Commonwealth v. Garrett G. Turner.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-1102

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

GARRETT G. TURNER.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

After a bench trial in the District Court, the defendant

was convicted of (1) breaking and entering a vehicle at night

with the intent to commit a felony and (2) larceny. On appeal,

we are not persuaded by the defendant's challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and

conclude that even assuming the judge erred in admitting certain

Venmo records, no prejudice resulted from the error. Thus, we

affirm the convictions.

Discussion. 1. Sufficiency of the evidence. In assessing

the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal

conviction, we ask "whether, after viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond

a reasonable doubt" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v.

Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979). "The inferences that

support a conviction need only be reasonable and possible;

[they] need not be necessary or inescapable" (quotation and

citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Faherty, 93 Mass. App. Ct.

129, 133 (2018).

a. Proof that the defendant was the perpetrator. Viewed

in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, see Latimore,

378 Mass. at 677, the evidence showed that the victim of the

larceny (whom we refer to as the victim) parked her partner's

car in the driveway of their home in Somerset sometime after

4:15 P.M. on January 27, 2022, and left her purse inside the car

overnight. Early the next morning, after the victim's bank

alerted her to an unauthorized use of her debit card, the victim

went out to the car to look for the debit card and found the car

unlocked. The victim believed that someone had "rummaged

around" in the car; her purse was there, but her wallet, which

had been inside the purse when the victim left it in the car the

previous day, was missing.1 Surveillance video recordings and

transaction records from a CVS store and a BankFive ATM in Fall

1 The missing wallet had contained, among other things, the
victim's debit card, $200 in cash, and at least $500 in gift
cards.

2
River showed the defendant2 using the victim's debit card on the

morning that the victim discovered that her wallet and the debit

card had been taken from the car.3

The evidence that the defendant had the victim's stolen

debit card in his possession very shortly after its theft was

itself sufficient to prove that the defendant stole the card

and, inferentially, the defendant's entire wallet and its

contents. "[T]he defendant's possession of recently stolen

goods permits the inference that he is the thief. 'The

circumstances as a whole must be looked at.'" Commonwealth v.

Rousseau, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 144, 146–147 (2004), quoting

2 The judge stated that he was satisfied that the person
pictured was the defendant; as such, the surveillance footage
was sufficient to identify the defendant as the thief. Cf.
Commonwealth v. Blackmer, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 474, 483-484 (2010)
(sufficient proof of identity where fact finder was "able to see
the defendant in the courtroom and to hear the description given
by both victims and the police officer"). We note that the
Commonwealth also introduced evidence that the defendant made
unauthorized transactions with the victim's debit card using
Venmo (an application that facilitates electronic money
transfers). Although the defendant argues, as discussed below,
that the Venmo evidence was inadmissible, we consider all the
evidence that was admitted, "without regard to the propriety of
the admission," in assessing the sufficiency of trial evidence.
Commonwealth v. Sepheus, 468 Mass. 160, 164 (2014), quoting
Commonwealth v. Farnsworth, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 87, 98 (2010).

3 The defendant appeared on CVS surveillance footage shortly
before 4 A.M. on January 28, 2022; transaction records revealed
his use of the victim's debit card. He also appeared on
surveillance footage at the BankFive ATM at approximately
5:30 A.M. on the same day.

3
Commonwealth v. Dellamano, 393 Mass. 132, 135 n.7 (1984). See

Commonwealth v. Latney, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 423, 425 (1998)

("[T]he defendant's mere possession of recently stolen property

may be relied upon by the jury as evidence that he had stolen

it"). The Commonwealth was not required to provide direct

evidence that the defendant had been in Somerset or to rule out

all other possible perpetrators. See Commonwealth v. Platt, 440

Mass. 396, 401 (2003); Faherty, 93 Mass. App. Ct. at 133.

Moreover, because the stolen debit card was taken from

inside the victim's partner's car, the judge could reasonably

have inferred that the person who had the card shortly after the

theft -- the defendant -- was the same person who took the debit

card from the victim's partner's car and that the defendant had

opened the car door and reached into the car to accomplish the

theft. The evidence was thus sufficient to prove that the

defendant broke and entered the victim's partner's car. See

Commonwealth v. Stokes, 440 Mass. 741, 748 (2004), S.C., 460

Mass. 311 (2011), quoting Commonwealth v. Burke, 392 Mass. 688,

690 (1984) ("for purposes of the home invasion statute," entry

"occurs when there is 'any intrusion into a protected enclosure

by any part of a defendant's body'"); Commonwealth v. Scott, 71

Mass. App. Ct. 596, 600-601 (2008) (evidence that defendant

opened closed door sufficient to prove "breaking" for crime of

breaking and entering building).

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b. The defendant's intent to commit larceny over $1,200.

We are likewise satisfied that the evidence was sufficient to

prove that at the time of the breaking and entering, the

defendant had the intent to commit larceny over $1,200. See

Commonwealth v. Hill, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 240, 247 (2003). That

the defendant did commit larceny is sufficient to prove his

intent to do so at the time of the breaking and entering. See

Commonwealth v. Ronchetti, 333 Mass. 78, 81-82 (1955), quoting

Commonwealth v. Carter, 306 Mass. 141, 149 (1940) (commission of

larceny after breaking and entering is "decisive proof of the

intent with which the entry was made"). Once the Commonwealth

proved the defendant's intent to steal, the fact finder was "not

required to conclude that he had intended to limit his theft to

property under [$1,200] in value." Hill, supra at 249 & n.6.

Particularly given the evidence that the defendant chose only

certain items to steal from the victim's partner's car -- taking

the wallet and its contents but leaving the victim's purse and

sunglasses, for example -- a reasonable fact finder could have

inferred that the defendant intended to steal items of value,

including those amounting to more than $1,200 in value. See

Ronchetti, supra.

2. Admission of Venmo spreadsheets. After obtaining a

warrant, the Somerset police acquired certain records from

Venmo; the judge allowed the Commonwealth to introduce those

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records at trial, over the defendant's objection. Even assuming

without deciding that as the defendant contends, the Venmo

records were inadmissible for lack of proper authentication and

on hearsay grounds, we are not persuaded that any error in their

admission was prejudicial. See Commonwealth v. Cruz, 445 Mass.

589, 591 (2005) (articulating standard of review for prejudicial

error). This is because in announcing his verdicts, the judge

was explicit that he relied on the surveillance video footage to

establish that the defendant committed the crimes of

(misdemeanor) larceny and breaking and entering a vehicle at

night to commit a felony. Where the judge said, "I am satisfied

that the same person is depicted in both [the CVS and BankFive]

videos," and, "I am satisfied that [the defendant is] the person

depicted in those videos and that he's the person who committed

those offenses," we are convinced that the judge's review of the

challenged Venmo records "did not influence the [judge], or had

but very slight effect." Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 417 Mass.

348, 353 (1994), quoting Commonwealth v. Peruzzi, 15 Mass. App.

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Ct. 437, 445 (1983). Accordingly, we affirm the defendant's

convictions.

Judgments affirmed.

By the Court (Hand, Hodgens &
Tan, JJ.4),

Clerk

Entered: December 16, 2025.

4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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