Commonwealth v. Cecil J. Baldwin.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-862

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

CECIL J. BALDWIN.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

On June 22, 2023, the defendant entered a conditional plea

of guilty to trafficking in cocaine and possession of marijuana.

See Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 (b) (6), as appearing in 482 Mass. 1501

(2019). He also pleaded guilty to operating a motor vehicle

while under the influence of drugs (OUI-drugs).1 The charges

arose from the stop and subsequent inventory search of the car

the defendant was driving in the early morning hours of March

1The defendant also was charged with multiple civil
infractions including a marked lanes violation, G. L. c. 89,
§ 4A, operating an unregistered motor vehicle, G. L. c. 90, § 9,
operating an uninsured motor vehicle, G. L. c. 90, § 34J, and
possession of an open container of alcohol, G. L. c. 90C, § 24I.
The Commonwealth entered a nolle prosequi as to the charge of
operating an uninsured vehicle, and the defendant was found not
responsible of the remaining charges.
19, 2022. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the drugs

(cocaine and marijuana) and money (around $2,000) that were

found in the car claiming, among other things, that the items

were discovered and seized unlawfully because the search was

conducted without a warrant or valid consent. At the hearing on

his motion, the defendant further contended that the items

should be suppressed because the troopers violated the State

police written towing policy, and thus the inventory search was

unlawful. The motion was denied by a judge of the District

Court in a comprehensive memorandum of decision and order. We

affirm.

Background. We summarize the facts as found by the motion

judge, supplemented by uncontested evidence presented at the

hearing. At approximately 12:15 A.M., Trooper Brittany

Martineau responded to a report of an erratic driver on

Interstate 91 in Springfield and observed the defendant driving

a Honda sedan at a low rate of speed from "left to right, left

to right" in the northbound travel lane. At one point the

defendant crossed over the "skip lane" and then came to a

complete stop in the right travel lane. Trooper Martineau

activated her emergency lights and pulled up behind the

defendant. After instructing the defendant to move his car into

the breakdown lane, which he did, Trooper Martineau approached

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the passenger side of the car and advised the defendant of her

concern that he was not driving safely and that other motorists

had reported similar concerns to the police. The defendant

appeared to be significantly impaired; he was flailing his arms

and did not know he was in Springfield. The car belonged to the

defendant's girlfriend and was not insured or registered.

Soon thereafter, a second trooper, Brendan Woeller, arrived

at the scene. He ordered the defendant out of the car, and when

the defendant opened the car door, Trooper Woeller saw a plastic

bag containing what he believed to be cocaine in the driver's

side door panel. As Trooper Martineau began to administer field

sobriety tests to the defendant, Trooper Woeller returned to the

car and seized the cocaine. Based on Trooper Martineau's

testimony and video footage of Trooper Woeller's body-worn

camera, the judge found that the cocaine was in "plain view"

when the defendant "hopped" out of the car.

Meanwhile, Trooper Martineau continued to conduct field

sobriety tests, none of which the defendant could perform

satisfactorily. Around this time, a third trooper and

paramedics arrived. The paramedics examined the defendant and

asked if he had any drugs in his system, to which the defendant

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responded, "probably marijuana."2 Ultimately, Trooper Martineau

formed the opinion that the defendant was under the influence

and placed him under arrest. Once the defendant was arrested,

or, as the judge found, "perhaps prior to the defendant's formal

arrest," the troopers made arrangements to have the car towed.

Before the tow truck arrived, the troopers conducted an

inventory search of the car and seized ten to twelve bags of

marijuana, seventy-five grams of cocaine, and approximately

$2,000 in cash. The car was then towed from the scene.

On the basis of these facts, the judge concluded that the

discovery of the cocaine was justified under the plain view

doctrine and that even if the cocaine had been seized

prematurely, it would have been lawfully discovered during the

subsequent inventory search and, therefore, alternatively, the

cocaine was admissible at trial under the inevitable discovery

doctrine. The judge further concluded that the marijuana and

cash were properly found and seized during the course of a

lawful impoundment and inventory search conducted pursuant to

written inventory and tow policies, which were introduced as

exhibits at the hearing.

2 Footage from a body-worn camera is documentary evidence,
and we may review such evidence de novo. See Commonwealth v.
Tremblay, 480 Mass. 645, 656 (2018).

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Discussion. "In reviewing a ruling on an order on a motion

to suppress, we accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact

absent clear error 'but conduct an independent review of his

ultimate findings and conclusions of law.'" Commonwealth v.

Scott, 440 Mass. 642, 646 (2004).

As noted above, the defendant entered a conditional plea so

as to preserve his challenge to the denial of his motion to

suppress.3 He argues that the judge erred by allowing Trooper

Martineau to testify as to what Trooper Woeller saw when the

defendant got out of his car. Relying on Commonwealth v. King,

67 Mass. App. Ct. 823, 830 (2006), in which we affirmed the

allowance of a motion to suppress where the officer who made a

plain view observation of drugs did not testify at the motion

hearing, the defendant contends that the judge could not

properly conclude that the cocaine was seized under the plain

view doctrine based solely on Trooper Martineau's testimony.

However, we need not decide whether the judge's reliance on

Trooper Martineau's testimony was improper because there was

additional evidence apart from Trooper Martineau's testimony

that supported the judge's finding. Both Trooper Martineau and

3 We acknowledge, as the Commonwealth notes in its brief,
that the motion to suppress had no effect on the defendant's
conviction of OUI-drugs and that his guilty plea to that charge
was unconditional.

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Trooper Woeller wore body cameras, and the video footage of

Trooper Woeller's camera, which was introduced at the hearing by

the defendant, supports the judge's finding that Trooper Woeller

"saw the plastic bag of cocaine" and was "justified in returning

to the defendant's car and pulling the plastic bag out of the

door panel" to examine it. The judge expressly relied on the

video footage in reaching his conclusion. As such, the finding

is not clearly erroneous. See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 429 Mass.

403, 405 (1999) ("motion judge's findings of fact are binding in

the absence of clear error").

Next, the defendant argues that the marijuana and

approximately $2,000 in cash found during the inventory search

of the car should have been suppressed because the troopers did

not follow their written inventory and towing policies. More

specifically, he claims the troopers violated the towing policy

by calling for a tow before he was formally arrested.4 We

discern no merit to this argument where, as here, the towing

policy explicitly permits the towing of any vehicle that is

"[n]ot validly registered or insured." Put simply, under the

circumstances presented, it matters not whether the tow

4 Although the Commonwealth had the burden of proving the
constitutionality of both the towing of the vehicle and the
inventory search, the defendant challenges only the propriety of
the tow.

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procedure was initiated before a formal arrest of the defendant

occurred. Because the car was not registered or insured, it was

properly subject to being towed even if the defendant had not

been arrested. In addition, the vehicle could not be safely

left on the highway at that time of the night. See Commonwealth

v. Rosario-Santiago, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 166, 175 (2019) (car

could not reasonably be left on side of Route 495 at 6 P.M.).

Consequently, the inventory search, the lawfulness of which

"turns on the threshold propriety of the vehicle's impoundment"

likewise was proper. Id. Moreover, to the extent the defendant

maintains that he should have been offered the possibility of

making other arrangements, we note that no other driver could

lawfully drive the car. Contrast Commonwealth v. Oliveira, 474

Mass. 10, 15-16 (2016) (motion to suppress properly allowed

where impounded vehicle was lawfully parked in department store

lot and driver, who had been arrested, provided reasonable

practical alternative to towing vehicle). Furthermore, contrary

to the defendant's assertion, the police were not obligated to

make alternative arrangements on behalf of the owner of the car.

See Commonwealth v. Eddington, 459 Mass. 102, 109 (2011) (police

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have no obligation to locate or telephone registered owner to

determine his or her wishes).

Order denying motion to
suppress affirmed.

By the Court (Vuono,
Massing & Allen, JJ.5),

Clerk

Entered: October 10, 2025.

5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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