ADAM JAMES BRADLEY v. WILLIAM A. LISANO & Others.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-500

ADAM JAMES BRADLEY

vs.

WILLIAM A. LISANO1 & others.2

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

In this case, appellant Adam James Bradley appeals from the

judgment dismissing his complaint filed against the Commonwealth

and several employees of the Lowell District Court: clerk-

magistrate William A. Lisano; assistant clerk-magistrate Pamela

J. Edward; and a clerk, of unknown name, but denominated John

Doe (collectively, clerk's office defendants).

We review a motion to dismiss allowed under Mass.

R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), de novo. Lanier v.

1Individually and as clerk-magistrate of the Lowell
District Court.

2Pamela J. Edward, assistant clerk-magistrate of the Lowell
District Court; John Doe, a clerk of the Lowell District Court;
and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Defendants Edward and
Doe were sued in their official and individual capacities.
President & Fellows of Harvard College, 490 Mass. 37, 43 (2022).

We must accept all the allegations of the complaint as true, and

dismissal is appropriate only where the plaintiff has failed to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See id. See

also Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974).

Facts. We take the facts, therefore, from the complaint.

Bradley is an incarcerated person serving a life sentence at the

North Central Correctional Institute. He submitted to Lisano a

written request, pursuant to Rule 2(b) of the Uniform Rules on

Public Access to Court Records, Trial Court Rule XIV (2016)

(Uniform Rules), seeking search warrant numbers for a particular

time period as well as material related to a search warrant that

issued as part of the criminal investigation resulting in his

conviction and incarceration.

The copy of the request attached to the complaint made

clear that the request was pursuant to Rule 2 of the Uniform

Rules. In the request, Bradley sought what he referred to as an

"independent record" maintained by the clerk's office (separate

from the warrant application, affidavit, and return), which

recorded the actual date on which the application, affidavit,

and return were physically brought into the court "to be

filed/recorded/documented." Bradley also sought "any other

independent record or information separate from the [search

warrant] application, affidavit, and return purporting to show

2
specific names and times as to who were the person[s] to

physically bring [these items] into court," along with all

search warrant application numbers for a specific time period.

In the complaint, Bradley alleged that although he was

"unsure [of] the exact name of the records he [sought]," he

understood that the defendants "maintain[ed] sep[a]rate court

records from the actual search warrant documents, whether in a

sep[a]rate log, index, document, hard copy or electronic data

format detailing information as to exactly when the search

warrant application affidavit and return [were] actually brought

in and filed in court."

As alleged in the complaint, neither the clerk-magistrate,

nor any other member of the clerk's office, provided the

information that Bradley requested. Bradley subsequently

submitted four more requests to the same effect. He received no

response to the first four requests. Bradley asserted his

belief that Lisano, through clerk Doe, responded after the fifth

request, not by providing the records or addressing the merits

of the requests, but instead by "implicitly informing [Bradley]

to . . . talk to his appellate counsel." Bradley also alleged

that he sent the clerk's office defendants letters and e-mail

messages seeking information about his requests, all of which

received no response.

3
Over eight months after his initial request, Bradley mailed

the clerk's office a document entitled "motion requesting court

to order clerk to provide Adam Bradley with dates on which

warrant application, affidavit, and return was physically

brought to court" (motion). The motion was captioned "In re

search warrant issued on July 7, 2012 on application of Trooper

Anthony DeLucia." The text of the motion contained citations to

the Uniform Rules and asked the court to provide the information

described above, except for the search warrant numbers.

Although the motion was not verified, a copy was attached as an

exhibit to the complaint. In a passage of the motion that seems

at variance with Bradley's assertion that he received no

response from the clerk's office except after filing the fifth

request, Bradley asserted that "[e]very attempt [he] makes with

[the] Clerk to obtain the actual filing dates, the Clerk's

answer is non-responsive to [his] request either telling [him]

to take the issue up with his Attorney, or that the date is on

the [search warrant]," a copy of which was in his possession.

Bradley further asserted in the motion that he "does not want

the dates that [are] signed on the Physical [search warrant], he

wants the [search warrant's] actual filing dates logged and

documented by this court/clerk's office." In his complaint,

Bradley asserted that the clerk's office refused to forward the

motion to a judge for consideration.

4
In September 2021, Bradley filed the complaint in which he

alleged twelve distinct claims.3 Some were claims for money

damages against the clerk's office defendants in their

individual capacities.4 Others were claims seeking injunctive

relief, mandamus, see G. L. c. 249, § 5, and declaratory relief

against all the defendants, in both their individual and

official capacities.

Discussion. 1. Uniform Rules. Some background about the

Uniform Rules is in order. Rule 1(b) of the Uniform Rules

states,

"[t]hese rules govern access to the court records of the
Trial Court. These rules apply to all court records,
regardless of the physical form, method of recording, or
method of storage, subject to these rules and the
technological capacity of the Trial Court to make such a
court record available."

Rule 1(e) of the Uniform Rules defines "[c]ourt record" as "all

or any portion of court papers, documents, exhibits, orders,

recordings, dockets, and other records that are made, entered,

3 It contains only eleven counts, but one has two claims
subsumed within it.

4 These included claims for conspiracy to violate, and
actual violation of, Bradley's common-law right to access public
court records; multiple theories for violations of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 based on violations of Bradley's First Amendment and
equal protection rights; violations of the Massachusetts Civil
Rights Act, G. L. c. 12, §§ 11H, 11I; and intentional infliction
of emotional distress.

5
filed, and/or maintained by the Clerk in connection with a case

or proceeding."

The Uniform Rules provide an independent right of access

for all members of the public beyond the rights of a criminal

defendant to information about their case. Rule 2(b) of the

Uniform Rules provides that "[a]ny member of the public may

submit to the Clerk at a courthouse a request to access a court

record . . . . The requester shall not be required to disclose

the reason for the request." Rule 2(d)(1) of the Uniform Rules

states, "The Clerk shall respond promptly upon receipt of a

request for access to a court record." There is no requirement

of acting through counsel.

The defendants argue that the data sought in this case "are

not judicial records." They argue that this data are "never

filed." But this reads the plain language of the Uniform Rules

too narrowly. As the language quoted above states, court

records include records that are "made, entered, filed, and/or

maintained by the Clerk in connection with a case or

proceeding." Rule 1(e) of the Uniform Rules. Any such item is

a public record subject to disclosure, see Rules 1(b), 1(c),

2(a), and 2(d)(1) of the Uniform Rules, unless it is

"[p]rohibited from public disclosure," Rule 1(e) of the Uniform

Rules, which the defendants do not argue.

6
When a person requests a record, they are entitled to see

the information described, or to receive from the clerk's office

something that is responsive, by reference to the Uniform Rules,

to their request. We think this is required by Rule 2(d)(1) of

the Uniform Rules. That does not mean the clerk must

necessarily provide the information requested; for example, the

clerk must first determine that the requested records are not

impounded or otherwise "prohibited from public disclosure."

Rule 2(d)(1) of the Uniform Rules. Likewise, under Rule 2(c) of

the Uniform Rules, "[t]he Clerk may set reasonable limits on the

time, location, volume, and manner of access to protect the

integrity of the court record and to prevent undue disruption to

the operations of the Clerk's office." But the clerk's office

must provide the requested information, or an explanation for

its refusal to provide the requested information, that is

allowed by the Uniform Rules.5

Court clerks' offices serve the public, and we have a

difficult time imagining what legitimate interest of the clerk's

office or the court could be served by failing to respond

5 The defendants assert that the search warrant itself is
impounded, and therefore Bradley has no right of access to it.
We have no information about the impoundment order or its scope,
but in any event it is irrelevant. Bradley was explicitly clear
in his request that he did not seek the warrant application,
affidavit, or return itself.

7
promptly to a request for a public record as required by Rule

2(d)(1) of the Uniform Rules.

The Commonwealth argues that the defendants are not subject

to a mandamus or injunctive action for failure to respond to a

public records request under the Uniform Rules because

responding is discretionary. As Rule 2(d)(1) of the Uniform

Rule states, it is not. The defendants also argue that they are

entitled to judicial immunity. Although we need not address

such immunity with respect to all the various claims in this

case, mandamus and injunctive claims seeking to compel the clerk

of a court to follow its rules are not barred by judicial

immunity; an individual may properly seek relief in the nature

of mandamus to compel a clerk of the trial court to comply with

its rules. See, e.g., Zatsky v. Zatsky, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 7,

12-13 (1994). See also Caggiano v. Commonwealth, 406 Mass.

1004, 1005 (1990) (referring mandamus request to single justice

for disposition). And the Supreme Judicial Court has

entertained suits in which both injunctive and mandamus relief

have been ordered against a government official. See Johnson v.

Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 355 Mass. 94, 95 (1968).

Of course, mandamus is a last resort, and before mandamus

(or equivalent injunctive relief) can be sought the plaintiff

must seek alternative routes of redress. As we said in Zatsky,

8
36 Mass. App. Ct. at 12-13, which involved somewhat similar

circumstances to the present case,

"If an appellant experiences delay in assembly of the
record, a pragmatic first step is to report the problem to
the clerk of the Appeals Court, the court with which the
appeal would lodge in the first instance. Often a clerk
to clerk (or, in this case, register of probate)
communication may produce the desired expedition. The
next steps, as in the case of judge delay, would be a
request for intervention by the chief judge of the trial
court concerned, invocation of the superintendency powers
of the Supreme Judicial Court, and mandamus. A party may
also bring a motion before a single justice of the Appeals
Court either to compel a clerk or register to assemble a
record promptly or to waive assembly of the record as a
prerequisite to entering the appeal."

Filing a motion with the court so that a judge may

determine what the clerk's office is required to do would be an

appropriate, "pragmatic" first step. Zatsky, 36 Mass. App. Ct.

at 12. Such a motion must be provided to a judge for

disposition. It need not set forth the docket number of some

other case; it is not a filing in any other case. And the

clerk's office may give it a docket number or take any other

procedural steps as a matter of internal operation of the office

to allow it to be properly filed and delivered to a judge for

consideration. Again, a clerk's office accepting for filing a

motion like the one in this case (that is otherwise in

compliance with the Uniform Rules), and delivering it to a

judge, are not discretionary acts.

9
2. This case. Whether the Uniform Rules were violated,

which is the basis of this case, thus turns on whether Bradley

received an adequate response to his request under Rule 2(d)(1)

of the Uniform Rules. Although his complaint stated that legal

conclusion, the question is what facts were alleged. Bradley

alleged he received no response until his fifth request. With

respect to his fifth request, the complaint said, "It is

Plaintiff's belief, that, Lisano through clerk Doe had responded

to this request, implicitly informing Plaintiff to otherwise

talk to his appellate counsel and did not respond by providing

any records requested." Of course, "[f]or purposes of surviving

a motion to dismiss, . . . a party may allege facts based on

'information and belief,' . . . and we assume the truth of such

allegations." Polay v. McMahon, 468 Mass. 379, 383 n.5 (2014).

Here, however, the allegation is that clerk Doe responded in a

way that "implicitly" meant that Lisano was telling Bradley to

talk to his lawyer. Because Bradley fails to state what clerk

Doe's actual response was, we conclude that this allegation

fails to support a judgment in Bradley's favor. Consequently,

we agree with the motion judge that the complaint fails to state

10
a claim upon which relief can be granted, and we affirm the

judgment dismissing the complaint.6

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Rubin, Neyman &
Tan, JJ.7),

Clerk

Entered: October 27, 2025.

6 Nothing stated herein precludes Bradley from renewing his
request to the clerk's office to provide the information he
seeks under Rule 2(b) of the Uniform Rules. We trust the clerk
will respond appropriately in light of our outline of the law in
this area, either by providing the information, or explaining
why, under Rule 2(d)(1) of the Uniform Rules, he is not required
to do so. We express no opinion on that question. Should
Bradley continue to receive what he believes is no response or
an inadequate response from the clerk under the Uniform Rules,
nothing prevents him from filing a motion as he did here,
seeking a judicial order that the clerk's office follow the
Uniform Rules. Again, without expressing any opinion on the
possible merits of such a motion, we trust the clerk's office
will accept any such motion for filing and deliver it to a judge
for disposition. Finally, nothing precludes Bradley from
refiling a suit such as this should the clerk's office in fact
fail to respond to his requests or fail to forward to a judge
for disposition any motion Bradley files seeking relief.

7 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

11