ERVIN TRIPLETT, JR. v. TERRENCE M. REIDY & Others.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-647

ERVIN TRIPLETT, JR.

vs.

TERRENCE M. REIDY1 & others.2

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, an inmate held at the Souza-Baranowski

Correctional Center, appeals from a judgment entered in the

Superior Court, dismissing his complaint for damages, injunctive

relief, and a declaratory judgment, based on various claims

challenging the validity of a security risk policy promulgated

by the defendants and applied to him. The judgment of dismissal

entered based on the plaintiff's failure to comply with Superior

Court Standing Order 1-96 (2020), which regulates the processing

1Individually and as Secretary of the Executive Office of
Public Safety and Security.

2Carol A. Mici, individually and as Commissioner of
Correction; Christopher H. Baker, individually and as chief of
the office of investigative services for the Department of
Correction; Dean C. Gray, individually and as superintendent of
Souza-Baranowski Correctional Center (SBCC); James W. Mitchell,
individually and as deputy superintendent of SBCC; and Danny
Ortiz, individually and as director of classification for SBCC.
and hearing of complaints for judicial review of administrative

agency proceedings. On appeal, the plaintiff asserts that

dismissal on that ground was improper, because his complaint did

not seek "judicial review of administrative agency proceedings,"

Standing Order 1-96(1), and Standing Order 1-96 accordingly is

inapplicable. We agree, and vacate the judgment of dismissal.

The plaintiff's complaint presented claims for relief in

seven separately-enumerated counts, claiming that: (1) the

defendants lack statutory authority to promulgate the security

risk policy applied to generate his risk classification; (2)

enforcement of his risk classification "is illegal, void and

must be vacated"; (3) the defendants' actions "is [sic]

arbitrary and capricious, and discriminatory"; (4) the risk

classification policy applied by the defendants to the plaintiff

violates the plaintiff's substantive due process rights; (5) the

security risk policy "violates the Ex Post Facto Clause"; (6)

the security risk policy "violates the Separation of Powers

Doctrine"; and (7) the security risk policy is an "Abuse of

Discretion." In its prayer for relief, the complaint seeks (1)

an injunction barring use of the security risk policy to assign

security risk classifications to inmates; (2) a declaratory

judgment regarding violations of the plaintiff's civil and

constitutional rights under the Federal and Massachusetts

Constitutions; (3) a declaration that the defendants' actions

2
violate the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act; (4) an award of

damages; (5) an award of attorney's fees and costs; and (6) an

award of "such other costs as the Court deems just and

equitable."

While not a model of clarity in many respects, neither the

substance of the plaintiff's claims, nor the relief sought by

his complaint, seeks review of an administrative agency

proceeding or decision. Instead, it challenges on various bases

the validity of the security risk policy, and thereby of any

actions taken under it.

We recognize that the opening sentence of the complaint

describes it as "a Civil Action Complaint for judicial review

wherein Plaintiff's entitlement to relief arises from the facts

set forth herein" (emphasis added). However, contrary to the

contention of the defendants (and, apparently, of the Superior

Court judges who directed the plaintiff to comply with Standing

Order 1-96 and then dismissed the complaint for his failure to

do so), the judicial review sought by the complaint is not of

administrative agency proceedings (or any decision assigning a

risk classification to the plaintiff), but of the security risk

policy itself.3

3 We also recognize that Standing Order 1-96 applies to a
complaint asserting multiple claims for relief if any one of
them seeks judicial review of administrative proceedings.
However, none of the claims in the complaint appears to seek

3
Because Standing Order 1-96 is inapplicable to the

plaintiff's complaint, it was error to dismiss the complaint by

reason of the plaintiff's failure to comply with the Standing

Order. The judgment is vacated, and the matter is remanded to

the Superior Court for such further proceedings as may be

appropriate.4

So ordered.

By the Court (Green, C.J.,
Englander & Brennan, JJ.5),

Assistant Clerk

Entered: April 25, 2024.

review of administrative agency proceedings, as compared to the
validity or enforceability of the security risk policy.

4 We express no view on the validity of the various counts
in the complaint, reserving any such questions for consideration
by the Superior Court in the first instance.

5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

4