The Skating Club of Boston v. Board of Assessors of the City of Boston (March 7, 2007)

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPELLATE TAX BOARD



THE SKATING CLUB OF        v.   	BOARD OF ASSESSORS OF
BOSTON	           	    	  	THE CITY OF BOSTON

     
Docket Nos. F276938				Promulgated:
  F277905	 		     March 7, 2007
     			   

	These are appeals under the formal procedure pursuant to G.L. c. 59, §§ 64 and 65 from the refusal of the appellee to abate taxes on certain real estate in the City of Boston under G.L. c. 59, § 38 for fiscal years 2004 and 2005.
Former Chairman Foley heard the appeals and was joined in the decision for the appellee by Commissioners Scharaffa, Gorton, Egan, and Rose.
These findings of fact and report are made at the requests of the appellant and the appellee pursuant to G.L. c. 58A, § 13 and 831 CMR 1.32.

Lawrence S. Delaney, Esq. and Stephanie T. Siden, Esq.  	for the appellant.

Laura Caltenco, Esq. for the appellee.


	FINDINGS OF FACT AND REPORT
	On the basis of testimony and exhibits introduced at the hearing of these appeals, the Appellate Tax Board ("Board") made the following findings of fact.  
On January 1, 2003, and January 1, 2004, The Skating Club of Boston ("appellant") was the assessed owner of a parcel of real estate located at 351 Western Avenue in the City of Boston ("subject property") upon which the appellant operates a figure-skating club also known as The Skating Club of Boston ("Club"), a member club of the United States Figure Skating Association ("USFSA"). 
The subject property consists of an 83,843 square-foot parcel improved with a 29,398 square-foot facility that resembles an aircraft hangar. The building houses a skating rink, locker rooms, a lounge/viewing area, a "rotch room," an office, and other areas used primarily for rink access and housing of mechanical systems. There is also commercial space, which during the relevant periods was occupied by two for-profit enterprises: the Metrowest Grille, which operated as a snack bar and caterer for the Club; and Skaters Landing LLC, a shop that sharpened and sold skates and skating apparel. 
For fiscal years 2004 and 2005 ("the years at issue"), the Board of Assessors of the City of Boston ("assessors") valued the subject property and assessed taxes thereon as follows. 


Docket No.	Fiscal
Year	Assessed Value	Tax 
Rate/$1000	Tax
Assessed	
F276938	2004	$1,804,600	$33.08	$59,696.17	
F277905	2005	$1,804,600	$32.68	$58,974.33	

The appellant paid the assessed taxes without incurring interest and timely applied to the assessors for abatement of the taxes and exemption of the subject property pursuant to G.L. c. 59, § 5, Third. The appellant also timely filed "Forms 3 ABC" with attached copies of "Form PC" for the years at issue. 
The assessors denied both of the appellant's applications, and the appellant seasonably filed petitions with the Board seeking abatement of the full amount of taxes assessed based on its claim of exemption for the subject property.  The pertinent filing and denial dates are set forth in the following table.


Docket No.	Fiscal Year	Abatement Application Filed	Abatement Application Denied	Appeal Filed with Board	
F276938	2004	04/28/04	07/28/04	10/26/04	
F277905	2005	01/18/05	04/18/05	05/03/05	

On the basis of the foregoing, the Board found that it had jurisdiction over the present appeals.
	The appellant was organized as a Massachusetts corporation in 1912 under G.L. c. 125, the predecessor to G.L. c. 180. In September, 2002, the appellant filed Articles of Amendment pursuant to G.L. c. 180, section 7 specifying organization "exclusively for charitable . . . purposes within the meaning of section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. . . ." The Amendment also provides that no part of the appellant's net earnings may inure to the benefit of, or be distributed to any private person, individual or member. Further, upon dissolution, the appellant's net assets are to be distributed for charitable purposes.  
The appellant was granted Internal Revenue Code ("Code") § 501(c)(3) status on September 16, 2002. On October 8, 2002, the appellant was issued a Certificate of Exemption, Form ST-2, by the Massachusetts Department of Revenue, affording exemption from sales tax on its purchases of tangible personal property.
The appellant's Constitution, as amended May 16, 2003, states that "[t]he object of the Club shall be to foster good feeling among its members and promote interest in the art of skating." The amended Constitution also provides that "[t]he use of the property of the Club shall be restricted to the members and their guests excepting to the extent the Board of Governors may in its discretion determine that other use is necessary in order to maintain unimpaired the financial position of the Club." In its fiscal year 2004 Form 3 ABC, "Return of Property Held for Charitable Purposes," the appellant states that its primary purpose is to "develop amateur figure skaters to compete in regional, sectional, national, and international and Olympic competitions." 
	The Club operates year round, and is open to members and non-members. Its "Club Season" runs from fall through spring, and the summer season comprises the balance of the year, from June through August. The Club is open for skating approximately one hundred and thirty hours per week, from five or five-thirty in the morning to between ten-thirty and midnight each day. Days are broken down into skating sessions, typically of fifty-minutes duration, and geared toward a particular type and skill level of skating. For instance, a session may be dedicated to "ice dance," "pairs skating" or "free skating" at different skill levels. The Club regulates the number and ability of skaters on the ice at any given time to ensure their safety. Individuals who skate at the Club are required to wear figure skates, with the following exceptions: "pick-up hockey" sessions, which are scheduled late at night; certain Club-sponsored skating classes; and "Public Skate" sessions, which total approximately four hours per week.  
	During the Club Season, approximately twenty-five percent of weekly sessions are reserved for members only. The balance may be attended by non-members. During the summer of fiscal year 2004, the entire ice schedule was open to both members and non-members. For fiscal year 2005, four hours per week in the summer were reserved for members' use. 
	Mr. Naphtal, the appellant's treasurer and primary witness, testified that during the years at issue, individual member and non-member sessions during the winter totaled approximately 1,800 per week. In the summer, sessions totaled between 1,400 and 1,500 per week. He estimated that there were between 680 and 900 individual non-member skating sessions each week throughout the year. During the summer, the number of non-member sessions tended toward 700 per week, and during the winter, the number was closer to 900 per week.  
The Club offers several types of memberships, primarily grouped into two categories, Regular and Special. The annual membership fee for Regular Memberships ranges from $125.00 to $395.00, accompanied by a one-time "entrance fee" of up to $200.00. Regular members must also purchase a $400.00 "bond," which is a refundable sum retained against the possibility of non-payment of any fees owed to the Club.  Regular members must also purchase six or twelve dinners and five or ten "Ice Chips" tickets per year, depending upon the membership sub-category.  Members are billed twenty dollars for each unused dinner or "Ice Chips" ticket.      
Annual membership fees for Special Memberships range from $100.00 to $270.00, with "entrance fees" up to $150.00. Certain Special Memberships are subject to the $400.00 bond and require the purchase of dinners and "Ice Chips" tickets.  
With the exception of several weekly "Club Sessions" and the "Public Skate" sessions, membership fees do not include skating time, for which a separate charge is made. During the years at issue, skating time cost between seven and thirteen dollars per fifty-minute session for non-members, the majority of sessions falling within the higher end of this range. Members were charged two dollars less per session than non-members. Skaters could also reserve or "contract" for ice time to ensure availability during desired sessions. Contracted sessions cost two dollars less than "walk-on," or non-contracted sessions, for both members and non-members. 
Prospective members must be sponsored by two Club members and complete the Club's membership application. The application requests a variety of information including a prospective member's occupation, education, participation in social and civic organizations, knowledge of the Club, and affiliation with any other USFSA skating club. 
Prior to submission of a prospective member's application, the applicant must attend at least two Friday night dinners or Club brunches and be introduced to the Club's Officers and Governors as a prospective member. While the application is considered, letters of recommendation, members' comments and other information may be submitted to the Committee on Admissions, which approves or denies the application at a meeting of the Board of Governors. Prior to action on an application, an applicant's name and address must be posted at the Club for at least two weeks. Mr. Naphtal testified that to his knowledge, no membership application had been declined during the ten years preceding the hearing of these appeals.
Members, inter alia, receive a Member Handbook ("Handbook"), which contains several sections describing the rules of the Club as well as its history and structure. One section of the Handbook, entitled "Champions," lists decades of individuals' placement in competitions commencing at the Club level and proceeding through the New England Regional Championships up to the Olympic Games and World Championships. The "History" section of the Handbook provides, in part, that "the greatest activity and contribution of the Club has been in competition. . . ."
	The Club sponsors several competitive figure skating events and exhibitions including the Boston Open, a competition open to the general public which typically attracts approximately 400 participants of all skill levels from the New England area. The Club also holds an annual Basic Skills Competition in which 400 to 500 skaters compete.  This competition is designed for children with a low level of skill, and is open to both members and non-members.  
	The Club sponsors an exhibition called Ice Chips, which includes member skaters of all levels, from beginner to Olympic, and is held at either Boston University or Northeastern University to accommodate the large audience. The Club donates the profit from the show to the Make-a-Wish Foundation and Children's Hospital Boston.  
	The Club's Friday night dinners are accompanied by skating exhibitions to allow skaters of various abilities to exhibit their programs in front of an audience in preparation for competition or other exhibitions, and to allow prospective members to become oriented to the Club.
	The Club hosts The Skating School of Boston, a USFSA affiliated "Basic Skills Program" that provides classes at the Club to a range of students from beginners who have never skated to those who can complete advanced jumps and spins. All students must enroll in the USFSA for a fee of five dollars. The Club also offers a "US Figure Skating Basic Skills Bridge Program," which is intended to serve as a bridge between Basic Skills classes and private lessons. Skaters may take private lessons from coaches who are appointed at the discretion of the Board of Governors and must pay coaches' fees of $1,100.00 or $600.00 per year depending on the frequency of lessons provided at the Club.  Access to and fees for the Basic Skills and Bridge programs are not dependent upon whether an individual is a member or a non-member.  
	The Club also offers free ice time to the Genesis Program, which teaches handicapped children how to skate.   Those who skate in the Genesis Program need not be Club members. 
The Club sponsors skating tests sanctioned by the USFSA. A skater who wishes to take one of these tests must be a member of the USFSA, and pay a fee ranging from $15.00 to $40.00 per test. Test-takers who are not members of the Club must also pay the Club's hospitality fee of $15.00.  
	In his testimony, Mr. Naphtal stated the Club's preference that all skaters who use the facility become members. Consistent with this preference, the Club's informational pamphlet, entitled "A Skating Tradition. . . The Skating Club of Boston" ("Pamphlet") promotes various attributes of membership, and prominently states that "Membership has its benefits." In particular, the Pamphlet references social events including Friday night dinners, skating parties, anniversary and reunion dinners, and holiday gatherings. 
	The Pamphlet also highlights the Club's prominence as a source of national and international judges as well as competitors and officials. As one of several answers to the question "What makes membership in our Club so special?," the Pamphlet states that the membership owns the Club and directs how the ice-skating facilities are used.
The Pamphlet makes no mention of any potential use of the Club by non-members. Similarly, no evidence presented indicates that the Club advertised the availability of its facilities for use by the general public. 
	The Club offers financial assistance to members and non-members in two forms. One form is the provision of stipends to individuals who enter figure-skating competitions. Approximately seventeen percent of Club dues go toward this purpose. Since 2002, after the Club was granted Code § 501(c)(3) status, the Club has offered "hardship scholarships" to those who could not otherwise afford to utilize its facilities. The sole publication indicating the availability of these scholarships is the Club's membership application which discusses financial assistance on its last page. During the years at issue, the Club offered four such scholarships accounting for between three and four percent of Club dues. 
Based on the foregoing, and to the extent it is a finding of fact, the Board found that the appellant failed to meet its burden of proving that it was a charitable organization occupying the subject property for charitable purposes as required by G.L. c. 59, § 5, Third. In particular, the appellant did not demonstrate that it operated to further a charitable purpose, provide for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, or lessen the burdens of government. 
Accordingly, and for the reasons detailed in the following Opinion, the Board denied the appellant's abatement requests for fiscal years 2004 and 2005 and issued decisions for the appellee.  
OPINION
Massachusetts General Laws impose a local tax upon "[a]ll property, real and personal, situated within the commonwealth, . . .  unless expressly exempt."  G.L. c. 59, § 2.  Section 5 of Chapter 59 specifies classes of property which "shall be exempt from taxation."  The clause relevant to these appeals, G.L. c. 59, § 5, Third, exempts from taxation all "real estate owned by or held in trust for a charitable organization and occupied by it or its officers for the purposes for which it is organized. . . ."  
	"A corporation claiming that its property is exempt under § 5, Third, has the burden of proving that it comes within the exemption, and that it is in fact operated as a public charity."  Town of Norwood v. Norwood Civic Association, 340 Mass. 518, 525 (1960) (citing American Inst. For Economic Research v. Assessors of Great Barrington, 324 Mass. 509, 512-14 (1949)). Moreover, "statutes granting exemption from taxation are strictly construed."  Animal Rescue League of Boston v. Assessors of Bourne, 310 Mass. 330, 332 (1941).  Thus, "'[a] taxpayer is not entitled to an exemption unless he shows that he comes within either the express words or the necessary implication of some statute conferring this privilege upon him.'"  Milton Hospital & Convalescent Home v. Board of Assessors of Milton, 360 Mass. 63, 67 (1971) (quoting Animal Rescue League of Boston, 310 Mass. at 332). 
"An institution will be classed as charitable if the dominant purpose of its work is for the public good and the work done for its members is but the means adopted for this purpose."  Massachusetts Medical Society v. Assessors of Boston, 340 Mass. 327, 332 (1960).  If, however, the dominant purpose of its work is to benefit the members, such organization will not be classified as charitable, even though the public will derive an incidental benefit.  Id.  The appellant must prove that "it is in fact so conducted that in actual operation it is a public charity" not a mere pleasure, recreation or social club or mutual benefit society.  Jacob's Pillow Dance Festival, Inc. v. Assessors of Becket, 320 Mass. 311, 313 (1946) (citing Little v. Newburyport, 210 Mass. 414, 415 (1912)); see also Rockridge Lake Shores Property Owners' Association v. Board of Assessors of Monterey, ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2001-581; Marshfield Rod & Gun Club v. Assessors of Marshfield, ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 1998-1130. 
The Supreme Judicial Court has described a charity as a gift "for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their minds or hearts under the influence of education or religion, by relieving their bodies from disease, suffering or constraint, by assisting them to establish themselves in life, or by erecting or maintaining public buildings or works or otherwise lessening the burdens of government." Boston Symphony Orchestra v. Board of Assessors of Boston, 294 Mass. 248, 254-55 (1936) (citing Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen 539). Charity may also encompass new forms, but "the more remote the objects and methods become from the traditionally recognized objects and methods the more care must be taken to preserve sound principles and to avoid unwarranted exemptions from the burdens of government."  Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Assessors of Boston, 315 Mass. 712, 718 (1944).  
Consistent with this precedent, a charitable organization must ensure that "the persons who are to benefit are of a sufficiently large or indefinite class so that the community is benefited by its operations."  Harvard Community Health Plan, Inc. v. Assessors of Cambridge, 384 Mass. 536, 543 (1981) (citing Children's Hospital Medical Center v. Board of Assessors of Boston, 353 Mass. 35, 44 (1967), Assessors of Boston v. Garland School of Home Making, 296 Mass. 378, 388-89 (1937), and 4 A. Scott, Trusts at 2897-98 (3d ed. 1967)).  Another important factor to be considered is whether the operation of the organization "'lessen[s] any burden government would be under any obligation to assume.'"  Western Massachusetts Lifecare Corp. v. Board of Assessors of Springfield, 434 Mass. 96, 102 (2001)(quoting Boston Chamber of Commerce, 315 Mass. at 717).
	  In the present appeals, the appellant was organized as a charitable corporation pursuant to its Articles of Amendment, specifying organization "exclusively for charitable . . . purposes. . . ." and was granted Code § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status as well as exemption from sales tax. While an organization's § 501(c)(3) status is a factor in determining whether the organization is charitable within the meaning of G.L. c. 59, § 5, Third, it is not dispositive.  See, e.g., H-C Health Services v. Board of Assessors of South Hadley, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 596, rev. denied, 425 Mass. 1104 (1997). "The mere fact that the organization claiming exemption has been organized as a charitable corporation does not automatically mean that it is entitled to an exemption for its property. . . .  Rather, the organization 'must prove that it is in fact so conducted that in actual operation it is a public charity.'"  Western Massachusetts Lifecare Corp., 434 Mass. at 102 (quoting Jacob's Pillow Dance Festival, Inc., 320 Mass. at 313).  
The appellant asserts that it does, in fact, conduct the Club's operation as a public charity. It claims that its charitable purpose is to promote figure skating, both recreationally and competitively, among the citizenry of the greater Boston area. In support of its assertion, the appellant emphasizes its accessibility to and substantial use by the general public and its significant role in assisting individuals to learn to skate, including members of the Genesis Program. The appellant also states that figure skating offers invaluable life lessons to children and adults, teaches discipline and commitment, and keeps both children and adults physically and mentally fit.  
The appellant further states that though there are costs associated with membership, an applicant's inability to pay membership fees is not a bar to membership.  In this regard, the Club states that it provides financial aid, in the form of hardship scholarships, to those applicants who require financial assistance.    
The Board acknowledges that the appellant promotes and encourages figure skating, which is a beneficial pursuit, both physically and emotionally. Neither is there a dispute that the public has access to the Club's facilities or that the Club offers skating lessons to both members and non-members. These facts do not, however, adequately address the central issue of whether, when the record before the Board is viewed as a whole, the appellant has demonstrated that its operation is charitable within the meaning of G.L. c. 59, § 5, Third.
	As a threshold matter, the Board found the Club's Constitution, as it relates to the use of the appellant's property, is explicitly restrictive and inherently exclusionary. In pertinent part, it provides that "[t]he use of the property of the Club shall be restricted to the members and their guests excepting to the extent the Board of Governors may in its discretion determine that other use is necessary in order to maintain unimpaired the financial position of the Club." This language, which was adopted by the appellant during the years at issue, after it was granted Code § 501 (c)(3) tax exempt status, provides for public use only to ensure the Club's financial stability. The Board found and ruled that such restrictive language is inherently incompatible with the inclusionary nature of a charitable organization. Further, it substantially undermines the appellant's assertion that its corporate documents support its charitable purpose. See Assessors of Boston v. The Vincent Club, 351 Mass. 10, 12 (1966) (opining that an organization's classification as charitable in part "depends upon 'the language of its charter or articles of association, constitution and by-laws. . . .'" (citing Henry B. Little v. City of Newburyport, 210 Mass. 414, 415 (1912)).  
 In Healthtrax Int'l et al. v. Board of Assessors of the Town of Hanover and South Shore YMCA, ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2001-366, aff'd, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 1116 (2002), the Board considered and affirmed the exempt status of athletic facilities operated by the South Shore Young Men's Christian Association ("SSYMCA"). Having discussed the facilities and various SSYMCA programs in substantial detail, the Board found that: 
SSYMCA provided compelling evidence that it reached out to the community at large through inclusive financial aid policies, and programs tailored to a wide demographic of adults, teens, children and the disabled of all ages.  SSYMCA demonstrated that, through its programs and activities at the Mill Pond facility, it emphasized its charitable purpose of strengthening the individual, family, and community through development of the mind, the body and the spirit.

Id. at 400.

	SSYMCA's dominant purpose of developing "well balanced individuals, strong and healthy families and a strong and healthy community" was evident in numerous facets of its operation, which fostered the "balance of body, mind, and spirit" of its members. Id. at 380 and 383. These facets included, inter alia, sponsorship of child care, day camps, various supervised programs for children and young adults, family events, and education regarding "core values of caring, respect, honesty, and responsibility." Id. at 378. 
In contrast, in the present appeals, the Board found that the appellant has demonstrated simply that it promotes the sport of figure skating, with a strong emphasis on competition from the most elementary levels through the Olympics. This emphasis is reflected in various documents and the Club's operation. For example, the Club's fiscal year 2004 Form 3 ABC states that its primary purpose is to "develop amateur figure skaters to compete in regional, sectional, national, and international and Olympic competitions." The "History" section of the Handbook provides, in part, that "the greatest activity and contribution of the Club has been in competition. . . ." Further, the Club sponsors competitions including the Boston Open and the Basic Skills Competition. Even the exhibitions accompanying the Club's Friday night member dinners are presented, in part, in anticipation of competition.
The primacy of competition is also evident in the manner in which the Club allocates financial assistance. More specifically, the vast majority of assistance provided by the Club is given in the form of stipends to those who enter figure-skating competitions. These stipends account for approximately seventeen percent of Club dues. Hardship scholarships, which support accessibility to the Club's facility and only four of which were granted during the years at issue, amount to between three and four percent of Club dues.  This allocation of Club resources does not reflect an emphasis on the public good, but on the narrow pursuit of competitive figure skating. Such pursuit cannot reasonably be characterized as a gift "for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons. . . ." as contemplated by the Court in Boston Symphony Orchestra, 294 Mass. at 254-55. 
Costs are hardly insignificant for those who use the Club's facilities with any frequency. Based on the Club's fees for ice time, a non-member who skates one fifty-minute session per week would spend hundreds of dollars each year. Lessons, group or private, or USFSA testing would substantially increase this sum. Members incur additional fees, not only for membership, but for associated social amenities as well. Competitive skaters can easily incur thousands of dollars of expenses per year, given their requirement of significant ice time and coaching. Need based financial assistance, which may mitigate expenses, is not well publicized, and the Club's membership application contains the sole reference to such aid. Moreover, hardship scholarships were meted out quite infrequently during the years at issue.
Although charging fees for services will not necessarily preclude an organization's charitable status, (See, e.g., New England Sanitarium v. Inhabitants of Stoneham, 205 Mass. 335, 342 (1910)), the Supreme Judicial Court has found that providing services at a relatively low cost, thereby making services available to a broader spectrum of the community, supports a finding that an organization provides a charitable service. See Harvard Community Health Plan, 384 Mass. at 540. The Court's attention to the costliness of fees reflects the well-established principle that "selection requirements, financial or otherwise, that limit the potential beneficiaries of a purported charity will defeat the claim for exemption."  Western Massachusetts Lifecare, 434 Mass. at 104 (citing Boston Symphony Orchestra, 294  Mass. at 255-56 (finding that the charitable exemption was properly denied where an educational organization charged substantial admission fees and gave seating preferences to season ticket holders)).  
The Board did not conclude that the fees charged by the Club necessarily limit its potential beneficiaries, thereby precluding charitable classification. Regardless, the fees charged are substantial, and the appellant did not demonstrate that fees were maintained at relatively low cost, thereby enhancing accessibility to its facility. Consequently, the Board found and ruled that the fees collected by the appellant did not support its claim for exemption.   
	The appellant claims that the Club operates in an egalitarian manner and is freely accessible to all. The evidence presented, however, does not adequately support this characterization. The Club's informational Pamphlet emphasizes the many benefits of membership. It states that the membership owns the Club and directs how the ice skating facilities are used, thereby implicitly promoting the Club's exclusivity. Further, it touts the social benefits associated with membership as well as skating related amenities. Moreover, the Pamphlet makes no mention of non-members' ability to use its facilities. Neither is there any indication that the Club advertises the availability of its facilities to the general public. Indeed, no evidence presented by the appellant provided insight as to how a member of the community-at-large would be apprised of the public's access to the Club. These facts are wholly consistent with Mr. Naphtal's testimony regarding the Club's preference that all who use the facility become members, and inconsistent with the nature of a charitable organization, the dominant purpose of which is for the public good and not merely to benefit its members. See Massachusetts Medical Society, 340 Mass. at 332. 
Notwithstanding Mr. Naphtal's testimony that no applicant has been declined for membership for over a decade, the Board found that membership itself is not simply open to all as claimed by the appellant. The application process is inherently daunting, requiring sponsorship by two Club members, and submission of personal information including one's occupation, education, and participation in social and civic organizations. Prior to submission of an application, the applicant must attend at least two Friday night dinners or Club brunches and be introduced to the Club's Officers and Governors as a prospective member. While an application is considered, letters of recommendation, members' comments and other information may be submitted to the Committee on Admissions, which may approve or deny the application. Moreover, prior to action on an application, an applicant's name and address must be posted at the Club for at least two weeks. Together with the financial commitment required of members, these facts again speak to the Club's exclusivity and not its work for the public good. Id. 
The appellant also argues that the Club lessens the burden of government by providing skating classes,  offering a skating venue, and encouraging participation in the Olympics. However beneficial providing access to and promoting figure skating may be, the Board can discern no aspect of the Club's operation which "'lessen[s] any burden government would be under any obligation to assume.'"  Western Mass Lifecare, 434 Mass. at 105 (quoting Boston Chamber of Commerce, 315 Mass. at 717. Consequently, the Board finds this argument unavailing.
	The appellant relies, in part, on MCC Management Group, Inc. v. Board of Assessors of the City of New Bedford, ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2000-886, for the proposition that its operation lessens the burden of government. The Board ruled that this reliance was misplaced. In MCC Management Group, Inc., the Board found and ruled that a skating rink and adjoining land qualified as a park within the meaning of G.L. c. 59, § 2B, and that its occupancy by the appellant, a for-profit entity which operated the rink, was necessary to the public purpose of a park. Id. at 905. General Laws c. 59, § 2B, in pertinent part, provides for taxation of real estate owned by the Commonwealth or any city or town if used in connection with a business conducted for profit, unless the use is reasonably necessary to the public purpose of a park. Its provisions do not relate to G.L. c. 59, § 5, Third, and the operation of a charity. The Board found and ruled, therefore, that MCC Management Group, Inc. is not instructive in the present appeals.
Based on the foregoing, the Board found and ruled that for the years at issue, the appellant failed to meet its burden of proving that it occupied the subject property as a charitable organization in furtherance of its charitable purposes within the meaning of G.L. c. 59, § 5, Third. Accordingly, the Board issued a decision for the appellee in these appeals.
					THE APPELLATE TAX BOARD



By:__________________________________
    Thomas W. Hammond, Jr., Chairman


A true copy,

Attest:_____________________________
  	  Assistant Clerk of the Board 

  The subject property's mailing address, utilized by the parties in various pleadings relating to these appeals, is 1240 Soldier's Field Road, which also borders the subject property and runs approximately parallel to Western Avenue.
 This figure is consistent with the City of Boston's records which reflect total square footage of 135,895 square feet for the subject property and the adjoining parcel, which is also owned by the appellant. The sum does not comport with an uncertified copy of a deed reflecting conveyance of a single parcel to the appellant in 1938, containing both the subject property and the adjoining parcel, and consisting of 138,800 square feet. The record before the Board does not account for this discrepancy. Based on lack of information as to events following the 1938 transfer and the updated nature of the City's records, the Board adopted the City's square footage of the subject property.
  The rotch room is a multi-purpose room used for meetings and storage. It is also available to rent for events such as birthday parties.
 The Board noted that the space occupied by these commercial enterprises would not have qualified for exemption, regardless of whether the Club had been afforded exempt status. See Lynn Hospital v. Board of Assessors of Lynn, 383 Mass. 14 (1981). 
 The assessors contested the adequacy of the appellant's "Form PC" relating to fiscal year 2005, noting that the signature line following schedules A-1 and A-2 contains no signatures. The Form PC in question was timely filed and signed by the appellant's treasurer on the page preceding schedules A-1 and A-2, directly under the statement "(u)nder penalty of perjury, I declare that the information furnished in this report, including all attachments, is true and correct to the best of my knowledge." To the extent necessary to establish the Board's jurisdiction, the Board found that this signature constitutes "verification under oath" of the form as prescribed by G.L. c. 12, § 8F. 
 Regular memberships include: Family; Single (over 18 years); Family (non-skating); Single (non-skating); Supporting (Family); and Supporting (Single).  Special memberships include: Ice Theater; Junior; Non-Resident Family; Non-Resident Single; Regular Membership for Meritorious Service; Supporting (Non-Skating); and Synchronized Skating.  
 Absent contradictory evidence in the record, the Board found that the information contained in the Pamphlet was representative of informational documents published by the Club during the relevant periods.

	ATB 2007-193