EAST LONGMEADOW REDEVELOPERS, LLC v. TOWN OF EAST LONGMEADOW & Others.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-123

EAST LONGMEADOW REDEVELOPERS, LLC

vs.

TOWN OF EAST LONGMEADOW & others.1

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The Fields at Chestnut Condominium Trust (Fields Trust), an

abutter to a property in East Longmeadow, appeals from the

denial of its motion to intervene in an action between East

Longmeadow Redevelopers, LLC (developer), and the town of East

Longmeadow (town) and the town's planning board (board).2 The

Fields Trust maintains that it has standing under G. L. c. 240,

§ 14A, and meets all the requirements to intervene as of right,

including that the town and the board did not adequately

1Planning board of East Longmeadow and the Fields at
Chestnut Condominium Trust, prospective intervener.

2Neither the developer nor the town filed a brief in this
appeal. An attorney for the town appeared for argument and
answered questions from the panel.
represent the abutter's interests. We agree and accordingly

reverse.

Background. In August 2022, the developer filed a site

plan review application with the board pursuant to Article IX

"Site Plan Review" of the town's zoning bylaws in connection

with the developer's proposed development of a warehouse that

will occupy nearly thirteen acres and have one hundred loading

docks. On May 2, 2023, following a series of public hearings,

the board approved the site plan subject to certain conditions.

On May 16, 2023, despite the previous approval, the town

continued to consider public comment on proposed conditions

imposed on the developer's plan. Eventually, after further

review, the town reversed its previous decision and voted to

deny the developer's site plan.

The developer filed suit in the Land Court. Its amended

complaint includes four counts: (1) a claim under G. L. c. 40A,

§ 11, for "Failure to Provide Notice"; (2) for declaratory

judgment under G. L. c. 231A, §§ 1 & 2; (3) for declaratory

judgment pursuant to G. L. c. 240, § 14A; and (4) for judicial

review under G. L. c. 40A, § 17. The Fields Trust, which is a

senior living community with over one hundred units that

immediately abuts the developer's property, moved to intervene

by right and alternatively by permission on the developer's

2
G. L. c. 240, § 14A, claim pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P.

24 (a) (2) & (b) (2), 365 Mass. 769 (1974). The motion judge

denied the Fields Trust's motion to intervene. This appeal

followed.3

Discussion. A judge should allow a motion to intervene as

of right when "(1) the applicant claims an interest in the

subject of the action, . . . (2) [the applicant] is situated so

that [its] ability to protect this interest may be impaired as a

practical matter by the disposition of the action, and (3) [the

applicant's] interest is not adequately represented by the

existing parties." Massachusetts Fed'n of Teachers, AFT, AFL-

CIO v. School Comm. of Chelsea, 409 Mass. 203, 205 (1991)

(Massachusetts Fed'n of Teachers). See Mass. R. Civ. P.

24 (a) (2). "Whether the prospective intervener has met the

requirements for intervention is a question of law, and

therefore we review the ruling de novo" (quotation and citation

omitted). Beacon Residential Mgt., LP v. R.P., 477 Mass. 749,

753 (2017).

3 In a motion for reconsideration, the Fields Trust
clarified that it was seeking to intervene on the developer's
G. L. c. 240, § 14A, claim. The judge denied the motion for
reconsideration, citing the Fields Trust's inability to show
inadequacy of representation by the town as required for
intervention as of right under Mass. R. Civ. P. 24 (a) (2).

3
The Fields Trust claims that it was entitled to

intervention as of right because it had compelling interests

that were distinct and not adequately represented by the town

and the board. "The burden of showing the inadequacy of the

representation is on the applicant." Attorney Gen. v. Brockton

Agric. Soc., 390 Mass. 431, 434 (1983). However, the

determination if an applicant has met its burden is case and

fact specific. See Massachusetts Fed'n of Teachers, 409 Mass.

at 206 ("There is no single standard for determining when an

applicant has carried his burden because the circumstances of

the case determine the weight of that burden"). In cases where

a

"prospective intervener's interest is similar to, but not
identical with that of one of the parties, a discriminating
judgment is required on the circumstances of the particular
case, but [the applicant] ordinarily should be allowed to
intervene unless it is clear that the [existing] party will
provide adequate representation for the [applicant]"
(quotation omitted).4

Bridgeman v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 471 Mass.

465, 485 (2015), S.C., 476 Mass. 298 (2017), quoting Mayflower

4 "If the interest of the prospective intervener is
identical to that of one of the present parties, or if there is
a party charged by law with representing his interest, then a
compelling showing should be required to demonstrate why this
representation is not adequate" (quotation omitted). Bridgeman
v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 471 Mass. 465, 485
(2015), S.C., 476 Mass. 298 (2017).

4
Dev. Corp. v. Dennis, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 630, 637 (1981). "These

interests should be compared from the perspective of the result

sought by [the] proposed intervener vis-a-vis the result sought

by the existing party" (quotation and citation omitted).

Mayflower Dev. Corp., supra.

We conclude that the Fields Trust's motion to intervene

should have been allowed. At oral argument, counsel for the

town conceded that the interests of the municipal defendants and

the Fields Trust are not necessarily aligned.5 See, e.g., Nextel

Communications of the Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. Hanson, 311

F. Supp. 2d 142, 152 (D. Mass. 2004) (party met threshold of

intervention as of right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24[a] by showing

the town would not adequately represent party's interests in

potential settlement negotiations). Indeed, before the motion

judge, the town did not dispute the Fields Trust's statement

that the town is a small "financially stressed municipality that

5 From the record and representation by the attorney for the
town, the town did not take a position on the motion in the Land
Court. On appeal, counsel for the town noted that "the town and
[Fields Trust] have not always been on the same page as far as
what the concerns [about the project] might be," and how the
plan might be modified to address those concerns. Town counsel
did not agree that the town's interests were different than
those of the Fields Trust, but did say that he could foresee "a
scenario where [the town's] goals might diverge from [the Fields
Trust's] goals."

5
lacks adequate financial resources to oppose" the project.6 The

Fields Trust's concerns such as adverse impacts of traffic,

noise, and deterioration of air quality caused by the

developer's proposed warehouse and particularly the solutions to

those concerns are not necessarily the same for the town.

Moreover, allowing for intervention in this case aligns

broadly with the permissive nature of abutter claims under G. L.

c. 240, § 14A.

"The primary purpose of proceedings under § 14A is to
determine how and with what rights and limitations the land
of the person seeking an adjudication may be used under the
provisions of a zoning enactment in terms applicable to it,
particularly where there is no controversy and hence no
basis for other declaratory relief."

Harrison v. Braintree, 355 Mass. 651, 654 (1969). The Supreme

Judicial Court in Harrison deemed "appropriate a broad

construction of c. 240, § 14A," id. at 654, and allowed for a

"petition [under G. L. c. 240, § 14A,] by a landowner on whose

land there is a direct effect of the zoning enactment through

the permitted use of other land." Id. at 655. See Hansen &

Donahue, Inc. v. Norwood, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 292, 296 (2004)

(abutting property owner permitted to bring a G. L. c. 240,

§ 14A, action when "experiencing the direct effect of the

challenged permitted use" under the contested bylaw); Hanna v.

6 The town adopted the Fields Trust's motion to dismiss
certain developer's claims, rather than submit its own.

6
Framingham, 60 Mass. App. Ct. 420, 422 (2004) (neighboring

landowner may bring G. L. c. 240, § 14A, action "if the use of

such other land pursuant to the zoning amendment 'directly and

adversely affects the permitted use of his land'" [citation

omitted]); Fitch v. Board of Appeals of Concord, 55 Mass. App.

Ct. 748, 754 (2002) (neighboring landowner could petition

pursuant to G. L. c. 240, § 14A, "where the proposed use on that

other land has a direct effect on his"). Given the court's

expansive approach for parties to petition under G. L. c. 240,

§ 14A, it should follow that this approach extends to abutting

parties seeking to intervene on a G. L. c. 240, § 14A, claim as

well.

Conclusion. The order denying the motion to intervene is

reversed, and a new order shall enter allowing the motion.

So ordered.

By the Court (Henry, Hand &
Brennan, JJ.7),

Clerk

Entered: July 8, 2025.

7 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

7