MARGARET KELLEY, Personal Representative, & Another v. MARK HURLEY & Others.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-349

MARGARET KELLEY, personal representative,1 & another2

vs.

MARK HURLEY3 & others.4

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Defendant Terri Hurley (Terri)5 appeals from a judgment

entered in the Superior Court and from orders denying four

postjudgment motions. We affirm.

Background. In 2019, the plaintiffs, Margaret Kelley as

personal representative of the estate of Charles Hurley and

Charles Andrew Hurley (Andy), filed a complaint in the Superior

1 Of the estate of Charles Hurley.

2 Charles Andrew Hurley.

3Individually and as trustee of the Charles Hurley
Irrevocable Trust.

4 Terri Hurley, Anna Hurley, and Kayla Hurley.

5Because five of the six parties share the same surname,
for clarity we refer to the Hurleys by their first names.
Court for declaratory judgment concerning the terms of the

Charles Hurley Irrevocable Trust (trust). The complaint named

as defendants Mark Hurley (Mark), who was the trustee of the

trust; Mark's wife, Terri; and their two daughters, Anna Hurley

(Anna) and Kayla Hurley (Kayla), who were both minors at the

time. The plaintiffs alleged that Terri, Anna, and Kayla had

been mistakenly listed as the beneficiaries of the trust and,

therefore, were erroneously given ownership of the trust's

primary asset, the property in Wakefield where Mark, Terri,

Anna, and Kayla resided (property). About the same time, Terri

commenced divorce proceedings against Mark in the Probate and

Family Court.

After years of litigation in both matters, in July 2023 the

parties reached a preliminary settlement agreement in the

declaratory judgment action. The parties agreed that Mark would

pay Terri $301,000, in exchange for which Terri would vacate and

relinquish her rights to the property, and Mark and Andy would

assume title. The preliminary agreement also included terms

regarding the division of the marital estate, alimony, and other

issues relevant to the divorce action. The preliminary

agreement was signed by both plaintiffs and by Mark, Terri, and

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Anna, who by this time was twenty years old.6 The preliminary

agreement contemplated that the parties would prepare a

"mutually agree[able] comprehensive written settlement

agreement."

When the parties failed to finalize their settlement in

writing, the plaintiffs, aligned with and joined by Mark, filed

an "emergency" joint motion to enforce the preliminary

settlement agreement, which Terri opposed. In an order dated

June 20, 2024, a Superior Court judge (first judge) allowed the

motion to enforce the preliminary agreement, rejecting Terri's

claims that she did not understand the agreement she signed and

that she signed it under duress. A judgment of dismissal was

entered, but then vacated upon Terri's motion. The first judge

ordered the parties to submit a proposed form of judgment by

November 22, 2024.

Still unable to agree on the form of the judgment, on

November 22, 2024, the parties filed separate proposed

judgments. The plaintiffs and Mark proposed a judgment removing

Terri, Anna, and Kayla as beneficiaries of the trust, depriving

them of any interest in the property, and vesting title in Mark

and Andy. Their proposed judgment in the declaratory judgment

6 Kayla, who was sixteen years old at the time, did not sign
the agreement. Mark and Terri, as her legal guardians, assented
on her behalf.

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case excluded the terms in the preliminary agreement relating to

the divorce action. Terri filed a proposed judgment requiring

Mark to pay her $301,000, in exchange for which Terri would

vacate and relinquish her rights to the property. Her proposed

judgment also included terms regarding division of marital

property and alimony, similar to those included in the

preliminary agreement. Terri's proposed judgment specifically

reserved Anna's and Kayla's interests in the trust and the

property.

After a hearing, on December 18, 2024, the first judge

signed the plaintiffs' and Mark's proposed order, which entered

as the judgment in the case. Terri then filed the four

postjudgment motions subject to this appeal. First, she timely

served a motion to vacate or modify the judgment, which was

denied by a different Superior Court judge (second judge) on

January 28, 2025. Terri filed a motion for reconsideration of

the order denying the motion to vacate, and the parties

subsequently filed additional pleadings seeking sanctions

against each other. The second judge denied the motion to

reconsider and denied all requests for sanctions on February 13,

2025. Terri's subsequent motions to substitute parties, filed

on February 26, 2025, and for injunctive relief, filed March 19,

2025, were denied by the second judge on February 28 and March

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28, 2025, respectively. Terri timely filed notices of appeal

from the judgment and from the orders denying all of these

postjudgment motions.

Discussion. In her brief, Terri asserts three main reasons

why the judgment should not have entered and why her

postjudgment motions should have been allowed. The primary

theme of her brief is that the judgment invalidated the plain

language of the trust that named Terri, Anna, and Kayla as

beneficiaries, wrongly depriving them of their interests in the

property. The second major theme is that because Anna and Kayla

reached the age of majority during the pendency of the case,

they were deprived of notice, representation, and informed

consent at various stages of the litigation. Her third theme is

that the preliminary settlement agreement was not enforceable

because she did not fully understand its terms when she signed

it, she signed it under duress, and she lacked representation

during critical periods of the litigation. She also argues that

the judge erred by denying her requests for attorney's fees and

injunctive relief.

As to the first theme, if the preliminary settlement

agreement was properly enforced, the nature and existence of

Terri's rights under the trust is irrelevant because Terri

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agreed to give up those rights in exchange for payment of

$301,000.7

The second theme, regarding Anna's and Kayla's rights, is

equally unavailing to Terri, because Terri is not an attorney.

Therefore, she may not represent Anna and Kayla in this appeal

or assert rights on their behalf. "Although she of course may

represent herself, she may not represent another." Stevenson v.

TND Homes I LLC, 482 Mass. 1006, 1006 n.1, cert. denied, 589

U.S. 1084 (2019). See Varney Enters., Inc. v. WMF, Inc., 402

Mass. 79, 82 (1988) ("person appearing pro se does not represent

another").8

As to Terri's own rights, the third theme of her brief, the

record does not support her claim that she did not understand

the preliminary settlement agreement or that she signed it under

7 Mark's obligation to pay Terri that sum is conspicuously
absent from the proposed judgment that he and the plaintiffs
submitted, and that the judge signed as an order of the court.
Likewise, any argument that this term was erroneously omitted
from the judgment is conspicuously absent from Terri's brief.
We can only assume that the omission was inadvertent, that the
parties have made an arrangement concerning this payment, or
that Mark's obligation to pay $301,000 to Terri in exchange for
the marital home will be incorporated as a term of the parties'
divorce judgment.

8 As Terri repeatedly points out, both Anna and Kayla are
now adults. They were both named as defendants in the
declaratory judgment complaint. When the preliminary settlement
agreement was prepared, as Anna had reached the age of majority,
Mark's attorney sent Anna a copy of the agreement for her review
and signature.

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duress, claims that the first judge specifically rejected in the

June 20, 2024, order enforcing the preliminary agreement. To

the contrary, the terms of the proposed judgment that Terri

submitted on November 22, 2024, were essentially the same terms

that were included in the preliminary agreement -- the only

difference being Terri's attempt to reserve Anna's and Kayla's

rights. Terri's proposed judgment demonstrated that she fully

understood and accepted the terms of the preliminary agreement

insofar as they affected her own interests. The preliminary

agreement set out all the material terms of the settlement and

manifested the parties' intent to be bound by those terms, even

without the more formal document contemplated in the preliminary

agreement. See Fecteau Benefits Group, Inc. v. Knox, 72 Mass.

App. Ct. 204, 212-213 (2008); I & R Mechanical, Inc. v. Hazelton

Mfg. Co., 62 Mass. App. Ct. 452, 455 (2004); Goren v. Royal

Invs. Inc., 25 Mass. App. Ct. 137, 140-141 (1987). Finally, as

Terri had no right to a court-appointed attorney in this case,

see Genninger v. Genninger, 418 Mass. 732, 735 (1994), the fact

that she was left to represent herself during periods of the

litigation does not provide grounds to attack the judgment. The

myriad motions that Terri filed on her own behalf, and both

judges' serious attention to those motions, demonstrate that she

was not deprived of a meaningful opportunity to be heard. See

7
Wilbur v. Tunnell, 98 Mass. App. Ct. 19, 25 n.10 (2020)

(although self-represented litigant must be given "meaningful

opportunity to present her case . . ., and some leniency is

appropriate, the statutes and rules of procedure bind a pro se

litigant as they bind other litigants" [quotations and citations

omitted]).

Nor did the second judge abuse his discretion in denying

Terri's requests for sanctions and for injunctive relief. The

record does not substantiate Terri's contentions that the

plaintiffs' claims were frivolous or advanced in bad faith. Nor

did the judge err in denying Terri's request for postjudgment

injunctive relief. The judge reasonably determined that Terri's

harm could be compensated monetarily. See Caffyn v. Caffyn, 70

Mass. App. Ct. 37, 42 (2007) ("Suffice it to say that the trial

judge acted within her discretion in concluding that injunctive

relief was not warranted, if only because the wife's claim of

potential monetary loss was insufficient to establish

irreparable harm").

Conclusion. The judgment is affirmed. The orders of

January 28, February 13, February 28, and March 28, 2025,

denying the motion to vacate or modify judgment, the motion for

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reconsideration and sanctions, the motion to substitute parties,

and the motion for injunctive relief, are affirmed.

So ordered.

By the Court (Massing,
Neyman & Smyth, JJ.9),

Clerk

Entered: April 14, 2026.

9 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

9