Dayani, Shiva v. State

*This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule
of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule
1-104(a)(2)(B).
Circuit Court for Montgomery County
Case No. 84091C
UNREPORTED*
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF MARYLAND
No. 1022
September Term, 2025
______________________________________
SHIVA DAYANI
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
______________________________________
Nazarian,
Kehoe, S.,
Getty, Joseph M.
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),
JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Getty, J.
______________________________________
Filed: October 13, 2026

— Unreported Opinion —
In the winter of 1999, shortly after her seventeenth birthday, Appellant Shiva
Dayani participated in a retaliatory armed robbery that resulted in a death. As a result, Ms.
Dayani faced charges for first-degree felony murder, along with fourteen related charges.
Ms. Dayani pleaded guilty to second-degree felony murder, along with the related charges,
and was sentenced to a total of 140 years, with all but 45 suspended. 	Her sentence was
subsequently corrected in 2015 to include time served, and her sentence was reduced by
eight years in 2016. Ms. Dayani began her parole in 2018.
Ms. Dayani filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief in 2001, which her
attorney advised her to withdraw in 2002. 	Her attorney incorrectly advised her that she
could re-file at any time. 	She filed a new petition for post-conviction relief with a new
attorney in May 2024, arguing extraordinary cause for the untimely filing. 	The court
denied her petition on June 10, 2025.
Ms. Dayani filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence in December 2024, alleging
that her sentence was illegal based on similar grounds to those asserted in her post-
conviction petition. 	The circuit court denied the motion without comment on June 12,
2025.
Ms. Dayani now appeals the denial of her motion to correct an illegal sentence. She
submits four questions for our review, which we have consolidated into one core issue:
1. 	Has Ms. Dayani articulated a cognizable challenge to the denial of her motion
based on an illegal sentence under Maryland Rule 4-345(a)? 1
1 Ms. Dayani’s enumerated questions read as follows:
1. 	Was Ms. Dayani convicted under an inapplicable statute, rendering her conviction
and resulting sentence for felony murder illegal?

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2
We shall answer in the negative, and therefore affirm the decision of the circuit
court.
BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
In the winter of 1999, the owner of a two-story single-family home in Gaithersburg,
Maryland, had left the home in the care of his two sons, aged twenty-two and eighteen at
the time. The two sons allowed several others to stay in the home, and illegal drugs were
regularly sold at the home. Ms. Dayani and her co-defendants had purchased illegal drugs
from the residence on several occasions. Most recently, the group had purchased heroin,
from which Ms. Dayani had become violently ill, and the group attempted to purchase
cocaine, but determined that it was fake. The group intended to return to the house to “get
their money back. There was no plan to hurt anybody or shoot anyone.”
Ms. Dayani arrived at the residence in Gaithersburg around 10:15 p.m. on January
11, 1999, in the company of Joshua Friedman and Chelsa Sommers. 	Mr. Friedman and
Ms. Sommers were nineteen and eighteen at the time, while Ms. Dayani had turned
seventeen a few weeks prior. Mr. Friedman was armed with a loaded shotgun, while Ms.
Dayani was armed with a loaded .32 caliber revolver and a knife. Mr. Friedman and Ms.
2. 	Was the Trial Court unable to accept Ms. Dayani’s guilty plea when it failed to
determine that a factual basis existed for the plea?
3. 	Was the Trial Court unable to accept Ms. Dayani’s guilty plea when it failed to
ensure that Ms. Dayani was pleading knowingly and voluntarily?
4. 	Does a juvenile’s diminished capacity to generate felony murder’s transferred intent
render the application of felony murder to juveniles unconstitutional?

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3
Dayani approached the house, and Ms. Sommers stayed in the car to serve as their means
of escape.
Mr. Friedman and Ms. Dayani entered the house through the front door, which was
closed but unlocked. 	They went upstairs to the bedroom of Jamil Neuman, who had
recently sold the group heroin. 	Mr. Neuman was in his bedroom along with two other
residents at the house, Robin Rogers and Ali Rabonik. Ms. Dayani pointed her handgun at
Mr. Neuman’s face and said, “Give me your shit, all of it.”
Mr. Friedman racked his shotgun, pointed it at the other two residents, and ordered
them to lie down. Ms. Dayani handed her pistol to Mr. Friedman and taped the wrists and
ankles of all three of the room’s inhabitants with duct tape. Two other people entered the
bedroom, and Mr. Friedman threatened them with the shotgun and ordered them to lie
down. 	While Ms. Dayani was in the process of taping the wrists of the two newcomers,
the noise awakened another resident of the house, Mike Porter.
When Mr. Porter entered the room, he saw Mr. Friedman holding a shotgun and
charged at him, intending to disarm him. The two struggled for control of the shotgun and
fell to the floor. Three of the room’s inhabitants, including Mr. Neuman, broke free of the
duct tape and fled the room. Mr. Neuman then changed his mind and returned to assist Mr.
Porter.
At this point, there were five people in the room: Mr. Porter on the ground on top
of the shotgun; Mr. Friedman on top of Mr. Porter struggling for control of the shotgun;
Mr. Neuman, who began punching Mr. Friedman in an effort to aid Mr. Porter; Ms.
Rabonik, who was still tied up; and Ms. Dayani, who was still armed with a knife.

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4
As Mr. Neuman was punching Mr. Friedman, Ms. Dayani stabbed Mr. Neuman in
the back, puncturing his lung. Mr. Neuman fell to the floor and rolled onto his back. Mr.
Neuman testified that he saw Ms. Dayani holding the knife in both hands.
Ms. Rabonik then freed herself from the duct tape and tackled Ms. Dayani. At the
same time, Mr. Friedman and Mr. Porter, still wrestling for the shotgun, began to stand up.
Mr. Porter tried to twist the shotgun out of Mr. Friedman’s hands. 	As he did so, Mr.
Friedman said, “It’s loaded.” 	As soon as he said this, the shotgun discharged and struck
Ms. Rabonik in the face. The evidence in the record did not establish whether the trigger
was pulled or the shotgun went off by accident.
After the shooting, Ms. Dayani and Mr. Friedman ran out of the house to Mr.
Friedman’s car, and Ms. Sommers sped off. Mr. Friedman still had the shotgun with him,
but had left the revolver in the house. They stopped at an intersection where Mr. Friedman
threw the shotgun into a sewer. The three then drove to a mobile home trailer where Mr.
Friedman lived.
Mr. Neuman was taken to Shady Grove Hospital in Rockville, Maryland, where he
was hospitalized for six days, recovering from a collapsed lung and other damage caused
by the stab wound he received from Ms. Dayani. 	Police responded to the residence and
found Ms. Rabonik dead from a shotgun wound to the face. Police recovered the revolver
Ms. Dayani brought into the house, a spent shotgun shell, a roll of duct tape, and the hood
from a coat Mr. Friedman wore during the robbery. 	Police arrested Ms. Dayani, Mr.
Friedman, and Ms. Sommers at the trailer the following morning.

— Unreported Opinion —
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5
B. Procedural History
A grand jury indicted Ms. Dayani on February 4, 1999, in the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County on fifteen counts, including first-degree murder, attempted murder,
five counts of first-degree assault, five counts of use of a handgun in a crime of violence
and the commission of a felony, robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous
and deadly weapon, and burglary. 	Ms. Dayani’s co-felons were indicted with the same
charges in separate cases.
On June 22, 1999, pursuant to a plea agreement, Ms. Dayani entered a guilty plea
to amended charges of second-degree murder and attempted second-degree murder, along
with the remaining thirteen charges. The court questioned Ms. Dayani to ascertain her plea
was knowing and voluntary, heard the State’s proffer, which included Ms. Dayani’s
confession, heard statements from Ms. Dayani clarifying details about the planning of the
robbery, reviewed three admitted exhibits, and heard Ms. Dayani’s acknowledgement of
her guilt. 	The court accepted Ms. Dayani’s guilty plea. 	Ms. Dayani’s co-felons entered
into similar pleas in their respective cases.
The court sentenced Ms. Dayani to a total of 140 years with all but 45 suspended on
November 29, 1999. 	The court also recommended Ms. Dayani for the Youth Offender
Program at the Patuxent Institution. 	Ms. Dayani’s co-felons, Mr. Friedman and Ms.
Sommers, received sentences of 85 years with all but 34 suspended and 35 years, which
were later reduced by three-judge sentence review panels to 65 years with all but 28
suspended and 15 years, respectively. Ms. Dayani did not file for consideration by a three-

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6
judge sentence review panel. 	All three participated in the Youth Offender Program at
Patuxent.
On May 4, 2000, Ms. Dayani, through the attorney who represented her at trial, filed
a motion to modify her sentence, which the court held in abeyance. She then filed a pro se
petition for post-conviction relief on October 15, 2001. In 2002, Ms. Dayani hired a new
attorney, Jonathan Katz (“Mr. Katz”), who advised her to withdraw the motion for post-
conviction relief and instead to proceed with a motion for modification of her sentence.
Mr. Katz advised her that she could re-file a petition for post-conviction relief “at any time
you choose.” However, pursuant to Section 7-103(b) of the Maryland Criminal Procedure
Article, petitions for post-conviction relief are bound by a ten-year statutory deadline. 2 See
Lopez v. State, 433 Md. 652, 654 (2013). 	For Ms. Dayani, that deadline was November
29, 2009.
On November 25, 2009, days before that deadline, Mr. Katz filed a motion for a
hearing on the sentence modification motion filed by Ms. Dayani’s previous attorney. The
sentence modification motion was denied on June 9, 2011.
Ms. Dayani hired a new attorney, Laura Rhodes (“Ms. Rhodes”), who filed a
combined motion to correct an illegal sentence, motion to reopen the 2010 sentence
2 The General Assembly reformed the criminal procedures for post-conviction relief
through two bills passed during the 1995 Legislative Session. 	The number of post-
conviction petitions allowed was reduced from two to one under Senate Bill 340 (1995 Md.
Laws Ch. 110). The unlimited time period for filing post-conviction petitions was capped
by a ten-year statutory deadline under House Bill 409 (1995 Md. Laws Ch. 258). The ten-
year statutory deadline became effective for criminal sentences imposed on or after
October 1, 1995. See State v. Williamson, 408 Md. 269, 277 (2009).

— Unreported Opinion —
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modification, and motion for modification of sentence, on July 15, 2015. The court granted
Ms. Dayani’s motion to correct an illegal sentence on December 9, 2015, because her
original sentence did not include time served.
The court granted Ms. Dayani’s motion for sentence modification on July 19, 2016,
to reduce her sentence by eight years and recommend her for parole. 	Ms. Dayani began
her parole in 2018.
Ms. Dayani consulted Ms. Rhodes, along with another unnamed attorney, about
filing for post-conviction relief, but this never came to fruition.
Ms. Dayani then hired Matthew Zernhelt, who filed a petition for post-conviction
relief on May 21, 2024. 	The petition asserted that Ms. Dayani received ineffective
assistance of counsel because: (1) trial counsel advised her she would not face immigration
consequences for accepting a guilty plea; (2) trial counsel advised her to plead guilty to
second-degree murder to avoid the probability she would be convicted for first-degree
murder; (3) trial counsel did not move to dismiss the first-degree felony murder charge,
which would have made Ms. Dayani eligible for a juvenile transfer; and (4) trial counsel
and the court did not sufficiently examine on the record whether Ms. Dayani understood
the fifteen charges to which she would plead guilty. 	The petition also asserted that the
court accepted Ms. Dayani’s guilty plea without a sufficient factual basis to support it; that
the summary of Ms. Dayani’s charges incorrectly stated she was facing the death penalty
for first-degree murder, which influenced her decision to plead guilty to second-degree
murder; and that a theory of felony murder was not constitutionally permissible because of
Ms. Dayani’s age at the time of the offense.

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8
The court denied Ms. Dayani’s petition. The court reasoned that although Mr. Katz
was Ms. Dayani’s attorney throughout the majority of her ten-year statutory period, and
although Mr. Katz’s incorrect advice to Ms. Dayani that she could re-file her petition for
post-conviction relief “at any time” constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, Ms.
Dayani then retained new counsel in Ms. Rhodes, who filed a comprehensive set of motions
to modify Ms. Dayani’s sentence in the years that followed. 	The court noted that Ms.
Rhodes could have argued extraordinary cause for a belated post-conviction petition at that
time, and that “Petitioner’s testimony reflected that Ms. Rhodes was aware she would have
been able to argue extraordinary cause and file a petition for post-conviction relief.” The
court found that Ms. Rhodes made a tactical decision to file the motions to modify Ms.
Dayani’s sentence and not to file a post-conviction petition arguing extraordinary cause,
and thus Ms. Rhodes did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to file a post-
conviction petition. 	The court found that this effectively cured the ineffective assistance
of prior post-conviction counsel, and thus Ms. Dayani suffered no further prejudice as a
result.
The court also addressed Ms. Dayani’s assertion that recent changes in immigration
policy, which made deportation for someone in Ms. Dayani’s situation more likely than
before, created grounds for extraordinary cause. 	The court noted that the purpose of the
extraordinary cause doctrine was to “allow a defendant to file a petition when there was an
irregular or abnormal occurrence that caused a petitioner to miss the statutory deadline.
Section 7-103(b) is meant to protect defendants from irregularities that occur within the
10-year statutory deadline, when the state legislature imposed a high penalty for missing

— Unreported Opinion —
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9
the deadline. Extraordinary cause is not meant to leave a loophole open for defendants to
file a petition if an occurrence happens after the statutory deadline. A sudden change in
immigration policy 15 years after the statutory deadline does not qualify as extraordinary
cause that would excuse Petitioner from missing the statutory deadline.”
Accordingly, the court held that Ms. Dayani’s 2024 post-conviction petition was
barred by the statute of limitations, and that Ms. Dayani failed to show extraordinary cause
for the delay. 	Ms. Dayani filed an application for leave to appeal the denial of her post-
conviction petition on August 30, 2025. 	In an unreported per curiam opinion filed May
28, 2026, this Court denied the application. 3
Ms. Dayani also filed through Matthew Zernhelt a motion to correct an illegal
sentence on December 30, 2024. Ms. Dayani argued that her sentence was illegal because
(a) she was convicted and sentenced under an inapplicable statute; (b) the court failed to
establish a factual basis on which to accept Ms. Dayani’s guilty plea; and (c) the court
failed to establish that Ms. Dayani’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. 	The court
denied the motion without further comment, two days after denying the post-conviction
petition, on June 12, 2025.
Ms. Dayani timely noted this appeal.
DISCUSSION
Ms. Dayani comes before this Court on appeal from the denial of her motion to
correct an illegal sentence. 	Ms. Dayani argues that her sentence was illegal on four
3 Dayani v. State, No. 1409, Sept. Term, 2025 (Md. App. Ct. May 28, 2026) (per curiam).

— Unreported Opinion —
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theories: first, that she was convicted under an inapplicable statute; second, that the circuit
court was unable to accept Ms. Dayani’s guilty plea because the court failed to determine
a factual basis for the plea; third, that the circuit court failed to ensure Ms. Dayani entered
her plea knowingly and voluntarily; and finally, that as a juvenile at the time of the offense,
Ms. Dayani had a diminished capacity to “generate felony murder’s transferred intent,” and
thus applying felony murder to a juvenile is unconstitutional.
Maryland Rule 4-345(a) provides that a court may correct an illegal sentence at any
time. 	“Because Rule 4-345(a) allows collateral and belated attacks on a sentence and is
not subject to waiver, it is well-established that its scope is narrow. Otherwise, it would
swallow the general rule of finality and allow repeated attacks on the underlying
conviction. It is limited to situations where there is some illegality inherent in the sentence
itself or where no sentence should have been imposed in the first place.” Farmer v. State,
481 Md. 203, 223 (2022) (citing Evans v. State, 382 Md. 248, 278-79 (2004)).
An illegal sentence under Rule 4-345(a) is “one in which the illegality inheres in the
sentence itself.” 	Colvin v. State, 450 Md. 718, 725 (2016) (internal quotations omitted).
In State v. Bustillo, our Supreme Court outlined three categories into which “inherently
illegal sentences” pursuant to Rule 4-345(a) typically fall: “(1) a sentence that exceeds the
statutory maximum, or is less than the required minimum; (2) a sentence that never should
have been imposed; or (3) a sentence that exceeds the cap imposed by a binding plea
agreement[.]” 480 Md. 650, 658-59 (2022) (cleaned up; internal citations omitted).
A motion under Rule 4-345(a) may not be used as a “vehicle for belatedly raising
any alleged error in the trial or proceedings that resulted in the sentence, for challenging

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the administration of the sentence, or for generally litigating the procedures that may
govern a future reduction of the sentence or the defendant’s release from custody.”
Farmer, 481 Md. at 225.
Thus, we must determine whether any of Ms. Dayani’s arguments creates a
cognizable challenge to the legality of her sentence under Rule 4-345(a).
Standard of Review
“Whether a sentence is illegal is a question of law – as is the question whether an
alleged defect relating to a sentence is cognizable in a motion to correct an illegal
sentence.” Farmer, 481 Md. at 222. “Accordingly, an appellate court reviews a denial of
a motion to correct an illegal sentence de novo.” 	Id. at 222–23 (citing Johnson v. State,
467 Md. 362, 389 (2020)).
A. Claim One: Ms. Dayani’s sentence is illegal because she was convicted under
an inapplicable statute.
Ms. Dayani first argues that her sentence was illegal because she was convicted
under a statute that was not applicable to the facts of her case. 	Ms. Dayani submits that
felony murder was not applicable to her because the State failed to offer sufficient evidence
to show that one of Ms. Dayani’s co-felons caused a killing.
Under the felony-murder rule, a person can be charged with murder in the first or
second degree if a death occurs during the commission of certain enumerated felonies, even
if there was no intent to kill. 	Section 2-201(a) of the Maryland Criminal Law Article
(hereinafter “CL”) provides that “[a] murder is in the first degree if it is: […] (4) committed
in the perpetration of or an attempt to perpetrate: […] (iii) burglary in the first, second, or

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third degree[.]” CL § 2-201(a). CL § 2-204(a) provides that “[a] murder that is not in the
first degree under § 2–201 of this subtitle is in the second degree.” Felony murder “requires
the State to prove (1) the elements of a qualified, underlying felony, and (2) that death
occurred in the perpetration of that felony.” 	Wagner v. State, 160 Md. App. 531, 560
(2005).
A participating felon is not guilty of felony murder if a person other than the felon
or 	her 	co-felons 	caused 	the 	death. 	“[K]illings 	committed 	by 	other 	persons—law
enforcement officers, victims, or bystanders—in an attempt to thwart or oppose the
enterprise do not impose criminal liability on the participating felons because they are not
ordinarily regarded as being in furtherance of the common object, but rather are in
opposition to it.” Watkins v. State, 357 Md. 258, 270 (2000).
Here, Ms. Dayani asserts that because the State did not offer sufficient evidence to
prove that one of Ms. Dayani’s co-felons—rather than one of the robbery’s victims—
caused the death, felony murder was inapplicable, and thus Ms. Dayani’s sentence is
illegal.
“[W]here 	a 	defendant 	has 	been 	charged 	and 	convicted 	under 	an
entirely inapplicable statute […] the resulting sentence under the inapplicable statute is
an illegal sentence which may be challenged at any time.” Moosavi v. State, 355 Md. 651,
662 (1999). In Moosavi, the eponymous appellant alleged during a dispute with his bank
that he intended to blow up the bank. 	Mr. Moosavi was charged under what was then
Article 27, Section 151A of the Maryland Code, which covered false statements or rumors
regarding “the location or possible detonation of a bomb.” Mr. Moosavi argued, and our

— Unreported Opinion —
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Supreme Court agreed, that his statements were better classified under what was then
Article 27, Section 9, entitled “Threats of Arson,” which stated that “[a] person may not
threaten either verbally or in writing to: (1) Set fire to or burn a structure; or (2) Explode a
destructive explosive device [...] in, on, or under a structure.” 4 	Our Supreme Court held
that Mr. Moosavi’s sentence was illegal because he was charged and convicted under an
inapplicable statute.
Here, Ms. Dayani’s claim amounts not to an argument that she was charged and
convicted under an entirely inapplicable statute, but instead amounts to an argument that
there was insufficient evidence to show that one of her co-felons caused the death. 	Ms.
Dayani suggests that the death could instead have been caused by Mr. Porter, who was a
victim of the robbery, and in that case Ms. Dayani would not have been liable for his
actions. An argument regarding sufficiency of the evidence does not create a claim for an
illegal sentence because the argument relates to the proceedings that led to the imposition
of the sentence, and not to the sentence itself.
Furthermore, Ms. Dayani pleaded guilty in this case. A guilty plea is “an admission
of conduct that constitutes all the elements of a formal criminal charge.” Metheny v. State,
359 Md. 576, 599 (2000) (internal quotations omitted). 	“A plea of guilty is more than a
4 As a result of code revision, certain sections of the former Article 27, entitled “Crimes
and Punishment”, were recodified as part of the Criminal Law Article (“CL”) of the
Maryland Code. Article 27, § 151A became CL § 9-504, and Article 27, § 9 became CL §
6-107. Both statutes were derived without substantive change from their predecessors and
became effective in 2002. “Code revision is a periodic process by which statutory law is
re-organized and restated with the goal of making it more accessible and understandable to
those who must abide it.” Smith v. Wakefield, LP, 462 Md. 713, 726 (2019) (citing Alan
M. Wilner, Blame it all on Nero: Code Creation and Revision in Maryland (1994)).

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voluntary confession made in open court. It also serves as a stipulation that no proof by the
prosecution need [be] advanced. […] It supplies both evidence and verdict, ending [the]
controversy.” Id. (quoting Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n.4 (1969)). By pleading
guilty, Ms. Dayani waived several fundamental rights, including “the right to insist that the
prosecution’s proof at trial establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 598 (internal
quotations omitted). 	The purpose of statements offered to support a factual basis for a
guilty plea “is to ensure the voluntariness of the plea, not to test the sufficiency of the
State’s case.” State v. Smith, 244 Md. App. 354, 397 (2020).
A motion to correct an illegal sentence is not the appropriate vehicle to raise an
argument that the State’s evidence was insufficient to show that the felony murder rule
applied in this case. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s denial on this count.
B. Claims Two and Three: Ms. Dayani’s sentence was illegal because the court
failed to determine a sufficient factual basis to support her guilty plea, and
because the court failed to ascertain that her guilty plea was knowing and
voluntary.
Ms. Dayani next submits that her sentence was illegal because the circuit court did
not have the authority to accept her guilty plea on two grounds: first, the court did not
establish a factual basis for her guilty plea; and second, the court did not properly ascertain
that her guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.
As we noted above, when a criminal defendant enters a guilty plea, “the accused is
not simply stating that [the accused] did the discrete acts described in the indictment; [the
accused] is admitting guilt of a substantive crime.” 	Metheny, 359 Md. at 599 (2000)
(quoting United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 570 (1989)). “Once accepted, a guilty plea

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amounts to a conviction and the only remaining tasks for the court to perform are to impose
judgment and conduct sentencing proceedings.” Id. at 600 (internal citations omitted). A
challenge to the validity of a guilty plea is separate from a challenge to the sentence the
court imposed as a result of that plea. “[A] motion to correct an illegal sentence is not an
alternative method of obtaining belated appellate review of the proceedings that led to the
imposition of judgment and sentence in a criminal case.” Colvin, 450 Md. at 725.
A motion to correct an illegal sentence is not the appropriate vehicle to raise a
challenge to the validity of a guilty plea. 	We affirm the circuit court’s denial on these
counts.
C. Claim Four: Ms. Dayani’s sentence is illegal because United States Supreme
Court doctrine indicates that the felony-murder rule should not be applied to
juveniles.
Ms. Dayani’s final claim was not raised in her motion to correct an illegal sentence,
but in her petition for post-conviction relief, on which this Court has already denied her
application for leave to appeal. 	Maryland Rule 8-131 provides that “[o]rdinarily, an
appellate court will not decide any other issue unless it plainly appears by the record to
have been raised in or decided by the trial court, but the Court may decide such an issue if
necessary or desirable to guide the trial court or to avoid the expense and delay of another
appeal.”
We note, however, that this Court’s prior denial of Ms. Dayani’s application for
leave to appeal does not deprive us of our discretion to address the issue. 	“[W]hen an
appellate court denies an application for leave to appeal and does not state its reasons for
doing so,” the issues contained therein are not “finally litigated” because “the court ‘tells

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no one what [it] thought of any particular allegation in the application.’” 	Davis v. State,
267 Md. App. 118, 144 (2019), cert. denied, 492 Md. 712 (2025) (quoting Hernandez v.
State, 108 Md. App. 354, 365 (1996)).
Nonetheless, Ms. Dayani’s final argument fails for the same reason as those we have
addressed above: a motion to correct an illegal sentence is not the proper vehicle to raise
this argument, and indeed, Ms. Dayani did not raise it in her motion below. “[A]n argument
that challenges the merits of a conviction is not properly raised by way of a motion to
correct an illegal sentence.” Ingram v. State, 179 Md. App. 485, 488 (2008); see Colvin,
450 Md. at 727 (“an alleged flaw in the procedure by which the guilty verdict was received
and finalized” does not render the sentence illegal as defined by Md. Rule 4-345(a))
(emphasis in original).
As the circuit court rendered no ruling in the motion before us, there is nothing to
affirm. We note instead that the proper vehicle to raise this argument, the post-conviction
petition, has already been denied, and the time in which to raise the argument has long
since passed.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Dayani has not raised a cognizable claim for an illegal sentence under Maryland
Rule 4-345(a). Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the circuit court.
JUDGMENT 	OF 	THE
CIRCUIT 	COURT 	FOR
MONTGOMERY 	COUNTY
AFFIRMED. 	COSTS 	TO 	BE
PAID BY APPELLANT.