R.B. v. C.C.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

22-P-520

R.B.

vs.

C.C.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

C.C. (wife), the former spouse of R.B. (husband), appeals

from a judgment of divorce nisi (divorce judgment) issued by a

judge of the Probate and Family Court, challenging various

aspects of the property division. We affirm.1

Background. We summarize the trial judge's relevant

findings, supplementing them with undisputed facts in the

record, and reserving other facts for later discussion. See

Pierce v. Pierce, 455 Mass. 286, 288 (2009).

During their long-term marriage, the parties enjoyed an

"affluent and upper class" lifestyle.2 The marital lifestyle was

1 The wife also filed a notice of appeal from a supplemental
judgment regarding the award of attorney's fees. As she makes
no separate argument regarding that judgment, we affirm it as
well.
2 The parties purchased the 6,000 square foot, "luxury" marital

home for $3.265 million, to which they made "significant
funded primarily with the husband's income,3 supplemented by

income from the wife's investment accounts and substantial

financial contributions from the wife's parents. In addition to

making annual cash gifts and "periodic larger gifts,"4 the wife's

parents gave her valuable interests in various entities and

several pieces of real property. Moreover, in January 2012, the

wife's mother settled an irrevocable trust, governed by Virginia

law, for the benefit of the wife and the wife's descendants.

The irrevocable trust was indirectly funded with proceeds from

the sale of assets owned by hospital entities established by the

wife's father.5 As a result of the wife's family wealth, the

parties formed a "reasonable expectation of future financial

security" that affected their "spending and saving habits

(including towards retirement assets[6]), [and] the types of jobs

[the] [h]usband took or didn't take," among other things.

renovations." They traveled frequently (including to various
European destinations, Caribbean islands, and ski resorts),
employed a nanny, sent their four children to private schools,
owned boats, maintained a yacht club membership, and made
"significant expenditures" on travel, education, and various
residences that they owned or leased.
3 The husband worked as a physician throughout the marriage,

earning approximately $474,000 per year at the time of trial.
4 In addition to annual gifts, the wife's parents made four

"large gifts" totaling $5.35 million between 2003 and 2012.
5 The wife's parents owned a number of hospital-related entities;

assets owned by those entities were sold in 2012 for $227.5
million.
6 The parties did not "aggressively save" for retirement because

of their "expectation that they would continue to benefit from
the [wife's] family wealth."

2
In June 2015, the husband filed a complaint for divorce;

the wife then filed a counterclaim for divorce. Following an

eleven-day trial held between October 2018 and June 2019, the

judge issued the divorce judgment dividing the marital estate in

August 2020. The judge found that, consistent with a June 2018

stipulation filed by the parties, the wife had already bought

out the husband's interest in the former marital home, paying

him $1.3 million as an "advance distribution of assets."7 The

judge determined that the remaining assets in the marital estate

were worth more than $46 million, with over $43 million of those

assets attributable to the wife. Among the assets included in

the marital estate was the wife's interest in the irrevocable

trust, which the judge found to be worth $12,153,553. The judge

concluded that the husband was entitled to twenty-five percent

of the value of the irrevocable trust, and thirty-five percent

of the remaining marital estate assets. To effectuate the

property division, the judge ordered the wife to make a lump sum

payment to the husband of $12,493,917 within sixty days of the

divorce judgment. The judge found that the wife had sufficient

7 During the pendency of the divorce proceedings, the parties
entered into a stipulation providing that they would equally
divide the $2.6 million equity in the marital home, and that the
wife would buy out the husband's share. The wife paid the
husband $1.3 million pursuant to their stipulation, which he
deposited in his UBS investment accounts (which accounts were
excluded from the asset division).

3
assets to make the lump sum payment without utilizing funds from

the irrevocable trust.

The wife thereafter filed a postjudgment motion requesting,

among other things, "an evidentiary hearing on the tax

implications of liquidating assets" to make the lump sum

payment. The judge denied the wife's request.8 The present

appeal by the wife followed.

Discussion. In an appeal challenging the division of

property in a divorce judgment, "[w]e review the judge's

findings to determine whether she considered all the relevant

factors under G. L. c. 208, § 34, and whether she relied on any

irrelevant factors." Zaleski v. Zaleski, 469 Mass. 230, 245

(2014). "We will not reverse a judgment with respect to

property division unless it is 'plainly wrong and excessive.'"

Id., quoting Baccanti v. Morton, 434 Mass. 787, 793 (2001).

Here, the wife claims error in the judge's (1) inclusion of

her irrevocable trust interest in the marital estate; (2)

valuation of her revocable trust account (Bessemer account); (3)

treatment of a promissory note held by one of the entities in

which she owns an interest; (4) failure to treat as advance

marital estate distributions allowances made to the husband for

attorney's fees during the pendency of the divorce proceedings;

8 It is undisputed that the wife made the lump sum payment to the
husband.

4
and (5) denial of her request for an evidentiary hearing on the

tax consequences of the lump sum payment. We address the wife's

arguments in turn.

1. The irrevocable trust. The wife first contends that

the judge erred in treating her interest in the irrevocable

trust as a property interest subject to equitable distribution

under G. L. c. 208, § 34. She asserts, among other things, that

her interest is too remote and speculative for inclusion in the

marital estate because she is but one of several beneficiaries

in an open class. We disagree.

"Whether a trust may be included in the . . . marital

estate requires close examination of the particular trust

instrument to determine whether the interest is a 'fixed and

enforceable' property right, . . . or 'whether the party's

interest is too remote or speculative' to be included." Levitan

v. Rosen, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 248, 253 (2019), quoting

Pfannenstiehl v. Pfannenstiehl, 475 Mass. 105, 111-112 (2016).

This question, which we review de novo, "turns 'on the

attributes' of the specific trust at issue." Levitan, supra,

quoting Pfannenstiehl, supra at 112.9

9 "If an interest in a trust is determined after such examination
to be speculative or remote rather than fixed and enforceable,
and thus more properly characterized as an expectancy, the
interest is to be considered under the G. L. c. 208, § 34,
criterion of 'opportunity of each [spouse] for future

5
Although Massachusetts law governs our ultimate

determination whether the wife's trust interest is includable in

the marital estate under § 34, Levitan, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at

253, we look to Virginia law when examining the trust to

ascertain the nature of the wife's interest. Id. at 251.10 "In

considering the language of a trust agreement, the intent of the

grantor controls." Harbour v. SunTrust Bank, 278 Va. 514, 519

(2009). "In ascertaining that intention, we must examine the

document as a whole and give effect, so far as possible, to all

its parts." Frazer v. Millington, 252 Va. 195, 199 (1996).

Here, while the trust identifies the beneficiaries as both

the wife and her "descendants living from time to time," a

"plain reading" of the entire trust instrument, "giving

expression to all [its] provisions," shows the settlor's intent

to prioritize the wife over all other beneficiaries. Frazer,

252 Va. at 201. The trust is entitled "IRREVOCABLE TRUST

AGREEMENT . . . FOR THE BENEFIT OF [THE WIFE]." The

"DISPOSITIVE PROVISIONS" section of the trust provides that

"[d]uring her lifetime, . . . [the wife], shall be the 'Trust

Beneficiary.'" The wife's right of withdrawal has first

acquisition of capital assets and income.'" Levitan, 95 Mass.
App. Ct. at 253, quoting Pfannenstiehl, 475 Mass. at 112.
10 Interpretation of the trust, and the determination whether the

wife's interest is includable in marital estate, are questions
of law we review de novo. See Levitan, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at
251-253.

6
priority over the rights of withdrawal of all other

beneficiaries. The wife's interest in the trust is not subject

to complete divestment, unlike the interests of all other

beneficiaries, because the trust grants her a power of

appointment to determine who will receive the remaining trust

corpus upon her death. See Va. Code Ann. § 64.2-701 (defining

"[p]ower of appointment" as "a power that enables a powerholder

acting in a nonfiduciary capacity to designate a recipient of an

ownership interest in . . . the appointive property"). The

trust also places special "[d]istribution [l]imitations" on the

wife's grandchildren and more remote descendants, conditioning

their eligibility for distributions on, among other conditions,

being "hard working and productive member[s] of society."

In addition to being the "Trust Beneficiary," the wife is

the sole trustee. The trust grants the wife discretion to make

distributions of income and principal to herself and her

descendants. Her exercise of this discretion is guided by an

ascertainable standard, under which she may make distributions

that she "deem[s] advisable for any such beneficiary's

maintenance, support, health and education." See Va. Code Ann.

§ 64.2-701 (defining "[a]scertainable standard" as "a standard

relating to an individual's health, education, support, or

maintenance within the meaning of § 2041[b][1][A] or 2514[c][1]

of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and any applicable

7
regulations"). The wife's authority to make distributions to

herself has few limitations. Most notably, she is prohibited

from making distributions that would violate the trust's

spendthrift provision.11 See Va. Code Ann. § 64.2-701 (defining

"[s]pendthrift provision" as "a term of a trust that restrains

both voluntary and involuntary transfer of a beneficiary's

interest"). See also Va. Code Ann. § 64.2-743. She also must

ensure that, in making distributions to herself, she does not

breach her fiduciary duties to the other beneficiaries. See,

e.g., Va. Code Ann. § 64.2-765 (duty of impartiality); Va. Code

Ann. § 64.2-764 (duty of loyalty).12 The wife's discretion to

make distributions to herself is therefore broad and is only

subject to judicial intervention if she has "clearly abused" it.

Rafalko v. Georgiadis, 290 Va. 384, 396 (2015).

We are unpersuaded by the wife's contention that the

presence of an ascertainable standard "limits [her] control"

thereby rendering her trust interest too remote and speculative

to be treated as a property right. Our courts generally view

the presence of an ascertainable standard in a discretionary

trust as a factor weighing in favor of treating a discretionary

11 The spendthrift clause prohibits the trustee from making any
distribution to a beneficiary if such distribution would be
subject to attachment or assignment.
12 "A violation by a trustee of a duty the trustee owes to a

beneficiary is a breach of trust." Va. Code Ann. § 64.2-792(A).
Removal is one remedy. Va. Code Ann. § 64.2-792(B)(7).

8
trust interest as an enforceable property right. See, e.g.,

Jones v. Jones, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 223, 232-233 (2023); Comins

v. Comins, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 28, 30-31 (1992). Here, because

the wife is the sole trustee, her right to receive distributions

is not subject to the condition precedent of a disinterested

trustee having first exercised his or her discretion. See

Pfannenstiehl, 475 Mass. at 114. Moreover, the ascertainable

standard guiding the wife's exercise of discretion authorizes

distributions to herself for maintenance, i.e., "with an eye

toward maintaining [her] standard of living in existence at the

time the trust was created." Id. at 113. At the time that the

trust was created, the wife was maintaining an "affluent and

upper class" lifestyle involving "[s]ignificant expenditures."

It is thus difficult to conceive of distributions to the wife

that might exceed the amount needed to fund her exceptionally

high standard of living and thus be deemed inconsistent with the

terms and purpose of the trust. See NationsBank of Va., N.A. v.

Estate of Grandy, 248 Va. 557, 561 (1994) ("Generally, a

trustee's discretion is broadly construed," so long as she

"exercise[s] . . . good faith and reasonable judgment to promote

the trust's purpose"). Moreover, the judge found that the wife

has already made a series of transactions as trustee (including

9
a large withdrawal to satisfy a note due to her) further

demonstrating her level of access and control.13

We are likewise unpersuaded by the wife's contention that

the existence of an open beneficiary class renders her trust

interest too remote and speculative for inclusion in the marital

estate. The wife relies on Pfannenstiehl, 475 Mass. at 114, for

the proposition that her discretionary trust interest was too

remote and speculative in part because she was a member of the

open beneficiary class. That case, however, is readily

distinguishable from the case at hand. In Pfannenstiehl, supra,

unlike here, the husband was the not the trustee, he did not

have a power of appointment, and the settlor's intent was not to

principally benefit the husband -- rather, it was to provide for

multiple generations. Compare id., with Jones, 103 Mass. App.

Ct. at 233-234 (wife's trust interest includable in marital

estate where trustee's discretion subject to enforceable

standard, wife held power of appointment, and settlor's intent

was to benefit wife rather than subsequent generations);

Levitan, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 249-250, 254 (wife's trust

13The judge found that, in 2013, the wife "as trustee, directed
$7,800,502 to be paid out from the [i]rrevocable [t]rust to her
individually in satisfaction of a [n]ote due to her
individually. The proceeds were deposited into [the] [w]ife's
[r]evocable [t]rust . . . but a year later the funds were
transferred by [the] [w]ife back into the [i]rrevocable
[t]rust."

10
interest includable in marital estate where, among other things,

wife was cotrustee with annual right of withdrawal but

independent cotrustee had uncontrolled discretion regarding

distributions, wife held limited power of appointment, and

settlor's primary intent was to provide for wife rather than

subsequent generations); Ruml v. Ruml, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 500,

511-512 & nn.17, 18 (2000) (trust settled by husband, of which

he was neither trustee nor beneficiary, having open beneficiary

class including his issue, was properly treated as part of

marital estate, given husband's retention of broad powers of

appointment in trust assets); Comins, 33 Mass. App. Ct. at 30-31

& n.4 (wife's trust interest includable in marital estate where

wife was beneficiary but not trustee, wife held power of

appointment, and trustee's discretion was subject to

ascertainable standard).

Further support for treating the irrevocable trust as a

marital asset is contained in the judge's findings regarding the

parties' reliance on the wife's family wealth, which allowed

them to maintain a more affluent lifestyle than they could have

with the husband's salary alone. See Comins, 33 Mass. App. Ct.

at 32.14 Although the wife seeks to distinguish Comins on the

14In Comins, 33 Mass. App. Ct. at 32, this court affirmed the
inclusion of the wife's trust interest in the marital estate,
noting that the trust "provided the parties with a substantial
insurance policy against economic hardship and also permitted

11
basis that she and the husband did not rely specifically on the

irrevocable trust (because it was settled shortly before the

irretrievable breakdown of the marriage), the judge's findings

reflect that the trust was indirectly funded with proceeds from

the sale of the hospital entities' assets, which entities formed

the bulk of the wife's family wealth that the parties relied on

throughout the marriage. Accordingly, the judge's findings

sufficiently demonstrate reliance by the parties on the wife's

family wealth that was redirected into the irrevocable trust

toward the end of the marriage -- which reliance formed the

basis for the parties' elevated lifestyle during the marriage.

See Comins, supra.

In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the wife's

trust interest is sufficiently "fixed and enforceable" to

constitute a property interest, Levitan, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at

253, quoting Pfannenstiehl, 475 Mass. at 111-112, and the judge

therefore permissibly included it in wife's estate, and assigned

it to her, for purposes of equitable distribution under G. L.

c. 208, § 34. Levitan, supra at 255.

them to direct their other marital assets, such as the husband's
salary, to the maintenance of a higher standard of living than
their earned income allowed." The court held that "[t]he judge
neither committed plain error nor abused his discretion in
concluding implicitly that the trust was an asset upon which the
couple, in the spirit of partnership, relied." Id.

12
2. Bessemer account valuation. The wife next contends

that the judge erroneously inflated the value of her Bessemer

account by approximately $1.3 million by overlooking evidence

that the wife used funds from that account to buy out the

husband's $1.3 million interest in the former marital home. The

wife asserts that this resulted in the husband being "overpaid"

by $455,000. We disagree.

In June 2018, the parties agreed to equally divide the

marital home equity of $2.6 million, with the husband receiving

a $1.3 million buyout payment and the wife retaining the home.

The husband deposited the $1.3 million buyout payment into two

UBS accounts. Both the marital home and the UBS accounts were

excluded from the property division as already-divided assets.

The wife's Bessemer account, however, was included in the

property division. The judge found that the Bessemer account

balance had decreased by approximately $1.3 million between

December 2017 ($13,454,167) and the time of trial ($12,074,505),

without explanation. The judge ultimately valued the Bessemer

account as of December 2017 ($13,454,167), treating it as if the

$1.3 million reduction had never happened, and assigned the

husband thirty-five percent of that amount ($4,708,958.45).

This left the wife with the remaining balance of $7,365,546.55

($12,074,505 minus $4,708,958.45).

13
The wife claims that the judge committed reversible error

because there was "ample evidence" that the $1.3 million

deduction in the Bessemer account balance was attributable to

her buyout of the husband's share of the marital home equity.

We are not persuaded that the wife has demonstrated clear error

in the valuation of the Bessemer account,15 especially where the

judge found that the wife's financial statements "have not

always reflected actual values . . . and have underestimated the

values of some of her assets, sometimes in significant ways."

See Kendall v. Selvaggio, 413 Mass. 619, 620-621 (1992) ("A

finding is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to

support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left

with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

committed" [quotations and citations omitted]). However,

assuming arguendo that the wife's calculations were correct, we

still would discern no error in the judge's treatment of the

Bessemer account.

As a result of the predivorce marital home buyout and the

division of the Bessemer account ordered by the judge, the wife

was left with nearly $10 million from the division of those two

assets. If, however, there had been no predivorce buyout of the

marital home (with the equity instead being divided equally in

15Indeed, the wife concedes in her brief that there was no
"direct proof" of this presented to the judge.

14
the divorce judgment and no $1.3 million decrease in the

Bessemer account balance), the wife still would have been left

with approximately $10 million from the division of those two

assets.16 Although the wife claims that the judge's failure to

deduct the marital home buyout payment from the Bessemer account

resulted in a $455,000 overpayment to the husband, it instead

prevented a $1.3 million overpayment to the wife. The parties

agreed to divide the marital home equity of $2.6 million

equally, with the wife retaining the home and using marital

estate funds to buy out the husband's one-half share. This

transaction was intended to result in each party netting $1.3

million. Because both the total marital home equity ($2.6

million) and the accounts holding the husband's $1.3 million

buyout payment were excluded from the property division, the

$1.3 million in marital estate funds that the wife used to buy

out the husband's share was properly added back into the marital

estate (by valuing the Bessemer account as of December 2017,

before the buyout payment occurred). This ensured that the

16If there had been no buyout, and the marital home equity had
instead been divided equally in the divorce judgment, the wife
would have received $1.3 million in equity plus approximately
$8,745,209 (representing sixty-five percent of the December 2017
Bessemer account balance). Instead, the wife retained the
entire marital home having $2.6 million in equity, and the
remaining Bessemer account balance of approximately $7,365,547
(after paying the husband thirty-five percent of the December
2017 balance).

15
wife's net from the marital home buyout transaction remained

$1.3 million (rather than $2.6 million, which would have been

the case if she were permitted to convert $1.3 million of

marital estate funds into real estate equity that was excluded

from the property division).

Accordingly, we cannot say that the judge's valuation of

the Bessemer account was clearly erroneous or that it resulted

in a "plainly wrong and excessive" division of property.

Zaleski, 469 Mass. at 245, quoting Baccanti, 434 Mass. at 793.

3. The promissory note. The wife next contends that the

judge overvalued one of the family entities in which she holds

an interest (entity 1), by erroneously finding that a $21

million promissory note due to entity 1 from another family

entity (entity 2) remained outstanding. The wife contends that

this was error where the "competent evidence" at trial

demonstrated that the note had been repaid. We disagree.

The wife contends that the note's absence from entity 1's

2014 year-end balance sheet is proof of its repayment in

December 2014. She further contends that the "only contrary

evidence was rank speculation by a nonpercipient witness."

However, the judge's ultimate finding that the note had not been

repaid was based on two credibility determinations, neither of

which we are inclined to disturb. See Johnston v. Johnston, 38

Mass. App. Ct. 531, 536 (1995). First, the judge found that the

16
balance sheet was unreliable as it contained inaccuracies and

redactions. Second, the judge credited the testimony of the

wife's brother, who had been responsible for running entity 1

for years and was well-acquainted with its financial holdings

and dealings. The brother testified that the note likely had

not been repaid. In light of the judge's credibility

assessments, the judge was well within her discretion to

implicitly conclude that the brother's testimony represented the

best available evidence of the status of the promissory note.

Accordingly, we discern no error in the valuation of the wife's

interest in entity 1. See Kendall, 413 Mass. at 620-621.

4. Allowances for attorney's fees. The wife next contends

that the judge erred in failing to consider, and treat as

advances of the husband's share of the marital estate, two

"allowances" totaling $475,000 made to him during the pendency

of the divorce action for the payment of his attorney's fees.

[W's br. at 41-42]. The wife asserts that this resulted in a

plainly wrong and excessive award of marital property to the

husband. We disagree.

The first allowance in the amount of $250,000 occurred in

2017; there is no indication in the 2017 temporary order that

this would be treated as an advance of the marital estate. The

second allowance in the amount of $225,000 occurred in 2018;

although the 2018 temporary order stated that the second

17
allowance would be treated as an "advance distribution of the

marital estate," there is no indication in the judge's findings

that she did not treat it as such in the property division. The

judge assigned a substantially larger portion of the marital

estate to the wife. The judge determined that the husband was

entitled to attorney's fees "in addition to the monies paid

during the pendency of trial." The judge also made findings

demonstrating the basis for the fee award.17 On this record, we

cannot say that the judge, in fashioning the property division

here, failed to consider the 2017 and 2018 allowances made to

the husband.18

5. Tax consequences. Finally, the wife contends that it

was an abuse of discretion for the judge to deny her request,

raised for the first time in a postjudgment motion, for an

evidentiary hearing regarding the potential tax consequences to

17 The judge found, among other things, that the wife's
inaccurate financial disclosures "resulted in the obfuscation of
the valuation of" the wife's family assets, resulting in the
husband's "incursion of tens of thousands of dollars in
additional legal fees."
18 Moreover, even if the judge had erroneously failed to consider

them (which we do not suggest), we would deem such error
"insignificant" given that the allowances amount to less than
one percent of the total marital estate. Ross v. Ross, 50 Mass.
App. Ct. 77, 81-82 (2000) ("Mathematical precision is not
required of equitable division of property"; error amounting to
fraction of percentage of marital estate deemed "insignificant"
[citations omitted]).

18
her resulting from liquidating assets to make the lump sum

property division payment to the husband. We disagree.

In dividing the marital estate, "where the issue of tax

consequences has been raised and the judge has been provided

with 'appropriate evidence in the record,' the judge should

consider the tax consequences arising from a judgment" (citation

omitted). L.J.S. v. J.E.S., 464 Mass. 346, 350 (2013). Parties

may ask the judge to consider tax consequences by filing "a

postjudgment motion . . . supported by citations to tax law and

regulations and by illustrative calculations, to amend the

judgment so as to alleviate undue adverse tax consequences"

(emphasis added). Fechtor v. Fechtor, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 859,

867 (1989).

Here, the wife's postjudgment motion did not contain any

citations to tax law and regulations, nor did it contain any

illustrative calculations. Fechtor, 26 Mass. App. Ct. at 867.

Instead, the wife merely asserted in her motion that "the

evidence does not support a finding that [she] has access to

cash assets sufficient . . . to make a cash lump-sum payment,"

thus "she will have to liquidate investments and will incur

significant capital gains taxes. It is inequitable for the

[w]ife, alone, to bear the burden of the taxes on capital gains

due on the liquidation of investment assets in order to pay a

cash lump-sum property payment." Where, as here, a party has

19
failed to include "reasonably instructive" information regarding

potential tax consequences in her postjudgment motion, "the

probate judge is not bound to grapple with the tax issues," nor

is the judge required to grant a request for an evidentiary

hearing. Id. at 866. See D.L. v. G.L., 61 Mass. App. Ct. 488,

510-511 (2004) (affirming denial of husband's request to "tax

effect" his lump sum property division payment to wife where he

failed to "failed to submit adequate evidence at trial

concerning tax issues" and failed "to provide the court with

citations to tax law, illustrative calculations, or other

pertinent information" in his postjudgment motion to amend).

Accordingly, it was not an abuse of discretion for the judge to

deny the wife's postjudgment request for an evidentiary hearing

on the tax consequences of the lump sum payment.19

Judgment affirmed.

Supplemental judgment
affirmed.

By the Court (Vuono, Hand &
Hodgens, JJ.20),

Clerk

Entered: October 6, 2023.

19 The husband is entitled to the costs of the appeal in the
ordinary course pursuant to Mass. R. A. P. 26 (a), as appearing
in 481 Mass. 1655 (2019). His request for double costs and
appellate attorney's fees is denied.
20 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

20