Ymca of Greater Boston, Inc. v. Hyh'nes Bakri.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-404

YMCA OF GREATER BOSTON, INC.

vs.

HYH'NES BAKRI.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

After a jury-waived trial, a judge of the Eastern Housing

Court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, YMCA of

Greater Boston, Inc. (YMCA), against the defendant, Hyh'nes

Bakri (Bakri), on numerous claims in a consolidated action

relating to a tenancy dispute between the parties. 1 Bakri

appeals from this judgment, 2 asserting numerous errors on appeal

1YMCA states that two entities, Hallkeen Management, Inc.,
and Cruz Management Company, Inc., "were [also] parties in this
action and join in on [YMCA's] [b]rief." While those entities
were named as defendants to a small claims action brought by
Bakri, which was consolidated with the Housing Court action
brought by YMCA, those entities were not named as plaintiffs in
YMCA's complaint and have not filed appearances in this appeal.

2Bakri filed her notice of appeal prior to final judgment
entering below. We exercise our discretion to hear this appeal
because the premature filing of the notice of appeal did not
and requesting that the judgment be vacated and damages be

entered in her favor. We affirm.

As a preliminary matter, we decline to address a number of

Bakri's claims that fail to comply with the Massachusetts Rules

of Appellate Procedure, 3 fail to rise to the level of appellate

argument, 4 or were not raised below. 5 We recognize that Bakri is

prejudice YMCA. See Roch v. Mollica, 481 Mass. 164, 165 n.2
(2019).

3 These claims include her references to the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; G. L.
c. 12, § 11H-11J; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604; G. L. c. 151B; and alleged violations of Housing Court
orders. Bakri filed an informal brief pursuant to the Appeals
Court Informal Brief Pilot Program (program) for self-
represented litigants, but the program still requires compliance
with the Massachusetts Rules of Appellate Procedure. See
Appeals Court Informal Brief Pilot Program,
https://www.mass.gov/info-details/appeals-court-informal-brief-
pilot-program.

4 These claims include "substantial civil rights injustice,"
"loophole disguised as procedure," and "plac[ing] the burden to
fix [YMCA's] continued noncompliance" on Bakri. The program
requires "adequate appellate argument," meaning that the
"Appeals Court does not have to consider any argument that is
not discussed in the brief or that lacks legal or factual
support." Appeals Court Informal Brief Pilot Program,
https://www.mass.gov/info-details/appeals-court-informal-brief-
pilot-program.

5 These claims include violation of the right to a speedy
trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment;
violation of art. 11 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights;
violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution; and violation of due process. See Commonwealth v.
Pares-Ramirez, 400 Mass. 604, 609 (1987). Generally, we do not
address issues raised for the first time on appeal "if the
record accompanying them is lacking, as is the case here, in

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self-represented, but nonetheless, pro se litigants are held to

the same standards as all other litigants. See Brossard v. West

Roxbury Div. of the Dist. Court Dep't, 417 Mass. 183, 184

(1994).

With regard to the majority of the remaining claims,

Bakri's arguments amount to a dispute with the weight that the

judge gave to certain evidence and with the judge's credibility

determinations. 6 However, "it is the trial judge who, by virtue

of his firsthand view of the presentation of evidence, is in the

best position to judge the weight and credibility of the

evidence." New England Canteen Serv., Inc. v. Ashley, 372 Mass.

671, 675 (1977). On appeal, we will not disturb such

determinations unless found to be clearly erroneous. Adoption

of Querida, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 771, 777 (2019). The judge found

in favor of YMCA on the contested claims largely because the

judge credited the testimony of YMCA and did not credit, or give

great weight to, the evidence that Bakri put forth to support

providing a basis for their intelligent resolution." Gagnon,
petitioner, 416 Mass. 775, 780 (1994) (superseded by G. L.
c. 123A, § 9).

6 As examples, Bakri claims that the judge erred in his
conclusions regarding Bakri's claims of retaliation, in
violation of G. L. c. 186, § 18; interference with quiet
enjoyment (G. L. c. 186, § 14); harassment; discrimination;
intentional infliction of emotional distress; negligent
infliction of emotional distress; breach of contract; and
violation of G. L. c. 93A.

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these claims. Bakri has not shown sufficient reason that the

judge's factual findings were clearly erroneous, and therefore

we do not disturb them and find no error in the judge's legal

conclusions.

For similar reasons, we disagree with Bakri's claims that

the judge erred in concluding there was no violation of the

Massachusetts Sanitary Code (code), or breach of the implied

warranty of habitability. The judge addressed these claims

together, as there is a breach of the implied warranty of

habitability when there is a material violation of the minimum

standards in the code. Whether there is a material breach or

violation of the code is a question of fact. See Boston Hous.

Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 200 (1973). Again, we

generally accept the findings of fact found by the judge in a

jury-waived case, unless shown to be clearly erroneous or unless

the evidence is entirely documentary. See Zaskey v. Whately, 61

Mass. App. Ct. 609, 614 (2004). Here, the judge found that

Bakri failed to meet her burden 7 regarding these claims because

no evidence was submitted regarding a violation of the code, nor

were there reports from inspectional services regarding defects

7 Bakri also argues that the judge erred in placing a burden
on her to prove her claims. There was no error, where,
generally, the party bringing a civil claim has the burden of
proving it by a preponderance of evidence. See Goodman v.
Atwood, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 655, 657 (2011).

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on the premises. Given the deferential standard of review

applicable here, we do not disturb the judge's rulings on these

claims.

To the extent that Bakri claims that the Housing Court

violated Standing Order 1-04, identifying time standards for

cases, it is without merit. See generally Housing Court

Standing Order 1-04 (2004). Housing Court Standing Order 1-04

provides that judges shall have discretion to "exercise sound

judgment in a manner that affords the parties a fair opportunity

to develop and present their claims to the court," and nothing

"shall limit the [judge's] authority, in appropriate cases where

the interests of justice require . . . to order that a

particular case not be or not remain subject to the time

standards set forth in this standing order." Bakri has failed

to articulate how the judge's management of the case constituted

an abuse of discretion, and we therefore conclude there was

none.

Finally, Bakri alludes to judicial and institutional bias

against her, and in favor of YMCA, throughout the proceedings.

Bakri's supposed evidence for this claim is solely that the

judge made rulings that were unfavorable to her. This claim is

without merit, as "[t]he mere fact that a party suffers adverse

rulings during litigation does not establish lack of judicial

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impartiality." Clark v. Clark, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 737, 739

(1999). 8

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Meade,
Hodgens & Allen, JJ. 9),

Clerk

Entered: May 20, 2026.

8 To the extent that we do not address other arguments, they
"have not been overlooked. We find nothing in them that
requires discussion." Commonwealth v. Domanski, 332 Mass. 66,
78 (1954).

9 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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