought her back to the scene. When he returned, the police were
already there. Travon told the police what happened but could not remember exactly what was
said. He recalled reviewing a lineup to identify defendant.
¶ 16 On cross-examination, Travon agreed that he met with the State prior to the trial. He stated
that he had never been convicted of burglary but was convicted twice for robbery and retail theft.
He also confirmed his current pending cases and that he was aware that there was chance he would
go back to prison. He again testified that the State made no offers based on his testimony at the
trial but that he was hoping for some benefit from the testimony.
¶ 17 Travon agreed that he was drinking on the day of the murders and was also taking Ecstasy.
He stated that he did not drink a lot and had a low tolerance to alcohol. He only recalled taking
one Ecstasy pill but stated that he continued to take pills after midnight. He agreed that he was
under the influence when the shots started but stated, “everything cleared up once I heard gunshots,
I’m completely sober.” He stated that he did not call defendant after they left Ashley’s house to go
to defendant’s house because they were friends and Travon was comfortable showing up

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unannounced at defendant’s house. Travon stated that, although he did not know exact times, they
all went to the bar “way earlier” than when he and Karlondus initially went to defendant’s house.
He further clarified that everyone had drinks while they were listening to music in the car except
defendant. He stated that after about two minutes of sitting in the car, defendant said he was going
to grab a drink. Travon could not recall the conversation prior to defendant going into his house
but stated, “I can tell you there was no foul language towards nobody, there was no, like, I didn’t
see nothing, you know what I mean, I didn’t see none of this coming.” He confirmed that no one
was arguing. Travon testified that defendant returned from the house about 30 seconds to a minute
later, opened the car door, and started shooting into the vehicle. Travon stated that he could not
see what was happening at first because he was facing the windshield. Travon did not see defendant
shooting until Travon was out of the car and defendant told him he was “good.” He stated that the
windows were up in the car and the air conditioning was on. Travon thought he saw defendant in
possession of two guns.
¶ 18 Travon testified that he did not hear anything from Andrell. He clarified that defendant
started shooting after he opened the backseat driver’s side door and later went around to the
passenger side. He stated that either defendant or Karlondus opened the rear passenger side door.
After defendant shot inside the car a second time, he told Travon to take Andrell and Karlondus to
the hospital. Travon did not remember if an officer swabbed his arm that night or if he had blood
on him. He could not recall what clothes he had on that night and said the police collected them as
evidence. Travon stated that when he was driving around with the victims in the car, he did not
hear them saying anything. He said that it sounded like Karlondus was choking on his blood. He
denied calling defendant when he was in the car and agreed that he eventually drove back to
Ashley’s house. He explained that he went to Ashley’s house because he did not know the families

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of the victims, but Ashley was close to Andrell. He could not remember if he called Ashley on the
way there or if he banged on the door. He told Ashley that he had two dead people in his car and
Ashley laughed. She thought Travon was joking. He could not recall how long he talked to Ashley
before the police were called. After Ashley called the police, Travon went to find his girlfriend,
who also called the police. Travon explained that he went to his girlfriend’s house because he
figured he was going to be taken into custody and she was the only person he trusted. Travon was
eventually taken to the police station and interviewed. He did not recall if they tested his arms for
gunshot residue; he only remembered them taking his clothes, which he never got back.
¶ 19 Travon stated that he did not have any guns and could not recall his cell phone number in
July 2023 but stated he had an iPhone. He agreed there were probably pictures of him on the phone
with guns but stated he was not carrying a weapon at that time in his life. He testified that he
believed the term “blick” was a street term for a gun. He did not recall texting defendant on July
19, 2023, stating that he needed a “lick ASAP.” Travon testified that, in that context, lick meant a
job. He agreed that he was neither arrested nor charged with either murder and he returned to his
girlfriend’s house after his police interview.
¶ 20 Kadeeja Graves testified that she was defendant’s girlfriend for about a year and was with
him at his West View Street house from July 20, 2023, to July 22, 2023. She did not know if
anyone else was at the house on July 20, 2023, because she was very intoxicated and tired that
night. Defendant’s brother, Malik, was defendant’s roommate. Kadeeja stated that she got to the
house between 10 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. She knew of a person who went by the name of “Sko”1
who would come around defendant’s house. She also knew Karlondus and stated she did not hear
him talking to defendant that evening in the house. She stated that defendant left the house around
1“Sko” is Travon’s street name.

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2:30 a.m. on July 21, 2023, to “make a run.” She let him take her car, which was a white Hyundai
Santa Fe. She went back to sleep after defendant left. She next saw him when he woke her up
around 6 a.m.
¶ 21 Kadeeja testified that she drove defendant to Aurora, Illinois, on July 21, 2023, and they
left between 8 a.m. and 9 a.m. She stayed there for three or four hours. During that time, she and
defendant ate and went to a mall. She left defendant at his cousin’s house. She agreed that she told
police that she went up to Aurora to pick up defendant, not drop him off. She stated that she
received a text message about defendant being a potential suspect in a double homicide and
admitted that she lied to the police about picking defendant up to protect him.
¶ 22 Kadeeja testified that she provided her cell phone to police and gave consent to look
through her phone. She was shown a photograph taken from her cell phone. The photograph
showed a red vehicle on the right side of the photo and a scraggly weed pile in the center of the
photo with debris behind the weeds. A large tree and grass took up the remainder of the photo
space. Kadeeja stated that she did not take the photo. She stated that her phone was in her car and
that defendant had access to both her car and her phone in July 2023.
¶ 23 On cross-examination, Kadeeja stated that she was 29 years old in July 2023 worked at
Heritage, and lived on Moore Street with her children and her sister’s children. She did not think
defendant’s brother was at defendant’s house on the night of the murders because she believed he
was incarcerated at that time. She stated that defendant used to live in Aurora and still had family
members that lived there. She took defendant to Aurora to meet his grandmother. She stated that
she drove back to Decatur alone. She did not recall hearing any gunshots or sirens on West View
Street on July 21, 2023. She did not know that officers were outside the house. She stated that
police did call and message her while she was in Aurora.

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¶ 24 Johnny Carter testified that he lived at 1157 Union Street, Decatur, Illinois, in July 2023.
Johnny explained that defendant was his nephew, and he only saw defendant occasionally. Johnny
agreed that he had contacted police about an incident that occurred with defendant and some guns
on his property. Johnny testified that defendant showed up at Johnny’s home on the evening of
July 22, 2023, and was driving a maroon Chrysler 300. Defendant said he “had to grab something”
and proceeded to grab a couple of firearms from the side of Johnny’s house. Johnny stated that he
had a trailer and a red Suburban parked on the side of the house. He agreed the vehicle was old
and had some rust on the front left quarter panel. Johnny identified the picture found on Kadeeja’s
phone as his property.
¶ 25 Johnny testified that after defendant retrieved the firearms from Johnny’s yard, defendant
came into the house and took the firearms to the bathroom to clean them with bleach. Johnny stated
that he knew police wanted to talk to defendant and asked defendant what happened. Defendant
did not respond. Johnny asked defendant what he was going to do and defendant stated that he was
getting rid of the guns and was probably going to throw them in the lake. Johnny offered to take
defendant to a spot at the lake where he could throw the guns. Johnny chose a shallow area because
he heard a rumor that Karlondus, who was a friend of defendant, had been killed and did not think
defendant killed Karlondus. He believed that ultimately the guns would exonerate defendant. A
couple of days after the guns were dropped in the lake, Johnny contacted the police and led them
to where defendant had thrown the guns. Johnny identified the area on a map.
¶ 26 Johnny stated that he and defendant took separate vehicles to the lake. Defendant followed
Johnny. Johnny stated that he drove past the Caterpillar facility because he knew there were
cameras at that location. Johnny explained that he went to the police because his family was being
threatened and police were harassing his mother. He had a card from a detective, contacted the

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detective, and told the detective what he knew. He also wanted defendant to come forward and tell
the police what happened. Johnny testified that he took the officers out to the lake and showed him
where one of the guns was thrown. Johnny did not see defendant throw the other gun, but he did
hear other pebble-like sounds that could have been ammunition. He stated that the police dive team
found several bullets.
¶ 27 On cross-examination, Johnny testified that he believed defendant came over on July 22,
2023. He had not seen him for several weeks before that time. Johnny stated that the firearms were
in defendant’s waistband when defendant brought them into the house and that defendant was only
at Johnny’s house for about 15 minutes. Johnny did not see defendant put the guns on his property.
Johnny explained that he was at his mother’s (defendant’s grandmother) house when a detective
visited her a day or two after he saw defendant with the firearms. Johnny did not say anything
about the firearms while he was at his mother’s house, so there would not be a “bunch of drama”
but took the detective’s card. The next day Johnny contacted and met the detective at the ball field
and then had the detective follow him to the lake.
¶ 28 Officer Jonathan Welton, a Decatur Police patrol officer, testified that he was dispatched
to 820 South Webster on July 21, 2023, following a call relaying that there were two bodies in a
car that were possibly dead. Upon arrival, Officer Welton was asked to take Travon to the police
department. Officer Welton stated that when he saw Travon, he was emotional and stuck in “a
circular loop of almost like disbelief and or almost shock.” Travon kept asking how this could have
happened and what he should do. He even asked the officer for a hug. Officer Welton confirmed
that he was wearing a body camera at that time, identified the footage, and the video was published
to the jury with no objection. The video showed Officer Welton speaking with Travon who asked
the officer for a hug and then leaned on the police car and started crying. On cross-examination,

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Officer Welton agreed that he observed blood on Travon’s clothing but could not recall where it
was found.
¶ 29 Officer Brian Allison, a Decatur police officer, testified that he was dispatched to 900 West
View Street on July 21, 2023, with the responsibility of locating a crime scene. He found the crime
scene and secured it by setting up crime tape. He noticed mud along the south curb that had tire
tracks along with two fired casings in the immediate area and a cell phone with what looked like
blood on it. He notified the detectives of his findings when they arrived.
¶ 30 Dr. Scott Denton testified that he performed the autopsies on Andrell and Karlondus. He
identified the photographs taken during the autopsies and they were published to the jury
throughout the remainder of Dr. Denton’s testimony. Dr. Denton testified that Andrell had two
gunshot wounds, one that entered about five inches down from the top of his head and exited out
the neck after passing through the carotid artery and jugular vein. He used a trajectory rod to show
the angle of the gunshot and opined that the weapon was at least two feet from Andrell when it
was fired. A second gunshot entered the left upper shoulder and remained in Andrell’s body near
his right armpit. Dr. Denton stated that both could have been, and were, fatal shots. Both bullets
moved from left to right, down, and forward. Dr. Denton collected the bullet that was lodged in
Andrell’s armpit for evidentiary purposes.
¶ 31 Dr. Denton testified that Karlondus’s body contained six gunshot wounds. The first entered
at the left upper shoulder and chest and remained in the body near the right armpit area. The second
entered on the left chest just above the nipple in front of the armpit and exited on the right side of
the body. The third entered below the left nipple and exited on his right mid lower back. The fourth
entered on his abdomen above the hip and exited on the right back. The fifth entered on the left
upper back near the shoulder blade and remained in the front of Karlondus’s chest area. He noted

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that this bullet was of a larger caliber than the others. The sixth bullet entered on the back of
Karlondus’s left forearm, went through the arm and came out the front of the arm after fracturing
the arm bones. All of the bullets traveled from left to right at a downward angle. He stated that all
but the sixth gunshot wound would have been fatal. He opined that none of the gunshot wounds
occurred from close range and that all occurred from a minimum distance of 18 to 24 inches.
¶ 32 On cross-examination, Dr. Denton stated that toxicology reports were obtained for both
victims. Andrell had a blood alcohol content (BAC) of 0.109. MDMA, which was commonly
referred to as Ecstasy, and Delta 9 THC, which is more commonly referred to as marijuana were
also found. Karlondus had positive findings for MDMA and Delta 9 THC. He again opined that
the bullets wounds were from left to right and stated neither of the victims were shot at close range.
He stated that Andrell had 17 $1 bills in his wallet, and no currency was found on Karlondus. He
agreed that if a person shot on one side of the car and then walked to the other side and shot again,
some of the wounds would have been from right to left. Dr. Denton did not see any gunshot wounds
that moved from the right side of the body to the left side.
¶ 33 Detective James Wrigley of the Decatur Police Department testified that he processed the
two crime scenes located at 820 South Webster and in the 900 block of West View Street. He
explained that the South Webster address was where the car with the bodies was found and the
West View Street address was where the shooting occurred. He discussed the photographs taken
at both locations. He stated that the center console of the Charger contained a green leafy substance
that appeared to be cannabis, and a spent .45 caliber shell casing was found on the driver’s seat of
the car. Additional casings, including both .45 caliber and 9-millimeter shell casings, were found
and collected for evidence. Trajectory rods were placed in the vehicle to show the path of the
bullets, and a cell phone was also collected. He stated that a Jeep was parked north of the Charger

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on Webster Street and the Jeep was also towed to the police station. A GMC was also seen on
Webster. Permission to search the vehicle was provided and nothing was located in that vehicle.
¶ 34 Detective Wrigley also took photographs at the West View Street scene and gathered
evidence. The evidence collected included shell casings and another cell phone. The shell casings
were all .45 caliber. The cell phone contained a red substance that was believed to be blood.
¶ 35 On cross-examination, Detective Wrigley testified that he obtained DNA swabs from all
four doors, the steering wheel, and the gear shifter of the Dodge Charger. He stated that the satchel
found on the victim in the backseat was empty and unzipped when it was initially seen. On redirect,
Detective Wrigley stated that not all of the DNA swabs were tested.
¶ 36 Sergeant Todd Koester of the Decatur Police Department testified about Cellebrite and
how the program was used on the cell phones collected. He examined Kadeeja’s cell phone and
prepared an extraction report. He testified that the photograph showing a red Chevrolet Tahoe
parked in a wooded or grassy overgrown area at the intersection of Union and Olive was found on
Kadeeja’s cell phone.
¶ 37 On cross-examination, Sergeant Koester agreed that he also performed an extraction on
Travon’s cell phone. He stated that a co-worker initially performed the Cellebrite extraction.
Sergeant Koester testified that he later used the Magnet AXIOM program, which found several
photographs of firearms. One photograph showed Travon holding a handgun and a rifle. He stated
that photograph was created on March 3, 2023. He further stated that a photograph with a handgun
and magazine found on the phone was created on June 8, 2023.
¶ 38 Detective Jason Kuchelmeister of the Decatur Police Department testified that on July 24,
2023, he received a call from defendant’s uncle, Johnny Carter, who provided additional
information about the location of the firearms that might have been used in the murders. Detective

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Kuchelmeister was present when the dive team began to search Lake Decatur but left before
anything was recovered.
¶ 39 Detective Charles Hendricks of the Decatur Police Department testified that he joined
Detective Kuchelmeister on July 24, 2023, to meet with Johnny Carter and later followed Johnny
to Lake Decatur. Nothing was found on July 24, 2023, but when they all returned the following
day, around 10:45 a.m., one of the divers found a Glock .45 caliber handgun. He recorded the
serial number of the weapon and confirmed it was the same weapon placed into evidence.
¶ 40 Detective Austin Clark of the Decatur Police Department testified that he was sent to Lake
Decatur to supervise the dive team at the 3100 block of East Sangamon Road. He testified that the
dive team found a Taurus handgun, a magazine, and three live rounds of ammunition.
¶ 41 Hali Carls-Miller of the Illinois State Police testified that she was a forensic scientist in the
Springfield, Illinois firearms section. The State offered Carls-Miller as an expert in firearms
examination identification. Defense counsel declined the opportunity to cross-examine the witness
as to her qualifications and agreed “she’s an expert.” Carls-Miller stated that her job entailed,
inter alia, determining whether ammunition was fired from a particular firearm. She examined the
Taurus 9-millimeter Luger and the Glock .45 retrieved from the lake along with eight fired
cartridge cases, and two fired bullets from the victims. Ultimately, based on her testing, she
determined that six of the .45 caliber cartridges were fired from the Glock and two of the 9-
millimeter cartridge cases were fired from the Taurus. She further testified that of the bullets
retrieved from the bodies, one was consistent with the Glock, and the other was consistent with
the Taurus but ultimately determined that the evidence was inconclusive as to whether the bullets
retrieved from the victims were shot from either weapon.

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¶ 42 Kelly Maciejewski of the Illinois State Police testified that she worked in the forensic
science laboratory in Springfield, Illinois, involving forensic biology and DNA. She obtained DNA
swabs off one of the weapons, but no DNA was found. On cross-examination, Kelly agreed that
she also had swabs from Travon’s right arm, the autopsy collection kits for Andrell and Karlondus,
suspected blood from the driver’s side door of the vehicle, the Glock, and the gun magazine.
Maciejewski stated that the Glock and the gun magazine had no DNA and opined that the blood
on Travon’s arm was most likely from Andrell. Maciejewski testified that the fluid from the
driver’s door ended up not containing blood.
¶ 43 Taylor Tieman of the Decatur Police Department testified that he was a digital forensic
examiner who dealt with cell phone evidence and the Flock system, which was a motion-automated
license plate reader in Decatur. As to the latter, he explained that if you provided a license plate or
the make and model of a vehicle, the Flock system would tell you the location of the camera along
with the date and time where the photograph of the vehicle was taken. Information could be
obtained from the Decatur system or other systems nationwide. Tieman obtained reports for license
plate numbers related to Travon’s Dodge Charger and Kadeeja’s Hyundai Santa Fe, which were
admitted into evidence with no objection.
¶ 44 On cross-examination, Tieman agreed that he also assisted with analysis of some cell
phones, including one belonging to Travon. He was provided copies of reports from the cell phone
and stated that he did not prepare those reports and believed they were obtained from either
Detective Wisniewski or Detective Kuchelmeister.
¶ 45 Detective Brian Kaylor of the Decatur Police Department testified that he participated in a
residential search at 949 West View Street in Decatur following the issuance of a search warrant.
He was looking for confirmation of defendant’s residence and the same was found from mail

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obtained at that residence. Detective Kaylor agreed that he was present for defendant’s interview
on July 25, 2023, which also included Detective Wisniewski. Detective Kaylor stated that a DNA
sample was obtained from defendant on July 24, 2023, and he was also present at that time as well
as the interview that occurred on that date.
¶ 46 Detective Kaylor testified that he utilized the Flock system to run a report on Johnny
Carter’s blue Subaru Forester. He obtained a report that showed the vehicle locations on July 22,
2023. The report also showed that a red or maroon Chrysler 300 followed Johnny’s car around 10
p.m. on July 22, 2023. Detective Kaylor stated that the Flock system corroborated Johnny’s
testimony about the Chrysler that followed his vehicle to another location. On cross-examination,
Detective Kaylor confirmed that the Subaru was always photographed in front of the Chrysler.
¶ 47 A stipulation was presented entitled Stipulation of Evidence T-Mobile records. The parties
stipulated that Darius Simmons would testify that he is a T-Mobile records custodian and the
company kept records of both whom it served and what services it provided to them, including
phone numbers and devices associated with those accounts, as well as which cell site or tower was
utilized for those services. With regard to those records, Simmons would testify that they were
kept in the ordinary course of T-Mobile’s business and that the entries in those records were made
roughly contemporaneously with the services they documented. The parties further stipulated that
based upon that testimony, a proper business records foundation for the admission of the exhibit
existed.
¶ 48 Detective James Weddle testified that he worked as a Decatur police detective and worked
for the Decatur Police Department for 11 years. He obtained a search warrant to obtain defendant’s
cell phone records from T-Mobile. The records were obtained. He testified that he had been to six
or eight trainings and had received an additional 160 hours of training through various companies

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on how to recover cell phone data. He stated that he previously testified in a federal case about cell
phone data. Detective Weddle stated that the data revealed that defendant’s cell phone was in
Decatur, Illinois on July 20, 2023. The officer testified that the records revealed the cell phone
remained in Decatur, Illinois, until it was picked up by Bloomington, Illinois, cell phone towers
around 10 a.m. on July 21, 2023. Thereafter, the cell phone was picked up by cell phone towers in
Naperville and Aurora, Illinois. Defendant’s cell phone remained in Naperville until it was picked
up by a cell phone tower in Pontiac, Illinois, around 5 a.m. on July 22, 2023. Thereafter, the cell
phone was picked up by Decatur, Illinois, cell phone towers around 8:30 a.m., Forsyth cell phone
towers around 11 a.m., a Decatur cell phone tower at 11:30 a.m., and Forsyth cell phone towers
around 3:30 p.m. The officer testified that the phone was at the West View Street location at 3:05
a.m. on July 21, 2023, and, based on calls made either to or from that phone, remained at that
location through 3:45 a.m. On cross-examination, Detective Weddle stated that a 3:45 a.m. call
came to defendant’s phone and went to voice mail. He agreed that the call came from Travon.
¶ 49 Several stipulations were read to the jury. The first involved Travon. The parties stipulated
that Travon had a prior conviction for aggravated kidnapping in Cook County case No. 17-CR-
013420. The stipulation further stated that as of November 12, 2024, Travon had a pending case
in Macon County (case No. 23-MT-610) for unlawful possession of cannabis by a passenger. He
failed to appear and a warrant was issued. When the matter was brought to the attention of Assistant
State’s Attorney Mullison on November 22, 2024, by Travon’s attorney, the warrant was quashed
and the matter was dismissed on the same date.
¶ 50 The second stipulation involved Kadeeja Graves. That stipulation indicated that Macon
County case No. 24-CF-1575, charging forgery, remained pending against Kadeeja.

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¶ 51 The third stipulation involved video from Caterpillar. That stipulation indicated that if
called to testify, Aaron Dickerson would testify that he worked for Caterpillar, which had security
cameras mounted to the rear of the buildings. He would testify that he was able to make digital
copies of footage from those cameras of events taking place on July 22, 2023, between 10:27 p.m.
and 10:35 p.m. The parties stipulated that a proper foundation existed for the video.
¶ 52 The fourth stipulation involved service records for guests and security cameras from
Quality Inn hotel. The stipulation indicated that Latishia Clark rented a room at the Forsyth,
Illinois, location on July 22, 2023. The parties stipulated that the Quality Inn security camera video
was admissible under an existing business records foundation.
¶ 53 Detective Timothy Wisniewski of the Decatur Police Department testified that he was the
lead detective on the case. He was involved with Travon’s interview and obtained a DNA sample
from Travon at that time. The detective explained that he took the DNA sample because Travon
was present for the shooting. The detective stated that when he interviewed Travon, he appeared
to have a dried red blood-like substance on his arm and the back of his pants. He expected that
Travon’s clothes would be taken into evidence and therefore the DNA sample was necessary.
¶ 54 Detective Wisniewski testified that that he also took Travon’s cell phone because Travon
stated that he had communicated with defendant earlier in the night and prior to the shooting. He
stated that defendant’s phone number would likely be in the phone, which would help identify
defendant. Detective Wisniewski testified that Travon told the police that defendant committed the
shootings. Travon also told the police that the shooting occurred at 949 West View Street in
Decatur, which was where officers found tire tracks, a bloody phone, and spent shell casings. In
order to determine if defendant lived at that location, a search warrant was obtained. Various
documents were taken during the search, and the officer also spoke with the owner of the residence.

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¶ 55 Detective Wisniewski testified that he interviewed Kadeeja because officers were informed
that she was present at the West View Street location when the shooting occurred and later traveled
with defendant to the Chicago area after the shooting. Her cell phone was also taken. The detective
stated that Travon’s phone was given to Officer Tieman and Kadeeja’s phone was reviewed by
Sergeant Koester. Both phones were analyzed. A photograph was found on Kadeeja’s cell phone
of a rusty red Suburban in front of the trailer. The GPS of that location was the same corner where
defendant’s uncle, Johnny Carter, lived. Detective Wisniewski looked around the trailer because
Johnny told the officers that defendant “stashed the guns” in that area. The officer found a black
t-shirt behind the trailer although nothing came of that finding.
¶ 56 Detective Wisniewski testified that he secured copies of surveillance video from the
Quality Inn hotel in Forsyth, Illinois. The videos were published to the jury and showed a maroon
Chrysler 300 parking in the parking lot and a woman obtaining a room at the hotel. Then, the same
woman, along with two children and a man are seen walking toward a door and later walking in
the hallway after entering the building. The video also showed the same people coming and going
through the door, using the hallway, and leaving the hotel in the maroon Chrysler 300 at various
times on July 22, 2023. The detective identified the man getting out of the vehicle in the peach-
colored hoodie as defendant. He stated that the woman at the front desk, and later seen in the
hallway, was defendant’s cousin, Latishia Clark. The detective testified that defendant was the
man getting into the maroon Chrysler 300 at 9:17 p.m. on July 22, 2023. The vehicle returned to
the parking lot later that evening.
¶ 57 Detective Wisniewski discussed the Flock system and its use for license plate associated
with Kadeeja’s Hyundai Santa Fe. The data revealed that Kadeeja’s vehicle left the West View
Street crime scene at 3:45 a.m. on July 21, 2023, and headed out of town to Naperville, Illinois at

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9 a.m. the following day. The officer agreed that a Flock report was also run on Travon’s Dodge
Charger and showed the vehicle at the location of the shooting based on the Flock hits. Around
3:45 a.m., both Kadeeja’s vehicle and Travon’s vehicle left the West View Street crime scene.
Andrell’s Jeep was also seen on the Flock system. Detective Wisniewski stated that Travon’s
statement, that he left Ashley’s house in Andrell’s Jeep to meet his girlfriend and then returned to
South Webster Street, was consistent with the Flock system data.
¶ 58 Detective Wisniewski agreed that he interviewed the defendant on July 24 and July 25,
2023. The videos were published to the jury. The first interview taken July 24, 2023, was roughly
seven minutes long. During that time, defendant stated that he voluntarily turned himself in, was
innocent, and requested a lawyer. His DNA was obtained at the end of that interview.
¶ 59 The second interview, taken on July 25, 2023, began with defendant confirming that he
requested the interview. He was read his Miranda rights and informed the officers that he wanted
to clear his name and provide information to the police. When asked what happened that morning,
defendant stated that he did not remember. He stated that he only remembered up until about 9
p.m. the night before when he went to bed with his girlfriend. Later that evening, Travon called
and said he was coming over. Defendant stated that he had to work the next day, so he did not
want Travon to come over but because he had not seen Travon in a while, he told Travon it was
fine. Defendant stated that Travon showed up with Karlondus. Travon was really drunk. Travon
told defendant that they needed to “chill” there because there was a robbery that occurred earlier
that evening. Defendant stated that Travon’s text messages would confirm that information and
could be obtained from Travon’s phone. He stated that Travon requested assurance that defendant
would answer his phone later because he needed defendant.

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¶ 60 After Travon and Karlondus left, defendant started getting ready for work because he had
to be there at 5 a.m. However, he decided not to go to work because his stomach hurt. Defendant
stated that he was also getting text messages about something that happened at his house.
Defendant stated that he was told that two people got killed and the messages were asking if he
was ok. Defendant was unsure when Travon and Karlondus got to his house and that he intended
to give his phone to his lawyer.
¶ 61 Defendant stated that before he decided he was not going to work, he and Kadeeja went to
pick up a bicycle at Uncle Johnny’s house because defendant used the bicycle to get home from
work. Since defendant decided he was not going to work, they left the bicycle at Johnny’s house.
He stated that he did not speak to Johnny at that time because Johnny was working. Defendant
then started getting the text messages about an incident at his house. He told the officers that since
he was not going to work, he was going to do what he wanted. He had previously planned to go to
Chicago, so he decided to go see his family. Kadeeja drove defendant to Chicago to see his
grandmother. He could not remember when they left for the trip. He said they met a friend, then
went to the mall where he got some shoes, a shirt, and a pair of pants, and then went out to dinner.
Thereafter, defendant spent time with his grandmother.
¶ 62 Defendant stated that Kadeeja left the next day, and defendant drove back later that night
with his cousin, Latishia, who drove a red Chrysler 300. He and Latishia got a hotel room on
Saturday in Decatur and defendant only left the hotel to get weed from his house on West View
Street. He stated he was never in Latishia’s car without her being in the car and he did not go
anywhere other than his house that night. After he left his house, he returned to the hotel and stayed
there for the remainder of the night.

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¶ 63 After confirming that he never spoke with Johnny on Friday, defendant stated that he never
talked to Johnny after Friday because defendant was in Chicago. Defendant averred that he spent
Saturday night at the hotel. On Sunday, defendant was just moving around. Defendant was arrested
on Monday when he went to Kadeeja’s house.
¶ 64 Defendant declined to provide his phone to police because he wanted to give it to his lawyer
and had “past stuff” on his phone. The officers stated they did not care about the past stuff; they
just wanted to figure out what happened. Defendant stated that he did not believe in “telling on
people” either. He said he was still trying to figure everything out and a lot of stuff was being said.
¶ 65 Defendant told the officers that Travon showed up to his house with a gun, which was a
Taurus. He did not know the caliber but stated it was a compact gun. Defendant denied having any
firearms. Defendant refused to provide his cell phone number and stated that he had recently
obtained a second cell phone. He indicated that the cell phone messages would be on Travon’s
phone. Defendant denied hearing any gunshots at his house due to air conditioning and fan noise.
¶ 66 Defendant stated that Travon and Karlondus showed up that morning and Andrell later
spoke with Travon by phone. Thereafter, Travon and Karlondus left to get Andrell. Defendant
stated that they never returned and, if they did, he did not know it because he was asleep. He was
asked if Kadeeja left the house and he said no. He was asleep and did not remember going
anywhere that night.
¶ 67 Defendant confirmed that he stayed at a Quality Inn out by the mall. Defendant could not
recall what time it was when he left the hotel to go to his house to get weed. He could not remember
if he went anywhere else when he was out. He confirmed it was dark at the time. The detectives
went through each direction in Decatur, including going to Lake Decatur. Defendant denied going

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in any of those directions or places. He could not remember where he went. He stated that he did
not see Kadeeja between her leaving Chicago on Saturday and defendant’s arrest on Monday.
¶ 68 The officers asked defendant if he knew who killed Andrell and Karlondus. Defendant said
he did not. The officers told defendant he had an opportunity to tell them what happened and
relayed information about the evidence they had obtained. Defendant said that Travon was lying
and further stated he did not even know if Travon told the officers what they claimed he said. One
of the officers left to obtain the arrest warrant. Defendant argued that he was arrested on hearsay.
The officer stated that it was eyewitness testimony. Defendant stated that he did not even know
Travon’s real name. Defendant was shown the arrest warrant and read the statements from Travon
about what happened on the evening of the shooting. Defendant denied Travon’s allegations. He
stated he was sleeping and it read like a “set up.”
¶ 69 Defendant was asked if Travon asked him to get rid of his guns. Defendant replied that
they should be talking to Travon. He then asked why Travon did not take the victims to the hospital
and then again stated that the officers were not helping him. The detectives asked for defendant’s
phone to support his claim that he was innocent. Defendant stated that his lawyer would be able to
get the phone evidence into court and refused to provide the phone to the officers. He stated that
he was afraid the police would destroy the evidence. He argued that he did not call any of these
people. They called him and he was just trying to sleep because he had to work the following day.
He did not know what happened on West View Street, and he could not tell them something they
did not know.
¶ 70 Defendant told the officers that he did not see anything. He further stated that he never
spoke with Travon after the killing. He spoke to Travon the first time he called, defendant answered
and Travon and Karlondus were at his house. Defendant told the officers that before Travon left,

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Travon put a gun on the dresser and told him about the robbery. When Travon called the second
time, after they went to get Andrell, defendant did not answer the phone. He did not know if Travon
was the shooter. He did not see anything.
¶ 71 The officers told defendant that they had Kadeeja’s gun. The officers also stated that they
intended to find the guns used in the murders and wanted to make sure they did not lead back to
defendant. Defendant then said that Kadeeja should be left out of it. Defendant agreed that he had
access to her gun and officers stated they were “pretty confident” that Kadeeja’s gun would “come
back clean.” The officer clarified that he was talking about other guns that would be tied to the
murder and asked defendant, if those were found, would they be tied to defendant. Defendant said,
“No because I ain’t never did nothin’.” He was asked if he got rid of the guns for Travon and
defendant said, “No.” He also disputed that he tried to run by going to Chicago. He stated that
Travon was the one involved with the robbery and “pushed up on” Karlondus’s girlfriend.
Defendant did not contact anyone; he was the one home in bed. He again denied doing anything
and stated the evidence on the phone would prove it. He said that Travon was very drunk when he
came over. He was laying back on the bed and put the gun on the dresser. He stated that Karlondus
did not carry a gun, but that Andrell did carry one.
¶ 72 The officers left the room and later returned with a photograph of Johnny’s car, which
defendant identified. He also identified Lakeisha’s car. The officers addressed the license plates
on those cars and then asked defendant again if he had spoken with Johnny. Defendant again said,
“No. He was at work.” He stated that he did not see his uncle’s car on Saturday either. The detective
asked defendant if he knew that the license plates could be read in Decatur, and defendant said he
did. The detective then showed the results from the Flock system showing Johnny’s car being
followed by the red Chrysler 300 going east in Decatur. Defendant said he did not remember any

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of that. Defendant was asked where they went. He stated that he did not remember because he was
drinking that night. He did not remember where he and his uncle went or if they went anywhere.
He did not remember when he talked to his uncle but stated that his uncle gave him some money
and told him to keep his chin up. Defendant denied following his uncle anywhere. He did not
remember any of the driving and asked why the detectives were showing him the Flock reader
pictures. The officers advised that they looked into defendant’s story and found that the red
Chrysler 300 was following his uncle’s car and thought it was strange.
¶ 73 Defendant clarified that he did not speak to his uncle on Friday. He stated that he talked to
him later. Defendant said he did not remember if he talked to his uncle on Saturday around 10 p.m.
He denied following his uncle anywhere on Saturday night. He only remembered going to his
house to get weed. The officer reiterated defendant’s previous claim that he did not go to the east
side on Saturday night. Defendant said he did not remember any of that. The detective stated that
he had both cars out by the lake and defendant said he “ain’t go out there.” He said the officers
were wasting his time and would not help him. Defendant said if he was going to get rid of
something he would not have dragged someone else into it. Defendant stated he did not do anything
and continued to claim his innocence.
¶ 74 A uniformed officer stepped into the interview room and said, “there was a recovery at the
lake.” The officer stated that they were headed to defendant’s uncle’s house and told defendant,
“Don’t do this to your family.” Defendant said he did not know what they were talking about and
again stated that the officers were wasting his time. He was asked if the Chrysler 300 had GPS and
said he did not know and told the officers again that they were wasting his time. Defendant said
he was not at the lake. There was nothing of which to dispose. He did not know where the officer’s
information was coming from. The officer explained that it came from a database that captured

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license plates. Defendant stated the officers were speculating and claimed they were trying to add
pieces to make it look like it was defendant. The detective told defendant that they talked to
Johnny, Johnny took them to the lake, and the gun was recovered by the dive team. He asked
defendant to explain that, and defendant claimed that the detective was lying. Defendant said he
did not know anything about any of it. The detective showed a picture of the recovered firearm to
defendant. Defendant stated that he had never seen it before in his life. He stated that he did not
follow his uncle in the lake and did not throw any gun in the lake. Defendant told the officer that
he needed to ask Travon where the gun was. The detective asked if defendant witnessed the
murder, defendant said, “No.” He told the officers that he did not have anything “to do with
nothing” and had nothing else to say. Thereafter, the officers left the interview room.
¶ 75 On cross-examination, Detective Wisniewski agreed that officers did not search Travon’s
home. He stated the officers took Travon’s phone and prepared an extraction report. He agreed
that Travon’s phone had a contact for “RaRa” and that during the investigation, the officers
determined that “RaRa” was defendant. He agreed that defendant called Travon at 4:26 p.m. and
5:32 p.m. on July 20, 2023, which was the day before the murders. Travon called defendant at 2:41
a.m. on July 21, 2023, and again at 2:54 a.m. There was also an incoming FaceTime call from
“Wopp Skino.” The detective explained that Wopp Skino was Andrell and confirmed that Andrell
spoke with Travon because the call lasted four minutes. Travon next called defendant at 3:45 a.m.
on July 21, 2023. The detective agreed that Travon’s cell phone had a contact named Rahneecia
Vorties and she was Travon’s girlfriend. The officer stated that between 3:48 a.m. to 4:54 a.m. on
July 21, 2023, there were 24 calls from Travon to Rahneecia. Detective Wisniewski stated that
some of the calls were answered and Rahneecia texted Travon numerous times during that period
as well. Thereafter, Travon called Ladwonna McDill at 4:10 a.m. and then FaceTimed her at 4:58

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a.m. Travon also called Ashley at 4:33 a.m. and 4:34 a.m. Both of those calls were unanswered.
The detective confirmed that Ashley hosted the barbeque. Detective Wisniewski agreed that the
attendees left the barbeque around midnight, went to a bar, and then returned to Ashley’s house.
¶ 76 Detective Wisniewski addressed three text messages to “Stuu” that came from Travon’s
phone. He stated that “Stuu” was Rashean Vorties. Travon’s text at 1:34 a.m. on July 21, 2023,
stated, “We fina go grab blicks then KT shit.” Detective Wisniewski stated that “blicks” was a
street term for firearms. He agreed that Travon sent a text to Andrell on July 20, 2023, that said,
“Pipe n crib b.” Detective Wisniewski stated that “pipe” was a slang term for firearms and “crib”
was slang for a house. There was also a text from Travon to defendant at 3:44 p.m. on July 19,
2023, that stated, “I need a lick ASAP.” Detective Wisniewski stated that “lick” referred to a
robbery or a burglary. Defendant’s reply stated, “LOL stop that MFS just got to put in different
work. Get you a job for a couple of months.”
¶ 77 Detective Wisniewski agreed that he interviewed Travon shortly after the murder and the
interview was several hours long. He returned Travon’s phone in August 2023. The officer agreed
that during Travon’s interview, a dried red blood-like substance was seen on the back of Travon’s
right arm. Photographs were taken of Travon’s arm. Detective Wisniewski stated that he asked
Travon about the spots on his pants, and Travon said he assumed he sat in it because he was in the
car when the victims were bleeding. The officer did not recall what area of Travon’s arm was
swabbed. He agreed that there were several droplets of what was presumed to be blood on Travon’s
elbow. The officer agreed that Travon had red stains on his pants and down his lower leg. Travon’s
clothes were taken as evidence and Travon was provided other clothes to wear home.
¶ 78 Detective Wisniewski stated that his interview with Travon was recorded and that Travon
claimed there were two rounds of shooting. The first had defendant firing into the car from the rear

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driver’s side open door. The second was after defendant went around the car to the passenger’s
side and fired into the car again. Travon stated that one or more of the victims were making noise
when defendant went from the driver’s side to the passenger’s side of the car. Detective
Wisniewski agreed that Travon told him that one of the victims was choking, gasping, and talking.
The words spoken were along the lines of “why, why.”
¶ 79 The detective testified that Travon told him during the interview that he went to defendant’s
house twice on July 21, 2023, and Travon spoke to Kadeeja during one of the visits. He agreed
that during Travon’s initial police interview, he stated that he never saw defendant’s gun. Travon
also stated that defendant “finished” the victims from the passenger’s side of the car and
spontaneously told the officer that he had seen two different shell casings in the car. The detective
stated that he thought it was kind of an odd thing to say and agreed it was dark at the time of the
shooting. He stated that Travon’s interview lasted five or six hours. The detective agreed that he
left the room from time to time. A video clip was played from that interview showing the detective
returning to the room following one of the breaks. When the detective walked in, he wanted to talk
to Travon about the Jeep keys because the Jeep was Andrell’s vehicle and Travon drove it from
the crime scene to meet his girlfriend and then returned to the crime scene in that vehicle. The
detective stated that the first 911 call was around 4:49 a.m., which was when Travon got out of the
Charger and into Andrell’s Jeep. The detective testified that Travon was only gone from the scene
a short time based on the 911 call and the Flock hits. Detective Wisniewski stated that during the
interview he wanted to know how Travon had gotten Andrell’s Jeep keys because he presumed
Andrell had his keys. A video clip was played with someone talking about who went to the
hospital. Detective Wisniewski agreed that Travon’s statement did not make any sense to him
because he had asked Travon about the keys and the reply was nonresponsive.

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¶ 80 Detective Wisniewski agreed that Travon told him that he called Ashley when he returned
to her house after the shooting, but she did not answer either call. He then went to her door and
knocked. When Ashley answered the door, Travon told her Karlondus and Andrell were dead.
Ashley eventually accompanied Travon to the car and Travon told Detective Wisniewski that they
stood outside the car for about 30 minutes before calling 911. He stated that during the
investigation he suspected that the deaths of Andrell and Karlondus were possibly related to a
robbery. He agreed that Travon denied taking anything off the bodies and that he lied when he told
the officer that he had not called defendant at 3:45 a.m. Detective Wisniewski agreed that
Karlondus was the victim seated in the back of the car and that Karlondus had a satchel or cross
body bag. The officer could not recall if there was anything in the satchel.
¶ 81 On redirect, Detective Wisniewski stated that Travon later told the officers that defendant
had two guns. He clarified that Travon was talking about Karlondus when he stated that defendant
finished on the passenger side. Detective Wisniewski stated that throughout the interview, Travon
expressed regret for not taking the victims to the hospital. He confirmed that he first saw the
suspected blood on Travon’s arm when he took Travon to the bathroom prior to the interview.
¶ 82 Following Detective Wisniewski’s testimony, the State rested. Defense counsel moved for
a directed verdict, stating that the State’s case, which in large part was based on Travon’s
testimony, was not strong enough to submit to the jury. The court denied the motion, finding that
evidence was sufficient to support the elements of the State’s case. Defendant confirmed to the
court that he did not wish to testify at the trial. Defense counsel presented no witnesses.
¶ 83 A jury instruction conference was held. Defense counsel submitted Illinois Pattern Jury
Instruction, Criminal, No. 3.11 (4th ed.) (2000) (hereinafter IPI Criminal 4th) addressing prior

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inconsistent statements for Travon’s testimony. Defendant also submitted an instruction related to
Travon’s prior convictions. The State submitted an instruction on accountability stating,
“that the thrust of things has been that it is [Travon] that is responsible rather
than the defendant. I think that given that the defendant dumped the firearms, there
is some evidence that can—there is some evidence that potential—well, and the
alleged text messages about a lick and all of that, there is—the jury could believe
that the two were acting together in all of this and therefore the accountability
instruction [is appropriate.]”
Defense counsel objected, stating, “If you look at this language, it doesn’t even fit the argument.
A person is legally responsible for the conduct of another person *** either before or during the
commission of an offense.” The State argued,
“I think that there’s been some suggestion, frankly by defense counsel, that
Travon was looking to perform a lick. This is all in front of defendant’s house. I
think it is conceivable that they both—that they believed that the two were acting
together. That is not the State’s primary theory of the case, but it is the law in this
situation, and I do believe it’s an appropriate instruction.”
The court addressed defense counsel, stating, “[i]t’s going to be your position, I assume, that it
was [Travon] and he *** alone did this?” Defense counsel replied, “Absolutely.” The court stated,
“I don’t think it—it applies here, Counsel. There’s been—there’s been no evidence of
accountability or some type of common plan or anything of that nature.” Thereafter, the court
denied admission of the accountability instruction but agreed to revisit the issue after closing
arguments if it was then applicable. Three other instructions (State’s Nos. 12(b), 14 and 15) were
then either rejected or modified because they addressed accountability.

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¶ 84 On December 19, 2024, closing arguments were presented, the jury instructions were read,
and the jury was sent to deliberate. Three notes were received from the jury. The first note asked,
“Did they test for gun residue on Travon and if so, was there any found on him?” The response,
approved by both sides, stated, “This is a question of fact. You have received all of the evidence.
Please refer to your notes and collective memory.” The second note requested a copy of the autopsy
diagram, and a copy was provided to the jury. The third note stated, “We would like to confirm
the caliber size per person.” The jury was provided a similar response as that provided with the
first note. The jury ultimately found defendant guilty of first degree murder for both victims. The
jury further found that defendant personally discharged the firearm that proximately caused the
death of both victims.
¶ 85 On January 17, 2025, defense counsel filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, or in the alternative, a motion for a new trial. The motion contended that the evidence was
insufficient to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and that the court erred when it
denied defendant’s motion for directed verdict on that ground. The motion further asserted that the
State made incomplete disclosures in advance of trial related to Travon’s prior convictions, hid
pending and recently resolved cases, as well as the fact that the State quashed a warrant and
dismissed charges in Macon County case No. 23-MT-610 in the weeks preceding the trial. The
motion further alleged that the State made incomplete disclosures prior to trial regarding Kadeeja’s
pending Macon County case No. 24-CF-1575 and failed to remove all references to the firearm
found in Kadeeja’s vehicle mentioned during the police interview in violation of the court’s motion
in limine order. Finally, the motion argued that it was error for the court to not read jury instructions
1.01A and B before opening statements and witness testimony.

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¶ 86 On January 27, 2025, a presentence investigation report (PSI) was filed. In addition to the
pending murder charges, the PSI revealed prior convictions for aggravated discharge of a firearm
in Du Page County, “del firearm/no valid FOID” from Kane County, and domestic battery in
Macon County, along with three juvenile convictions. Defendant provided limited information
regarding his parents, foster parents, and siblings and then terminated the interview. Based on
records received, the report determined that defendant was currently 30 years old, completed the
eighth grade, had learning disabilities, and was unemployed. He also had an extensive mental
health history as a juvenile.
¶ 87 On February 5, 2025, the court denied defendant’s posttrial motion and proceeded with the
sentencing hearing. No corrections were necessary to the PSI. The State presented two videos. The
first was of Karlondus at his last Thanksgiving, and the other was from Andrell’s son’s first
birthday celebration following Andrell’s death. Victim impact statements were read. No evidence
was submitted in mitigation, and defendant declined the opportunity to present a statement in
allocution. Following argument by the State and defense counsel, defendant was sentenced to life
imprisonment in the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) with three years mandatory
supervised release.
¶ 88 A motion to reconsider the sentence was filed by defense counsel on February 5, 2025. The
motion contended that the life sentence was excessive because defendant had only been
incarcerated for three years in IDOC prior to this sentence, the natural life sentence precluded the
court from considering statutory factors in mitigation, and the sentence was overly punitive, cruel,
and unusual based on the facts. On February 19, 2025, a hearing on the motion to reconsider
sentence was held. The court found that based on defendant’s actions, more than one person was
killed, and it had no discretion other than to impose a life sentence. Defendant timely appealed.

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¶ 89 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 90 On appeal, defendant argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to prove him
guilty of murder and his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by (a) failing to request a jury
instruction, (b) failing to cross-examine or challenge the State’s witness regarding firearm
identification, (c) stipulating to admission of cell phone records, (d) failing to object to Detective
Weddle’s testimony about the cell phone records due to his lack of qualification, and (e) failing to
object to portions of Travon’s testimony, object to statements about Kadeeja’s gun in defendant’s
police interview, and failure to ensure those same statements were removed prior to trial. In
response, the State argues that sufficient evidence was presented and defendant’s claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel are deficient.
¶ 91 A. Sufficiency of evidence
¶ 92 “When considering a challenge to a criminal conviction based upon the sufficiency of the
evidence, our function is not to retry the defendant.” People v. Johnson, 2026 IL 131337, ¶ 59
(citing People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 242 (2006)); see People v. Eyler, 133 Ill. 2d 173, 191
(1989). Instead, we review a claim of insufficient evidence to “determine ‘whether, after viewing
the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Id.
(quoting People v. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 64). We will not set aside a criminal conviction
unless it is so improbable or unsatisfactory that a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt remains.
People v. Byron, 164 Ill. 2d 279, 299 (1995). Determinations of witness credibility, weight
afforded to witness testimony, and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are provinces for the
trier of fact. Id. “ ‘Therefore, a reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier

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of fact on issues involving the weight of the evidence or the credibility of witnesses.’ ” Johnson,
2026 IL 131337, ¶ 59 (quoting Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 64).
¶ 93 Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove he was guilty of murder
because Travon’s testimony was not credible. In support, defendant argues that Travon’s testimony
was not believable because he arranged an armed robbery, had reason to blame defendant, was
drunk and high at the time of the shooting, and displayed bizarre behavior in the immediate
aftermath of the shooting. We note, however, that Travon was the only eyewitness to the shooting
to testify at the hearing and “ ‘eyewitness testimony may be found insufficient “only where the
record evidence compels the conclusion that no reasonable person could accept it beyond a
reasonable doubt.” ’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 36 (quoting People v.
Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2004))).
¶ 94 “Credibility is not itself a discrete fact but the lens through which all ultimate facts must
pass, and thus it is the decisive thing.” People v. Davila, 2022 IL App (1st) 190882, ¶ 61. While it
is undisputed that Travon’s credibility was at issue, the issue was for the jury to determine. Id.
(“The jury, as arbiter, is the reviewer of those ultimate facts in light of who it finds most credible.”)
While deference is afforded to a jury’s ultimate conclusion on the issue of credibility (see People
v. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d 532, 542 (1999)), deference does not extend to testimony that is “so lacking
in credibility that a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt remains.” People v. Schott, 145 Ill. 2d
188, 206-07 (1991). It is only a conviction based on testimony that is “improbable, unconvincing,
and contrary to human experience” that requires reversal. People v. Vasquez, 233 Ill. App. 3d 517,
527 (1992). “Where the finding of the defendant’s guilt depends on eyewitness testimony, a
reviewing court must decide whether a fact-finder could reasonably accept the testimony as true
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 36. “Under this standard, the eyewitness

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testimony may be found insufficient ‘only where the record evidence compels the conclusion that
no reasonable person could accept it beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Id. (quoting People v.
Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2004)). “A conviction will not be reversed simply because the
evidence is contradictory or because the defendant claims that a witness was not credible.” Id.
(citing People v. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d 213, 228 (2009)).
¶ 95 Defendant first argues that Travon’s testimony was not credible because he “planned an
armed robbery” and discussed his intent with both Andrell and defendant. He argues that since
Andrell told Travon where a gun could be found and Travon texted Rashean prior to the shooting
with language that involved “blicks” and mentioned Karlondus that a “reasonable interpretation”
was that Travon and Andrell planned an armed robbery of Thomas. We disagree with the alleged
“reasonable interpretation.”
¶ 96 While we do not dispute the texts, to accept such interpretation would require this court to
ignore defendant’s police interview. Therein, defendant repeatedly stated that when Travon and
Andrell first visited defendant’s house, Travon was drunk, rambled about a robbery that had
already occurred, placed a gun on the dresser, and was looking for a place to “chill.” Notably,
based on defendant’s interview, all of those acts occurred prior to the shooting and defendant did
not mention anything about Travon wanting to rob Karlondus. To accept defendant’s argument,
this court and the jury would have to believe that two armed robberies occurred when there was
no evidence submitted of either robbery.
¶ 97 We further note that while questions were asked about the contents of Karlondus’s bag, the
questions were nonspecific. The photographs revealed that Karlondus had both a cross body bag
and a backpack in the backseat of the car at the time of the shooting. No follow up questions to
clarify which bag was at issue were asked. It is equally notable, that at no time did defense counsel

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question any of the officers if an armed robbery occurred earlier in the morning, as claimed by
defendant during his police interview. As such, we disagree with defendant’s claim that Travon’s
“intent to engage in violent criminal behavior” just prior to the shooting rendered his credibility
“highly suspect.”
¶ 98 Defendant further contends that Travon was not credible because Travon was awaiting his
own trial on charges of aggravated battery, armed habitual criminal, and reckless discharge of a
firearm. In support, defendant argues that Travon agreed at trial that he was “hoping” his testimony
at defendant’s trial would be “helpful” in his own cases. Defendant contends that because Travon
had something to gain, his testimony was suspect.
¶ 99 While there is no dispute that an inference arises when a witness has something to gain or
lose by his testimony (see People v. Triplett, 108 Ill. 2d 463, 481 (1985)), it is undisputed that
Travon told officers that defendant committed the shooting during his initial police interview. It is
equally clear that Travon’s statement was the basis of the arrest warrant issued for defendant and
that the charges for which Travon was awaiting trial, did not stem from the shooting, but occurred
after the murder of Andrell and Karlondus. More importantly, while a few details regarding the
shooting emerged at the trial that were not included in Travon’s police interview, the majority of
the details remained exactly the same, including Travon’s testimony that defendant shot both
Andrell and Karlondus from both sides of the car, and that defendant left in his girlfriend’s vehicle
immediately after the shooting. In any event, any inference that Travon had something to gain was
a fact placed before the jury to consider during their deliberations.
¶ 100 Defendant also contends that Travon was under the influence of drugs and alcohol and was
not credible because he claimed to immediately sober up when the shooting started. Again, there
was no dispute that Travon imbibed and took drugs on the evening and morning in question and

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we agree that whatever substances remained in Travon’s body at the time of the shooting did not
magically disappear when the shots were fired. With that said, there was no laboratory report
showing the amount of alcohol or drugs that were in Travon’s system or testimony regarding the
effect those substances would have on Travon at the time of the shooting. Our supreme court
explained the importance of mind-altering substances in Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 40. Therein, the
court stated,
“Evidence that a witness was drinking near the time of an event about which
she testifies is probative of the witness’s sensory capacity (People v. Di Maso, 100
Ill. App. 3d 338, 343 (1981)) and affect the weight to be given her testimony
(People v. McGuire, 18 Ill. 2d 257, 259 (1960)). However, the fact that a witness
had been drinking alcohol or was drunk does not necessarily preclude the trier of
fact from finding the witness credible.” Id. (citing People v. Bradford, 194 Ill. App.
3d 1043, 1046-47 (1990); People v. Vandiver, 127 Ill. App. 3d 63, 67 (1984)).
Similarly, “testimony of a narcotics addict must be viewed with caution”; however, “the testimony
may be enough to sustain a conviction if credible in view of the surrounding circumstances.”
People v. Steidl, 142 Ill. 2d 204, 227 (1991) (citing People v. Norman, 28 Ill. 2d 77, 82 (1963)).
Here, as in Gray and Steidl, the jury was aware that Travon had been drinking and taking drugs
prior to the shooting and could have believed that he remained under the influence after the
shooting occurred despite Travon’s opposite testimonial contention.
¶ 101 The State argues that it was reasonable for the jury to infer that defendant’s shock following
the shooting enhanced Travon’s perception based on the excited utterance exception to the hearsay
rule. However, neither that argument, nor any evidence to support that argument, was placed into

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the record that would have addressed the likelihood that a strong emotion like shock or fear could
override or ameliorate the underlying lack of sobriety. As such, the argument has little merit.
¶ 102 Regardless, because the jury was aware of Travon’s use of alcohol and drugs prior to the
shooting, “[t]he assessment of [the witness’s] credibility was properly a question for the jury,
which had the opportunity to view [the witness’s] testimony first hand at trial.” Gray, 2017 IL
120958, ¶ 41. The jury’s assessment was also enhanced by viewing the body camera video footage
from Officer Welton showing Travon at the scene and hearing Officer Welton’s testimony that, in
his opinion, Travon was stuck in “a circular loop of almost like disbelief and or almost shock.” As
such, we believe the jury had sufficient evidence to determine the credibility of Travon’s testimony
and his claim of becoming instantly sober when the shooting began.
¶ 103 Finally, defendant argues that Travon’s testimony that defendant killed Karlondus when
he shot him from the passenger side of the vehicle was not credible based on the autopsy evidence
that found all of the bullets traveled from left to right in the victims. In support, defendant contends
that Travon testified that defendant “finished” Karlondus on the passenger side of the car. We note,
however, that the record is devoid of any medical qualification that Travon may have held to
determine which bullet was fatal. Instead, we have Dr. Denton’s testimony that revealed six bullets
hit Karlondus and all but the bullet that hit his forearm were likely fatal.
¶ 104 Travon testified that when defendant first shot the victims, defendant was on the driver’s
side of the car. All of the autopsy evidence revealed wounds inflicted by traveling from the left to
the right side of the bodies. Travon testified that he was in the driver’s seat of the car when the
shooting started. The evidence revealed blood spatter on the right side of Travon’s body and
clothes consistent with blood spatter emanating from Andrell’s wounds in the front passenger seat.
The photograph of the back of Travon’s pants reveals what appears to be blood spatter on his right

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side of his clothes as well as spatter from the left pocket to the middle seam on the seat of Travon’s
pants. The left side splatter is consistent with Travon’s testimony that he removed himself from
the vehicle during the shooting, as his lower body was turned away from Andrell when Andrell
was shot. In any event, the jury was aware of the conflicting statements as to the “final” shot from
Travon and Dr. Denton, and it was the jury’s responsibility to weigh the evidence and assign
credibility to whomever it believed was more credible as to each fact. People v. Bradford, 2016 IL
118674, ¶ 12. Moreover, “the jury is free to accept or reject as much or as little of a witness’s
testimony as it pleases.” People v. Caliendo, 84 Ill. App. 3d 987, 997 (1980).
¶ 105 We cannot find that Travon’s testimony was “so unreasonable, improbable, or
unsatisfactory” (see People v. Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶ 67) that a jury could not accept the
testimony. Our conclusion is based on the fact that Travon’s testimony, in large part, was supported
by other evidence, or an inference that could be drawn from the evidence as shown above. Travon
testified that after the shooting, defendant entered a white vehicle, that belonged to defendant’s
girlfriend and left the scene. Flock cameras confirmed that the same vehicle left the scene around
3:45 a.m. which was when the shooting occurred. Travon testified that he drove around in the
Charger after the shooting while calling numerous people. This testimony was also supported by
the Flock camera evidence and the detective’s testimony about the phone calls found on Travon’s
phone. Further, Travon testified that after he advised Ashley of what happened, he got into
Andrell’s Jeep, drove to his girlfriend’s house, and then drove back to Ashley’s house where the
police, the Charger, and the victims were all located. This testimony was also confirmed by the
Flock camera evidence.
¶ 106 In addition to the evidence stemming from Travon’s testimony and the evidence supporting
same, the police interview revealed that defendant proceeded to Johnny’s house after the shooting,

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left with Kadeeja to go to the Chicago-area, returned two days later, proceeded to Johnny’s house
a second time wherein defendant retrieved two guns, cleaned them with bleach, followed Johnny
to the lake, threw the weapons and ammunition in the lake, those same weapons were later
recovered by the dive team and were consistent with the weapons used in the double murder.
Notably, during defendant’s police interview, defendant repeatedly denied retrieving, cleaning, or
discarding the guns and further denied following Johnny to the lake, despite police advising
defendant that they had spoken to Johnny and had Flock camera evidence supporting Johnny’s
statements.
¶ 107 Here, a jury could reasonably conclude that Travon’s testimony was more credible than
defendant’s police interview statements. Travon’s testimony was not so improbable to require
reversal (see Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶ 67) and it is well established that circumstantial evidence
is sufficient to find a defendant guilty of first degree murder. See Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 64.
Accordingly, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we hold that a
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the fact finders could reasonably accept Travon’s testimony as true beyond a reasonable
doubt and therefore, sufficient evidence was presented to uphold defendant’s convictions.
¶ 108 B. Ineffective assistance of counsel
¶ 109 Defendant also raises numerous ineffective assistance of counsel claims. He contends that
his trial counsel was ineffective because she failed to request the accomplice jury instruction, failed
to cross-examine or challenge the State’s firearms expert, she stipulated to the admission of cell
phone records, failed to object to officer testimony regarding cell phone records, and failed to
object to Travon’s testimony based on a prior agreement with the State. The State disagrees and
contends that defendant’s defense counsel was not ineffective and that prejudice cannot be shown.

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¶ 110 A defendant is guaranteed the right to effective assistance of counsel at trial. U.S. Const.
Amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Cost. 1970, art I, § 8. In order to determine whether effective assistance was
provided, we review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under the two-pronged Strickland
(see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)) standard. People v. Torres, 2024 IL
129289, ¶ 26. The test in its simplest form requires a showing that trial counsel’s performance was
deficient and the deficient performance was prejudicial to defendant. Stickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
More specifically, the Strickland test requires a defendant to show that (1) counsel’s performance
“fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that a reasonable probability exists
that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. ¶ 27
(citing People v. Peterson, 2017 IL 120331, ¶ 79). Defendant’s failure to establish either Strickland
prong precludes the finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Henderson, 2013 IL
114040, ¶ 11.
¶ 111 1. Failure to request IPI Criminal No. 3.17
¶ 112 Defendant first argues that his trial counsel was deficient because she failed to submit the
accomplice-witness jury instruction (see Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction, Criminal, No. 3.17)
(approved Oct. 17, 2014) (hereinafter IPI Criminal No. 3.17). “The function of jury instructions is
to convey to the jury the law that applies to the evidence presented.” People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d
167, 187 (2005). IPI Criminal No. 3.17 states:
“When a witness says he was involved in the commission of a crime with the
defendant, the testimony of that witness is subject to suspicion and should be
considered by you with caution. It should be carefully examined in light of the other
evidence in this case.” Id.

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¶ 113 In order to determine whether a witness is an accomplice, which would entitle defendant
to have IPI Criminal No. 3.17 given, the court determines “ ‘whether there is probable cause to
believe that [the witness] was guilty either as a principal, or on a theory of accountability.’ ” People
v. Cobb, 97 Ill. 2d 465, 476 (1983) (quoting People v. Robinson, 59 Ill. 2d 184, 191 (1974)). This
requires the evidence to show there is probable cause to believe that the witness was not merely
“ ‘present and failed to disapprove of the crime, but that he participated in the planning or
commission of the crime.’ ” People v. Kirchner, 194 Ill. 2d 502, 541 (2000) (quoting People v.
Henderson, 142 Ill. 2d 258, 315 (1990)).
¶ 114 “The law is clear that a person is not rendered accountable for the acts of another by his
mere presence or even his acquiescence.” People v. Morrow, 303 Ill. App. 3d 671, 678 (1999).
“Absent some evidence of other circumstances or conduct from which it can be inferred that a
person approved of the offense and aided it by his presence, mere presence is not enough to show
that the person is an accomplice to a crime.” Id. at 678-79 (citing Henderson, 142 Ill. 2d 258, 316
(1990)). However, if the witness is an accomplice, as defined above, a defendant is entitled “to a
cautionary instruction as to the reliability of the witness’ testimony.” Cobb, 97 Ill. 2d at 476.
¶ 115 “[A]n accomplice is one who could himself have been indicted for the offense either as
principal or as an accessory.” Id. (citing People v. Nowak, 45 Ill. 2d 158, 168 (1970)). “The
evidence required to charge an individual as an accomplice must show that the individual ‘took
some part in the crime charged [citation] or *** that [the individual] “knowingly, voluntarily, and
with common interest united[d] with the principal offender in the commission of the crime.” ’ ”
Morrow, 303 Ill. App. 3d 671, 678 (1999) (quoting People v. Winfield, 113 Ill. App. 3d 818, 828
(1983) (quoting People v. Travis, 94 Ill. App. 3d 983, 991 (1981)). If the witness is not an
accomplice, it is not error to fail to request the instruction. See Nowak, 45 Ill. 2d at 169 (finding

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no error in the court’s refusal to give the accomplice jury instruction where the witness was not an
accomplice).
¶ 116 As such, we must first determine if Travon was an accomplice in the shooting deaths of
Andrell and Karlondus. Defendant argues that trial counsel was required to request the instruction
because she claimed that Travon was the shooter. He further contends that evidence of a robbery
was also shown. However, an argument is not evidence, and this is such an important principle
that juries receive an instruction setting forth that principle. See IPI Criminal No. 1.03 (“Neither
opening statements nor closing arguments are evidence, and any statement or argument made by
the attorneys which is not based on the evidence should be disregarded.”).
¶ 117 In the case at bar, while there is no dispute that trial counsel argued in her closing that
Travon was the real shooter; the argument was not based on evidence. Notably, defendant
specifically told police in his interview that he did not know who the shooter was because he was
asleep in the house when the shooting occurred. Further, while defense counsel contended that
Travon planned a robbery with Andrell in the days leading up to the shooting, an empty backpack
is not evidence of robbery, without additional evidence to support the argument. Even if
defendant’s police interview statements contended that Travon was involved in a robbery earlier
that evening, no evidence of any robbery actually occurring was presented at trial. There were no
questions of the officers regarding earlier events of the evening, that would have confirmed,
clarified, or disputed a robbery. Further, while Travon was present at the shooting, drove around
with the victims, failed to take them to the hospital as allegedly instructed by defendant, and had
reason to provide favorable testimony based on his own pending crimes, those facts are not
evidence that Travon was principle, or even an accessory, to the double murder.

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¶ 118 Our review of the record reveals no evidence to support defense counsel’s claim that
Travon was the shooter. There was no dispute that Travon was in the driver’s seat when the
murders occurred. Dr. Denton testified that none of the gunshots were taken at close range and
were, at a minimum, 18 to 24 inches away from the victims. There was no evidence submitted that
the console separating Travon and Andrell was greater than 18 to 24 inches in width. Nor does
defendant’s argument explain how Travon could have shot Andrell, who was on his right, alighted
from the vehicle to his left, and obtained the alleged blood spatter pattern seen on Travon’s pants.
Further, unlike defendant, Travon returned to the scene after police arrived.
¶ 119 Additionally, there was no evidence that Travon ever touched the weapons used to shoot
Andrell and Karlondus. The evidence confirmed that defendant cleaned the weapons with bleach
and then threw them in Lake Decatur to hide them. Our review of the record reveals no evidence
against Travon that rose to a level of probable cause to claim he was either the principle in the
murder or an accessory. As such, defense counsel’s failure to submit IPI Criminal 3.17 cannot be
seen as error or deficient performance required for a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶ 120 2. Failure to cross-examine or challenge the State’s firearms expert
¶ 121 Defendant also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because she failed to cross-
examine or challenge the State’s firearms expert. In support, defendant relies on numerous
secondary sources to contend that firearm ballistic evidence is invalid. He further contends, citing
People v. Petrie, 2021 IL App (2d) 190213, that this court may consider those secondary
authorities to assess whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge expert testimony.
¶ 122 We note, however, that in Petrie, the issue was what symptoms, if any, would be
observable, and when they would have been observable, prior to brain swelling and subsequent
seizures related to the swell occurred in cases involving shaken baby syndrome. See id. ¶ 67. In

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Petrie, defense counsel did cross-examine the State’s expert and produced an expert to testify as
well; however, the court found that defense counsel did not cross-examine the expert on the
foundation of the State’s expert, or the critical issues in the case. Id. ¶¶ 75-78. The case was
ultimately reversed based on the State’s failure to provide a sufficient foundation for its expert’s
opinion, defense counsel’s failure to “appreciate and understand the legal principles applicable to
the case” (id. ¶ 78) and the prejudice shown to defendant. Id. ¶ 83.
¶ 123 There is a presumption that defense counsel will pursue “sound trial strategies.” Strickland,
466 U.S. at 689. A showing that trial counsel’s strategy was unsound requires more than a lack of
success at trial; the strategy must be “irrational and unreasonable in light of the circumstances that
defense counsel confronted at the time” of trial. People v. Faulkner, 292 Ill. App. 3d 391, 394
(1997). Rebuttal of the presumption that trial counsel’s trial strategy was sound is shown when the
chosen strategy is “so unsound that counsel completely fails to conduct any meaningful adversarial
testing” (People v. Leeper, 317 Ill. App. 3d 475, 482 (2000)) or “when no reasonably effective
criminal defense attorney, facing similar circumstances, would pursue such strategies.” Faulkner,
292 Ill. App. 3d at 394. Further, it is well-settled that the decision to cross-examine or impeach a
witness is a matter of trial strategy which will not support a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. People v. Pecoraro, 175 Ill. 2d 294, 326 (1997). “Defendant can only prevail on an
ineffectiveness claim by showing that counsel’s approach to cross-examination was objectively
unreasonable.” Id. at 327.
¶ 124 As such, we must determine whether counsel’s choice not to cross-examine the forensics
expert was objectively unreasonable and, first consider, as seen in Petrie, whether a sufficient basis
for the admission of evidence in Illinois was met. In order for the testimony to be admissible, the
witness must be qualified to testify as an expert witness, the opinion-if it concerns scientific

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evidence-must have a foundation for the scientific principle pursuant to Frye v. United States, 293
F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), and there must be “ ‘an adequate foundation establishing that the
information upon which the expert bases his opinion is reliable.’ ” See People v. Safford, 792 Ill.
App. 3d 212, 221 (2009) (quoting Hiscott v. Peters, 324 Ill. App. 3d 114, 122 (2001)).
¶ 125 In the case at bar, after the State obtained information related to Carls-Miller’s education,
employment, professional organizations and previous testimony as an expert, it offered the witness
as an expert in firearms examination identification. In response, defense counsel stated that she
had no cross-examination and accepted Carls-Miller as an expert. Qualification of an expert is laid
by foundation that typically shows the witness’s “knowledge, skill, experience, training or
education.” Snelson v. Kamm, 204 Ill. 2d 1, 24 (2003). Here, no argument was presented that
defense counsel’s agreement as to Carls-Miller’s status as an expert was evidence of trial counsel’s
ineffective representation. As such, we hold that the first requirement was met.
¶ 126 The second requirement is based on the foundation for the scientific principle of the
testimony, i.e., firearm identification. In Illinois, firearm and toolmark comparison have long been
admissible. See People v. Fisher, 340 Ill. 216, 240-41 (1930). Despite both federal and state court
revisiting the admission of expert testimony, “the judicial decisions uniformly conclude toolmark
and firearms identification is generally accepted and admissible at trial.” People v. Robinson, 2013
IL App (1st) 102476, ¶ 91. As such, the second requirement for admissible evidence was met.
¶ 127 The third requirement is the foundation of the expert’s opinion. To meet this requirement
“ ‘it must be shown that the facts or data relied upon by the expert are of a type reasonably relied
upon by [experts] in that particular field in forming opinions or inferences.’ ” People v. Smith,
2012 IL App (1st) 102354, ¶ 70 (quoting People v. Contreras, 246 Ill. App. 3d 502, 510 (1993)).
Here, no argument was raised that Carls-Miller’s testimony had an improper foundation. As such,

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the evidence submitted was admissible. Therefore, unlike Petrie, which also found counsel’s
failure to object on the lack of the foundation for the expert’s opinion (Petrie, 2021 IL App (2d)
190213 ¶ 75), no basis for defense counsel to cross-examine Carls-Miller on admissibility is found.
¶ 128 Instead, defendant’s argues that defense counsel was deficient because she failed to cross-
examine Carls-Miller regarding the scientific validity of firearm and toolmark identification. In
support, defendant argues that the witness “testified that the casings recovered from the car and
the area at [defendant’s] house were fired from the Glock gun, as well as the Taurus gun” and
determined that one of the bullets recovered from Karlondus’s body “was fired from the same
firearm as one of the recovered casings.” We noted however, that contrary to defendant’s latter
claim, the expert concluded that neither of the bullets retrieved from the victims’ bodies could be
conclusively determined to have been shot from either gun.
¶ 129 Defendant complains that his counsel did not cross-examine the witness or “educate the
jury that her conclusions were subjective, the product of circular reasoning, and believed by many
to be unreliable and lacking in scientific validity.” He also complains that counsel failed to request
the court bar the witness from “testifying that she had unqualifiedly identified a match between
the recovered casings to the recovered firearms.” However, we fail to see where such request was
necessary as defendant fails to cite any portion of the record where the witness provided such
testimony. While the witness agreed that her opinions were provided to a reasonable degree of
scientific certainty, she qualified the opinion as being “based on my knowledge, experience, and
training.”
¶ 130 More importantly, while defense counsel certainly could have addressed the studies that
undermine reliability of ballistic testing, we must determine if doing so would have undermined
the defense theory which was that Travon was the shooter. Here, defendant’s police interview

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revealed that Travon owned a Taurus gun and the diver’s ultimately recovered a Taurus gun.
Allowing the unchallenged testimony of the forensic expert that the cartridges found at the scene
matched a Taurus gun is not objectively unreasonable, especially in light of the lack of evidence
that defendant owned a Taurus or a Glock. Notably, the ballistic evidence was so minor that neither
the State nor defense counsel addressed it during closing argument. More importantly, the issue at
trial was not whether the guns found in the lake were the murder weapons; the issue was who fired
the guns that killed Andrell and Karlondus.
¶ 131 The State argued that it was defendant and defense counsel who argued that it was Travon.
The majority of defense counsel’s argument addressed conflicting versions of Travon’s testimony
and his behavior after the murders. In fact, defense counsel also interpreted Uncle Johnny’s
testimony as further evidence that defendant did not commit the crime and argued that defendant
was dumping the guns in the lake for Travon. As such, the fact that the ballistic expert tied the
guns to the cartridges found in the Dodge Charger was not evidence that sealed the case. Under
these facts, although cross-examination certainly could have been performed, trial counsel’s failure
to cross-examine the forensic expert can easily be classified as a product of trial strategy.
Therefore, we deny defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to cross-
examine the ballistic expert.
¶ 132 3. Stipulating to admission of cell phone records
¶ 133 Defendant also contends that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by
stipulating to the admission of the cell phone records. In support, he argues that the written
stipulation failed to adhere to the self-authentication requirements of Illinois Rule of Evidence
902(11) (eff. Sept. 28, 2018). Typically, the rule, allowing self-authentication of certified records

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of regularly conducted activity, requires: (1) “a written declaration” made (2) “under oath subject
to the penalty of perjury.” People v. Hauck, 2022 IL App (2d) 191111, ¶ 36.
¶ 134 The T-Mobile records submitted into evidence contained no such certification. Instead,
defense counsel and the prosecutor stipulated that Darius Simmons would testify that he is a T-
Mobile records custodian and the company keeps records of both whom it serves and what services
it provides to them including phone numbers and devices associated with those accounts as well
as which cell site or tower was utilized for those services. With regard to those records, he would
testify that they are kept in the ordinary course of T-Mobile’s business and that the entries in those
records are made roughly contemporaneously with the services they document. The parties further
stipulated that based upon that testimony, proper business records foundation for the admission of
T-Mobile records existed.
¶ 135 Defendant admits that phone records are frequently admissible records under the business
record exception but argues citing Hauck, 2022 IL App (2d) 191111, that his counsel was
ineffective in allowing the stipulation without the certification. We disagree.
¶ 136 In Hauck, at trial, the defendant argued that the certification accompanying the phone
records failed to satisfy the Rule 902(11) requirement and the State failed to establish the necessary
foundation under Illinois Rule of Evidence 803(6) (eff. Jan. 25, 2023). Id. ¶ 1. The records were
admitted, over defense counsel’s objection as to the form and content of the certification, which
was signed electronically. Id. ¶ 5. On appeal, defendant argued that the State’s submission of self-
authenticating evidence without the proper certification was improper. Id. ¶ 29. The court agreed
and found the circuit court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence (id. ¶ 49) but ultimately
determined that the error was harmless. Id. ¶ 62.

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¶ 137 Hauck is distinguishable because the evidence in the case at bar was not submitted by the
State as self-authenticating which are business records that “do not require testimony at trial.”
People v. Crump, 2018 IL App (3d) 160124, ¶ 19. Instead, the evidence was submitted as a
stipulation by the parties based on the proposed testimony of the T-Mobile employee.
¶ 138 “ ‘A stipulation is an agreement between litigants or their attorneys with respect to an issue
before the court.’ ” People v. Beeler, 2012 IL App (4th) 110217, ¶ 19 (quoting People v. Carodine,
374 Ill. App. 3d 16, 27 (2007)). “The law is well established that an accused may, by stipulation,
waive the necessity of proof of all or part of the case which the People have alleged against him.”
People v. Polk, 19 Ill. 2d 310, 315 (1960). Defense counsel’s decision to stipulate to certain facts
is typically a matter of trial tactics and strategy. See People v. Reinking, 2024 IL App (4th) 230486,
¶ 117; People v. Phillips, 217 Ill. 2d 270, 284-85 (2005) (“As a matter of trial strategy, defense
counsel might choose to stipulate to evidence in an effort to minimize the adverse impact it will
have at trial.”). “Matters of trial strategy will generally not support a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, even if defense counsel made a mistake in trial strategy or tactics or made an error in
judgment.” People v. Redmon, 2022 IL App (3d) 190167, ¶ 19 (citing People v. Patterson, 217 Ill.
2d 407, 441 (2005)). Only if the attorney’s strategy was objectively unreasonable, will a defendant
overcome the strong presumption of sound trial strategy. People v. Mays, 2023 IL App (4th)
210612, ¶ 117.
¶ 139 Here, the stipulation was based on the testimony of the T-Mobile employee. As such, the
proper evidentiary rule at issue would be Illinois Rule of Evidence 803(6) (Ill. R. Evid. 803(6) (eff.
Jan. 25, 2023)), which addresses the testimony of the records custodian or other qualified witness.
No argument as to whether the requirements for Rule 803(6) were met was provided in defendant’s
opening brief and his reply brief concedes “that the records could have been submitted under Rule

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803(6).” As such, defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for this issue must be
denied.
¶ 140 4. Failure to object or move to exclude officer testimony regarding the cell phone records
¶ 141 Defendant also argues that his defense counsel was ineffective by failing to object to
Detective Weddle’s testimony as to the cell site analysis or seek to exclude his testimony based on
his lack of qualifications. Decisions regarding “what matters to object to and when to object”
(People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 344 (2007)) and motions to exclude or suppress evidence are
both matters of trial strategy. People v. Little, 322 Ill. App. 3d 607, 611 (2001). Decisions related
to trial strategy generally will not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel even if the
strategy was a mistake. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d at 355 (citing People v. Enis, 194 Ill. 2d 361, 378 (2000)).
“Only if counsel’s trial strategy is so unsound that he entirely fails to conduct meaningful
adversarial testing of the State’s case will ineffective assistance of counsel be found.” Id. at 355-
56 (citing People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 432-33 (1999)).
¶ 142 In order to overcome the presumption related to exclusion of evidence, “a defendant must
show that (1) the unargued motion *** would have succeeded and (2) *** a reasonable probability
that the outcome of the trial would have been different [if] the evidence been suppressed.” People
v. Shelton, 2020 IL App (2d) 170453-B, ¶ 16. Defense counsel’s failure to file a motion that would
have been futile precludes finding ineffective assistance of counsel. Patterson, 217 Ill. 2d at 438.
Similarly, futile objections preclude findings of ineffective assistance of counsel. People v.
Shatner, 174 Ill. 2d 133, 159 (1996).
¶ 143 Therefore, the first step is to determine whether an objection as to Officer Weddle’s expert
status or his testimony regarding the cell phone evidence has merit. Notably, defendant concedes
that the State did not ask the court to qualify Detective Weddle as an expert. Without the request

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to qualify the officer as an expert, no objection would be relevant. As such, we find the objection
would be futile.
¶ 144 Defendant also contends that Detective Weddle was unqualified to address the cell phone
evidence. In support, he argues that Detective Weddle’s 120 hours of training and providing
testimony only one other time was insufficient to classify Weddle as an expert. However, as noted
above, the State never asked the court to classify Weddle as an expert. More importantly, defendant
fails to explain why Weddle’s training and prior testimony was insufficient to allow him to testify
about the cell phone evidence.
¶ 145 Illinois “does not impose explicit requirements as to the level or extent of experience,
education, scientific study, or training that is required to qualify a witness to offer expert
testimony.” People v. Pingelton, 2022 IL 127680, ¶ 56 (citing People v. Lovejoy, 235 Ill. 2d 97,
125 (2009)). Testimony is proper if the witness has knowledge and experience beyond the average
citizen that would assist the jury in evaluating the evidence. Id.
¶ 146 Here, Deterctive Weddle testified that he had been a police officer for 11 years. He further
testified that he had 160 hours of training from various companies on how to recover cell phone
data in addition to training from six or eight training sessions. While defendant contends the
experience was insufficient, and the other companies were not specified, defendant points to
nothing in the record that would indicate the average citizen had more knowledge and experience
related to cell phone data analysis than Detective Weddle. Nor does defendant contend that
Detective Weddle’s evaluation of the evidence failed to assist the jury. As such, we hold that any
objection as to Detective Weddle’s classification as an expert or motion to exclude his testimony
would have been futile because the objection would have been overruled and motion to exclude

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would have been denied. As such, defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on this
basis must fail.
¶ 147 5. Failure to object to Travon’s testimony and defendant’s access to Kadeeja’s gun.
¶ 148 Finally, defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
Travon’s testimony that indicated he met defendant in prison or defendant’s videotaped interview
remarks that he had access to his girlfriend, Kadeeja’s gun. The basis of the latter argument is
defense counsel’s previously filed motions in limine addressing defendant’s “criminal history and
parolee status” and Kadeeja’s gun.
¶ 149 At the motion hearing, the State advised that it was not planning on addressing defendant’s
parole status and stated it would not put forth any evidence about Kadeeja’s gun but noted that it
was brought up during defendant’s police interview. The court advised the parties to “get together
as to whether or not you want to delete that portion of the interview.”
¶ 150 At trial, Travon testified that he met defendant in prison and confirmed to the prosecutor
that he had indeed been in prison. Defense counsel did not object to the question. The State argues
that Travon’s testimony did not indicate that defendant was incarcerated when they met in prison
and he only confirmed that he had been in prison, not defendant. It claims therefore that it is
plausible that defense counsel chose not to object because the statements could be equally
interpreted in a manner where defendant was employed by the prison or was visiting someone else
in prison when he met Travon.
¶ 151 We find that the State’s argument has little merit considering that Travon also testified that
he and defendant “was in the joint together, you know that’s how we met, like, that’s how we
locked in, too.” The latter statement certainly clarified that defendant was incarcerated. We note
that neither defendant’s appellate counsel nor the State included this fact on appeal and we

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admonish both parties to more carefully review the record as to relevant facts related to issues
raised.
¶ 152 Regardless, the decision to object or not object is one of trial strategy which generally
precludes finding ineffective assistance of counsel. Here, it is not difficult to presume that
counsel’s failure to object to Travon’s testimony about meeting defendant while they were both
incarcerated was an intentional decision not to object because it would have simply drawn
additional attention to the testimony by the jury. See People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 221 (2004)
(the significance of inadmissible testimony may be diffused by ignoring the statement as opposed
to objecting which would “draw further attention to the statement.”).
¶ 153 Defendant further contends that his trial counsel was ineffective because she failed to
ensure that the State redacted the portion of defendant’s videotaped interview, that revealed he had
access to Kadeeja’s gun and also failed to object to that portion of the video when it was published
to the jury. As to the latter claim regarding the failure to object, the issue was discussed during the
post-trial motion hearing and defense counsel stated that she “did not want to draw additional
attention to it by jumping up in the middle of the video and objecting again.” As such, the decision
not to object would be trial strategy and insufficient to support a claim for ineffective counsel.
People v. Gardner, 2024 IL App (4th) 230443, ¶ 39.
¶ 154 However, defense counsel’s failure to ensure the video was properly redacted prior to trial
is evidence of deficient performance, especially in light of counsel’s motion in limine and the
court’s ruling in her favor. We view counsel’s performance from her “perspective at the time,
rather than through the lens of hindsight.” Perry, 224 Ill. 2d at 344. While the court told the parties
to “get together as to whether or not you want to delete that portion of the interview,” there is
nothing in the record to determine whether that occurred or if the issue was ever addressed after

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the motion hearing. In any event, given the court’s directive, and the evidence revealing that
defense counsel failed to review the videotape prior to it being published at trial, defense counsel’s
representation was deficient.
¶ 155 Having found that counsel performed deficiently, we now turn to the question of whether
defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance. In order to show prejudice,
defendant must show that there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient
performance, the result of the proceedings would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
“A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.
¶ 156 Defendant’s argument related to prejudice combined Travon’s testimony about meeting
defendant in prison as well as defendant’s access to Kadeeja’s gun. Therein, he claimed that he
was “portrayed as a reprobate, previously involved with crime and guns.” He further claims, based
on the closeness of the evidence, there was a reasonable probability “that this improper tendency
to believe that [defendant] acted in conformity with this apparently poor character was powerful
enough to effect the outcome of his trial.” He contends, citing People v. Richardson, 189 Ill. 2d
401, 411 (2000), that his counsel’s errors “rendered the result of the trial unreliable or the
proceedings fundamentally unfair.”
¶ 157 As only his access to Kadeeja’s gun is relevant, we must parse out the relevant portions of
defendant’s prejudice claim. First, we disagree that defendant having access to Kadeeja’s gun
portrayed defendant “in an unnecessarily negative light for the jury.” Access to Kadeeja’s gun did
not make it more likely that defendant committed the murders because the videotape also revealed
that the police believed that Kadeeja’s gun would not come back as one of the murder weapons.
Further, there was no evidence presented at trial that Kadeeja’s gun was one of the murder

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weapons. Therefore, just because defendant had access to a gun does not make it more likely to
believe defendant committed the murders in the case at bar.
¶ 158 Nor do we believe that defendant having access to Kadeeja’s gun would cause defendant
to be “portrayed as a reprobate, previously involved with crime and guns” when defendant
explained to the officers that his access was solely for self-defense purposes. More importantly,
we do not believe the evidence was closely balanced. As noted above, the issue, framed by defense
counsel, was not about the evidence, it was about the person who shot the weapon. As shown
above, while there was evidence that Travon owned a weapon similar to that used in the murders,
there was no evidence linking the weapon found in the lake to Travon. Instead, the weapons were
linked to defendant by the testimony of Uncle Johnny that confirmed defendant’s possession and
cleaning of the weapons at Johnny’s house and then following his uncle to the lake to dispose of
the weapons. While defendant denied those actions, the Flock camera evidence confirmed the
implausibility of defendant’s denials. As such, we cannot find that defendant’s access to his
girlfriend’s gun was sufficient to tip the scales away from defendant’s favor in a manner that would
allow this court to find there was a reasonable probability that, but for the error, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. Accordingly, we deny defendant’s claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel.
¶ 159 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 160 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that sufficient evidence was presented to support the
jury’s verdict of guilt and finding that defendant was shooter. We further hold that defendant’s
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are denied due to either a failure to show deficient
performance, prejudice, or both. As such, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 161 Affirmed.

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