Commonwealth v. William Mejia.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

21-P-1122

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

WILLIAM MEJIA.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

On June 8, 2019, law enforcement officers seized a firearm,

ammunition, and other evidence1 during the execution of a search

warrant at 7 Carmody Court, apartment 809, in South Boston. The

defendant, William Mejia, was subsequently indicted on charges

of unlicensed possession of a firearm, possession of ammunition,

unlawful possession of a large capacity feeding device,

possession of a loaded firearm, discharging a firearm within

five hundred feet of a dwelling, and being an armed career

criminal. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the

evidence, claiming that the affidavit in support of the search

warrant failed to establish probable cause that the defendant

1 The search warrant return reflects the seizure of, among other
items, a "Toyota car key with remote" and personal
identification papers.
participated in the alleged criminal act, and failed to provide

a sufficient nexus between the alleged criminal activity and the

defendant's apartment. The motion judge held a nonevidentiary

hearing in the Superior Court and subsequently issued a

memorandum of decision and order denying the motion to suppress.

A single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court allowed the

defendant's application for leave to file this interlocutory

appeal pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (a) (2), as amended, 476

Mass. 1501 (2017). We affirm.

Legal standards. We review the question whether there was

probable cause to issue a search warrant de novo. See

Commonwealth v. Perkins, 478 Mass. 97, 102 (2017). Our analysis

of the sufficiency of a search warrant application begins and

ends with the "four corners of the affidavit" (citation

omitted). Commonwealth v. O'Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297 (2003). In

this regard, "we determine whether, based on the affidavit in

its entirety, the magistrate had a substantial basis to conclude

that a crime had been committed . . . and that the items

described in the warrant were related to the criminal activity

and probably in the place to be searched" (citation omitted).

Id. at 298. "[P]robable cause to believe [that] evidence of

criminal activity will be found in a particular place must be

demonstrated by a 'nexus' between the crime alleged and the

place to be searched." Commonwealth v. Hart, 95 Mass. App. Ct.

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165, 167 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Matias, 440 Mass. 787,

794 (2004). See also Commonwealth v. Donahue, 430 Mass. 710,

712 (2000) (in reviewing nexus we determine whether affidavit

supporting search warrant "provide[s] a substantial basis for

concluding that evidence connected to the crime will be found on

the specified premises"). Search warrant affidavits "should be

interpreted in a commonsense and realistic fashion," and "read

as a whole, not parsed, severed, and subjected to hypercritical

analysis" (citations omitted). Donahue, supra. Finally, we

give considerable deference to the magistrate's determination,

Commonwealth v. Walker, 438 Mass. 246, 249 (2002), and bear in

mind that the "resolution of doubtful or marginal cases . . .

should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to

warrants." Commonwealth v. Germain, 396 Mass. 413, 418 (1985),

quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965).

Discussion. In the present case, the judge determined that

the affidavit established a sufficient nexus between the

criminal activity -- the discharge of a firearm -- and the

defendant's residence. After de novo review, we reach the same

conclusion.

The affidavit, drafted by Detective John Shaughnessy of the

Boston Police Department, averred, inter alia, that at around

5:58 A.M. on June 8, 2019, the Boston Police Department

responded to a "ShotSpotter activation" at 318 Norfolk Avenue in

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Dorchester; that a Boston police officer was approached by a

witness "who stated that the gunshots came from the window of a

red, maroon, or burgundy Toyota Camry with a MA license plate of

4YC772";2 that the witness followed that vehicle to Columbia

Road, onto Boston Street, and then saw it make a right turn

after 215 Dorchester Street toward the "war monument;" that an

inquiry showed the vehicle with Massachusetts license plate

4YC772 to be a 2007 red Toyota Camry that the defendant had been

operating when it was involved in a prior motor vehicle

accident, with the accident report for that incident listing the

defendant's address as 7 Carmody Court; that the defendant's

address listed on his Registry of Motor Vehicle license was "7

Carmody Ct.," which is located in the Old Colony Housing

Projects; that at 7:02 A.M., two other Boston police officers

responded to the Old Colony Housing Projects and located the

vehicle parked and unoccupied opposite 1244 Columbia Road, which

is "located next to 7 Carmody Ct. in the Old Colony Housing

Projects"; that as the officers approached the vehicle, "they

heard the sound of a beep coming from the car consistent with

the car being locked remotely with a key fob"; that at

2 The defendant neither claimed in the Superior Court nor argues
on appeal that the affidavit failed to satisfy either prong of
the Aguilar-Spinelli test. See generally Aguilar v. Texas, 378
U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969);
Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363 (1985).

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approximately 7:30 A.M., Detective Shaughnessy and other

officers entered 7 Carmody Court and saw the defendant's surname

alongside the name "Mendez" on a mailbox for apartment 809; that

the officers "knocked on apartment #809" and Kassandra Mendez

answered the door; that Mendez acknowledged that the defendant,

her husband, was inside the apartment; that the officers asked

to speak to the defendant; that the defendant "was asked if the

red Toyota parked outside was his and he stated in the

affirmative"; that the defendant stated that no other person had

access to his vehicle; that police investigators reviewed video

surveillance footage that showed the red Toyota driving on

Boston Street and on Dorchester Street toward Old Colony Avenue

between 5:58 A.M. and 6:03 A.M.; and that the video evidence

confirmed "the route described by the witness, who observed the

shooting and followed the Toyota."

The above-listed particularized information was more than

sufficient to establish probable cause that the defendant

committed the crime, and the requisite nexus between the crime

and the apartment searched.3 The witness advised police officers

that the gunshots came from a "red, maroon, or burgundy Toyota

Camry" with license plate 4YC772. The witness saw that vehicle

3 To the extent that the affidavit referenced the defendant's
arraignment history and purported gang-related history, we do
not rely on such averments in our probable cause analysis. See
Commonwealth v. Ponte, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 78, 82 (2020).

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drive away and followed it as it made turns and traveled toward

the "war monument," which was on the route to the defendant's

residence. Video evidence confirmed the witness's description

of the route taken by the vehicle. Approximately one hour after

the shots were fired, officers saw the red Toyota parked

adjacent to the defendant's address. As they approached the

vehicle, the car beeped, consistent with the remote locking of

the vehicle with a key fob. Combined with the defendant's

presence at the residence a mere hour after the crime, the

location and locking of the vehicle, and his admission that he

had sole and exclusive access to the vehicle, it was reasonable

to infer that the defendant had participated in the crime,

returned to his residence, and that evidence of the crime

"reasonably may be expected to be located" at the defendant's

apartment (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Thevenin, 82

Mass. App. Ct. 822, 825 (2012). Ample precedent supports our

determination. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Alexis, 481 Mass. 91,

103 (2018) (reasonable to expect handgun would be located in

defendant's home one day after committing armed home invasion);

Commonwealth v. Rand, 363 Mass. 554, 562 (1973) (directed

verdict motion properly denied where in addition to

circumstantial evidence that defendant was driving car on street

half-hour before accident, there was evidence he "had authorized

no one else to use the car and that he had sole possession of

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the keys to the ignition"); Commonwealth v. Fleurant, 2 Mass.

App. Ct. 250, 255 (1974) (unlike drugs, "weapons [are] not

likely to be consumed or destroyed"). Contrast Hart, 95 Mass.

App. Ct. at 167-168 (observation of firearm stored in

defendant's home sixty days before application for search

warrant insufficient to establish timely nexus between crime and

location searched). Although the defendant conjures possible

scenarios in which another person could have fired the gun, a

search warrant application need not disprove all other

possibilities. See Commonwealth v. Guastucci, 486 Mass. 22, 26

(2020) (probable cause "is not a high bar," it "does not require

definitive proof of criminal activity," and "officers need not

rule out a suspect's innocent explanation for suspicious facts

to obtain a warrant" [quotations and citations omitted]);

Commonwealth v. Clagon, 465 Mass. 1004, 1006 (2013) (search

warrant application "need not establish to a certainty that the

items to be seized will be found in the specified location, nor

exclude any and all possibility that the items might be found

elsewhere" [citation omitted]); Commonwealth v. Harmon, 63 Mass.

App. Ct. 456, 461 (2005) ("The test is probable cause, not

certainty"). To hold otherwise would require a hypercritical

analysis and parsing of the affidavit that we are compelled to

reject. See Commonwealth v. Diaz-Arias, 98 Mass. App. Ct. 504,

508 (2020). See also Commonwealth v. Perez, 90 Mass. App. Ct.

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548, 551 (2016), quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.

160, 175 (1949) ("In dealing with probable cause, however, as

the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are

not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations

of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal

technicians, act").

Order denying motion to
suppress affirmed.

By the Court (Neyman, Shin &
Hodgens, JJ.4),

Clerk

Entered: February 15, 2023.

4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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