Ducharme v. Mobile Home Rent Control Board of Chicopee

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24-P-1132 Appeals Court

LINDA DUCHARME vs. MOBILE HOME RENT CONTROL BOARD OF CHICOPEE
& another.1

No. 24-P-1132.

Hampden. October 8, 2025. – May 22, 2026.

Present: Meade, Neyman, Walsh, JJ.

Mobile Home. Manufactured Housing Community. Municipal
Corporations, Special act, Rent control. Administrative
Law, Hearing, Judicial review, Standing, Substantial
evidence. Housing Court, Jurisdiction. Jurisdiction,
Housing Court. Rent Control, Mobile home, Rent increase,
Judicial review. Practice, Civil, Review of action of rent
control board, Review of administrative action, Standing.

Civil action commenced in the Western Division of the
Housing Court Department on March 3, 2023.

The case was heard by Jonathan J. Kane, J., on motions for
judgment on the pleadings.

Ryan K. O'Hara for the intervener.
Daniel Ordorica for the plaintiff.
Mark J. Albano, for the defendant, was present but did not
argue.

1 Jean Real Estate, Inc., intervener.
2

NEYMAN, J. The plaintiff, Linda Ducharme, brought an

action in the Housing Court for review of a decision by the

mobile home rent control board of Chicopee (board) allowing the

defendant intervener, Jean Real Estate, Inc. (Jean), to increase

rent in three manufactured housing communities (parks). On

cross motions for judgment on the pleadings, a Housing Court

judge determined that due to technological issues with an

Internet-based video conferencing platform used during the

public hearing and inaudible portions of the resulting audio

recording and transcript, the board's decision must be set aside

because it was "in violation of constitutional provisions and

made upon unlawful procedure."

On appeal, Jean argues that the Housing Court lacked

jurisdiction over the matter, the plaintiff had standing only to

challenge the board's decision as to the one park where she is a

tenant, the plaintiff's substantial rights were not violated at

the hearing, the plaintiff waived her objections to the

technological issues at the hearing, and that the board's

decision was supported by substantial evidence. For the reasons

discussed herein, we vacate the judgment and remand for further

findings by the board only as to the park where the plaintiff

resides.

Background. 1. Regulatory scheme. In 1977, the

Legislature, through a special act, declared "a serious public
3

emergency" with respect to housing in the city of Chicopee

(city) "created by excessive, abnormally high and unwarranted

rental increases imposed by some owners of mobile parks located

therein." St. 1977, c. 596, § 1. To address the emergency, the

Legislature authorized the city to establish the board to

regulate rents in manufactured housing communities. See

St. 1977, c. 596, § 2.

The board is permitted to make individual or general

adjustments to rents to ensure that park owners receive a "fair

net operating income" for the units. St. 1977, c. 596, § 3 (a).

The special act and the related city ordinance define fair net

operating income as

"that income which will yield a return, after all
reasonable operating expenses, on the fair market value of
the property equal to the debt service rate generally
available from institutional first mortgage lenders or such
other rates of return as the board, on the basis of
evidence presented before it, deems more appropriate to the
circumstances of the case."

St. 1977, c. 596, § 3 (a). See City of Chicopee Ordinance

§ 195-5(B) (Ordinance § 195). The special act and the ordinance

also state that the fair market value of the property "shall be

the assessed valuation of the property or such other valuation

as the board, on the basis of evidence presented before it,

deems more appropriate to the circumstances of the case."

St. 1977, c. 596, § 3 (a); Ordinance § 195-5(C). Proceedings

before the board and judicial review of the board's final
4

decision are governed by G. L. c. 30A. See St. 1977, c. 596,

§§ 4, 5 (a); Ordinance § 195-7(A).

2. Facts. Jean is a corporation owned by Edison Yee, his

wife, and his siblings. Jean operates three parks in Chicopee -

- Holiday Mobile Home Park Phase I (Holiday I), Holiday Mobile

Home Park Phase II (Holiday II), and Kontiki Village Mobile Home

Park (Kontiki). These parks are situated on land owned by two

trusts. Edison Yee is the sole trustee of those trusts and his

mother, Linda Yee, is the beneficiary. The plaintiff is a

tenant of Holiday I.

In November 2022, Jean submitted three separate written

requests, along with supporting documentation, to the board

seeking rent increases at each of the parks (proposals). As to

Holiday I, Jean proposed a monthly rent increase of $150.08 for

each of the thirty-four sites, including the site occupied by

the plaintiff. At the time, Jean collected $89,279 annually in

rent at Holiday I. The monthly rent had not been adjusted since

2011 and ranged from $206.27 to $231.27 per site, depending on

lot size and location. In calculating the proposed rent

increase, Jean determined that Holiday I had reasonable

operating expenses of $59,513 and an appraised fair market value

of $1.3 million, and that a seven percent debt service rate was

applicable. Based on these amounts, Jean claimed a fair net
5

operating income of $150,513 annually (representing a $61,234

increase from the amount Jean was then collecting).

The plaintiff submitted written objections to Jean's

proposed rent increases to the board. On January 25, 2023, the

board held a public hearing on the three proposals. The hearing

was held in a "hybrid" format, with participants appearing in

person or using the Internet-based video conferencing platform,

Zoom Video Communications, Inc. (Zoom). Two members of the

board attended the hearing in person, and one appeared via Zoom.2

The hearing transcript reflects that at various times during the

hearing there were difficulties with the volume on Zoom such

that some remote participants (not including the board member)

complained about the audio during the proceeding.

The plaintiff's counsel, who appeared in person at the

hearing, made a presentation to the board.3 The plaintiff raised

two objections as to Holiday I. First, the plaintiff argued

2 The remaining two board members were excused from the
hearing and did not vote. The chair of the board noted at the
hearing that there was a quorum, and no party contends otherwise
on appeal.

3 Although not dispositive on the issues before us, it
appears that the plaintiff attended the hearing with counsel,
and she does not argue that her ability to participate was
hindered in any way. Rather, as discussed below, she argues
that the extent of the technological issues was not apparent to
the in-person participants during the hearing and thus could be
raised for the first time before the Housing Court judge.
6

that the board should determine the fair market value for the

property based on its "assessed" value of $700,100, as "is

legally preferred," rather than on the "appraised" value of $1.3

million proposed by Jean. Second, the plaintiff challenged

Jean's inclusion of $19,468.80 annually for land rent as a

reasonable operating expense. The plaintiff argued that the

board should exclude that amount from the calculation because

(1) it was not an expense related to the operation of the park,

and (2) it was paid by Jean to the trusts of which Edison Yee is

the trustee and Linda Yee is the beneficiary.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the three board members

voted to approve the rent increases proposed by Jean for all

three parks and implement them in two phases, with half the

increase to be added in March 2023 and the other half in March

2024. On February 3, 2023, the board issued a single written

decision as to the three parks. Those written findings reflect

that the board adopted Jean's calculations. In addition, the

board provided two reasons for using the appraised (as opposed

to assessed) value for Holiday I: (1) the practice "is

consistent with Board precedent"; and (2) "the city assessment

of the property may yield a net loss for the owner."
7

Accordingly, the rent in Holiday I increased by $75.04 in March

2023, and again by the same amount in March 2024.4

3. Housing Court proceedings. On March 3, 2023, the

plaintiff brought the present action in the Housing Court

seeking judicial review of the board's decision under G. L.

c. 30A, and a declaratory judgment under G. L. c. 231A. The

plaintiff's complaint again challenged the use of the appraised

value and the inclusion of land rent as a reasonable operating

expense. Jean was permitted to intervene and the parties cross-

moved for judgment on the pleadings. In the plaintiff's cross

motion, she argued for the first time that the proceedings

before the board were defective because of the technological

issues for the participants on Zoom, including one board member.

At the hearing on the parties' cross motions, the board argued

that the judge should not consider any challenge concerning Zoom

because the plaintiff did not raise that issue before the board.

On January 7, 2024, the judge issued a written decision

explaining that the recording of the board's hearing "is

repeatedly inaudible," and the transcript "is replete with

references to inaudible comments" and "includes references to

Zoom participants being unable to hear the proceedings." The

judge noted that while the board member participating via Zoom

4 Holiday II and Kontiki's rent also increased by the
proposed amounts.
8

was able to state his thoughts about the proposals, "he did not

have the benefit of hearing some if not most of the questions

and answers posed during the public hearing, rendering the

hearing relatively meaningless." In his decision, the judge

also noted that the plaintiff "has standing only to challenge

the rent increase for the manufactured housing community in

which she lives" but that any procedural defects in the hearing

related to all three parks. The judge set aside the board's

decision in its entirety on the basis that it was "in violation

of constitutional provisions and made upon unlawful procedure."

Jean now appeals.5

Discussion. 1. Housing Court's jurisdiction. Jean first

argues that "it is questionable whether the Housing Court in

fact could properly exercise [subject matter] jurisdiction in

this matter." The special act authorizing the creation of the

board contains an explicit provision authorizing review by the

District Court and the Superior Court, St. 1977, c. 596,

§ 5 (a),6 but no such provision referencing the Housing Court,

5 The board also timely filed a notice of appeal in the
Housing Court but did not file a brief in this appeal.

6 Statute 1977, c. 596, § 5 (a) provides:

"The district court of Chicopee shall have original
jurisdiction, concurrently with the superior court, of
all petitions for review brought pursuant to section
fourteen of chapter thirty A of the General Laws."
9

even though the Housing Court in Hampden County was then in

existence,7 see St. 1973, c. 591. Thereafter, however, the

Legislature incorporated the provisions concerning the Housing

Court's jurisdiction in G. L. c. 185C, § 3, see St. 1978,

c. 478, § 92 & St. 1979, c. 72, § 3, and amended the statute to

further define and expand the jurisdiction of the Housing Court.

See Tedford v. Massachusetts Hous. Fin. Agency, 390 Mass. 688,

693 n.7 (1984) ("The Housing Court's jurisdiction was greatly

expanded by the 1979 amendments").

The 1979 amendments to G. L. c. 185C, § 3, added, in part,

that the Housing Court has "jurisdiction of all housing

problems, including all contract and tort actions which affect

the health, safety and welfare of the occupants or owners

thereof, arising within and affecting residents" of Hampden

County, among other places. G. L. c. 185C, § 3, as amended

through St. 1979, c. 72, § 3. Relying on this language, this

court has explained that "[a] suit [brought under G. L. c. 30A]

to correct a rent increase for mobile home occupants that was

illegally authorized by public body seems to constitute a

'housing problem' affecting the welfare of that characteristic

population." Quinn v. Rent Control Bd. of Peabody, 45 Mass.

7 In contrast, G. L. c. 30A provides that proceedings for
judicial review of agency decisions "shall be instituted in the
superior court." G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (1).
10

App. Ct. 357, 370 (1998).8 The same is true here, where the

board was created to regulate and control rents to prevent

"serious threats to the public health, safety and general

welfare of the citizens of Chicopee, particularly the elderly."

St. 1977, c. 596, § 1. Moreover, the Supreme Judicial Court has

read the broad language of G. L. c. 185C, § 3,9 to confer

concurrent jurisdiction on the Housing Court as to actions

brought under statutes that do not include the Housing Court

among the list of courts with jurisdiction. See, e.g., Figgs v.

Boston Hous. Auth., 469 Mass. 354, 361 n.12 (2014) ("the Housing

8 We note, as we did in Quinn, 45 Mass. App. Ct. at 370,
n.15, that in the present case "[t]here was no objection to the
Housing Court's assumption of jurisdiction at the time."

9 General Laws c. 185C, § 3, also grants the Housing Court
concurrent jurisdiction over actions brought under certain
enumerated statutes, and more broadly,

"under the provisions of common law and of equity and any
other general or special law, ordinance, by-law, rule or
regulation as is concerned directly or indirectly with the
health, safety, or welfare, of any occupant of any place
used, or intended for use, as a place of human habitation
and the possession, condition, or use of any particular
housing accommodations or household goods or services
situated therein or furnished in connection there with or
the use of any real property and activities conducted there
on as such use affects the health, welfare and safety of
any resident, occupant, user or member of the general
public and which is subject to regulation by local cities
and towns under the state building code, state specialized
codes, state sanitary code, and other applicable statutes
and ordinances."

G. L. c. 185C, § 3.
11

Court has jurisdiction under G. L. c. 249, § 4, concurrent with

the Superior Court, to review decisions of a public housing

authority regarding housing matters" despite the language of

G. L. c. 249, § 4, which provides that "[a] civil action in the

nature of certiorari . . . may be brought in the supreme

judicial or superior court or, if the matter involves any right,

title or interest in land . . . in the land court"). See also

Berrios v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 411 Mass. 587, 592-593

(1992) (noting that Housing Court is empowered to grant

declaratory judgments and adjudicate claims related to

procedures required by G. L. c. 30A, even though G. L. c. 30A,

§ 14 [1] provides that proceedings for judicial review of agency

decisions "shall be instituted in the superior court"). In

light of this precedent, the Housing Court has jurisdiction

concurrent with the District Court and the Superior Court to

review the board's decision.

2. Plaintiff's standing. Jean next argues that the

plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the board's decisions as

to Holiday II and Kontiki. General Laws c. 30A, § 14, permits a

"person . . . aggrieved" by a final decision of the board to

obtain judicial review. See St. 1977, c. 596, § 4 (board is

subject to G. L. c. 30A, "as if [it] were an agency of the

commonwealth"). Such person "must be aggrieved in a 'legal

sense' and show that 'substantial rights' have been
12

'prejudiced.'" Group Ins. Comm'n v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 381

Mass. 199, 202–203 (1980), quoting Duato v. Commissioner of Pub.

Welfare, 359 Mass. 635, 637-638 (1971).

As a tenant of Holiday I subject to the rent increase

approved by the board, the plaintiff has standing to challenge

the board's decision as to that park. See Ginther v.

Commissioner of Ins., 427 Mass. 319, 323 (1998) (party who

alleges injury that falls within area of concern of regulatory

scheme and is direct consequence of complained action has

standing). By contrast, where the plaintiff is not a tenant of

Holiday II or Kontiki and has neither alleged nor offered proof

that raising rents at Holiday II or Kontiki caused her injury,

she is not a person "aggrieved" as to Jean's actions related to

those two parks. See id. at 323. Of note, the plaintiff

brought the present action "in her individual right, and . . .

it is not brought by or in behalf of a group under claim of a

class proceeding." Duato, 359 Mass. at 638.

We also discern no error in the manner in which the board

conducted its proceedings. See Zachs v. Department of Pub.

Utils., 406 Mass. 217, 227 (1989) ("administrative agencies have

broad discretion over procedural aspects of matters before

them"). The issuance of a single decision by the board to

address Jean's proposals for the three parks does not alter the

fact that the plaintiff is only "aggrieved" by the decision to
13

raise rent at Holiday I. Jean submitted a separate proposal for

each park and the board could have issued a separate decision on

each of Jean's proposals. That the board held one public

hearing for all those affected by the proposals and addressed

all three proposals in a single written decision does not alter

the analysis. Indeed, no party objected to this procedure,

nothing in the record suggests that the board formally

consolidated the matters, and the plaintiff cites no authority

that compels any conclusion to the contrary. Cf. Lumiansky v.

Tessier, 213 Mass. 182, 188-189 (1912) (absent court order for

consolidation, judge has discretion to try cases together that

involve common issues, but cases remain distinct and such

practice "does not change . . . the rights of the parties, as

those rights must still turn on the pleadings, proofs and

proceedings in their respective suits. The parties in one suit

do not thereby become parties in the other, or a decree in one

is not a decree in the other unless so directed" [citation

omitted]).

3. Board's decision. Our review of the board's decision

to increase rent in Holiday I is governed by G. L. c. 30A,

§ 14 (7). "General Laws c. 30A, § 14 (7), 'requires us to

determine whether a party's substantial rights were prejudiced

because the decision was in violation of constitutional

provisions, based on an error of law or unlawful procedure, or
14

unsupported by substantial evidence'" (citation omitted). Slive

& Hanna, Inc. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination,

100 Mass. App. Ct. 432, 436 (2021). Our review of the Housing

Court judge's decision is de novo. See Doe, Sex Offender

Registry Bd. No. 523391 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 95 Mass.

App. Ct. 85, 89 (2019).

a. Hearing. The judge concluded that the technological

issues at the hearing may have prejudiced the tenants and thus

the board's decision was made upon unlawful procedure. See

G. L. c. 30A, § 14. We disagree.

During the hearing, the board's chair noted on at least

three occasions that he had received complaints from some Zoom

participants regarding difficulty hearing the proceedings.10

Although the plaintiff, through her counsel, did not object at

the hearing, she now argues that the issues with Zoom became

apparent only after she received the transcript and audio

recording of the hearing during the Housing Court proceedings

and are therefore preserved for appeal. Jean, on the other

hand, argues that the plaintiff's claim regarding technological

10For instance, at one point, the chair reviewed the chat
function of Zoom and explained, "There is nobody to type the
. . . transcript of the meeting into the chat for those of you
who are in Zoom. So, I'm sorry if you're feeling like you're
missing parts of the meeting, but . . . Zoom is only capable of
what it's capable of."
15

issues at the hearing was not raised with the board in the first

instance, and is thus waived. Jean's argument is bolstered to

some extent by the chair's comments at the hearing which

notified the in-person participants of certain technological

issues. Furthermore, the plaintiff neither objected nor

requested a continuance. In view of these facts, there is a

measure of persuasiveness to Jean's contention. See, e.g.,

Lincoln v. Personnel Adm'r of the Dept. of Personnel Admin., 432

Mass. 208, 213 n.6 (2000). Nonetheless, we will assume for

purposes of argument that the technological issues are not

waived.

Even with that assumption, we discern no basis to set aside

the board's decision. We may set aside a decision made on

unlawful procedure if the plaintiff's "substantial rights . . .

may have been prejudiced." Sullivan v. Superintendent, Mass.

Correctional Inst., Shirley, 101 Mass. App. Ct. 766, 773 (2022),

quoting G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7). "[T]he question is . . .

whether the unlawfulness of the [board]'s procedure may have

affected the outcome." Sullivan, supra, quoting Rivas v.

Chelsea Hous. Auth., 464 Mass. 329, 337-338 (2013).

Here, the plaintiff's counsel appeared in person at the

hearing and submitted written objections in advance. The

plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to present her

argument to the board and ask questions of Jean's principal.
16

Furthermore, the board discussed the plaintiff's specific

objections at length, and she has not otherwise demonstrated

that her substantial rights may have been prejudiced. Indeed,

she offered no evidence from any Zoom participants who were

residents of Holiday I that their ability to present information

or arguments to the board, or to question Jean's principal, was

significantly diminished.

Nor, on this record, can the plaintiff successfully

challenge the decision based on the participation of one board

member by Zoom. That board member responded when directly

addressed at the hearing and was able to acknowledge concerns

raised during the hearing. While the plaintiff now asserts that

"[i] t is difficult to credit [the board member's] immediate

responses as indicative that the Zoom was clear and audible

given the contradictory statements by others on Zoom," that

argument is speculative. Where, as here, a party alleges

"irregularities in procedure before the agency, not shown in the

record, testimony thereon may be taken in the court." G. L.

c. 30A, § 14 (5) (judicial review "shall be confined to the

record, except that in cases of alleged irregularities in

procedure before the agency, not shown in the record, testimony

thereon may be taken in the court"). The record does not reveal

what the board member did or did not hear, or whether the

participation by Zoom of other Holiday I residents was adversely
17

affected. Moreover, the plaintiff failed to take advantage of

the mechanism provided under G. L. c. 30A to offer evidence

before the Housing Court on that point. See id. As such, the

plaintiff has not shown that her substantial rights may have

been prejudiced by any technological issues with Zoom.11

b. Rent increase. As set forth above, the board was

required to determine Jean's "fair net operating income," which

is calculated after determining "all reasonable operating

expenses" plus the product of the "fair market value of the

property" and the applicable "debt service rate."12 St. 1977,

c. 596, § 3 (a). As the Supreme Judicial Court has explained,

"The flexibility contained in the definition [of fair net
operating income] is needed in order to administer rent
control effectively. As formulated, it is entirely
consistent with the overriding requirement of a reasonable
return on investment which we feel to be incorporated in
the term 'fair net operating income.'"

11Notwithstanding the technological issues with Zoom and
the audio recording of the hearing, we conclude that the record
before us is adequate to review the merits of the board's
decision. We disagree with the Housing Court judge's conclusion
that the record "preclud[es] meaningful review." As discussed
supra, we have independently reviewed the transcript and the
audio, and the record is far from unreviewable despite some
inaudible portions. We are able to discern and review the
relevant arguments made at the hearing and have access to the
documents relied upon by the board members.

12We confine our discussion to objections raised by the
plaintiff before the board. The parties did not challenge the
board's decision as to the applicable debt service rate and we
do not discuss it further.
18

Marshal House, Inc. v. Rent Control Bd. of Brookline, 358 Mass.

686, 706 (1971). See Chelmsford Trailer Park, Inc. v.

Chelmsford, 393 Mass. 186, 193 (1984).

i. Fair market value of property. The special act and the

city ordinance provide a presumption that the fair market value

of the property "shall be the assessed valuation of the

property," but provides the board with the discretion to use a

different valuation that the board "deems more appropriate in

the circumstances," based on the evidence before it. St. 1977,

c. 596, § 3 (a). See Ordinance § 195-5(C).

Relying on the appraisal submitted in support of its

proposal, Jean asserted (and the board accepted) that the fair

market value of Holiday I was $1.3 million. In its written

decision, the board explained that it

"was satisfied with the rationale of the appraiser for use
of [the $1.3 million] figure as opposed to the city
assessment of the property for two reasons: 1) this is
consistent with Board precedent, and 2) the city assessment
of the property may yield a net loss for the owner."

This rationale is not sufficient, standing alone, to rebut the

statutory presumption in favor of using the assessed value. The

fact that the board has used an appraised value in the past does

little to explain why such approach is appropriate based on the

evidence before the board and "the circumstances of [this]

case." St. 1977, c. 596, § 3 (a). As to the board's statement

that use of the assessed value "may yield a net loss for the
19

owner," the board failed to explain how that is true in this

case, and the board members' remarks during the hearing do not

shed further light on that decision.13 But see WB&T Mtge.

Co. v. Assessors of Boston, 451 Mass. 716, 726 (2008) (although

"[t]ax assessors are obliged . . . to assess all real property

at its full and fair cash value . . . . that determination is

inherently inexact"). The formula used to determine the owner's

"reasonable return on investment" contemplates that the owner

will receive some profit in addition to all reasonable operating

expenses. Marshal House, Inc., 358 Mass. at 706. See St. 1977,

c. 596, § 3 (a). As the plaintiff notes, the fair market value

determines, in part, the amount of the profit, "not whether

there is a profit or loss."

The board has the discretion to use a value other than the

assessed value in applying this formula; however, the board's

decision must be "accompanied by a statement of reasons for the

13The board's decision cites to the appraisal. The
appraisal references the tax assessed value of the property, but
does not elaborate as to why this amount is not the appropriate
valuation. At the hearing, Edison Yee explained that he was
told by the appraiser that Holiday I was "way undervalued" based
on a review of rent charged in comparable rent control
communities (as described in the appraisal). He also stated,
"[Y]ou can talk about assessed values versus appraised values,
but . . . everybody wants to buy your park on assessed value,
but you as the owner, are never gonna sell your park on
assessment." The board made no specific findings regarding this
testimony.
20

decision, including determination of each issue of fact or law

necessary to the decision." G. L. c. 30A, § 11 (8). See Vinal

v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 13 Mass. App. Ct. 85, 92

(1982). Given the statutory presumption in favor of using the

assessed value, the board was required to explain its reasoning

for using a different valuation method based on the specific

facts before it and the board failed to do so here.14 Because

determining the appropriate valuation "brings into play the

experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of

the [board]," we remand to the board for further findings and

explanation (citation omitted). Manias v. Director of the Div.

of Employment Sec., 388 Mass. 201, 205 (1983). See Vinal, 13

Mass. App. Ct. at 93 (remand to allow appeal board to revise

decision to comply with G. L. c. 30A, § 11 [8]). On remand, the

board "need not make detailed findings of all evidence presented

to it, as long as its findings are sufficiently specific to

14We note that on at least two occasions, Jean's counsel
requested that the board make a specific finding as to why it
was accepting the appraised value.
21

allow us to review its decision."15 Hingham v. Department of

Telecomm. & Energy, 433 Mass. 198, 207 (2001).16

ii. Reasonable operating expenses. Under the special act

and city ordinance, the board was required to determine "all

[Jean's] reasonable operating expenses" related to Holiday I.

St. 1977, c. 596, § 3 (a). See Ordinance § 195-5(B). Neither

the special act nor the ordinance specifies what qualifies as

such an expense and the parties have not pointed us to any local

ordinance, rule, or regulation that provides a definition.

The plaintiff challenged the inclusion of the $19,468.80

annual payment for land rent as a reasonable operating expense

for Holiday I. The board considered the plaintiff's argument

that land rent is not an expense related to park operations and

that the expense was unreasonable given that it was paid for the

15Remand is appropriate irrespective of the fact that some
evidence in the record supported the board's valuation. See
NSTAR Elec. Co. v. Department of Pub. Utils., 462 Mass. 381, 390
n.6 (2012); Manias, 388 Mass. at 205-206. On remand, the board
is free to proceed in whatever manner it deems appropriate. For
instance, it may (but is not required to) reopen evidence to
take testimony from the appraiser, as contemplated at the
hearing.

16The plaintiff also challenges the methodology used by the
appraiser and argues that the board abused its discretion in
crediting the appraised value. We do not address that argument
given that we do not have a sufficient explanation of the
board's decision to adopt the appraised value and such question
is for the board to resolve in the first instance. See Manias,
388 Mass. at 205.
22

benefit of a family member, Linda Yee. After consideration, the

board likened the payment of land rent to a mortgage payment and

expressly accepted it as reasonable. Given that the board is

vested with broad discretion to apply the formula consistent

with the special act's objective, we do not disturb the board's

findings in this regard. See Chelmsford Trailer Park, Inc., 393

Mass. at 193.

Conclusion. The judgment setting aside the board's

decision is vacated. A new judgment shall enter dismissing the

plaintiff's action as to the decision affecting Holiday II and

Kontiki for lack of standing and remanding the matter as to

Holiday I to the board for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion.

So ordered.