JOSHUA CARRIER v. JAMES RIOUX & Others.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-823

JOSHUA CARRIER

vs.

JAMES RIOUX & others.1

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, Joshua Carrier, appeals from a judgment

entered after a Superior Court judge allowed the defendants'

motion for judgment on the pleadings, thereby affirming a

decision of the Department of Correction (department) denying

the plaintiff's request for reasonable accommodations to his

cell based on his height.2 We affirm.

1James O'Gara and the Massachusetts Department of
Correction.

2The plaintiff also appealed from an order denying his
postjudgment motion for an enlargement of time to file a motion
for reconsideration. As the plaintiff made no argument
addressing this order in his briefing, we do not consider it
further. See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as appearing in 481
Mass. 1628 (2019).
Background. In 2021, the plaintiff, an inmate at Old

Colony Correctional Center (OCCC), made a request for reasonable

accommodations under the department's Reasonable Accommodations

for Inmates policy, 103 DOC 408 (2018), implementing the

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et

seq., and similar state law provisions. The plaintiff, who is

six feet, seven inches tall, described his disability as "too

tall for normal items" and requested an extended mattress and

changes to the desk and chair inside his cell. OCCC's deputy

superintendent and acting ADA coordinator, defendant James

Rioux, denied the plaintiff's requests because (1) he already

had a longer mattress, which was in good condition, and had been

authorized by the medical department to obtain an additional

mattress, and (2) the seat and desk could not be modified

because of "security reasons." The plaintiff appealed Rioux's

decision to the department's ADA coordinator for inmates,

defendant James O'Gara. After consulting with OCCC's health

services administrator, who consulted with medical providers at

the facility, O'Gara denied the appeal on the ground that the

plaintiff had not demonstrated that he had a "diagnosed

impairment" entitling him to accommodations under the ADA.

The plaintiff filed a complaint for judicial review in the

Superior Court under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, requesting that the

2
defendants "redo" his ADA request and approve the accommodations

he had requested. He also requested a declaration under G. L.

c. 231A, § 1, that he has a disability that affects at least one

of his daily life functions, that he is "covered" by the ADA,

and that he is entitled to accommodations. Acting on cross

motions for judgment on the pleadings, the judge entered

judgment for the defendants, affirming the department's denial

of the plaintiff's request. The plaintiff appeals.

Discussion. Our review of an order allowing judgment on

the pleadings is de novo. See Sullivan v. Superintendent, Mass.

Correctional. Inst., Shirley, 101 Mass. App. Ct. 766, 775

(2022). That is, we review the same administrative record as

the Superior Court judge and reach our own determination whether

the defendants are entitled to judgment. See Miller v.

Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., Shirley, 99 Mass. App.

Ct. 395, 400-401 (2021).

Where, as here, an inmate has filed a grievance against

prison officials concerning conditions of confinement and has

exhausted administrative remedies, the inmate may seek judicial

review of the decision under G. L. c. 30A, § 14. See

Fitzpatrick v. Department of Correction, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 617,

619 (2023); Sullivan, 101 Mass. App. Ct. at 772; Davis v.

Commonwealth, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 398, 399 (2019); Grady v.

3
Commissioner of Correction, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 126, 131-132

(2013). Only the final decision of the agency, in this case

O'Gara's denial of the plaintiff's appeal, is subject to

judicial review. See Paquette v. Department of Envtl.

Protection, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 844, 847 (2002). We may set aside

or modify the department's decision only if we determine the

decision "exceeded the statutory authority or jurisdiction of

the agency, was based on an error of law, was made upon unlawful

procedure, was unwarranted by facts found in the record . . . ,

or was arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or

otherwise not in accordance with law." Fitzpatrick, 102 Mass.

App. Ct. at 619, citing G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

The plaintiff contends that the department's failure to

recognize his height as a disability was erroneous as a matter

of law and not supported by the facts in the administrative

record, which showed that a standard bed was too short for him

to sleep and that he was unable to sit at the desk in his cell.

Although we are sympathetic to the plaintiff's claims, the

record does not permit us to conclude that the department's

decision is reversible under G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

As relevant here, the ADA's definition of "disability" is

"a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one

or more major life activities." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). The

4
department's policy likewise defined a "disabled inmate" as

"[a]n inmate who has a physical or mental impairment that

substantially limits one or more major life activities." 103

DOC § 408.02 (2018).3 Assuming for the purposes of this appeal

that the plaintiff's height substantially limits his ability to

sleep in a bed that is too short and to eat or type at the fixed

desk and chair in his cell, and that these are major life

activities, the plaintiff's claim falters on the requirement

that these activities be limited by a "physical or mental

impairment."

The ADA does not define what qualifies as a physical

impairment, but the United States Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission's regulations implementing the ADA do, as follows:

"Any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic

disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more body

systems, such as neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense

organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular,

reproductive, digestive, genitourinary, immune, circulatory,

hemic, lymphatic, skin, and endocrine." 29 C.F.R.

§ 1630.2(h)(1) (2011). While we are not aware of any

3 As of January 2025, the policy replaced the definition of
"disabled inmate" with a definition of "incarcerated individual
or civil commitment with a disability," which has essentially
the same definition. 103 DOC § 408.02 (2025).

5
authoritative decision on point,4 the majority of decisions

considering whether obesity qualifies as a physical impairment

conclude that it is not, unless it is caused by a physiological

disorder. "Taken as a whole, the relevant statutory and

regulatory language makes it clear that for obesity to qualify

as a physical impairment -- and thus a disability -- under the

ADA, it must result from an underlying physiological disorder or

condition." Morriss v. BNSF Ry. Co., 817 F.3d 1104, 1109 (8th

Cir.), cert denied, 580 U.S. 875 (2016). Accord Richardson v.

Chicago Transit Auth., 926 F.3d 881, 887–888 (7th Cir. 2019)

(collecting cases). The defendants could have reasonably

concluded that the same reasoning applied to height.

The plaintiff does not allege, and the record does not

demonstrate, that his height is the result of a physiological

disorder or condition. Accordingly, the department's

determination that the plaintiff did not have a "diagnosed

impairment," and was not entitled accommodations on that basis,

appears to be correct as a matter of law and supported by the

record. The Superior Court judge's decision, affirming the

department's action on the plaintiff's request for

4 Of the very few unpublished trial court decisions we have
found that discuss allegations similar to the plaintiff's, all
concluded that height was not a qualifying disability under the
ADA.

6
accommodations and denying declaratory relief, must therefore be

affirmed.5

Judgment affirmed.

Order denying motion for
enlargement of time to file
motion for reconsideration
affirmed.

By the Court (Massing,
Neyman & Wood, JJ.6),

Clerk

Entered: May 9, 2025.

5 We note that the initial decision to deny the plaintiff's
request for an extended mattress was based, in large part, on
the fact that he already had one, and that a second mattress had
already been preapproved. We were advised at oral argument,
however, that, in an effort to provide higher quality mattresses
throughout the plaintiff's facility, the department had given
the plaintiff a too-short mattress, but we were reassured by
department counsel's representation that this was a mistake,
that a ninety-inch-long mattress had been ordered, and that the
plaintiff would receive the new mattress forthwith. Nothing in
this decision, which is limited to the plaintiff's claim for
accommodations under the department's ADA policy, should be
understood to relieve the department of its obligation to act
consistently with counsel's representation.

6 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

7