John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 528364 v. Sex Offender Registry Board.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-1048

JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 528364

vs.

SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, John Doe, appeals from a Superior Court

judgment affirming a Sex Offender Registry Board (board)

decision classifying Doe as a level two sex offender. Doe

argues that (1) the hearing examiner's decision was not

supported by clear and convincing evidence, and (2) the hearing

examiner's findings concerning Internet dissemination were

insufficiently particularized to Doe's risk of reoffense. We

affirm.

Background. We summarize the facts as set forth in the

hearing examiner's decision. See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd.

No. 10800 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 459 Mass. 603, 606

(2011).
On October 10, 2020, a seventeen year old girl (the victim)

called for a taxi around 1:25 P.M. Doe, the taxi driver,

greeted the victim after she entered the taxi. He then told her

"If no one has ever told you before, you are beautiful," and

"You are very beautiful, you have beautiful eyes, nose, lips,

and body." Doe continued to drive without further comment but,

before arriving at the victim's intended destination, stopped

the car next to an IHOP restaurant. Doe then closed the car's

windows, locked its doors, and asked the victim for a kiss. The

victim told Doe "No," and that she had a boyfriend. Doe then

got into the back seat with the victim, grabbed her hands and

said, "Let me kiss you." When the victim tried to pull away

from Doe, he grabbed her hands tighter and forcefully kissed her

on the mouth and cheeks. The victim told Doe, "Let me go,

respect me, I have a boyfriend," to which Doe responded, "No one

will find out, he won't know." Doe then grabbed the victim's

breasts and vaginal area over her clothing. The victim pushed

Doe away and repeatedly told him to let her go. After Doe

realized the victim was crying, he stopped. Doe then got out of

the backseat and reentered the driver's seat. While Doe drove

the victim to her destination, the victim sent text messages to

her boyfriend stating that she had been abused and needed help.

The victim's boyfriend was waiting for her when she arrived.

The victim's boyfriend attempted to confront Doe, but Doe drove

2
away. The next day, Doe came to the Revere Police Department

with his attorney. The police made him aware of his charges and

placed him in custody.

On March 8, 2022, Doe pleaded guilty to three counts of

indecent assault and battery on a person age fourteen or over in

violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13H.

Discussion. A board decision "may only be set aside if the

court determines that the decision is unsupported by substantial

evidence or is arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion,

or not in accordance with law." Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd.

No. 10216 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 447 Mass. 779, 787

(2006) (Doe No. 10216), citing G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (e), (g).

1. Doe's risk of reoffense and dangerousness. To classify

a person as a level two sex offender, the hearing examiner must

make three explicit determinations by clear and convincing

evidence:

"(1) that the risk of reoffense is moderate; (2) that the
offender's dangerousness, as measured by the severity and
extent of harm the offender would present to the public in
the event of reoffense, is moderate; and (3) that a public
safety interest is served by Internet publication of the
offender's registry information."

Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 496501 v. Sex Offender

Registry Bd., 482 Mass. 643, 644 (2019) (Doe No. 496501). In

making these determinations, "[t]he hearing examiner has

discretion to determine how much weight to ascribe to each

3
factor under consideration." Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No.

23656 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 483 Mass. 131, 138-139

(2019) (Doe No. 23656).

Doe challenges the hearing examiner's findings that Doe's

risk of reoffense was moderate and that any reoffense would

present a moderate degree of dangerousness to the public.

First, he argues that it was error to give moderate weight to

factor 11 (violence unrelated to sexual assaults) where the

allegation that Doe had assaulted his former girlfriend was

based on a single police report of the incident, and where the

hearing examiner only gave minimal weight to factor 10 (Doe's

contact with the criminal justice system). Second, Doe contends

that the evidence of his home situation and support system as

well as his materials submitted regarding stability in the

community show that his risk of reoffense and degree of

dangerousness are low.

a. Doe's violence unrelated to sexual assaults. The

hearing examiner credited an August 13, 2018 police report

entered in evidence. In the report, the police officer states

that he saw Doe assault a woman who was Doe's then-girlfriend in

the back of a car. Doe acknowledges that the hearing officer

"was entitled to construe the police report," but contends that

she should not have accepted "all of its components without

scrutiny," particularly because the Commonwealth filed a nolle

4
prosequi for Doe's charge, assault and battery on a household or

family member in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13M, stemming from

this incident. We are not persuaded.

A hearing examiner "may admit and give probative effect to

that evidence 'which reasonable persons are accustomed to rely

in the conduct of serious affairs,'" including hearsay evidence

"if it bears sufficient indicia of reliability." Doe, Sex

Offender Registry Bd. No. 523391 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd.,

95 Mass. App. Ct. 85, 89 (2019) (Doe No. 523391), quoting Doe,

Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 356011 v. Sex Offender Registry

Bd., 88 Mass. App. Ct. 73, 76 (2015). "When reviewing an

examiner's determination that hearsay evidence is substantially

reliable, we ask whether it was reasonable for the examiner to

admit and credit the facts described in the hearsay evidence"

(quotation and citation omitted). Doe No. 523391, supra.

Here, the hearing examiner explicitly considered and

analyzed evidence of the report's reliability, including the

fact that the officer who wrote the report saw the incident

himself, described the incident in detail, and wrote that the

alleged victim confirmed what the officer saw. See Doe No.

523391, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 89 ("Common indicia of reliability

include a detailed account; the consistency of the hearsay

incident with other, known behavior; . . . and independent

5
corroboration" [citations omitted]). We discern no error in the

hearing examiner's consideration of the police report. See Id.

Doe further asserts that the hearing examiner's decision to

give minimal weight to Doe's contact with the criminal justice

system while giving moderate weight to his violent acts

unrelated to sexual assaults was "lacking in logical

consistency." We disagree. In fact, weighing these factors

differently shows that the hearing examiner approached each

factor carefully. See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 356315

v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 99 Mass. App. Ct. 292, 299 (2021)

("It is apparent from the hearing examiner's careful weighing of

the factors, . . . including his decision to not give full

weight to some aggravating factors, that the classification is

based on a sound exercise of informed discretion rather than the

mechanical application of a checklist or some other reflex"

[quotation and citation omitted]). The hearing examiner

appropriately weighed each factor in crediting the police

officer's report that the defendant had committed an act of

violence while simultaneously recognizing that Doe's contact

with the criminal justice system itself was minimal. See Doe

No. 23656, 483 Mass. at 138, quoting G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) ("we

'give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and

specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the

discretionary authority conferred upon it'").

6
b. Doe's mitigating factors. Doe also argues that the

hearing examiner should not have classified Doe as a level two

sex offender when she also gave full mitigating weight to his

home situation and support system and to his stability in the

community. The claim is without merit.

The weight given to the factors is left to the sound

discretion of the hearing examiner and will not be disturbed

unless "the court determines that the decision is unsupported by

substantial evidence or is arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of

discretion, or not in accordance with law." Doe No. 10216, 447

Mass. at 787. See Doe No. 23656, 483 Mass. at 138-139. Here,

the hearing examiner weighed the mitigating factors1 against

Doe's risk-elevating factors in reaching her ultimate

conclusion. Doe assaulted a stranger in public while in a

position of trust as a taxi driver. The hearing examiner also

appropriately considered the report that Doe had been charged

with assault and battery on a family or household member in

2019. We decline to reweigh these factors. See id.; Doe, Sex

Offender Registry Bd. No. 68549 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd.,

470 Mass. 102, 110 (2014), ("[o]ur review does not turn on

1 The hearing officer also considered Doe's age and his
compliance with his probationary conditions imposed as a result
of his index offenses as mitigating factors. She gave minimal
weight to Doe's age because Doe committed his index offenses at
the already advanced age of forty and was forty-two years old at
the time of his board hearing.

7
whether, faced with the same set of facts, we would have drawn

the same conclusion as an agency or local board, but only

whether a contrary conclusion is not merely a possible but a

necessary inference" [quotation and citation omitted]).

2. Internet publication. A hearing examiner must make an

explicit determination that "a public safety interest is served

by Internet publication of the offender's registry information."

Doe No. 496501, 482 Mass. at 644.

Contrary to Doe's contention that the hearing examiner did

not make particularized findings supporting Internet publication

of Doe's offender information, the hearing examiner considered

the fact that Doe committed his index offenses against a

stranger while in a position of public trust as a taxi driver

and while in public. She further noted that Doe's index

offenses suggested that if he reoffended, it would likely be

against a stranger in public and concluded that women in the

community should have access to Doe's registry information to

take steps to protect themselves. This was sufficient to show

that, "in light of the particular risks posed by the particular

offender, Internet access to that offender's information might

realistically serve to protect the public against the risk of

the offender's sexual reoffense." Doe No. 496501, 482 Mass. at

655. See Doe No. 23656, 483 Mass. at 145 (plaintiff's offenses

committed against strangers in public locations warranted

8
Internet publication so that members of public could "take

precautions to avoid encountering [plaintiff] in situations in

which the members of the public are vulnerable").

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Meade,
Desmond & Wood, JJ.2),

Clerk

Entered: May 7, 2026.

2 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

9