Commonwealth v. Brunette-Silveira

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24-P-1351 Appeals Court

COMMONWEALTH vs. MANUEL BRUNETTE-SILVEIRA.

No. 24-P-1351.

Suffolk. November 4, 2025. – May 12, 2026.

Present: Hershfang, Hodgens, & Smyth, JJ.

Assault and Battery on Certain Public Officers and Employees.
Threatening. Mental Health. Criminal Responsibility.
Insanity. Evidence, Insanity, Expert opinion. Witness,
Expert. Practice, Criminal, Motion for a required finding.

Complaint received and sworn to in the Central Division of
the Boston Municipal Court Department on June 2, 2023.

The case was heard by Mark H. Summerville, J.

Meghan K. Oreste for the defendant.
Megan Keane (David D. McGowan, Assistant District Attorney,
also present) for the Commonwealth.

HERSHFANG, J. After a bench trial by a judge of the Boston

Municipal Court, the defendant was convicted of four counts of

assault and battery on a police officer in violation of G. L.

c. 265, § 13D, and one count of threatening to commit a crime in

violation of G. L. c. 275, § 2. The defendant contends, as he
2

did in two motions for a required finding of not guilty, that

the evidence at trial was insufficient as a matter of law to

permit a rational fact finder to find beyond a reasonable doubt

that he was criminally responsible at the time of the crimes.

We agree and reverse.

Background. Because the defendant challenges the

sufficiency of the evidence, we describe the trial evidence in

the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. See Commonwealth

v. Griffin, 475 Mass. 848, 849 (2016). The charges arose after

two police officers were called to the Edward W. Brooke Court

House for a person causing a disturbance. Because our analysis

depends in large part on distinguishing evidence from inference,

we describe in some detail the testimony of those two officers,

who were the victims of the charged crimes and the

Commonwealth's only trial witnesses.

When the officers arrived at the court house, they spoke

with court officers who provided a description of the person and

the direction in which he had gone. The officers set out from

the court house and, about one minute later, found someone

matching the description (the defendant) sitting on the stairs

"right down the street." The officers approached the defendant,

saying "something to the effect[] of" "can we speak with you,"

or "how are you, sir?" The defendant responded, "What bitch"

and immediately spit on the face and chest of one of the
3

officers (first officer). The officers arrested and handcuffed

the defendant and put him in the cruiser for the short drive to

the police station.

At the station, the officers sought to remove the defendant

from the cruiser. He spit on the second officer's head and said

"something to the effect of, 'What, bitch, I'm going to punch

you in the face.'" The officers put the defendant "in [a]

holding cell because he wasn't being cooperative. [They] let

him calm down. Then [they] attempted to take him out and

fingerprint him." When they removed his handcuffs, the

defendant punched the second officer in the shoulder. The

officers replaced the handcuffs and returned the defendant to

the cell.

The second officer had no further contact with the

defendant. The first officer tried to remove the defendant from

the cell and the defendant "threw a cup of toilet water on

[him], in [his] face and [his] upper body."1 The defendant "was

eventually booked" without the involvement of either of the

arresting officers. The record is devoid of evidence as to how,

when, or by whom this booking was accomplished.

1 From the officers' testimony it is not clear whether this
incident occurred during the second booking attempt (when the
defendant punched the second officer) or a third booking
attempt. Because it does not change our analysis, we need not
try to resolve this ambiguity.
4

The defendant called an expert in forensic psychology, a

licensed psychologist from Bridgewater State Hospital who first

met and evaluated the defendant in 2019. The expert opined that

on the day of the offense the defendant suffered from a chronic,

major mental illness that included both psychotic symptoms and

mood episodes, including what the expert characterized as a

"manic episode" at the time of the offense. When the expert

spoke with the defendant, the defendant "talked about

experiencing hallucinations" in the police station, but "was not

able to go into more specific detail about how those may have

influenced his behavior." Because, in the expert's opinion,

"that second level of analysis would have been required to opine

whether such symptoms caused substantial impairments in [the

defendant's] appreciation of wrongfulness and criminality," the

expert was not able to reach a reliable conclusion on the

defendant's appreciation of wrongfulness or criminality.

The expert concluded that the defendant "was experiencing

substantial impairments in his ability to control his behavior

at the time of the offense," including behaviors of "excessively

masturbating and consuming his own semen" and "ingesting toilet

water" while in the holding cell. The expert testified further

that the "assaultive behavior, aggressive behavior, [and]

hypersexual behavior" the defendant exhibited at the time of the

offense "continued for multiple days . . . and did not stop
5

until he received multiple intramuscular injections of

antipsychotic medication five to seven days after the offense

occurred."

Discussion. "[A] required finding of not guilty by reason

of lack of criminal responsibility may rest on the failure of

proof of criminal responsibility." Commonwealth v. Lawson, 475

Mass. 806, 812 (2016). "A trial judge sitting without a jury is

presumed, absent contrary indication, to have correctly

instructed himself as to the manner in which evidence was to be

considered in his role as factfinder." Commonwealth v. Batista,

53 Mass. App. Ct. 642, 648 (2002).

When a defendant raises a defense of lack of criminal

responsibility and the trial evidence, if viewed "in the light

most favorable to the defendant, would permit a reasonable

finder of fact to have a reasonable doubt whether the defendant

was criminally responsible at the time of the offense," then

"the Commonwealth bears the burden of proving beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant was criminally responsible."

Lawson, 475 Mass. at 811. The Commonwealth then must "prove

negatives beyond a reasonable doubt," first, "that the defendant

did not have a mental disease or defect at the time of the

crime" or, second, "if that is not disproved beyond a reasonable

doubt, that no mental disease or defect caused the defendant to

lack substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality
6

of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of

law." Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Keita, 429 Mass. 843, 849-

850 (1999).

The Commonwealth may not simply rest on the so-called

"presumption of sanity." Lawson, 475 Mass. at 814. "[T]he

inference that the defendant is criminally responsible because

the great majority of persons are criminally responsible is not

sufficient alone to warrant a rational finder of fact to

conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant is

criminally responsible." Id. at 815. Instead, "through the

inferences arising from the circumstances of the offense," the

Commonwealth must demonstrate criminal responsibility. Id. at

816. Expert testimony is not required. See Keita, 429 Mass. at

846. "A trier of fact may reject the testimony of experts that

a defendant lacked criminal responsibility and may infer sanity

from the defendant's conduct and the facts of the crime." Id.

To evaluate the sufficiency of the Commonwealth's evidence

of criminal responsibility, we "examine the evidence in the

light most favorable to the Commonwealth" to "determine whether

'the evidence and the inferences that reasonably could be drawn

from it were "of sufficient force"' to permit a rational finder

of fact to conclude that the defendant was criminally

responsible beyond a reasonable doubt." Lawson, 475 Mass. at

816, quoting Commonwealth v. Scott, 472 Mass. 815, 820 (2015).
7

Accordingly, we "must disregard contrary evidence presented by

the defendant, including the testimony of a defense expert,

unless the contrary evidence demonstrates that the

Commonwealth's evidence, or any inference drawn from such

evidence, is 'conclusively incorrect'" (citation omitted).

Lawson, supra at 817. "It will be the rare case where the

totality of the evidence regarding the defendant's conduct and

the circumstances surrounding the offense will not be sufficient

to defeat a defendant's motion for a required finding of not

guilty by reason of lack of criminal responsibility." Id.

The evidence in this case -- particularly the expert's

testimony -- "viewed in the light most favorable to the

defendant, would permit a reasonable finder of fact to have a

reasonable doubt whether the defendant was criminally

responsible at the time of the offense." Lawson, 475 Mass. at

811. The Commonwealth therefore bore "the burden of proving

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was criminally

responsible." Id.

Having determined that the Commonwealth bore the burden of

proving the defendant was criminally responsible, we disregard

the testimony of the defendant's expert, see Lawson, 475 Mass.

at 817, and view both the remaining evidence and inferences

favorably to the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth's proof must be

through "the inferences arising from the circumstances of the
8

offense, including evidence that the defendant planned the

offense, acted on a rational motive, made rational decisions in

committing the offense and in avoiding capture, and attempted to

conceal the offense or his or her role in the offense." Id. at

816. In assessing whether the Commonwealth met its burden,

"[w]e are not permitted to pile inference upon inference."

Commonwealth v. Mazza, 399 Mass. 395, 399 (1987). Having

applied this lens, we conclude that the Commonwealth failed to

prove criminal responsibility beyond a reasonable doubt.

Although there was ample, uncontested evidence that the

defendant spit on, hit, and threw toilet water at the officers,

the trial evidence was insufficient to meet the Commonwealth's

burden to prove that he did not lack the substantial capacity to

(1) appreciate the criminality or wrongfulness of his conduct

and (2) conform his conduct to the requirements of law. See

Commonwealth v. Rezac, 494 Mass. 368, 371 (2024).

There is no evidence of what happened on the short cruiser

ride from the scene of the first assault to the police station.

There is no evidence that the defendant "calmed down" when left

in the cell to do so. There is no evidence of how the defendant

was booked, or the process followed, or when the booking was

accomplished. The dissent rests on inferences as to what

happened when neither testifying witness was present, but that

failure of proof left an evidentiary hole that cannot be filled
9

solely with inference. See Commonwealth v. Simpkins, 470 Mass.

458, 461-462 (2015); Commonwealth v. Oyewole, 470 Mass. 1015,

1016 (2014) (Commonwealth may rely only on "reasonable and

possible" inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence to

satisfy its burden). This absence of evidence did not give rise

to an inference that the defendant's conduct proved criminal

responsibility.

The Commonwealth failed to carry its burden. In

Commonwealth v. Fujita, 497 Mass. 46, 59-62 (2026), for example,

the court ruled that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to

reject the defendant's assertion of lack of criminal

responsibility in light of his clear motive for the killing, his

state of mind (upset about his breakup with the victim), and his

"calculated steps to avoid detection," including assuring that

no one would come home during the time the victim was there,

instructing her to park out of sight, taking care to ensure that

the murder was blocked from public view, and taking a "series of

methodical steps to disperse evidence and avoid detection." Id.

at 61. Similarly, in Griffin, 475 Mass. at 851-853, 856, the

defendant "appeared to be acting normally in the days leading up

to the killing," helped a friend care for his ailing father, and

prepared a "last will and testament" before leaving to kill his

daughter. Id. at 856. "There was also evidence that the

defendant carefully planned the killing . . . by assembling all
10

of the materials he might need during the assault and placing

them in his backpack." Id. He walked to the crime scene in the

rain to avoid making noise with his Jeep, cut telephone lines

both inside and outside the house, turned off the electricity,

"ensur[ing] that any occupants who awoke would be left in the

dark," and took care to clean up and repack his belongings, then

left the house without waking anyone. Id. at 857.

Those were extreme cases. But even in cases that were

closer to this one -- that is, closer to the line -- the

Commonwealth has provided more evidence. Lawson, like this

case, involved an assault on an arresting police officer.

Lawson, 475 Mass. at 818. There, the court determined that the

evidence was sufficient for a fact finder to infer that

"the defendant (1) told the doctor that he struggled with
the officer because he feared he would be taken back to
jail and therefore understood that the man was a police
officer, with the power to arrest him; (2) attempted to
divert the officers' attention by asking one of the
officers to light his cigarette, because he feared that the
officers were going to arrest him on an outstanding warrant
and became violent once he realized that his ruse had
failed; (3) fought the officers because he wanted to escape
rather than be arrested and return to jail; and (4) was
fabricating his claims that the person he assaulted was
wearing a yellow suit with a reflective emblem and that he
did not believe the person to be a police officer."

Id. Critical to the court's analysis was that, in addition to

evidence about what the defendant did when approached by the

officers, the judge had evidence of what the defendant did

beforehand ("walking, talking, and laughing with two other men,"
11

and asking the officer to light his cigarette, id. at 808), as

well as the defendant's post hoc explanations of his behavior to

the testifying expert. No similar evidence was introduced here.

The trial evidence was limited to the defendant's charged

criminal conduct and did not include any evidence of his acting

in a rational, deliberate, or calculated manner.

Commonwealth v. McGillivary, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 501 (2023),

also involved an attempted assault on a police officer. In that

case, the Commonwealth carried its burden by offering "evidence

of the defendant's words and conduct before, during, and after

the offense." Id. at 504, quoting Lawson, 475 Mass. at 816. We

concluded that the evidence of criminal responsibility was

sufficient because it permitted a rational fact finder to infer

that

"(1) the defendant was aware of his own mental health issues
when he called police to request hospitalization for a
mental health evaluation hours before his confrontation with
police; (2) the defendant's threats to shoot anyone who came
to his door were motivated by police officers' refusal to
'get off [his] property' and 'leave [him] alone'; (3) the
defendant knew that his threats and conduct toward police
were wrong when he refused to leave his house despite
multiple attempts by police to negotiate with him to come
outside; and (4) the defendant possessed the ability to
control his behavior because, while he was described as
'agitated,' 'angry,' and 'yelling' during interactions with
the police, he was 'calm' when speaking with his cousin
during the [eight-hour] standoff."

McGillivary, supra. Again, no such evidence appears on the

record before us.
12

Finally, in Keita, 429 Mass. at 844-845, the defendant

first spoke and gestured obscenely to a fellow passenger on a

Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) red line train

and then, as she disembarked, lunged for her, groped her, and

muttered obscenities. He was apprehended by another person and,

when the victim returned with three uniformed MBTA officers, the

defendant "was cooperative and his arrest uneventful"; during

the booking process "immediately following his arrest," the

defendant "was docile and responsive to questions concerning his

personal history" (citation omitted). Id. at 845. A forensic

psychologist testified that the defendant was suffering from

mental illness on the day of the attack and would have had

"substantial difficulties conforming his behavior to the

requirements of the law." Id.

Affirming the conviction, the court identified (1) "police

testimony that, when arrested, the defendant did not struggle,

did not act in an erratic way, and was cooperative," (2) the

defendant's cooperative behavior during booking, and (3) the

fact that, when interviewed by the testifying psychologist, the

defendant's responses suggested he "knew what lawful conduct

was." Id. at 848-849. The court described this evidence as

"thin," but concluded that, taken together with the (later

questioned) "presumption of sanity," it was sufficient to
13

support the judge's finding of guilt. Id. at 849. See Lawson,

475 Mass. at 813-815 & nn.7, 8.

If the evidence in Keita was "thin," this was gossamer.

Without either the pre-Lawson "presumption of sanity" or a

factual basis from which to infer intent, awareness of

criminality, or rational action, see Lawson, 475 Mass. at 816,

it was an error of law to "pil[e] . . . inference upon inference

or conjecture and speculation," Commonwealth v. Armand, 411

Mass. 167, 170 (1991), and deny the defendant's motions for a

required finding of not guilty.2

The judgments are reversed, the findings are set aside, and

judgments of not guilty by reason of lack of criminal

responsibility shall enter. The case is remanded for the

process applicable to persons found not guilty by reason of lack

of criminal responsibility. See G. L. c. 123, § 16.

So ordered.

2 The cases cited by the dissent as to inferring sanity only
drive home the distinction. In each, the fact finder was
presented with evidence that went beyond the bare criminal acts
to reveal purposeful behavior: in Commonwealth v. Cullen, 395
Mass. 225, 230 (1985), the defendant's history of steady
employment before the crime, combined with his targeted and
accurate shooting at police officers, followed by flight to the
home of the defendant's lawyer and a surrender in response to
being told to "give it up"; and, in Commonwealth v. Cole, 380
Mass. 30, 33, 35-36 (1980), plans to kill two specific coworkers
while reassuring others -- accurately -- that they were safe
and, after the shootings, behaving rationally during booking
including calmly invoking Miranda rights.
HODGENS, J. (dissenting). "It will be the rare case where

the totality of the evidence regarding the defendant's conduct

and the circumstances surrounding the offense will not be

sufficient to defeat a defendant's motion for a required finding

of not guilty by reason of lack of criminal responsibility."

Commonwealth v. Lawson, 475 Mass. 806, 817 (2016). The evidence

presented by the Commonwealth shows that this is not that rare

case.

Such evidence, offered through the testimony of two

arresting officers, showed the defendant engaged in unlawful and

belligerent goal-directed behavior that also reflected a strong

"anti-police" animus aimed at the uniformed officers who

confronted him on the street: the defendant caused a

disturbance at the loading dock of the court house and left the

scene; two uniformed officers found him sitting on stairs about

a one-minute drive from the court house; the defendant

immediately spat on the first uniformed officer who spoke to him

and called the officer a bitch; the officers arrested the

defendant and transported him in a police cruiser to the station

where he spat on the second arresting officer, called him a

bitch, threatened to strike him, and later punched him in the

shoulder; the officers placed the defendant in a holding cell

where he calmed down; upon interacting with the first officer

again, the defendant threw toilet water at him; although
2

initially agitated during booking, the defendant changed his

behavior when the first arresting officer left the room; and the

defendant successfully completed the booking process with

another officer. Viewing the totality of this evidence, and

only this evidence, in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth, I must conclude that the trial judge properly

denied the defense motion for a required finding of not guilty

by reason of insanity. See Lawson, 475 Mass. at 817 (reviewing

court and judge "must disregard contrary evidence presented by

the defendant, including the testimony of a defense expert").

Until today, our appellate courts have never taken the

question of criminal responsibility away from the fact finder.

Indeed, the Supreme Judicial Court has repeatedly cautioned

against doing so. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rasmusen, 444

Mass. 657, 662 n.6 (2005) (required finding generally "not

appropriate where the defense is lack of criminal

responsibility"); Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 436 Mass. 671, 676

(2002) ("we are aware of no case in which we have ordered the

entry of a judgment of not guilty by reason of the defendant's

lack of criminal responsibility after a jury has rejected such a

defense"); Commonwealth v. Rosenthal, 432 Mass. 124, 130 (2000)

(same). Especially given the "paramount role of the [fact

finder] in assessing the defendant's criminal responsibility,"
3

the Commonwealth's evidence did not compel a finding of not

guilty by reason of insanity. Rasmusen, supra at 663.

It is well settled that the Commonwealth is not required to

produce expert testimony to show that the defendant had the

mental capacity to commit the crime. See Lawson, 475 Mass. at

815-816. Sanity may be inferred from "testimony of lay

witnesses who observed [the] defendant at relevant times, [and]

the evidence as to the circumstances of the commission of the

crime." Blaisdell v. Commonwealth, 372 Mass. 753, 765-766

(1977). Accord Lawson, supra. The fact finder may infer sanity

from the "facts underlying the crime and evidence of [the

defendant's] actions before and after the crime." Commonwealth

v. Cullen, 395 Mass. 225, 229 (1985). Those facts showed that

by aggressive words and actions, the defendant directed his

anger toward the two uniformed police officers who approached

him while he passively sat on stairs. His repeated acts

directed only at the two arresting officers evinced intentional,

goal-directed conduct successfully targeting the officers who

were the objects of his anger. See, e.g., Lawson, supra at 815,

quoting Commonwealth v. Ricard, 355 Mass. 509, 515 (1969)

("anger, revenge, rejection, jealousy, hatred, insult,

intoxication, or the like" may account for behavior by sane

person); Commonwealth v. LaCava, 438 Mass. 708, 714 (2003)

("serious impediment" to husband's potential insanity defense to
4

murder of wife included "anger over their impending divorce");

Commonwealth v. Francis, 355 Mass. 108, 111 (1969), S.C., 411

Mass. 579 (1992) (rational motives supporting sanity may include

"jealousy, hatred, greed, envy, frustration of aroused sexual

desire or the like"). A fact finder could readily conclude that

anger and animosity rather than a mental disease or defect

motivated the defendant to act as he did. See Commonwealth v.

Lunde, 390 Mass. 42, 47-48 (1983) (Commonwealth may carry its

burden even when conceding defendant suffered from mental

disease or defect).

Beyond discerning a rational motive, the fact finder could

also infer sanity from evidence and reasonable inferences

showing the defendant was "oriented as to time, place, and

persons." Commonwealth v. Cole, 380 Mass. 30, 36 (1980). He

caused a disturbance outside the court house, yet maintained the

presence of mind to leave before the police could arrive; he sat

passively on stairs along a city street, yet betrayed his

frustration at being tracked down by the police; and he spat on

the arresting officers and struck them, yet he managed to

complete the booking process with other officers. From this

sequence of events a fact finder could conclude that the

defendant engaged in "calculated behavior" and was "fully

capable of committing" the charged crimes. Jackson v. Virginia,

443 U.S. 307, 325 (1979). The defendant's situational awareness
5

became particularly evident when he showed the ability to turn

his hostility on when interacting with the arresting officers

and turn it off twice -- first, when placed in the holding cell,

and second, when another officer suggested that an arresting

officer leave the room to enable the defendant to complete the

booking process with different officers. See, e.g., Lawson, 475

Mass. at 807 (sufficient evidence of sanity where defendant

"resisted arrest and assaulted the officers" but had rational

motives); Cullen, 395 Mass. at 226 (sufficient evidence of

sanity where defendant "threw a rock at a marked police cruiser"

and fired gunshots at officers but attempted to evade capture);

Commonwealth v. McGillivary, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 501, 502, 504

(2023) (sufficient evidence of sanity where defendant

"threatened to shoot" police but showed "ability to control his

behavior").

The majority characterizes the Commonwealth's evidence of

sanity as "gossamer," suggests certain inferences are

unwarranted, and provides a contrasting and detailed account of

the defense expert's opinion (based on the defendant's

"functioning, thoughts, feelings, [and] motivations at the time

of the offense," medical records, and psychiatric care rendered

five days after the arrest), but on appeal we should not be

reweighing evidence in all but name. See Cullen, 395 Mass. at

231 n.4 ("extreme thinness of evidence" speaks to weight of
6

evidence and is inappropriate appellate consideration [citation

omitted]). The sufficiency "inquiry does not require a court to

'ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial

established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Jackson, 443

U.S. at 318-319, quoting Woodby v. Immigration & Naturalization

Serv., 385 U.S. 276, 282 (1966). Weighing the evidence and

inferences from the evidence is the role of the fact finder who

notably considered and expressly rejected the testimony of the

defense expert in its entirety. That alternative inferences may

be drawn from the evidence by an appellate court does not render

the evidence insufficient in the trial court. See Commonwealth

v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 678-679 (1979). An inference "need

only be reasonable and possible; it need not be necessary or

inescapable" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Merola, 405

Mass. 529, 533 (1989). Also, just because the Commonwealth

could have presented more evidence, as has been done in

archetypal criminal responsibility cases such as homicides, does

not mean that the evidence presented here (through just two

police witnesses) was necessarily insufficient to prove criminal

responsibility for assault and battery on a police officer and

threatening to commit a crime. When reviewing the denial of a

motion for a required finding of not guilty, we should be

focused on the Commonwealth's evidence and indulge all

reasonable inferences in favor of the Commonwealth. We should
7

also not engage in an extensive review of the defense expert's

testimony, particularly where the parties never disputed that

the Commonwealth shouldered the burden of proving the

defendant's criminal responsibility. See Commonwealth v.

Goudreau, 422 Mass. 731, 737 (1996) (Commonwealth bears burden

to prove criminal responsibility "once the issue . . . is

raised"). Ultimately, "[t]he question of what inferences to

draw from this evidence is for the [fact finder] . . . and not

this court." Commonwealth v. Kappler, 416 Mass. 574, 579

(1993).

Finally, sufficiency of the evidence does not turn on the

level of the Commonwealth's ardor for the case -- it is

controlled by the evidence and inferences from the evidence. At

trial, the Commonwealth unsuccessfully attempted to stipulate to

the police reports, unsuccessfully attempted to stipulate to the

defense expert report, waived the opening statement, waived

cross-examination of the defense expert, waived the argument on

a required finding motion at the close of evidence, and in a

brief closing argument announced that the prosecution declined

to "contest[]" the testimony of the defense expert. Once the

parties submitted the case to the fact finder, the evidence, and

not the strategy or will of the parties, controlled the result.

That evidence enabled, but did not compel, the judge to conclude

that the defendant was criminally responsible for spitting on,
8

striking, and threatening the two police officers who arrested

him. At no point in the trial did the Commonwealth's evidence

compel the judge to find the defendant lacked criminal

responsibility for this conduct. Only by adverting to the

defense evidence can the majority reach the result that it does.

If, however, we look only at the Commonwealth's evidence and

draw all inferences in its favor, then we have a man on a city

street who directed anger and violence at two uniformed police

officers -- an event that is neither inexplicably irrational

nor, sadly, unusual.