Carmen Hardy-Rondash v. Cassidi Hardy.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-54

CARMEN HARDY-RONDASH

vs.

CASSIDI HARDY.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The parties, Carmen Hardy-Rondash (father) and Cassidi

Hardy (mother), were married in 2011. Four children were born

of the marriage between 2012 and 2020. In June 2019, the father

commenced divorce proceedings in the Probate and Family Court.

In January 2023, the parties submitted for incorporation into

the divorce judgment a "partial divorce agreement" (PDA)

resolving several disputed issues. The remaining issues were

tried on August 30 and September 8, 2023, and judgments issued

on November 16, 2023 (divorce judgment1). Among other things,

1The trial judge issued two identical judgments of divorce
nisi separately adjudicating the father's complaint for divorce
and the mother's counterclaim for divorce. For purposes of
simplicity, we refer to those judgments collectively as the
"divorce judgment."
the divorce judgment required the parties to comply with the

terms of the PDA, granted the father sole legal and primary

physical custody of the children, made the mother responsible

for all transportation during parenting time transitions,

ordered the mother to pay weekly child support of $389, and set

forth additional provisions concerning the children and the

parties' respective therapy-related obligations.

On appeal, the mother challenges (1) certain provisions of

the divorce judgment that conflict with the terms of the PDA;

(2) the allocation of all transportation responsibilities to

her; (3) the amount of child support; (4) certain therapy-

related provisions (including one that prohibits her from

seeking modification of custody and parenting time unless a

category E guardian ad litem previously appointed in the case

[GAL] has certified that she has engaged in appropriate

therapy); and (5) the judge's decision to limit the length of

the trial to two days.2 We vacate so much of the divorce

judgment that conflicts with the terms of the PDA, assigns all

transportation responsibilities to the mother, and prohibits the

mother from seeking modification absent the GAL's certification.

2 The mother is not challenging the judge's calculation of
child support arrears, the judge's determination of legal and
physical custody, or the parenting plan (apart from the discrete
issues raised in her brief with respect to the PDA and the
children's transportation). The mother has also waived her
appeal from a related contempt judgment issued in November 2023.

2
The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with

this memorandum and order. The divorce judgment is affirmed in

all other respects.

Discussion. 1. Partial divorce agreement. The mother

contends that the judge erred by including provisions in the

divorce judgment (concerning telephone contact with the children

and transportation of the children to extracurricular

activities) that directly conflict with provisions of the PDA,

which was incorporated into the divorce judgment. We agree.

With respect to telephone contact with the children, the

PDA allowed each parent to call the children once per day when

they are in the other parent's care (including Friday, Saturday,

and Sunday on alternating weekends). The divorce judgment,

however, departed from the terms of the PDA by (a) restricting

the parties' weekend telephone contact to Saturdays only

(thereby eliminating Fridays and Sundays), and (b) requiring the

mother's telephone contact on Tuesdays and Thursdays to occur at

7 P.M.3 The judge did not make any findings explaining the basis

for these changes.

With respect to the children's extracurricular activities,

the PDA provided, in relevant part, that each party "shall

3 Both parties' proposed judgments included a specific
window of time for the telephone contact to occur: the mother
proposed a window of 6 P.M. to 8:30 P.M., whereas the father
proposed a longer window of 4 P.M. to 8:30 P.M.

3
generally be responsible for transporting the children to and

from their agreed upon extracurricular activities . . . during

his/her respective parenting time" (emphasis added). The

divorce judgment, however, omitted "generally" and "agreed upon"

from the preceding sentence and further provided that the

parties "shall ensure that the children attend their scheduled

practices, games, and events during their respective parenting

time." It appears that these changes were adopted from the

father's posttrial amended proposed judgment. The judge did not

explain her reasoning for omitting the language in the PDA that

limited the parties' transportation obligations to "agreed upon"

extracurricular activities only. At trial, the mother testified

that the father unilaterally enrolled the children in

extracurricular activities during her parenting time (either

without consulting her or over her objection), often in

"inconvenient locations," which reduced her overall time spent

with the children and "t[ook] up a lot of [her] parenting time

with driving time." It is unclear whether the judge considered

this testimony, as she did not address it in her findings.

The mother contends that the judge erroneously

(1) revisited issues previously settled by the parties in the

PDA, asserting that "those issues were res judicata"; and

(2) entered a divorce judgment that conflicted with the PDA

without affording the mother notice and an opportunity to be

4
heard. We are not persuaded that the telephone contact and

extracurricular activities issues were subject to the doctrine

of res judicata by virtue of their inclusion in the PDA, given

that the PDA was not incorporated into a prior judgment (rather,

it was incorporated into the divorce judgment). See Santos v.

U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 687, 692 (2016).

However, we agree with the mother that she was deprived of

adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard on those issues.

In a June 2023 trial scheduling order (June 2023 order),

the trial judge ordered that the PDA "shall be incorporated into

the Court's final Judgment." There was nothing in the June 2023

order, or the parties' pretrial memoranda,4 indicating that the

issues addressed by the PDA remained contested for trial. See

Cavanagh v. Cavanagh, 490 Mass. 398, 426 (2022) ("[O]nce the

issues are defined in a final pretrial order, 'they ought to be

adhered to in the absence of some good and sufficient reason'"

[citation omitted]). Moreover, based on the record before us,

it appears that the father did not seek changes to the PDA until

after the trial had already concluded.5 Because there was no

4 The parties' pretrial memoranda included in the record
appendix did not identify the PDA, or the specific issues of
telephone contact and transportation to extracurricular
activities, as contested issues for trial.

5 At oral argument, the father stated that he sought changes
to the PDA in his amended proposed judgment filed after the
trial (a copy of which was included in the record appendix), but

5
indication from the judge or the father prior to (or during) the

trial that the telephone contact and extracurricular activities

issues remained in dispute, the mother was deprived of a

meaningful opportunity to be heard and present evidence on those

issues. See Brantley v. Hampden Div. of the Probate & Family

Court Dep't, 457 Mass. 172, 187 (2010) ("Due process requires,

at minimum, an opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and

in a meaningful manner'" [citation omitted]).

In addition to the notice problem, there is a potential

enforcement problem. The language of the divorce judgment is

internally inconsistent insofar as it provides that the parties

"shall abide by the terms of the [PDA]," yet includes certain

provisions that directly conflict with the "terms" of the PDA.

It is unclear which provisions are controlling and what the

parties' rights and obligations are with respect to telephone

contact and transportation of the children to extracurricular

activities. As a result, the conflicting provisions of the PDA

and divorce judgment have been rendered unenforceable insofar as

a contempt finding cannot be based on ambiguous language. See

Sax v. Sax, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 765, 771 (2002). A remand is

therefore necessary, not only to provide the mother with a

he could not recall whether he also sought those changes in his
proposed judgment filed on the first day of trial (a copy of
which was not included in the record appendix).

6
meaningful opportunity to be heard, but also to allow the judge

to redetermine and clarify the parties' rights and obligations

with respect to these issues.

2. Transportation during parenting time transitions. The

mother contends that the judge abused her discretion by

requiring the mother to be solely responsible for the children's

transportation during all parenting time transitions without

making adequate subsidiary findings in support thereof. We

agree.

In or around October 2021, the parties entered into an

agreement, which was incorporated into a temporary order,

setting forth a temporary parenting plan under which all

parenting time transitions would occur at the father's

residence. Although the mother agreed to shoulder the entire

transportation responsibility on a temporary basis, she sought

to share that responsibility with the father on a permanent

basis. In April 2022, the parties filed a stipulation

identifying as a contested issue for trial the allocation of

responsibility for the children's transportation during

parenting time transitions. The mother also listed it as a

contested issue for trial in her June 2023 pretrial memorandum,

stating that she was seeking to have the father share in the

transportation responsibilities. The mother reiterated this

request in her posttrial amended proposed judgment.

7
During the pendency of the divorce proceedings, the GAL was

appointed to, among other things, make recommendations regarding

an appropriate parenting plan that would promote the children's

best interests.6 In his final report submitted in December 2022,

the GAL recommended that all parenting time transitions occur at

fixed times at a location equidistant between the parties'

homes. At trial, both parties testified regarding the GAL's

transportation recommendations. The father stated that he did

not agree with the GAL's recommendations, but did not elaborate

as to why. The mother stated that she agreed with the GAL's

recommendations, explaining that she would like more equalized

time with the children rather than "spend[ing] so much time in

transitions." The mother also provided examples of how her

transportation duties required spending some of her limited

parenting time driving.7

The judge ultimately ordered all parenting time transitions

to occur at either the father's residence or the children's

6 "In addition to investigating and reporting factual data
to the court, a Category E GAL develops clinical opinions to
assist the judge . . . in making custody and [parenting time]
decisions." Imbrie v. Imbrie, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 557, 561 n.5
(2023).

7 With respect to picking the three eldest children up from
school, the mother testified that they have staggered release
schedules, requiring each child to be picked up at a different
time between 3:30 P.M. and 4:10 P.M. (despite all three children
attending the same school).

8
school, effectively rejecting the GAL's transportation

recommendations. Although a judge is not required to adopt the

recommendations of a GAL, see Pizzino v. Miller, 67 Mass. App.

Ct. 865, 876 (2006), the reason for rejecting them should be

clearly articulated in the judge's findings. See Ventrice v.

Ventrice, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 190, 196 (2015). Here, "we cannot

ascertain why the judge chose not to follow the [transportation]

recommendations of the GAL" because she did not address them (or

the parties' relevant testimony) in her findings. Id.

Accordingly, the transportation issue must be remanded for

reconsideration and entry of further findings reflecting

consideration of the GAL's recommendations (and other evidence

presented on this issue, including the parties' testimony). Id.

at 196-197.

3. Child support. In challenging the amount of child

support ordered by the judge, the mother claims error in the

judge's (a) calculation under the Child Support Guidelines

(guidelines); (b) disparate treatment of the parties with

respect to their receipt of financial assistance from household

and family members; and (c) failure to consider factors

mitigating against increasing the mother's prior support

obligation of $309 per week (established by a temporary order in

2020), including changes in the parties' respective incomes and

the birth of the mother's fifth child (fathered by the mother's

9
current partner) in 2021. For the reasons that follow, we are

not persuaded.

We review a judge's determination of child support for an

abuse of discretion. See Cavanagh, 490 Mass. at 417. "[T]he

method for calculating . . . child support is governed both by

statute, see G. L. c. 208, § 28, and by the [guidelines].

Although the guidelines have been subject to periodic revision

since their enactment, an essential premise has remained

constant: that child support should be calculated as a

percentage of parental income" (quotations and citations

omitted). Emery v. Sturtevant, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 502, 507-508

(2017).

With respect to the parties' incomes at the time of trial,

the judge found that the mother was earning a total of $1,023.85

per week ($903.85 as a sports program manager and $120 as a

part-time umpire coordinator8), and the father was earning a

8 The mother asserted on her financial statement that she
expected her position as a part-time umpire coordinator to end
in October 2023; however, she did not provide any testimony or
documentary evidence supporting that assertion. Given the lack
of supporting evidence presented by the mother, we discern no
error in the judge's decision to include her part-time income in
the child support calculation. In light of this conclusion, we
are unpersuaded by the mother's contention that the $389 per
week child support order is improper because it amounts to more
than forty percent of her gross income from her primary job
(after adding her part-time income, the order amounts to
approximately thirty-eight percent of her total income). See
Child Support Guidelines § IV(C) (Oct. 2021, as amended Jul.
2023).

10
total of $1,095.82 per week ($1,027.17 as a special programs

coordinator and $68.65 as a part-time wrestling coach).9 These

income figures found by the judge were also reported on the

parties' financial statements submitted at trial.

In her findings pertaining to child support, the judge

stated that she would "use the incomes listed on each party's

financial statement, the parties submitted child support

guidelines [worksheets] using the income identified on the

financial statements filed at the time of trial. The child

support [order] that results from application of the guidelines

to this income is $389 per week." The mother contends that this

finding is clearly erroneous insofar as the worksheets submitted

by the mother and the father showed presumptive child support

orders of $351 and $354 per week, respectively. The mother

fails to acknowledge, however, that those worksheets only

included the parties' incomes from their primary jobs, entirely

omitting their part-time incomes. Applying the guidelines to

the parties' total incomes as found by the judge (from both

primary and part-time employment) results in a presumptive child

9 The judge also found that the father was receiving SNAP
benefits of $188.14 per week, which cannot be considered for
purposes of calculating child support. See Child Support
Guidelines § I(A) (Oct. 2021, as amended Jul. 2023).

11
support order of $389 per week.10 Accordingly, we discern no

error in the judge's calculation of support pursuant to the

guidelines.

Insofar as the mother claims the judge unfairly treated her

partner's contribution of $500 per week toward her legal fees as

income for purposes of child support (while omitting similar

assistance received by the father from his family), it is

apparent from the amount of child support actually ordered by

the judge that neither party's receipt of financial assistance

was included in the child support calculation.11 Moreover,

although the judge acknowledged the mother's receipt of

financial assistance from her partner, nowhere in her findings

did she state that the partner's contributions would be treated

as income for purposes of calculating child support. We are

likewise unpersuaded that the judge failed to consider changes

in the parties' incomes between the time of the 2020 temporary

order (which set child support at $309 per week) and the 2023

10It is apparent that the judge rounded down (rather than
up) when entering the parties' income figures into the
guideline's worksheet. Using rounded-down weekly income figures
of $1,095 for the father and $1,023 for the mother (with no
insurance deductions or childcare credits) yields a presumptive
order of $389 per week.

11To illustrate, if the judge had added $500 per week to
the mother's income (increasing her total weekly income to
approximately $1,523), the resulting presumptive child support
order would have been $550 per week.

12
trial,12 given that the $389 per week support order was

calculated using the parties' current incomes at the time of

trial.

Turning to the mother's remaining claim that the judge

abused her discretion in setting child support without

considering the mother's financial obligations to her fifth

child, we conclude that the mother did not adequately present

this issue below. She did not identify this as a contested

issue for trial in her June 2023 pretrial memorandum. Instead,

she raised it for the first time in her amended proposed

judgment submitted after the trial, asking the judge to set

child support at $309 -- below the presumptive guidelines amount

-- which she asserted would "effectively allocate $45 per week

for support of [her fifth] child."

"When an initial order . . . is sought for a child covered

by the order in the case under consideration, a hypothetical

amount of child support for a child with whom the parent resides

but for whom no child support order exists shall be deducted

from the gross income of the parent." Child Support Guidelines

§ II(K)(3) (Oct. 2021, as amended Jul. 2023). "The parent

seeking the deduction must provide sufficient proof of the legal

obligation to support the child and of the gross income of that

12The mother previously had been earning around $72,000 per
year (approximately $1,385 per week) as a public school teacher.

13
child's other parent." Id. See G. L. c. 208, § 28; Department

of Revenue v. Mason M., 439 Mass. 665, 672 (2003).13 "The burden

is on the parent who seeks to deduct a hypothetical amount to

provide to the Court the information necessary for calculating

the hypothetical amount, including the non-party parent's gross

income." Child Support Guidelines § II(K), commentary 2017

(Oct. 2021, as amended Jul. 2023). Here, the mother failed to

provide sufficient proof to calculate the hypothetical amount

(namely, the gross income of her fifth child's father). We

therefore discern no error in the judge declining the mother's

request to reduce the support order based on her financial

obligations to her fifth child.14

13"When a [judge] makes an order for maintenance or
support, the [judge] shall determine whether the obligor . . .
is responsible for the maintenance or support of any other
children . . . even if a court order for such maintenance or
support does not exist . . . ." G. L. c. 208, § 28. "If the
[judge] determines that such responsibility does, in fact, exist
and that such obligor is fulfilling such responsibility such
[judge] shall take into consideration such responsibility in
setting the amount to [be] paid under the current order for
maintenance or support." Id.

14The mother argues that that the judge should have
considered her fifth child as basis for not increasing her
support obligation from the temporary order amount of $309,
relying on section II(K)(4) of the guidelines. That section,
however, is inapplicable here because it pertains to
modification proceedings. See Child Support Guidelines
§ II(K)(4) (Oct. 2021, as amended Jul. 2023) ("Obligations to a
subsequent family may be used as a defense to a request to
modify an order seeking an increase in the existing order, but
such obligations should not be considered a reason to decrease
an existing order" [emphasis added]).

14
4. Therapy-related provisions. The divorce judgment

ordered the mother to "obtain an experienced and seasoned

psychotherapist who specializes in domestic violence with female

perpetrators . . . and anger management," among other things.

This provision largely adopted the GAL's recommendations. The

divorce judgment further ordered the mother to "attend a

Massachusetts Trial Court approved batterers program and anger

management course with in-person sessions" and "provide proof of

completion to [the] [f]ather." The judgment also prohibited the

mother from seeking modification of custody or parenting time

"until the GAL can certify that [she] has engaged in appropriate

therapy for the issues outlined in [the GAL's] reports and this

[j]udgment."15 The mother contends that these therapy-related

provisions are too vague and onerous, unfairly require her to

reenroll in programs that she has already completed, and

improperly make the GAL the gatekeeper of any future request for

modification.

With the exception of the gatekeeper provision, as

discussed infra, we discern no error in the therapy-related

provisions of the divorce judgment. They are amply supported by

both the judge's subsidiary findings and evidence in the record.

The judge made many findings describing the parties' tumultuous

15This gatekeeping provision was not part of the GAL's
therapy-related recommendations.

15
relationship plagued by explosive confrontations that often

occurred in the children's presence. The judge found that the

mother had been physically abusive to the father, subjected the

children to highly inappropriate "diatribe[s]" about the father,

and exhibited "out-of-control behavior [in] total disregard [of]

the best interests of the children." The judge credited the

father's testimony about the mother's abuse, and found there to

be "overwhelming, credible evidence of [the] [m]other's

uncontrollable anger [and] lack of self-control." The judge

found that the mother had exhibited "no insight into the

detrimental effect of her behavior," had denied or minimized

responsibility for her actions, and had not been candid with

past mental health providers (in both individual therapy and a

batterers' program she attended in 2020) regarding her role as a

perpetrator of domestic violence. The judge further found that

the mother was not actively engaged in therapy at the time of

trial, the mother had not previously received therapy consistent

with the GAL's recommendations, and "without proper therapy to

address [her] behavior, . . . the children remain[ed] at risk

while in the [m]other's care." Accordingly, we discern no abuse

of discretion in the judge's decision to adopt the GAL's

therapy-related recommendations and require the mother to

complete new batterers' treatment and anger management programs.

16
However, we conclude that it was improper to make any

future request by the mother to modify custody or parenting time

contingent on the GAL's certification that she has engaged in

appropriate therapy. The GAL was first appointed in a June 2019

order, which appointment concluded after he submitted two

reports in January 2020 and June 2020. The GAL was thereafter

reappointed in an April 2022 order for the purpose of updating

his June 2020 report. He filed his final report in December

2022, completing the duties specified in the April 2022

reappointment order. Because the June 2019 and April 2022

appointment orders did not direct the GAL to certify the

mother's compliance with the therapy-related provisions of the

divorce judgment, providing such a certification would exceed

the scope of those appointments.16 See Probate and Family Court

Standing Order 1-08(1) (2008) ("The GAL performs duties that are

within the scope of the court order of appointment"). Moreover,

to the extent that the gatekeeper provision may improperly shift

judicial authority to the GAL to decide whether the mother is

eligible to seek relief from the Probate and Family Court, it

cannot stand. See Bower v. Bourney-Bower, 469 Mass. 690, 706-

707 (2014); Silverman v. Spiro, 438 Mass. 725, 736-737 (2003).

Accordingly, we vacate so much of the divorce judgment that

16The trial docket does not show any further orders
reappointing the GAL.

17
prohibits the mother from filing a complaint for modification of

custody or parenting time until the GAL can certify that she has

engaged in appropriate therapy.

5. Length of trial. Finally, the mother asserts that the

judge abused her discretion by issuing the June 2023 order that

reduced the number of scheduled trial days from four to two,

thereby hampering the mother's ability to present sufficient

evidence on several issues. While we are not persuaded by the

father's contention that the mother waived this issue,17 we

17The father contends that it was incumbent on the mother
to object to the June 2023 order or to request more time during
the trial, neither of which she did. The mother, however,
plausibly asserts that she did not believe the judge would
entertain such a request in light of a provision in the June
2023 order stating that "NO FURTHER MOTIONS OR COMPLAINTS SHALL
BE FILED WHILE THE TRIAL IS PENDING INCLUDING MOTIONS FOR
PERMISSION TO FILE." The June 2023 order carved out a narrow
exception for "motions in limine, motions to preclude, and any
other motion normally heard . . . immediately prior to the
commencement of trial," with the caveat that such motions must
be "presented at least 14 days prior to the [t]rial . . . with
sufficient time for them to be scheduled [for hearing] in the
normal course." The mother filed several motions in limine
approximately one month prior to trial in accordance with the
June 2023 order; however, the judge refused to entertain the
motions because the mother was unable to mark them for hearing
prior to trial as no hearing dates were available. Accordingly,
we cannot fault the mother for not requesting additional time
where making such a request would have seemingly violated the
filing ban set forth in the June 2023 order, and the judge did
not otherwise exhibit any willingness to entertain such a
request. Contrast Babaletos v. Demoulas Super Markets, Inc.,
493 Mass. 460, 467-468 (2024) (no abuse of discretion where
trial judge expressed willingness to consider requests for more
time, and appellant failed to make such request). Finally,
while we are mindful that trial judges require broad discretion
to manage their extraordinary caseloads, we think the filing

18
nevertheless conclude that the mother has not identified how the

reduced trial time affected the issues that she has raised on

appeal.18 Although the mother claims she was prejudiced by

having insufficient time to call the GAL as a witness for the

purpose of challenging his therapy-related recommendations,

among other things, she concedes that she "did not have the

financial ability to call the GAL to testify at trial." She has

therefore failed to demonstrate that, but for the trial

scheduling order, she would have called the GAL as a witness.

Conclusion.19 Paragraphs 9, 12, 21, and 23 of the judgments

of divorce nisi dated November 16, 2023, are vacated. The case

is remanded to the Probate and Family Court for further

proceedings consistent with this memorandum and order. The

restrictions contained in the June 2023 order exceeded the
bounds of that discretion. Although a limited filing order may
be appropriate in some circumstances, see State Realty Co. of
Boston v. MacNeil, 341 Mass. 123, 124 (1960) (judge has inherent
discretion to issue limited filing order to put "a stop to
harassing, vexatious, and repetitious litigation"), we do not
see any obvious justification for it on the record before us
and, even if such justification were apparent, the filing
restrictions here are so extreme that they run the risk of
improperly restricting the parties' access to the court.

18We reject the mother's remaining contention -- that the
judge ignored "significant unrebutted evidence" regarding the
father's alleged infidelity and a pending criminal charge -- on
similar grounds. The mother has failed to demonstrate how that
evidence has any bearing on the issues raised in this appeal.

19 The father's request for appellate attorney's fees is
denied.

19
judgments are affirmed in all other respects. During the

pendency of the remand, paragraphs 9, 12, and 21 of the November

16, 2023 judgments shall remain in effect as a temporary order,

unless otherwise ordered by the judge.

So ordered.

By the Court (Rubin, Hand &
Smyth, JJ.20),

Clerk

Entered: November 10, 2025.

20 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

20