K.T. v. D.T.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-1284

K.T.

vs.

D.T.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

D.T. (husband) and K.T. (wife) were divorced pursuant to a

judgment of divorce nisi (divorce judgment) in March 2024. The

husband appealed, and a different panel of this court affirmed

the judgment in an unpublished memorandum and order. See K.T.

v. D.T., 105 Mass. App. Ct. 1141 (2025). While that appeal was

pending, the wife filed two complaints for contempt, both of

which resulted in judgments in her favor, which entered August

13, 2024 (first contempt judgment), and May 22, 2025 (second

contempt judgment). As we discuss later, a motion to amend the

second contempt judgment in one minor respect was allowed on

June 26, 2025. With respect to the first contempt judgment, the

judge found the husband had failed to comply with several
provisions of the divorce judgment. The second contempt

judgment stemmed from the husband's failure to comply with the

first contempt judgment. The husband has appealed from both

judgments, and the two appeals have been consolidated. In

addition, following oral argument on December 3, 2025, the

husband filed a motion seeking emergency relief from the order

allowing amendment of the second contempt judgment. That

motion, filed originally as a single justice petition, has been

referred to this panel. For the reasons discussed below, we

affirm the first and second contempt judgments and deny the

husband's motion.

1. The first contempt judgment.1 As noted, while the

husband's appeal from the divorce judgment was pending, the wife

filed a complaint for contempt contending that the husband had

failed to comply with various provisions of the divorce

judgment, mostly pertaining to the division of marital assets.2

A hearing on the contempt complaint was held on July 29, 2024,

1 We acknowledge the wife's argument that the husband's
brief should be stricken for failure to comply with Mass.
R. A. P. 16 (a) (6), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019), and
that portions of the appendix should be stricken pursuant to
rule 16 (e). Given our resolution of the issues, we need not
address this argument.

2 The complaint was filed on June 7, 2024, and amended on
June 25, 2024.

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before a judge of the Probate and Family Court, who was not the

judge who presided over the divorce proceedings.

At the start of the hearing, the husband's counsel made an

oral motion to withdraw. The judge inquired whether the husband

wanted to proceed "on [his] own" or with counsel, to which the

husband responded, "I would prefer to have counsel, but I will

go forward without one."3 The judge then permitted counsel to

withdraw. The judge also denied the husband's request for an

evidentiary hearing and proceeded to hear arguments from the

wife's counsel and the husband.

In a detailed and well-reasoned judgment, the judge found

the husband guilty of contempt for failing to comply with six

provisions of the divorce judgment, which required him to (1)

provide proof of a life insurance policy naming the wife as the

beneficiary; (2) pay the wife a sum of $174,163.45; (3)

reimburse a Fidelity account with one-half of the funds

withdrawn between certain dates, and pay that amount to the

wife; (4) pay the wife $56,254.87 for her share of the husband's

stock option proceeds; (5) provide the wife with a final

schedule of his stock portfolio; and (6) transfer $237,661.58 to

the wife from his IRA account. The judge ordered the husband to

comply with all six provisions within seven to eighteen days,

3 The husband is a licensed attorney in Michigan and
Massachusetts but does not practice law.

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depending on the action required, and further ordered the

husband to pay $10,000 in attorney's fees to the wife.

Thereafter, on August 22, 2024, the husband filed a motion

seeking relief pursuant to Mass. R. Dom. Rel. P. 60 (b) (rule 60

motion), which was denied. This appeal ensued.4

4 We note that the parties have proceeded with the
understanding that the husband filed a timely notice of appeal
from the first contempt judgment. However, our review of the
record calls this understanding into question. The docket shows
that the first contempt judgment was entered on August 13, 2024.
The husband filed his rule 60 (b) motion within ten days (on
August 22) and therefore the time to file an appeal from the
contempt judgment would begin to run upon the final disposition
of the rule 60 motion (assuming neither party filed any
additional motions). See Mass. R. A. P. 4 (a) (3), as appearing
in 481 Mass. 1606 (2019). On September 11, 2024, the judge
issued a procedural order in which she refers to the rule 60
motion but does not affirmatively deny it. The judge wrote, in
part, that she had "reviewed the motions filed by Husband. All
requests for stay are denied. All motions are seeking relief
pursuant to Rule 60 or 2-99 and do not require a hearing." The
rule 60 motion was denied by an order dated November 1, 2024,
and entered May 22, 2025. Thus, the thirty-day period for
filing a notice of appeal from the contempt judgment ran from
May 22 to June 23. No notice of appeal was filed during that
time period. Instead, the husband filed a notice of appeal on
October 3, 2024. That notice purports to appeal from a
"contempt" dated September 11, 2024. However, no contempt
judgment was entered on that day. The October 3rd notice
clearly refers to the September 11 procedural order described
above but, as we have noted, that order did not amount to a
final disposition of the rule 60 motion. Consequently, the
October 3rd notice was premature. All that said, given that the
issues have been fully briefed and both parties apparently
interpreted the September 11th procedural order as a final
ruling on the rule 60 motion, we will address the merits of the
husband's appeal. See Roch v. Mollica, 481 Mass. 164, 165 n.2
(2019).

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The husband first argues that the judge violated his right

to due process by not conducting an evidentiary hearing, not

continuing the hearing after permitting his attorney to

withdraw, preventing him from presenting exculpatory evidence,

and not resolving what he describes as "ambiguities" in his

favor. The record provides no support for these claims and, as

a result, there is no basis on which to conclude that the

husband's due process rights were violated.

First, "a judge may properly rule on a complaint for

contempt without an evidentiary hearing or without receiving

live testimony [when] . . . material facts are not in dispute."

Mahoney v. Mahoney, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 537, 540 (2006). The core

material facts were not in dispute in this case. In fact,

during the course of the hearing, the husband admitted that he

had not complied with three of the six provisions on which he

was found guilty of contempt.5 Moreover, the husband did not

dispute that he failed to comply with another provision

requiring him to pay the wife $174,163.45 by May 31, 2024. The

husband argues that some of the orders he did not comply with

were the result of flaws in the divorce judgment, but those

alleged flaws have no bearing on the validity of the contempt

5 The husband admitted that he had failed to timely provide
proof of a life insurance policy naming the wife as beneficiary,
had not timely provided a final schedule of his stock portfolio,
and did not transfer $237,661.58 to the wife.

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judgment. An "attack on a judgment is not . . . a defense to a

charge of contempt for disobeying the judgment." Banville v.

Banville, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 951, 952 (1986). In sum, the

undisputed facts show that the husband committed several

material violations of the divorce judgment, and these

violations provide a sufficient basis to find the husband guilty

of contempt. See O'Connell v. Greenwood, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 147,

153 n.7 (2003) (given that "there is one sound basis . . .

sufficient to validate [the contempt judgment]," "we need not

extend this [decision] by examining [other] evidentiary bases").

Consequently, the husband's due process rights were not violated

by the judge's failure to hold an evidentiary hearing.

Second, with regard to the husband's claim that the judge

should have continued the hearing, it suffices to note that the

husband did not request a continuance. The appropriate time to

ask for one would have been at the point when the judge allowed

the husband's counsel to withdraw. He did not do so. While we

acknowledge that the judge informed the parties that the hearing

would proceed that day, in the absence of a direct request for a

continuance, this (unsubstantiated) claim provides no support

for a violation of the defendant's due process rights.

Third, our review of the record provides no support for the

husband's claim that he was prevented from presenting

exculpatory evidence. To the contrary, the husband had ample

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opportunity to fully present his arguments to the judge. That

the judge listened attentively is established by the numerous

questions she posed to the husband, all of which he answered.

At no point was the husband precluded from presenting his

defense to the contempt allegations. Accordingly, the husband

was not denied due process on this ground.

Finally, the husband has not provided us with any

authority, nor are we aware of any, to support his assertion

that ambiguous issues should be resolved in his favor.

Accordingly, this argument similarly fails to support the

husband's claim that his right to due process was violated.

The husband also argues that the judge abused her

discretion in finding him guilty of contempt because the

provisions of the divorce judgment with which he did not comply

were ambiguous and, as such, did not constitute "clear and

unequivocal command[s]." Birchall, petitioner, 454 Mass. 837,

851 (2009) ("[t]o constitute civil contempt, there must be a

clear and undoubted disobedience of a clear and unequivocal

command" [citation omitted]).6 This argument also is unavailing.

There was nothing imprecise or ambiguous about what the husband

was ordered to do under the divorce judgment. The provisions at

6 See Commercial Wharf E. Condominium Ass'n v. Boston Boat
Basin, LLC, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 523, 532 (2018) (contempt
judgments reviewed for abuse of discretion).

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issue were sufficiently definite so as to enable the husband to

know what was required of him. If the husband was uncertain

about any aspect of his obligations, the proper course would

have been to seek a modification or clarification and not ignore

the order altogether. See Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Mkts.,

Inc., 424 Mass 501, 566-567 (1997).

Lastly,7 the husband argues that the judge abused her

discretion in awarding attorney's fees to the wife. He claims

that the award was improper because the wife filed the contempt

complaint in bad faith, and because the wife and her attorney

prolonged the proceedings and misrepresented the facts at the

hearing. A judge has considerable discretion in awarding

attorney's fees and "[s]uch an award is 'presumed to be right

and ordinarily ought not to be disturbed.'" Murphy v. Murphy,

82 Mass. App. Ct. 186, 195 (2012), quoting Moriarty v. Stone, 41

Mass. App. Ct. 151, 159 (1982). In addition, as the judge

noted, G. L. c. 215, § 34A, creates a presumption in favor of an

award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs to a successful

party in a contempt action. Given the circumstances presented,

particularly the husband's admission that he failed to comply

with aspects of the divorce judgment, we discern no abuse of

7 We note that the husband has advanced additional arguments
relating to the underlying divorce judgment. None of those
arguments are properly before us and we do not address them.

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discretion. Moreover, the award was not excessive and was less

than the amount ($12,862) requested.

2. The second contempt judgment. As discussed above, the

husband was found guilty of contempt and ordered to comply with

six separate provisions of the divorce judgment within seven to

eighteen days and ordered to pay $10,000 in attorney's fees to

the wife. When he failed to comply, the wife filed a second

complaint for contempt on September 13, 2024. A hearing on that

complaint was held before the same judge on November 4, 2024.

In a judgment entered May 22, 2025, the judge found the husband

guilty of contempt for failing to comply with four of the six

orders set forth in the first contempt judgment. The husband

was again ordered to comply with those provisions, and he was

ordered to pay additional attorney's fees and costs. The wife

moved to amend the judgment, and her motion was allowed about

one month later, on June 26, 2025. On appeal, the husband

argues that the second judgment of contempt should be vacated

because it was not supported by documentary evidence, because he

could not comply with the orders set forth in the first contempt

judgment without the cooperation of the wife, which he claims he

did not receive, and because the divorce judgment was flawed.8

8 The judge found that, at the hearing on the second
contempt, the husband argued that "he [was] not in contempt, and
never has been in contempt, because of errors within the
judgment of divorce."

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We first address the wife's claim that the husband's appeal

from the second contempt judgment was not timely and, therefore,

the appeal should be dismissed. The second contempt judgment

was entered on the docket on May 22, 2025. The husband filed

his notice of appeal on June 20, 2025. The wife served a motion

to amend the judgment on June 4, 2025. The motion was allowed

on June 26, 2025. However, the wife's motion to amend the

judgment did not toll the time for the filing of a notice of

appeal, as she claims, because it was not served within ten days

of the entry of the original judgment. See Mass. R. A. P.

4 (a) (2) (C), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1606 (2019). Thus, the

husband was not required to file a new notice of appeal within

30 days of the entry of the amended judgment on June 26, and

consequently, the husband's appeal from the second contempt

judgment is properly before us.

After careful review of the record, we discern no basis for

concluding that the judge abused her discretion in finding the

husband guilty of contempt. The issue before the judge was

whether the husband had complied with the orders set forth in

the first contempt judgment. The record fully supports the

judge's findings that the husband did not comply with four

"clear and unequivocal commands" set forth in the first contempt

judgment and that he did so intentionally. Indeed, at the

hearing the husband admitted that he had not complied by failing

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to pay the amounts due and had not paid the attorney's fees as

ordered. The judge further found that, based on the husband's

financial statement filed on the date of the hearing, he had

adequate assets ($782,762.00) to pay all amounts due. Given

these circumstances, we conclude that the husband was properly

found guilty of contempt.9

3. Motion for emergency relief. In his motion seeking

emergency relief, the husband requests that we vacate the order

allowing amendment of the second contempt judgment, entered on

June 26, 2025, on the ground that the Probate and Family Court

no longer had jurisdiction due to his pending appeal. He

further argues that, on information and belief, the wife is

dissipating funds that he claims should be held in escrow in

accordance with the second contempt judgment -- before it was

amended. The motion is denied.

First, the husband's argument that the Probate and Family

Court lacked jurisdiction to enter an amended judgment on June

26, 2025, fails because his appeal was not docketed in our court

until July 10, 2025. Second, although the husband is correct

that before the second contempt judgment was amended, he was

required to "pay to counsel for [the wife], to be held in escrow

pending resolution of the appeal of the underlying divorce

9 The wife's application for appellate attorneys' fees and
costs incurred in connection with the two appeals is denied.

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action or further order of this Court, the sum of $174,163.45,

within ten days of this judgment," he ignores subsequent events.

As discussed above, the wife filed a motion to amend the second

contempt judgment in which she asserted that because the husband

had already paid the funds at issue ($174,163.45) to her

directly, the judgment should no longer require that the funds

be held in escrow. The motion was allowed. Given these

circumstances, it matters not whether the wife has used the

funds in question. The record establishes that those funds were

due to be paid to the wife and the husband complied with the

order to do so at some point before the second contempt judgment

was entered in May 2025. Consequently, the husband is not

entitled to relief.

Contempt judgment entered
August 13, 2024, affirmed.

Contempt judgment entered May
22, 2025, as amended,
affirmed.

By the Court (Vuono, Shin &
Smith, JJ.10),

Clerk

Entered: April 1, 2026.

10 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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