Kansas Attorney General Opinion 2013-011

July 5, 2013
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 2013- 11
Robert J. Schmisseur, County Counselor
Pratt County Counselor’s Office
223 South Main St., Suite 200
P.O. Box 313
Pratt, KS 67124
Re: 	Counties and County Officers–General Provisions–County Home Rule
Powers; Limitations, Restrictions and Prohibitions; Charter Resolutions
State Departments; Public Officers and Employees‒Firearms‒Personal
and Family Protection Act
Synopsis: 	A county may not enact a charter resolution to exempt the county from L.
2013, Ch. 105, § 2. Cited herein: K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 19-101a; K.S.A.19-
101c; K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 75-7c01; 75-7c17, as amended by L. 2013, Ch.
105, § 10; 75-6102; L. 2013, Ch. 105, § 2.
* 	* 	*
Dear Mr. Schmisseur:
As the Pratt County Counselor, you request our opinion whether a county may enact a
charter resolution exempting itself from Section 2 of Senate Substitute for House Bill
2052 (Senate Sub. for HB 2052), hereinafter referred to as L. 2013, Ch. 105, § 2.
Effective July 1, 2013, L. 2013, Ch. 105, § 2 prohibits a Kansas municipality 1 from
restricting persons licensed by the state to carry concealed handguns from carrying a
1 The legislature adopted the definition of municipality in K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 75-6102(b) for the purposes
of the bill, excluding school districts: “any county, township, city . . . or other political or taxing subdivision
of the state, or any agency, authority, institution or other instrumentality thereof.” L. 2013, Ch. 105,
§2(l)(2).

Robert Schmisseur
Page 2
concealed 	handgun 	into 	a 	state 	or 	municipal 	building 2 unless 	such 	building 	has
adequate security measures 3 to detect and restrict all weapons from entering the
building. 4
Your question pertains to a county’s power of home rule, which allows the governing
body of a county to “transact all county business and perform all powers of local
legislation and administration as it deems appropriate.”5
The principles governing county home rule authority are well-established. County home
rule powers derive from statute, specifically K.S.A. 19-101 et seq. Such home rule
powers “shall be liberally construed for the purpose of giving to counties the largest
measure of self-government.”6 As part of its home rule authority, a county may enact a
charter resolution to exempt itself from state laws that are applicable to the county but
not uniformly applicable to all counties.7
County home rule powers are not unlimited. “Counties are prohibited . . . from passing
any legislation which is contrary to or in conflict with any act of the state legislature
which is of uniform application to all counties throughout the state.”8 Such uniform laws
“occupy the field” of regulation and preclude home rule: “The legislature may reserve
exclusive jurisdiction to regulate in a particular area when an intent is clearly manifested
by state law to pre-empt a particular field by uniform laws made applicable throughout
the state.”9 Thus, whether a county may enact a charter resolution to exempt itself from
the provisions of Section 2 of L. 2013, Ch. 105 depends upon whether the law is a
uniform enactment that preempts local regulation of concealed carry.
Section 2 of L. 2013, Ch. 105 is “a part of and supplemental to” 10 the Personal and
Family 	Protection 	Act 	(PFPA), 11 commonly 	known 	as 	the 	concealed 	carry 	law.
Therefore, we consider Section 2 in the context of the PFPA as a whole.
2 “’State or municipal building’ means a building owned or leased by such public entity. It does not include
a building owned by the state or a municipality which is leased by a private entity whether for profit or not-
for-profit or a building held in title by the state or a municipality solely for reasons of revenue bond
financing.” L. 2013, Ch. 105, § 2(l)(5)(A).
3 “’Adequate security measures’ means the use of electronic equipment and personnel at public
entrances to detect and restrict the carrying of any weapons into the state or municipal building, including,
but not limited to, metal detectors, metal detector wands or any other equipment used for similar
purposes to ensure that weapons are not permitted to be carried into such building by members of the
public. Adequate security measures for storing and securing lawfully carried weapons, including,
but not limited to, the use of gun lockers or other similar storage options may be provided at public
entrances.” L. 2013, Ch. 105, § 2(l)(1).
4 The governing body or chief administrative officer of a municipal building may exempt the building from
this requirement for specified periods of time by submitting written notice to the Attorney General. L.
2013, Ch. 105, §§ 2(i) and (j).
5 K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 19-101a(a).
6 K.S.A. 19-101c.
7 K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 19-101a(b).
8 Missouri Pac. R R. v. Board of Co. Comm’rs of Greeley Co., 231 Kan. 225, 227 (1982). See also K.S.A.
2012 Supp. 19-101a(a)(1).
9 231 Kan. at 227.
10 L. 2013, Ch. 105, § 2(m).

Robert Schmisseur
Page 3
The PFPA includes a clear description of the legislature’s intent in enacting statewide
laws governing concealed carry. K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 75-7c17(a), as amended by L.
2013, Ch. 105, § 10, states:
The legislature finds as a matter of public policy and fact that it is
necessary to provide statewide uniform standards for issuing licenses to
carry concealed handguns for self-defense and finds it necessary to
occupy the field of regulation of the bearing of concealed handguns for
self-defense to ensure that no honest, law-abiding person who qualifies
under the provisions of this act is subjectively or arbitrarily denied the
person's rights. No city, county or other political subdivision of this state
shall regulate, restrict or prohibit the carrying of concealed handguns by
persons licensed under this act except as provided in section 2, and
amendments 	thereto, 	and 	in 	subsection 	(b) 	of 	K.S.A. 	75–7c10, 	and
amendments thereto, and subsection (f) of K.S.A. 21–4218, prior to its
repeal, or subsection (e) of K.S.A. 21–6309, and amendments thereto.
Any existing or future law, ordinance, rule, regulation or resolution enacted
by any city, county or other political subdivision of this state that regulates,
restricts or prohibits the carrying of concealed handguns by persons
licensed under this act except as provided in section 2, and amendments
thereto, 	and 	in 	subsection 	(b) 	of 	K.S.A. 	75–7c10, 	and 	amendments
thereto, and subsection (f) of K.S.A. 21–4218, prior to its repeal, or
subsection (e) of K.S.A. 21–6309, and amendments thereto, shall be null
and void. 12
In our opinion, this statute is a clear manifestation of the legislature’s intent to preempt
local regulation of concealed carry. Consistent with such intent, the other statutes of the
PFPA contain no provision that would exempt certain counties from its application or
otherwise create exceptions to the general applicability of the PFPA to all counties.
Although the PFPA authorizes counties to restrict the concealed carry of handguns into
certain county buildings, 13 it is nonetheless uniformly applicable to all Kansas counties.
Section 2 of L. 2013, Ch. 105 is no different. Section 2 applies to “any . . . municipal
building” and any “municipality.” The bill defines municipality to include “any county.” If
we substitute “county” for “municipality” in Section 2, it is clear that the statute applies to
all counties. For example, Section 2(c) would read: “No state agency or county shall
prohibit 	an 	employee 	who 	is 	licensed 	to 	carry 	a 	concealed 	handgun 	under 	the
provisions of the personal and family protection act from carrying such concealed
handgun at the employee’s work place . . . .”14
11 K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 75-7c01 et seq.
12 Emphasis added.
13 See L. 2013, Ch. 105, §§ 2(g), (h) and (k).
14 Emphasis added.

Robert Schmisseur
Page 4
It is our opinion that L. 2013, Ch. 105, § 2 is part of an act of the legislature that is
uniformly 	applicable 	to 	all 	counties. 	Because 	the 	PFPA 	is 	a 	uniform 	enactment
applicable to all counties, a county may not enact a charter resolution to exempt itself
from the provisions of Section 2 of L. 2013, Ch. 105, or from any other provision of the
PFPA. However, we note that Sections 2(i) and 2(j) of L. 2013, Ch. 105 provide
mechanisms by which a county may exempt certain buildings from the provisions of the
bill for specific periods of time.15
Sincerely,
Derek Schmidt
Attorney General
Sarah Fertig
Assistant Attorney General
DS:AA:SF:sb
15 L. 2013, Ch. 105, §§ 2(i) and (j).