Adoption of Doretta

NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound
volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us

24-P-712 Appeals Court

ADOPTION OF DORETTA (and two companion cases1).

No. 24-P-712.

Hampden. September 15, 2025. – January 30, 2026.

Present: Shin, Grant, & Hershfang, JJ.

Adoption, Care and protection. Minor, Adoption, Care and
protection. Parent and Child, Adoption, Care and
protection of minor. Due Process of Law, Care and
protection of minor, Assistance of counsel. Constitutional
Law, Assistance of counsel. Department of Children &
Families. Practice, Civil, Adoption, Care and protection
proceeding, Assistance of counsel, Self-representation.

Petition filed in the Hampden County Division of the
Juvenile Court Department on September 7, 2021.

Following review by this court, 101 Mass. App. Ct. 584
(2022), the case was heard by Carol A. Shaw, J.; a motion to

1 Adoption of Daniel and Adoption of Erik. The children's
names are pseudonyms. We use the same pseudonyms for the
children that we used in an earlier appeal in this case. See
Care & Protection of Doretta, 101 Mass. App. Ct. 584 (2022). By
order of a single justice, Erik's appeal of the order denying
his amended and renewed motion to reopen the evidence was
consolidated with this appeal. As he has not addressed the
order in his brief, the appeal of that order is deemed waived.
See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as appearing in 481 Mass.
1628 (2019).
2

reopen the evidence, filed on July 11, 2024, also was considered
by her.

Joan M. Altamore for the mother.
Kylah Clay for Erik.
Margaret M. Geary for the father.
Kristin S. Braithwaite for Department of Children and
Families.
Warren M. Yanoff for Doretta.
Lisa M. Kling for Daniel.

HERSHFANG, J. The father, the mother, and one of the

children, Erik, appeal from decrees issued by a judge of the

Juvenile Court finding the father and the mother unfit to parent

their three children and terminating their parental rights after

a trial. The appeals focus primarily on the judge's denial of

the father's requests to represent himself and the mother's

requests for new counsel, as well as the sufficiency of the

evidence. We affirm.

1. Background. The facts underlying the care and

protection petition are detailed in an earlier appeal, Care &

Protection of Doretta, 101 Mass. App. Ct. 584 (2022) (Doretta

I). We summarize here the judge's relevant posttrial findings

of fact and conclusions of law, reserving some facts for

discussion.

a. The children. The father and the mother are parents to

three children: Doretta, age thirteen at the time of trial, and

twins Daniel and Erik, twelve years old at the time of trial.
3

The Department of Children and Families (department) filed a

care and protection petition on behalf of the children in

September 2021. Initially, the court granted conditional

custody to the parents, but when the parents failed to comply

with the conditions of custody, the department sought and was

granted temporary custody. The children remained in the

department's temporary custody throughout the case and,

following the trial, were placed in the department's permanent

custody.

All three children faced mental health and learning

challenges. Doretta has been diagnosed with depression and

anxiety. As of February 2023, Doretta attended outpatient

therapy once a week with a treatment goal of reducing the

intensity of her anxiety, fears, and worries, which stemmed in

part from her relationship with her parents and issues that

arose from their visits.

Doretta testified during the trial, and the judge

implicitly credited that testimony. Although Doretta loved her

parents, she was angry at them and "[felt] fine" not living with

them. Visits with them were stressful; the mother forced food

on her, and the father talked about the court proceedings. The

mother whispered in Doretta's ear, telling her that she was

coming home, but then denied having done so when Doretta, who

"couldn't stand it," told the department about the whispering.
4

Doretta also testified that she "was raised to lie." The

father told her what to say to the department, including that he

and the mother were completely disabled and confined to a bed

and a wheelchair, which Doretta testified was not true. Before

Doretta was removed, the father controlled Doretta's

participation in therapy sessions, which took place by video

conference, by giving her scripts to use and telling her what to

say. Because of this, Doretta "never . . . got to open up to

[her] therapist."

Erik was diagnosed with autism, depression, and anxiety; as

of February 2023, he attended outpatient therapy once a week.

Erik did well in school, where he benefited from an

individualized education plan. He needed "continued support

from professionals . . . to develop as an individual person,

separate from both [his siblings], and independent of the

inappropriate and unrealistic demands of [the parents]."

Daniel was diagnosed with severe autism. He was a

residential student at an educational center specializing in

providing applied behavioral analysis (ABA) services. When he

arrived there, Daniel was essentially nonverbal and deliberately

harmed himself by hitting his head and biting himself. By the

time of trial, his consistent engagement in ABA services had

significantly reduced his dangerous behaviors and increased his

verbal and nonverbal communication skills. Daniel still
5

required vigilant supervision twenty-four hours a day, seven

days a week; continued consistent engagement with ABA services

was necessary to keep him safe and help him achieve his full

potential.

The father and the mother opposed Daniel's placement at the

educational center and maintained that its services were

unnecessary and inappropriate. The judge found that if Daniel

was in the father's custody, Daniel would not be enrolled at the

educational center, and "would not have made such significant

progress." Further, the father and the mother repeatedly -- and

falsely -- accused the educational center of abusing Daniel.

Both tried to take photos of his naked body to substantiate

alleged injuries. The center staff described the parents'

visits with Daniel as distressing for him and not "therapeutic."

The parents had unrealistic expectations that Daniel participate

in hour-long virtual visits. The father was "unsupportive" and

potentially "combative" of the staff's attempts to support

Daniel.

b. The father. The father reported coming to the United

States in his twenties as an Iranian refugee fleeing political

and religious persecution. In his life in the United States, he

has been dedicated to advocating for issues including worker

protection and veterans' safety, and he reported having been a

whistleblower and having engaged in public protest to bring
6

attention to these issues. He is highly educated and asserted

fluency in four languages.

Although the father loves his children and "considers them

to be gifts," the judge found that the father's ability to

engage with, accurately report to, and follow up with the

children's service providers was "hampered, and at times made

impossible by his detrimental patterns of behavior." The judge

found that the father is "argumentative, fixated, and passionate

to the point of appearing aggressive and threatening. He

perseverates on certain topics and repeats decades-old examples

of how he has been wronged or victimized." The father denied

throughout the proceedings, including trial, and continues to

deny on appeal, that he has any mental health issues. The judge

concluded that his behavior in court indicated otherwise and

noted that his denial prevented him from receiving potentially

helpful treatment.

Throughout the case, the father identified his experience

as a whistleblower sixteen years before trial as the reason he

and his family have been -- in his view -- consistently

targeted, victimized, and retaliated against. The father

"insisted on discussing the 2007 whistleblower story . . . when

it was completely irrelevant to the situation at hand," and as a

result, he was "unable to effectively communicate with

professionals in the community." For example, the father called
7

911 when he thought Daniel was being assaulted but could not

communicate with the 911 dispatcher about the emergency because

he insisted on recounting his whistleblower history. The father

would not be deterred from his recounting, even when the

dispatcher tried to ask questions relevant to the emergency.

When attempting to address an "issue or challenge he or the

[c]hildren face," the father "demands the specific service he

believes is appropriate and necessary and will accept nothing

else." Communication with service providers became "on-going

battle[s] about retaliation against the family for the

whistleblower situation, followed by complaints, grievances, and

lawsuits." The father's "all or nothing approach often resulted

in nothing for the [c]hildren."

The father appropriately initiated some services and

interactions, but "collaboration [was] only possible to the

extent that the party he engage[d] [was] willing to comply with

his rules; his rules [were] inflexible and [could not] be

altered, even in the face of contradictory information." For

example, once, at the father's request, an agency agreed to pay

to have a taller fence installed around the family's home for

Daniel's safety, but the father insisted that the department

secure a needed variance. Despite being told the variance was

his responsibility, the father refused to budge from his

position. As a result, the "[f]ather's insistence on strict
8

adherence to his specific method of problem solving prevented

his own solution from being implemented," and the fence was

never built. "[A]ttempts to challenge or alter his rules [were]

treated by [the] [f]ather as an existential threat." The father

similarly "respond[ed] to minor issues or problems as though

they [were] significantly larger and more serious, demanding

responses which end[ed] up being grossly out of proportion."

This trait "severely limit[ed] his ability to be an "advocate

and protector of his [c]hildren . . . leav[ing] them at risk of

serious abuse and/or neglect."

The father's physical condition was the subject of

contradictory evidence. He described himself as "totally

disabled," unable to leave the house without an ambulance and

two emergency medical technicians, incontinent, in constant need

of supplemental oxygen, and using a feeding tube. Doretta

testified that when "important people" came to the house, her

father would "go to his bed," and that she saw her father both

"put on" medical equipment when people come to the house and

camouflage himself in blankets before walking outside. During

the trial, the father said that he was working out up to sixteen

hours a day and looked like Rambo and Hulk Hogan. He asserted

that he experienced headaches, neck and back pain, and nerve

damage that prevented him from using his hands. Yet the judge

saw him writing what appeared to be pages of notes during trial,
9

and the father would not permit the department to verify the

father's reported health issues with his medical providers.

c. The mother. The mother's native spoken language is

Fuzhou, a Chinese dialect. She is unable to read or write. She

reported that she does not speak, read, or write English other

than a few simple words. The mother relied on the father to

communicate for her, although the record reveals no fluently

spoken language common between the two of them. The mother's

inability to communicate in English "resulted in her total

dependence on [the] [f]ather, and limited her ability to

function as the parent the [c]hildren need." The mother

deferred to the father in practically every respect: the father

handled appointments for her and the children, and the father

controlled her engagement with the department.

The mother has some physical limitations, the cause and

extent of which are unclear. She would not allow the department

to verify her physical health. The father has described her as

totally disabled, yet also able to mow the lawn, shovel snow,

and chase the children. Doretta corroborated that her mother

"mow[ed] the grass and did outside work, and . . . raked the

leaves."

Both parents refused to engage in any services because they

did not acknowledge that their parenting could be improved.
10

d. Court clinic evaluation. On October 19, 2021, the

judge ordered both parents to "undergo court clinic evaluation

as to competency to represent themselves." The evaluations were

filed by the clinic on November 2, 2021. The clinician, noting

there was no legal standard for either "competency to proceed in

[care and protection] cases in [Massachusetts]" or "evaluating

the capacity for self-representation," decided to "adapt[] the

legal criteria for competency to stand trial in criminal cases."

The clinician's effort to evaluate the mother was hampered

by many factors: an expedited schedule, the need to meet by

video conference because of COVID-19 concerns, limitations on

the interpreter's availability, language and cultural

differences, possible coaching by the father, and the absence of

requested records from the department. Despite the limitations,

the clinician conducted the evaluation and opined that the

mother "did not demonstrate the skills generally associated with

competence to stand trial."

The clinical evaluation of the father was more robust; the

clinician met three times (by telephone or video conference)

with the father, interviewed the father's then-current lawyer,

and reviewed documents the father provided. She concluded that

the father had neither a "cognitive defect" nor a "significant

mental illness that would interfere with his competency to

proceed at this time." She noted that, although the father had
11

"some mental health limitations," in her opinion they were not

"currently . . . a significant impediment to his competency to

proceed with his cases." The clinician opined that the father

"require[d] support to parse what is relevant detail for the

purpose of his defense in his case" and "does well with an

explanation of why certain data, which he believes is important,

does not contribute to his defense."

e. The father's representation. Before trial, while

represented by his fifth counsel, the father asked to represent

himself.2 At a status hearing on January 24, 2022, the father

informed the judge that he "was going to represent [himself] on

this hearing" and there was "a possibility that [he] may

continue to request for representing [himself] in a future

hearing." The judge explained that self-representation was not

available "on an event-by-event basis" and that the father's

lawyer could either represent him or act as standby counsel.

The father said he "definitely need[ed] a standby attorney with

[an] expanded scope of work."

On January 28, 2022, the father's counsel filed a motion to

withdraw. Citing a "respectful but irreconcilable disagreement"

2 The father had earlier asked to represent himself during
the temporary custody hearing. The father, the mother, and the
children appealed the temporary custody determination, which
gave rise to Doretta I. They did not raise the issue of self-
representation in that appeal, see Doretta I, 101 Mass. App. Ct.
584, and we do not consider that issue here.
12

about the role of standby counsel, counsel sought a "complete

withdrawal" and requested that the father be allowed to

represent himself. At a hearing on the January 28 motion, the

judge acknowledged the court clinic evaluation of the father's

competency to represent himself but noted that she was not

required to adopt its conclusions. The judge also made clear

that she had no reason to question the father's fifth counsel's

"level of preparedness or readiness to engage in representing"

the father.

During a colloquy with the father, the judge explained

that, if he represented himself, he would be bound by the same

rules, regulations, procedures, and practices as any practicing

lawyer. The father acknowledged that he understood, but stated

he was entitled to an accommodation under the Americans with

Disabilities Act (ADA). When the judge asked him what

accommodation he was seeking, the father raised "potential

judicial bias and judicial conflict of interest," and asked for

a change of venue.

The judge asked the father many times whether he was asking

to have his lawyer removed from the case. The father's answers

ranged from "I do believe that only a fool will have himself for

an attorney" to assertions that he was a victim of past

ineffective representation, to seeking to represent himself and

his children, to asking for standby counsel. The judge told the
13

father that he could not represent his wife or children and

again reminded him that, if he were to represent himself, he

would be bound by all the same rules and procedures as a lawyer.

After the judge took the motion to withdraw under advisement,

the father interrupted the hearing to repeat that he would need

standby counsel with an "expanded scope of work," including

administrative duties, such as typing e-mail messages. The

judge explained that this request demonstrated a

misunderstanding of the role of standby counsel.

The judge ruled that the father's fifth counsel could

withdraw as soon as successor counsel filed an appearance and

denied the father's request to represent himself and appoint

standby counsel. On a subsequent motion to reconsider, the

judge declined to alter her original order.3 No new counsel

filed an appearance, and trial began on February 6, 2023, with

the father represented by his fifth counsel.

The father made numerous requests to represent himself

during and after trial. These requests centered on the father's

3 At the father's request, the judge filed findings of fact
and an explanation relative to her denial of the father's
counsel's request to withdraw. Shortly thereafter, the father
pursued an interlocutory appeal of the order. The single
justice denied the father's petition noting that, after a review
of the petition and supporting materials, the father had "not
met his burden of establishing that the judge abused her
discretion when denying" the father's request to represent
himself.
14

dissatisfaction with counsel's trial strategy; in one, the

father explained that he had "200,000 exhibits" and needed "at

least a month of trial." After the close of evidence, the

father's counsel successfully sought to reopen the evidence and

then filed another motion to withdraw. The judge denied the

motion, noting that she had previously denied two similar

motions, and saw no "substantial difference" that warranted

reversal.

f. The mother's representation. By the time of trial, the

mother was represented by her third counsel, having been without

a lawyer for two status conferences.

The third counsel filed a motion to withdraw on December 9,

2022. Trial was scheduled to begin in February of 2023. At the

hearing on the motion, the mother's then-counsel stated that the

mother "completely disagree[d] with anything and everything [the

counsel] would want to do at this point" and would prefer to

represent herself, or, failing that, have substitute counsel.

The judge denied this request, noting that the court clinic

evaluation "suggested that self-representation was not

appropriate," and citing the multiple changes of counsel that

had resulted in significant delays and gaps in representation,

as well as the approaching trial date.

On August 25, 2023, the last day of trial, the third lawyer

filed a second motion to withdraw, asking the judge either to
15

allow the mother to proceed pro se, or to appoint new counsel.

This motion was denied. The judge relied on the court clinic

evaluation to find that the mother was not competent to waive

her right to counsel.

2. Discussion. a. The father's right of self-

representation at trial. We review the judge's denial of the

father's requests to represent himself de novo, affording

"'substantial deference' to the trial judge's factual findings

related to the loss of the right to counsel." Adoption of

Raissa, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 447, 452 (2018), quoting Commonwealth

v. Means, 454 Mass. 81, 88 (2009).

The father contends that he has a constitutional right to

self-representation in this care and protection case.4 He bases

his claim on criminal law, including art. 12 of the

Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, and Means, 454 Mass. at 88-

89. Because it helps to frame the issue, we begin with a short

summary of the right to self-representation.

The constitutional right to counsel in criminal cases is

well established under both Federal and Massachusetts law. See

United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653-654 (1984); Gideon v.

4Erik also purports to challenge the judge's orders
relative to the father's and the mother's representation, but he
has no standing to raise these claims. See Adoption of Mary,
414 Mass. 705, 713 (1993).
16

Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-345 (1963); Commonwealth v.

Dufresne, 489 Mass. 195, 203 (2022).

Under both Massachusetts and Federal law, a criminal

defendant also has a constitutional right of self-

representation. See Means, 454 Mass. at 89, citing Faretta v.

California, 422 U.S. 806, 821 (1975); Commonwealth v. Martin,

425 Mass. 718, 720-721 (1997). Both the right to counsel and

the right to represent oneself in criminal proceedings are

established by art. 12 ("every subject shall have a right to

. . . be fully heard in his defence by himself, or his council,

at his election"). The right of self-representation in the

criminal context "is not wholly unqualified," Commonwealth v.

Mott, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 47, 51 (1974), a thread we pick up later.

Parents facing the permanent loss of their children in care

and protection cases have both a constitutional right to

counsel, which is grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment to the

United States Constitution and in art. 10 of the Massachusetts

Declaration of Rights, and a statutory right to counsel. See

G. L. c. 119, § 29; Department of Pub. Welfare v. J.K.B., 379

Mass. 1, 3-4 (1979). As the Supreme Judicial Court explained,

"[t]he interest of parents in their relationship with their

children has been deemed fundamental, and is constitutionally

protected." J.K.B., supra at 3. "An indigent parent facing the

possible loss of a child cannot be said to have a meaningful
17

right to be heard in a contested proceeding without the

assistance of counsel." Id. at 4. The court further explained

that

"[t]he petition may well involve complex questions of fact
and law, and require the marshalling and rebutting of
sophisticated expert testimony. These aspects of
adjudication underscore the necessity of affording
appointed counsel to those defendant parents who contest
the proceedings. Provision of appointed counsel not only
safeguards the rights of the parents, but it assists the
court in reaching its decision with the utmost care and an
extra measure of evidentiary protection, required by law"
(quotations and citation omitted).

Id.

Traditionally, Massachusetts "courts have looked to the

criminal law in deciding issues of individual rights in care and

protection cases." Adoption of Raissa, 93 Mass. App. Ct. at

452. See Care & Protection of Stephen, 401 Mass. 144, 149

(1987). Even so, courts have "repeatedly rejected incorporating

the full panoply of constitutional rights afforded criminal

defendants into proceedings involving custody and termination of

parental rights." Adoption of Don, 435 Mass. 158, 169 (2001).

This limit is grounded in the purpose of a care and protection

case, where "the State does not act to punish misbehaving

parents[,] but to protect children" (citation omitted). Id. at

168. The privilege against self-incrimination, Care &

Protection of Quinn, 54 Mass. App. Ct 117, 121 (2002), the right

to face-to-face confrontation, Adoption of Don, supra, and
18

principles of double jeopardy, Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass.

733, 746 (1978), are examples of constitutional rights deemed

essential in the criminal context, but not applicable in care

and protection proceedings.

Relying on Means and Faretta, the father asserts that he

has a constitutional right of self-representation. After

careful review, we consider the passing reference in Means, 454

Mass. at 89, relating to self-representation in civil cases to

be dictum and thus without precedential value. See Commonwealth

v. Rahim, 441 Mass. 273, 284-285 (2004). Means was a criminal

case, and the comment about civil cases was not dispositive to

the outcome. See Means, supra, citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 821

("Just as criminal defendants have a constitutional right to be

represented by counsel, individuals in criminal and civil

matters have a constitutional right to represent themselves").

See also Martinez v. District Court of Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S.

152, 154 (2000) (Faretta "extend[s] only to a defendant's

constitutional right to conduct his own defense" [quotation

omitted]).

Unlike art. 12, which grants criminal defendants both the

right to counsel and the right of self-representation, there is

no provision in the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights that
19

speaks to the right of self-representation in civil cases.5 The

father has not briefed whether such a right can be inferred from

art. 10 of the Declaration of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment

to the United States Constitution, or some other constitutional

provision, and he has cited no case (nor have we found one)

addressing a constitutional right of self-representation in the

context of a care and protection case. Moreover, although a

parent in a care and protection case has the same statutory

right of self-representation applicable to all Massachusetts

civil cases, G. L. c. 221, § 48,6 the father has not shown, or

even argued, that he was unlawfully deprived of his statutory

right or that he suffered resulting prejudice, as was his

burden. See Commonwealth v. A Juvenile (No. 2), 396 Mass. 215,

224 (1985) ("Ordinarily, . . . the deprivation of a statutory

right is not grounds for reversal unless the [party] can

demonstrate resulting prejudice").

5 Nor is there any such provision in the United States
Constitution. Indeed, numerous courts have held in the civil
commitment context that there is no Federal constitutional right
to self-representation in civil cases. See, e.g., United States
v. O'Laughlin, 934 F.3d 840, 841 (8th Cir. 2019), cert. denied,
589 U.S. 1283 (2020); Matter of V.H., 996 N.W.2d 530, 537 (Iowa
2023); Matter of S.M., 389 Mont. 28, 32, 38 (2017).

6 Parties in civil cases are statutorily permitted to
"prosecute or defend their own suits personally, or by such
attorneys as they may engage." G. L. c. 221, § 48.
20

In the case before us, however, we need not decide whether

parents have a constitutional right of self-representation in

care and protection cases because, if such a right exists, the

father did not properly exercise that right. Even in the

criminal context, where defendants do have a constitutional

right to self-representation, Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836; Means,

454 Mass. at 89, the right is not absolute. Mott, 2 Mass. App.

Ct. at 51. First, a defendant's request to exercise this right

"must be unequivocal." Id. "Second, the request should be

asserted before trial." Id. "Third, and perhaps most

important, the trial judge should be satisfied that the right is

being exercised knowingly and intelligently, and not for an

ulterior purpose." Id.

Before applying this test borrowed from the criminal law,

we pause to recognize that care and protection cases are

materially different from criminal cases because "the focus of

proceeding[s] [that terminate or curtail parental rights] should

be on the best interests of the child." J.K.B., 379 Mass. at 5.

See Adoption of Don, 435 Mass. at 169 (listing criminal

constitutional rights not afforded parents in proceedings

involving custody and termination of parental rights). Where

children's interests are at stake, "the balance to be struck"

between "the rights of the individual parent and the interest of

society" and the "rights and needs of the child" is "complex."
21

Adoption of Olivia, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 670, 677 (2002), quoting

J.K.B., supra. "[R]ecognition of important parental rights does

not change the 'crucial fact' that the focus of proceedings that

terminate or curtail parental rights should be the best

interest[s] of the child." Id. "The children's rights to a

stable and safe environment, therefore, assume an importance at

least equal to the parent's interest." Adoption of Olivia,

supra.

In criminal cases, by contrast, "where the accused is

harming himself by insisting on conducting his own defense,

respect for individual autonomy requires that he be allowed to

go to jail under his own banner if he so desires." Mott, 2

Mass. App. Ct. at 52, quoting United States ex rel. Maldonado v.

Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied sub nom.

DiBlasi v. McMann, 384 U.S. 1007 (1966).

With this distinction in mind, we turn to the three-part

inquiry from Mott, beginning with timeliness. A "defendant's

right to proceed pro se can be circumscribed if it is raised

during or on the eve on trial." Commonwealth v. Najjar, 96

Mass. App. Ct. 569, 578 (2019). "It is in these situations that

the judge must weigh 'the interests of the courts and the public

in efficient trial administration' with 'a showing of good cause

to support the defendant's motion.'" Id., quoting Commonwealth

v. Chavis, 415 Mass. 703, 712 (1993). This good cause
22

requirement "is designed to protect efficient trial

administration, not to protect a defendant from making a poor

decision." Id. at 578-579. The timely adjudication of child

custody cases is no less urgent than the timely adjudication of

criminal cases. See Adoption of Valentina, 97 Mass. App. Ct.

130, 134 (2020). A careful review of the record reveals one

pretrial request by the father: the January 28, 2022 motion to

withdraw and the associated May 9, 2022 motion to reconsider.

The father's remaining requests were made after trial began, so

it was within the judge's discretion to deny them, and we need

not consider them here. Najjar, supra.

We are not convinced that the father's pretrial request was

unequivocal. Although the written motion unambiguously sought

the court's leave for counsel to withdraw, the father vacillated

when questioned by the judge. The father's "vacillat[ion] in

his requests between several different arrangements regarding

his representation" demonstrates the request was not

unequivocal. Commonwealth v. Chapman, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 260, 266

n.4 (1979).

The father's behavior stands in stark contrast to that of

the criminal defendant in Mott, who told the judge that he would

prefer to defend himself, was "ready for trial," and had to

"think of [his] case the way [he] figure[d] [was] better for

[him]." Mott, 2 Mass. App. Ct. at 49 n.2. See Najjar, 96 Mass.
23

App. Ct. at 581 (defendant engaged in "extensive pretrial

dialogue" with judge and gave "unequivocal responses" to

questions about proceeding pro se). In the circumstances, we

cannot conclude that the father's pretrial request to represent

himself was unequivocal.

Even if the father's request was unequivocal, we conclude

that his request would still fail because it was not being

exercised "knowingly and intelligently, and not for an ulterior

purpose." Mott, 2 Mass. App. Ct. at 51. To analyze this

factor, in a criminal case, "the trial judge should conduct some

sort of inquiry once the defendant has made a timely and

unequivocal request in order to ascertain the defendant's

motives for asserting the right." Chapman, 8 Mass. App. Ct. at

265, citing Mott, supra at 52.

Although the judge did not conduct a colloquy explicitly

directed at answering this question, it is evident both from her

extended discussion with the father at the March 8, 2021 hearing

and from her written findings denying the father's January 28

motion that she concluded that the father's request did not pass

this test. For example, the judge found that the father's

actions repeatedly delayed the proceedings, noting that the

"[f]ather has consistently interrupted and spoken out asserting

his thoughts and opinions during court events, sometimes related

to the matter being discussed, and often relating to other
24

issues entirely." After reviewing the clinic evaluation and

seeing the father in court, the judge found she had "no

confidence in [the] [f]ather's ability to maintain proper

courtroom decorum, follow procedural rules, or abide by [c]ourt

orders and directions." These findings support the denial of

the father's request to represent himself. Contrast

Commonwealth v. Conefrey, 410 Mass. 1, 11-12 (1991) (no ulterior

purpose could be presumed where nothing in record suggested

defendant "would [not] cooperate in good faith with rulings and

directions of the judge throughout the trial . . . ."); Chapman,

8 Mass. App. Ct. at 267 (where nothing in record showed

defendant was trying to delay proceedings, it cannot be said he

"waived his right by asserting it to further an ulterior,

dilatory purpose"). The judge's assessment of the situation

finds support in the father's requests to try his case with

20,000 to 200,000 exhibits and up to 200 witnesses.

And, crucially, this was not a criminal case. We end this

analysis where we began, with the unique characteristics of care

and protection cases. See, e.g., Adoption of Don, 435 Mass. at

169; Adoption of Valentina, 97 Mass. App. Ct. at 134 ("judge

must balance the interests of the parent with the child[ren]'s

interest in finality"). The children, with special needs

ranging from mild to severe, had been removed from their

parents' care for eight months when the judge issued her
25

findings on the January 28 motion. Even if the father's

interest in representing himself was constitutionally protected,

in the circumstances of this case the judge did not err in

denying the father that opportunity. See Adoption of Ilona, 459

Mass. 53, 61 (2011) ("the parents' rights are secondary to the

child's best interests and . . . the proper focus of termination

proceedings is the welfare of the child" [citation omitted]).

b. The father's right of self-representation on appeal.

The father also asserted, in an emergency preargument filing,

that he had a right to self-representation on appeal. Even in

the criminal context, there is no such right under the United

States Constitution, see Martinez, 528 U.S. at 163, and we have

found no case recognizing one under the Massachusetts

Declaration of Rights. Rather, appellate courts may exercise

their discretion in deciding whether to allow nonlawyers to

represent themselves on appeal. See id. Given the eleventh-

hour timing of the father's request, the challenge of balancing

the priorities of care and protection cases and self-

representation by a parent, and the "significant differences

between the trial and appellate stages" of a case (citation

omitted), id. at 162, we exercised our discretion to deny the

father's request.

c. Counsel for the mother. The mother contends that her

due process rights were violated because she did not have
26

appointed counsel during "critical hearings," and was

subsequently "forced to retain counsel not of her choice." The

mother makes no argument as to what transpired at these hearings

or how they were "critical." We have reviewed the transcripts

of the two status hearings held while the mother was without an

attorney and see no rulings that give us pause. The judge

steered clear of any substantive discussion related solely to

the mother, noting that efforts were underway to provide her

with new lawyers, and that matters including the mother's ADA

meeting would be scheduled after she had counsel.

The mother's brief strongly conveys her dissatisfaction

with counsel but fails conclusively to tie that dissatisfaction

to a particular legal framework. Although she adverts to

Faretta, she failed to assert that any ruling by the judge

denying a self-representation request was error. Application of

the Mott framework is therefore not called for. The mother

disclaims any ineffective assistance of counsel, so we do not

apply the Saferian standard, see Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366

Mass. 89, 96 (1974). See also Adoption of Raissa, 93 Mass. App.

Ct. at 455. The nub of her objection seems to be that she did

not have "a representative who would handle the case in the

manner that [the] mother requested," and did not "want the

counsel that will not accede to her demands." But we are aware

of no principle, and the mother cites none, that dictates a
27

client is entitled to counsel who will "follow her theory of the

case." See Commonwealth v. Moran, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 200, 204

(1983). "The right to counsel does not include the right to

dictate who shall be appointed"; in the absence of demonstrated

"good cause" to substitute counsel, a "perceived lack of a

meaningful relationship" is not "grounds for discharging [a]

lawyer." Adoption of Olivia, 53 Mass. App. at 675. There was

no error.

d. Sufficiency of the evidence. A judge's decision to

terminate parental rights must be supported by "clear and

convincing evidence, based on subsidiary findings proved by at

least a fair preponderance of evidence, that the parent is unfit

to care for the child and that termination is in the child's

best interests." Adoption of Arianne, 104 Mass. App. Ct. 716,

720 (2024), quoting Adoption of Xarissa, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 610,

615 (2021). "We review the judge's findings with substantial

deference, recognizing her discretion to evaluate a witness's

credibility and to weigh the evidence." Adoption of Nancy, 443

Mass. 512, 515 (2005). We "reverse only where the findings of

fact are clearly erroneous or where there is a clear error of

law or abuse of discretion." Adoption of Ilona, 459 Mass. at

59. Having considered the parties' arguments and reviewed the

extensive record, we see no reason to disturb the judge's

findings of unfitness or the best interests determinations.
28

"Parental unfitness must be determined by taking into

consideration a parent's character, temperament, conduct and

capacity to provide for the child in the same context with the

child's particular needs, affections, and age." Adoption of

Mary, 414 Mass. at 711. See Adoption of Quentin, 424 Mass. 882,

887 (1997) ("judge may consider whether parental behavior

adversely affects the child"). In making the best interests

determination, the judge was entitled to weigh the evidence as

she saw fit, and "[w]e do not sit as a trial court to review de

novo the evidence presented by the parties." Adoption of Paula,

420 Mass. 716, 730 (1995).

Here, the judge's findings identified each of the

children's individual needs, including the need for "a safe and

secure home, with parents who can put the [c]hildren's needs

first, and assure that their educational, developmental,

emotional, mental, and physical health needs are consistently

met." The father, the mother, and Erik do not contest any of

the specific findings relative to the needs of the children.

Nor do they contest the findings that the father's "detrimental

patterns of behavior" hamper his "ability to initiate, engage,

accurately report, and follow up with" service providers; that

his "[rigid] and insistent methods often result in no services

or assistance at all"; and that "it is emotionally abusive and

neglectful to require that the [c]hildren join in perpetuating
29

his untruths." Instead, the majority of the father's, the

mother's, and Erik's claims about the evidence of unfitness

"amount to no more than dissatisfaction with the judge's

weighing of the evidence and [her] credibility determinations."

Adoption of Quentin, 424 Mass. at 886 n.3.

The father also contends that the lack of expert evidence

establishing a nexus between his mental health and any instances

of neglect precluded the judge from finding that "[t]he barriers

to [the] [f]ather's safe parenting of the [c]hildren are rooted

in his untreated mental health issues." We are not persuaded.

The father's behavior was one of several factors the judge

properly considered in determining the father's unfitness. See

Care & Protection of Vick, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 704, 709 (2016)

(parent's "over-all demeanor . . . was one of several factors

that contributed to [their] parental shortcomings"); Adoption of

Eduardo, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 278, 282-283 (2003) (judge did not

err in considering parent's mental illness to extent it

explained inability to provide for child). Although the father

unquestionably loves the children, the judge thoroughly detailed

the link between the father's detrimental patterns of behavior

and his unfitness. We see no reason to disturb the judge's

findings.

The record evidence is also sufficient to demonstrate the

mother's unfitness. Although she too unquestionably loves the
30

children, her visits with both Doretta and Daniel were extremely

upsetting to the children; she did not engage in her action plan

tasks, and her relationship to the world -- including the

department and the children's service providers -- was solely

through the father, resulting in a lack of cooperation. The

judge found that the mother "is a willing participant in the

family dynamic that allows [the] [f]ather to be in total

control, and she persists in this position despite the negative

consequences, all to the [c]hildren's detriment."

The record amply supports the judge's findings that the

children suffered damage to their psychological, emotional, and

moral development while in the parents' custody. Furthermore,

"the judge was entitled to focus on the consistent inability or

unwillingness of the parents to cooperate with service plans and

the comparative improvement" of the children in their

preadoptive placements. Custody of Michel, 28 Mass. App. Ct.

260, 270 (1990). See Adoption of Carla, 416 Mass. 510, 519-520

(1993). "[T]he judge [was] not required to grant the [parents]

an indefinite opportunity to reform," and, in considering the

evidence that their unfitness was not temporary, and that they

had not complied with their service plans, "the judge . . .

properly determine[d] that the child[ren]'s welfare would be

best served by ending all legal relations between [the]
31

parent[s] and [the] child[ren]." Adoption of Cadence, 81 Mass.

App. Ct. 162, 169 (2012).

e. The father's access to case records. The father also

asserts that his due process rights were violated because he was

denied access to his case records and thus precluded from

participating meaningfully at trial and assisting his counsel.

Given the timing and nature of his requests, we are unpersuaded.

The father's sole pretrial request for these materials was

a contingent one made in the context of his counsel's January

28, 2022 motion to withdraw; counsel asked that, if he were

allowed to withdraw, he be permitted "to deliver . . . all

materials received by [him] from the [department], and/or prior

counsel" to the father. This request became moot when the judge

denied the motion for the father to represent himself.

The father also rests this claim on the midtrial denial of

a motion for fees and costs to obtain a transcript of the

previous days of trial, asserting that his disabilities

prevented him from taking notes, and that future trial dates

needed to be postponed for the father "to review the transcript

and prepare for his rebuttal testimony." The father does not

challenge the judge's findings, in denying the request, that in

fact he could write and take notes. We conclude that the denial
32

of this motion did not hinder the father's ability to rebut the

allegations against him.7

f. Conclusion. The decrees are affirmed. The order

denying the amended and renewed motion to reopen evidence is

affirmed.

So ordered.

7 The father also relies on a December 2023 pro se motion
seeking access to the court case records. Because this motion
postdated trial, its denial could not have meaningfully affected
the father's ability to participate in the trial or assist his
counsel.