Candace Langevin v. Dawn Theresa Booth-Desmarais.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

22-P-86

CANDACE LANGEVIN

vs.

DAWN THERESA BOOTH-DESMARAIS.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

On November 10, 2020, Candace Langevin (landlord) filed in

the Housing Court a summary process complaint against her

daughter, Dawn Booth-Desmarais (tenant). The complaint alleged

that the tenant failed to vacate after receiving a thirty-day

notice to quit. The tenant did not file an answer or raise any

counterclaims. Following a bench trial on February 4, 2021, the

court entered judgment for the landlord for possession and

stayed execution until June 1, 2021. We affirm.

Background. As reflected in the trial transcript and the

judge's findings of fact, the parties did not dispute most of

the material facts. According to that evidence, the landlord

owned a three bedroom, one bath ranch in Millbury, where she

lived alone. She was lonely following the death of her husband

and asked the tenant and her children to live with her.
Converting a garage, the landlord added an additional bedroom

and bathroom. The tenant and her minor children moved into the

subject property in July 2017. Through a verbal agreement, the

tenant paid $625 per month. Due to rising costs associated with

the property, the parties agreed in 2019 to an increased rent of

$775 per month. The tenant always remained current on the rent

payments. The landlord split her time between the subject

property and another property in Florida. By October 2019, the

landlord lived in Florida and did not return to the subject

property. After expenses continued to rise, the landlord could

no longer "afford to keep the house in Millbury." On April 17,

2020, the landlord served on the tenant a notice to quit the

premises by June 1, 2020. The tenant acknowledged receiving the

written notice.

The parties disputed the nature and duration of the

tenancy. The tenant claimed to have exclusive possession of the

premises until 2025 when the tenant's daughter graduated from

high school. According to the landlord, she expected to return

to the premises from Florida in 2019 for Christmas, but claimed

that the tenant told her that she "couldn't return to the

house." The landlord acknowledged promising her grandchildren

that they could live in the house until 2025 "if the money

lasted and it hasn't lasted."

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The judge prepared written findings of fact and conclusions

of law, concluding:

"The Court finds the parties entered into an oral tenancy
at will agreement in July of 2017 for $625.00 in monthly
rent with both parties being able to use the Premises. A
new oral tenancy at will was established in Fall of 2019
for $775.00 in monthly rent. The Plaintiff properly
terminated this oral tenancy at will and is entitled to
possession."

The judge stayed execution until June 1, 2021, to enable the

tenant's children to finish the academic year and to provide the

tenant sufficient time to secure a new residence.

Discussion. On appeal, the tenant raises the following

claims supported by numerous materials that were not presented

at trial: (1) a signed lease allows her to remain on the

property until 2025; (2) she agreed to the rent increase because

the landlord agreed to allow her to remain on the property until

2025; (3) the property has been subject to extensive flooding;

(4) her children deserve to stay in a secure and healthy home

until the date agreed upon; (5) the residence contains extensive

mold, mildew, and other microorganisms; (6) a massive sewer leak

occurred on the premises in May 2021; (7) the landlord has taken

no steps to clean up the sewer leak as required by the town; (8)

the property has a massive rodent and insect problem; (9) the

landlord has people harass the tenant by driving by and making

hang up calls; (10) the landlord has sufficient money to

maintain the property; (11) the tenant and her children have

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suffered great medical and respiratory stress due to the

condition of the property; (12) the tenant cannot afford to live

anywhere but on the streets; and (13) the landlord was dishonest

with the realtor about property defects. In addition to these

claims, the tenant has included a prayer for relief that

includes allowing the tenant to remain on the property until the

summer of 2025, ordering the landlord to remedy all sanitary

code violations, and awarding damages approaching $5 million.

With the exception of the claim about the duration of the

tenancy, all the claims raised by the tenant are being asserted

for the first time on appeal. Despite having opportunities to

do so, the tenant did not file an answer or counterclaim in the

Housing Court and did not introduce any exhibits at trial. See

Rule 3 of the Uniform Summary Process Rules (1993) ("defendant

shall . . . state in the answer any affirmative defenses which

may be asserted"); Rule 5 of the Uniform Summary Process Rules

(1980) ("right to counterclaim shall be deemed to be waived as

to the pending action if such a claim is not filed with the

answer . . . unless the court shall otherwise order on motion

for cause shown"). By raising the claims for the first time on

appeal, the tenant deprived the trial judge of the ability to

review the claims and deprived the landlord of a fair

opportunity to challenge the claims. "An issue not raised or

argued below may not be argued for the first time on appeal."

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Century Fire & Marine Ins. Corp. v. Bank of New England-Bristol

County, N.A., 405 Mass. 420, 421 n.2 (1989). See Adjartey v.

Central Div. of the Hous. Court Dep't, 481 Mass. 830, 855 (2019)

("tenant must generally assert any affirmative defenses and

counterclaims in the answer"). The tenant's pro se status does

not excuse the waiver of these claims because pro se litigants

"are held to the same standards as litigants who are represented

by counsel." Davis v. Tabachnick, 425 Mass. 1010, 1010, cert.

denied, 522 U.S. 982 (1997). A pro se defendant is expected "to

understand and set forth his or her legal rights, or risk

waiving them." Adjartey, 481 Mass. at 855. Therefore, we do

not consider these belated and new claims.

As to the claim about the duration of the tenancy, we

discern no error in the judge's conclusion that the landlord was

entitled to possession of the premises after properly

terminating a tenancy at will. "When reviewing the decision of

a trial judge in a summary process action, 'we accept [the

judge's] findings of fact as true unless they are clearly

erroneous,' but 'we scrutinize without deference the legal

standard which the judge applied to the facts." Cambridge St.

Realty, LLC v. Stewart, 481 Mass. 121, 123 (2018), quoting

Andover Hous. Auth. v. Shkolnik, 443 Mass. 300, 306 (2005).

Undisputed testimony at trial showed that the parties agreed to

rent the premises for $625 per month and later agreed to $775

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per month. The parties stipulated that the tenant remained

current on the agreed rent payments and had lawful possession of

the premises before receiving the notice to quit. Based upon

this evidence, the judge could conclude that a tenancy at will

existed. See Mastrullo v. Ryan, 328 Mass. 621, 624 (1952) ("If

there is nothing more than payment and acceptance, a tenancy at

will is created"); Belizaire v. Furr, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 299, 303

(2015) ("There are two essential requirements for the creation

of . . . a tenancy [at will]: first, a contractual agreement

between the landlord and the tenant, and second, that the tenant

exclusively occupy the premises"). Because the tenant

acknowledged that she received the notice to quit, the judge

could further conclude that the landlord provided the proper

notice and was entitled to possession of the premises. See

Williams v. Seder, 306 Mass. 134, 137 (1940) (tenancy at will

"could be terminated by a written notice in accordance with

[G. L. c. 186, § 12]").

Based upon the evidence presented, the judge properly

declined to accept the tenant's claim that the landlord promised

in 2017 to rent the premises to the tenant until 2025. "Any

promise involving real property is enforceable only if that

promise meets the [writing] requirements of the Statue of

Frauds, G. L. c. 259, § 1." Schwanbeck v. Federal-Mogul Corp.,

412 Mass. 703, 709 (1992). "An estate or interest in land

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created without an instrument in writing signed by the grantor

or by his attorney shall have the force and effect of an estate

at will only, and no estate or interest in land shall be

assigned, granted or surrendered unless by such writing or by

operation of law." G. L. c. 183, § 3. The tenant claimed that

the night before the trial she found a "standard residential

lease" form that contained the terms of the parties' rental

agreement. The judge asked the tenant, "what's the term of it?"

Reading from the document, the tenant replied that the lease was

to begin on September 1, 2017, "and shall end on blank." Upon

questioning from the judge, the tenant acknowledged that the

document also required a rental payment of $1,400. The tenant

further acknowledged that the parties never performed according

to the terms of the document. As the tenant put it, "that's

what she wanted, and I was like yeah, we can't do that." Thus,

the record supports the judge's conclusion that the landlord

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properly terminated the tenancy at will and was entitled to

possession of the premises.

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Neyman, Sacks &
Hodgens, JJ.1),

Clerk

Entered: May 4, 2023.

1 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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