Commonwealth v. Anthony M. Valenti.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-965

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

ANTHONY M. VALENTI.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Following a jury-waived trial in the District Court, the

defendant, Anthony M. Valenti, was convicted of violation of an

abuse prevention order under G. L. c. 209A, § 7.1 The defendant,

representing himself, appeals his conviction on numerous

grounds. We affirm.

Background. The victim and the defendant began dating in

2021 and had a child together in 2022. The relationship ended

in 2023, and the victim sought and received an abuse prevention

order on May 8, 2023, requiring the defendant not to abuse or

1The judge allowed the defendant's motion for a required
finding of not guilty on an unrelated violation of an abuse
prevention order complaint that was joined for trial with this
case.
contact her. The defendant and the victim have an ongoing

matter in the Probate and Family Court. The victim retained

counsel in that matter. Correspondence from the defendant went

through her counsel, and the defendant contacted the victim's

counsel frequently. The victim had sole legal and physical

custody of the child at the time, and the defendant filed a

motion for temporary orders in the Probate and Family Court

seeking visitation with the child.

The victim received a letter in the mail addressed to her,

and she recognized the handwriting as the defendant's and the

return address as his address. She testified that inside the

envelope was a letter from the defendant "threatening all the

things that he wanted in probate court." The victim filed a

report with the police alleging the violation of the abuse

prevention order. The defendant testified that he knew the

victim was represented by counsel and that when he told an

employee of the Probate and Family Court that the victim had an

active abuse prevention order against him, that employee told

him to mail any motions to the victim and her attorney.

Discussion. We begin by noting that the defendant has

cited no legal authority to support his arguments which do not

rise to the level of appellate argument as required by Mass. R.

A. P. 16 (a) (9) (a), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019), and

2
fail for that reason alone. However, in reviewing the record

and considering the defendant's arguments, see Commonwealth v.

Alphas, 430 Mass. 8, 13 (1999) (limiting review to whether there

was any error, and if so, whether that error created substantial

risk of miscarriage of justice) we discern no error and conclude

that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.2

1. Sufficiency of the evidence. The defendant argues that

the evidence at trial does not support his conviction for

violation of an abuse prevention order. We disagree.

In determining the sufficiency of the evidence at trial,

"we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth to determine whether 'any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.'" Commonwealth v. Powell, 459 Mass. 572, 579

(2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1262 (2012), quoting Commonwealth

v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979), S.C., 423 Mass. 129

(1996).

To establish a violation of an abuse prevention order, the

Commonwealth must prove that (1) a valid c. 209A abuse

2 While we are not insensitive to challenges faced by self-
represented litigants, we hold them to the same standards as
litigants represented by counsel. See Davis v. Tabachnick, 425
Mass. 1010 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 982 (1997); Pandey v.
Roulston, 419 Mass. 1010 (1995) ("The fact that the plaintiff is
pro se does not excuse him from compliance with relevant rules
of substantive and procedural law").

3
prevention order was in effect on the date of the alleged

violation; (2) the defendant had knowledge of the order; and (3)

the defendant violated the order. Commonwealth v. Silva, 431

Mass. 401, 403 (2000).

The defendant does not contest that a valid abuse

prevention order was in effect at the time of the violation or

that he knew about the order, nor does he dispute that he mailed

the victim a motion for temporary orders. He argues that he was

"merely attempting to exercise his legal rights" by sending the

motion to the victim and that the Probate and Family Court's

decision to grant him visitation with his child "demonstrates

the legitimacy" of his actions. The argument is unavailing.

"A person subject to a G. L. c. 209A 'no contact' order

violates it by communicating by any means with a protected party

or merely by being near that person." Commonwealth v. Kendrick,

446 Mass. 72, 76 (2006). To prevent any interaction between the

parties, the "obligations are imposed without regard to a

person's intent to violate an order." Id. The defendant

refused to answer when asked by the prosecutor multiple times

whether he knew that the victim's attorney would notify her if

he served the attorney. The judge did not find the defendant

credible, stating that "[t]he defendant's defiant testimony

extinguished the reasonable doubt that I had" and finding that

4
the defendant's action "was merely a pretext of an excuse for

contacting [the victim]." Because the judge was best positioned

to evaluate the defendant's demeanor and assess his credibility,

we discern no error. See Commonwealth v. Werner, 81 Mass. App.

Ct. 689, 698 (2012) ("We are in no position to substitute our

judgment for that of the judge on credibility questions").

The defendant claims that language in a document he

received from the District Court -- titled "Notice to Defendant

Regarding Abuse Prevention (Restraining) Order" -- gave him the

right to mail legal documents to the victim. We disagree. The

defendant argues that the language on the notice stating that

"[t]he court staff will let you know . . . if you need to send

the plaintiff notice of the hearing date by mail" gave him the

right to send legal mail to the plaintiff. However, as

demonstrated by the title of the document, "Notice to Defendant

Regarding Abuse Prevention (Restraining) Order," the information

in the document refers to correspondence regarding abuse

prevention orders, not Probate and Family Court orders.

The defendant argues that the prosecutor's characterization

of the envelope as "a threatening letter" violated his due

process rights. We are not persuaded because this argument

conflates the victim's testimony with the prosecutor's argument.

Only the victim characterized the letter inside the envelope as

5
threatening, stating that the letter "threaten[ed] all the

things that he wanted in probate court." Even if we were to

conclude that the contents of the envelope were not threatening

in nature, the defendant's argument still fails because the

Commonwealth is not required to show that the contact was

threatening. See Silva, 431 Mass. at 200 ("to obtain a

conviction, the Commonwealth is not required to prove that the

defendant actually intended to violate the order, but only to

prove that the act constituting the violation was voluntary").

We discern no error.

The defendant claims that the prosecutor failed to meet the

"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard required for a conviction

by failing to introduce the letter into evidence. We disagree.

The prosecutor was not required to produce the actual letter to

prove that the defendant violated the abuse prevention order.

The defendant concedes that he mailed the motion for temporary

orders to the victim and that he knew about the abuse prevention

order at the time. Viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth, we conclude there was sufficient

evidence that the defendant intended to mail the temporary

orders to the victim, thereby violating the no contact provision

of the abuse prevention order. See Silva, 431 Mass. at 200.

6
2. Ineffective assistance of counsel. The defendant

claims that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of

counsel because of his "confusing arguments, failure to

introduce relevant evidence, and overall lack of preparation."

We are not persuaded. To sustain a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel, the defendant must show that "behavior of

counsel [fell] measurably below that which might be expected

from an ordinary fallible lawyer," and that such failing "likely

deprived the defendant of an otherwise available, substantial

ground of [defense]." Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89,

96 (1974). "[T]he preferred method for raising a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel is through a motion for a new

trial." Commonwealth v. Zinser, 446 Mass. 807, 810 (2006).

"[A]n ineffective assistance of counsel challenge made on the

trial record alone is the weakest form of such a challenge

because it is bereft of any explanation by trial counsel for his

actions and suggestive of strategy contrived by a defendant

viewing the case with hindsight." Commonwealth v. Peloquin, 437

Mass. 204, 210 n.5 (2002). Therefore, a "claim of ineffective

assistance may be resolved on direct appeal of the defendant's

conviction when the factual basis of the claim appears

indisputably on the trial record" (citation omitted). Zinser,

supra at 811. This is not such a case. The defendant does not

7
specify how counsel's arguments were confusing or identify what

"relevant evidence" trial counsel failed to introduce. On the

record before us, we conclude that the defendant's claim of

ineffective assistance fails.3

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Rubin, Neyman &
Tan, JJ.4),

Clerk

Entered: August 12, 2025.

3 To the extent that we have not specifically addressed
subsidiary arguments in the defendant's brief, they have not
been overlooked. We find nothing in them that requires further
discussion. See Commonwealth v. Domanski, 332 Mass. 66, 78
(1954).

4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

8