Kelly v. State

Zuri Kelly v. State of Maryland, No. 68, September Term, 2023. Opinion by Zarnoch, J.

STATUTES – RETROACTIVITY – Statutes are presumed to operate prospectively.
However, there are exceptions to this presumption: 1) a legislative change affecting
procedure only and not substantive rights; 2) a statute that has remedial effect and does not
impair vested rights; and 3) a statute that affects a matter still in litigation. An important
caveat to each of these exceptions is that they cannot be applied if the General Assembly
expresses a contrary intent.

STATUTES – RETROACTIVITY – In 2023, the Legislature passed a law generally
preventing law enforcement officers from stopping or searching a vehicle solely on the
basis of the odor of cannabis and excluding such evidence from being admitted in judicial
proceedings. Before the new law took effect, appellant was convicted of certain offenses
after the odor of cannabis was admitted into evidence to justify a search. After sentencing
and the taking of an appeal, he argued that the new law applied retroactively. However,
the intent of the General Assembly expressed in the text of the new law indicates to the
contrary. The statute provides that evidence discovered or obtained “in violation of this
section” is not admissible in a proceeding. However, there was no violation of the statute
when the search was conducted. Thus, the exclusionary rule was not intended to apply
until such a violation could occur, viz., after the new law took effect.
Circuit Court for Baltimore County
Case No. C-03-CR-21-002015

REPORTED

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF MARYLAND

No. 68

September Term, 2023

ZURI KELLY

v.

STATE OF MARYLAND

Arthur,
Tang,
Zarnoch, Robert A.
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

Opinion by Zarnoch, J.

Filed: June 27, 2024

Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal
Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State
Government Article) this document is authentic.

2024.06.27
14:56:04 -04'00'

Gregory Hilton, Clerk
In 2023, the General Assembly passed legislation generally preventing law

enforcement officers from stopping or searching vehicles solely on the basis of the odor of

cannabis and, among other things, excluding such evidence from being admitted in judicial

proceedings. The principal issue in this case is whether this legislation was intended to

apply retroactively to cases pending on direct appeal. 1 For reasons stated below, we

conclude that the text of the 2023 legislation indicates the General Assembly’s intent that

the law does not apply retroactively.

In 2021, Zuri Kelly, appellant, was arrested and charged, in the Circuit Court for

Baltimore County, with various narcotics-related offenses after a police officer, upon

detecting the odor of cannabis emanating from Kelly’s vehicle during a traffic stop,

conducted a warrantless search of Kelly’s vehicle and found evidence of drug possession

and distribution. Prior to trial, Kelly filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in his

vehicle. That motion was denied. Kelly thereafter entered a conditional plea of guilty to

one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, and the court sentenced Kelly to

a total term of twelve years’ imprisonment, with all but two years suspended. This timely

appeal followed.

While Kelly’s appeal was pending, a new law governing searches pursuant to the

odor of cannabis became effective in Maryland. That law, which was codified in § 1-211

of the Criminal Procedure Article (“CP”) of the Maryland Code, prohibited a police officer

1
This is often referred to as “pipeline retroactivity.” See Frederick J. Melkey,
Creating New Law or Restoring the Old? – Retroactivity and the Americans with
Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008: A Comment on EEOC v. Autozone, 34 N.C. Cent. L.
Rev. 1, 11 (2011).
from conducting a search of a person’s vehicle based solely on the odor of cannabis. The

law also stated that any evidence obtained in violation of the statute was inadmissible.

Subsequent to CP § 1-211 becoming effective, Kelly filed his brief in the instant

case, presenting a single question for our review. For clarity, we have rephrased that

question as 2:

Is CP § 1-211 applicable in Kelly’s case, even though Kelly was convicted
and sentenced before the statute became effective and the text of the
enactment indicates the prospectivity of its terms?

For reasons to follow, we hold that CP § 1-211 does not apply retroactively and is

inapplicable to the facts presented here. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit

court.

BACKGROUND

On May 9, 2021, Kelly was driving in the area of Route 40 and Rosedale Avenue

when he was stopped by a police officer for speeding. Upon making contact with Kelly,

the police officer observed “a distinct odor coming from the vehicle[,]” which the officer

recognized as “both burning and fresh unburned [cannabis.]” Based on that observation,

the officer ordered Kelly to step out of the vehicle. The officer then conducted a search of

Kelly’s vehicle and discovered a bag containing cannabis and other drug-related

paraphernalia. Kelly was arrested, and a subsequent search of Kelly’s person revealed

Kelly phrased his question as: “Does [CP § 1-211], which prohibits vehicle
2

searches based solely on the odor or possession of cannabis, govern this appeal, which was
pending on direct review when that statute took effect?”

2
various quantities of cocaine and Oxycodone. Kelly was thereafter charged with several

offenses based on the evidence found in his vehicle and on his person.

Prior to trial, Kelly filed a motion to suppress the physical evidence found in his

vehicle and on his person. That motion was denied on March 29, 2022.

On February 27, 2023, Kelly entered a conditional plea of guilty to one count of

possession with intent to distribute cocaine. The State dismissed the remaining charges.

Under the terms of his conditional plea, Kelly agreed that his right to appeal would be

limited “to the pretrial issues litigated in Baltimore County Circuit Court[.]” That same

day, the court imposed sentence.

On March 1, 2023, Kelly noted an appeal in this Court. On July 1, 2023, while

Kelly’s appeal was pending in this Court, CP § 1-211 became effective. As noted, the law

prohibited a police officer from conducting a search of a person’s vehicle based solely on

the odor of cannabis and rendered inadmissible any evidence obtained in violation of the

statute.

DISCUSSION

Kelly argues that, pursuant to CP § 1-211, the evidence obtained during the search

of his vehicle must be suppressed because that search was based solely on the odor of

cannabis. Recognizing that CP § 1-211 did not become effective until after he was

convicted and sentenced, Kelly nevertheless insists that the statute should govern his

appeal. First, Kelly argues that this Court should apply the law as it exists today, rather

than as it existed prior to his conviction and sentencing, because “an appellate court

typically applies a change in criminal procedure to cases that were pending on direct review

3
when that change occurred.” Second, Kelly argues that CP § 1-211 should govern this

appeal because the statute “satisfies the traditional principles for retroactive application in

Maryland” and because “[t]he broad language and legislative history of CP § 1-211

necessarily imply that the General Assembly intended it to apply retroactively.”

The State, on the other hand, contends that CP § 1-211 has no application here. 3

Regarding Kelly’s claim that this Court should apply the law as it exists today, the State

argues that that general rule applies to the relevant case law, not a statute, particularly

where, as here, the statute was enacted after conviction and sentencing. As to whether CP

§ 1-211 should be applied retroactively, the State notes that all statutes are presumed to

apply prospectively unless the Legislature has indicated a contrary intent or unless the

statute satisfies the traditional principles for retroactive application. The State argues that

neither exception applies here. The State contends, therefore, that CP § 1-211 should be

applied prospectively, which would make it inapplicable in Kelly’s case.

It is undisputed that the search of Kelly’s vehicle was based solely on the odor of

burnt or unburnt cannabis. It is equally undisputed that Kelly’s subsequent conviction and

sentencing all occurred prior to July 1, 2023, which is when CP § 1-211 became effective.

3
The State argues, preliminarily, that Kelly’s argument has not been preserved for
appellate review because Kelly never raised the argument below and because Kelly, as part
of his conditional guilty plea, agreed that all appellate issues would be limited to those
issues actually litigated in the circuit court. We find no merit to the State’s preservation
argument. Obviously, Kelly could not raise the issue in the circuit court because the statute
did not become effective until after he was convicted and sentenced. We shall therefore
exercise our discretion and consider the issue. See White v. State, 223 Md. App. 353, 402
(2015) (noting that the power to decide an unpreserved issue is solely within the appellate
court’s discretion).

4
Because Kelly does not challenge the search of his vehicle on any grounds other than that

the search violated CP § 1-211, the sole question here is whether the exclusionary remedy

provided by CP § 1-211 is applicable to a defendant who is convicted and sentenced before

the statute’s effective date.

Standard of Review

Questions of statutory interpretation are legal issues that we review de novo.

Romeka v. RadAmerica II, LLC, 485 Md. 307, 323 (2023). In construing a statute, we

begin with ‘“the language of the statute itself.”’ Holmes v. State, 236 Md. App. 636, 651-

52 (2018) (quoting Seal v. State, 447 Md. 64, 70 (2016)). “‘If the language of the statute

is unambiguous and clearly consistent with the statute’s apparent purpose,’ our inquiry as

to legislative intent ends ordinarily and we apply the statute as written, without resort to

other rules of construction.” Agnew v. State, 461 Md. 672, 679 (2018) (further quotation

marks and citation omitted) (quoting Harrison-Solomon v. State, 442 Md. 254, 265 (2015)).

“If, however, the language is ambiguous, we move on to examine case law, the structure

of the statute, statutory purpose, and legislative history to aid us in ascertaining the intent

of the General Assembly.” Holmes, 236 Md. App. at 652 (quotation marks and citation

omitted).

Principles of Retroactivity

“‘Retrospective statutes are those acts which operate on transactions which have

occurred or rights and obligations which existed before passage of the act.’” United Ins.

Co. of Am. v. Md. Ins. Admin., 450 Md. 1, 27 (2016) (further quotation marks and citation

omitted) (quoting Muskin v. State Dep’t of Assessments & Tax’n, 422 Md. 544, 557

5
(2011)). “‘The question whether a statute operates retrospectively, or prospectively only,

ordinarily is one of legislative intent.’” State v. Smith, 443 Md. 572, 588 (2015) (quoting

Langston v. Riffe, 359 Md. 396, 406 (2000)). “In determining this intent, ‘[s]tatutes are

presumed to operate prospectively; consequently, absent manifest legislative intent to the

contrary, statutes may not be given retrospective or retroactive application.’” Graves v.

State, 215 Md. App. 339, 350 (2013) (quoting Gregg v. State, 409 Md. 698, 714 (2009)).

There are, however, exceptions to the presumption that statutes are to be applied

prospectively. First, “‘a statute effecting a change in procedure only, and not in substantive

rights, ordinarily applies to all actions whether accrued, pending or future, unless a contrary

intention is expressed.’” Id. (further quotation marks and citation omitted) (quoting Gregg,

409 Md. at 714-15). Second, a statute that has a remedial effect, and does not impair vested

rights, can be applied retroactively. Id. at 351.

Regarding the first exception, the Supreme Court of Maryland has explained that

“‘a law is substantive if it creates rights, duties and obligations,’ and procedural if it ‘simply

prescribes the methods of enforcement of those rights.’” Smith, 443 Md. at 590 (quoting

Langston, 359 Md. at 419). In other words, a statute is procedural if the effect of the statute

‘“is not to impair existing substantive rights, but only to alter the procedural machinery

involved in the enforcement of those rights, or the remedies available to enforce them[.]’”

Est. of Zimmerman v. Blatter, 458 Md. 698, 729 (2018) (quoting Langston, 359 Md. at

419).

Similarly, a statute is remedial, and thus falls within the second exception, if it

“‘provide[s] a remedy, or improve[s] or facilitate[s] remedies already existing for the

6
enforcement of rights and the redress of injuries.’” Smith, 443 Md. at 592 (quoting Doe v.

Roe, 419 Md. 687, 703 (2011)). A statute may also be remedial if it is ‘“designed to correct

existing law”’ or if it is ‘“intended for the correction of defects, mistakes[,] and omissions

in the civil institutions and the administration of the [S]tate.”’ Est. of Zimmerman, 458

Md. at 729-30 (quoting Langston, 359 Md. at 408-09).

The majority opinion in In re M.P., 487 Md. 53, 86 (2024), described another

“exception” to the general rule of prospectivity – the rule that absent a contrary legislative

intent, a statute that affects a matter still in litigation will be applied by a reviewing court

even though the statute was not law when the lower court decision was handed down. 4

An important caveat to each of these exceptions is that they cannot be applied if the

General Assembly expresses a contrary intent. See id. (matter still in litigation); Smith,

443 Md. at 589 (procedure); and Landsman v. Md. Home Improvement Comm’n, 154 Md.

App. 241, 251 (2003) (remedy).

Relevant Cannabis Law

Prior to 2014, possession of cannabis in any amount was considered a criminal

offense in Maryland. Md. Code, Crim. Law § 5-601 (effective to September 30, 2014). At

the time, it was well settled that the smell of cannabis emanating from a vehicle constituted

probable cause to justify a warrantless search of that vehicle. Johnson v. State, 254 Md.

App. 353, 371 (2022).

4
This decision, which will be described in greater detail infra, states that
retroactivity was not at issue in that case. In re M.P., 487 Md. at 93 (“In this instance,
retroactive application of a jurisdictional amendment is not at issue[.]”).

7
In 2014, the Maryland General Assembly enacted a law making the possession of

less than ten grams of cannabis a civil offense. Lewis v. State, 470 Md. 1, 9 (2020). Despite

that change, the Supreme Court of Maryland consistently held that the odor of cannabis

remained evidence of a crime and permitted a warrantless search of a vehicle. E.g., In re

D.D., 479 Md. 206 (2022); Pacheco v. State, 465 Md. 311 (2019); Robinson v. State, 451

Md. 94 (2017).

In 2022, Maryland voters approved of a constitutional amendment that permitted,

as of July 1, 2023, the use and possession of cannabis by an individual in the State who is

at least twenty-one years old. Md. Const., art. XX, § 1 (effective December 14, 2022).

That same year, the General Assembly overhauled Maryland’s cannabis laws in light of

the new constitutional amendment. 2022 Md. Laws, ch. 26. Under the new laws, the use

and possession of a certain quantity of cannabis (the “personal use amount”) would be legal

for individuals who were at least twenty-one years old. Id. Possession of more than the

personal use amount but less than a certain quantity (the “civil use amount”) would be a

civil offense and result in a fine. Id. Possession of more than the civil use amount was a

crime punishable by imprisonment and/or a fine. Id. Those changes were to take effect on

July 1, 2023. Id.

The following year, during the 2023 legislative session, the General Assembly

enacted CP § 1-211, which, as noted, also became effective July 1, 2023. Acts of 2023,

ch. 802, § 2. That law states, in pertinent part, that “[a] law enforcement officer may not

initiate a stop or a search of a person, a motor vehicle, or a vessel based solely on . . . the

8
odor of burnt or unburnt cannabis[.]” CP § 1-211(a)(1). 5 The law states further that

“[e]vidence discovered or obtained in violation of this section, including evidence

discovered or obtained with consent, is not admissible in a trial, a hearing, or any other

proceeding.” CP § 1-211(c).

To date, neither this Court nor the Supreme Court of Maryland has determined

whether CP § 1-211 should be applied retroactively. Looking at other jurisdictions, we

have found one case from our neighboring state of Virginia, Street v. Commonwealth, 876

S.E.2d 202 (Va. Ct. App. 2022), that is instructive. There, the defendant’s vehicle was

subjected to a warrantless search after a police officer detected the odor of cannabis

emanating from the vehicle. Id. at 205. During the search, the police discovered a firearm,

and the defendant was arrested for illegal possession of a firearm. Id. After the defendant

was indicted, but before trial, a new law, Va. Code Ann. § 4.1-1302(A), became effective

in Virginia. Id. Under that law, the police were prohibited from conducting a search based

solely on the odor of cannabis, and any evidence obtained in violation of the law was

inadmissible. Id. The defendant thereafter filed a motion to suppress and argued that the

new law should be applied retroactively. Id. The motion was denied, and the defendant

was convicted. Id. After the defendant appealed, the Court of Appeals of Virginia

affirmed, holding that the new law was inapplicable to searches that occurred prior to the

law’s effective date. Id. at 209. In reaching that decision, the Court provided the following

relevant analysis:

5
The statute also prevents law enforcement officers from stopping a vehicle because
of the presence of cash or currency in proximity to cannabis.

9
Clearly, Code § 4.1-1302(A) does not contain an express statement
indicating that it is to be applied retroactively. Examining the language of
the statute as a whole actually leads to a contrary conclusion regarding the
intent of the General Assembly. In a single sentence, the statute specifically
provides in relevant part, first, that no law enforcement officer “may lawfully
. . . search . . . any person, place, or thing . . . solely on the basis of the odor
of marijuana” and, second, that “no evidence discovered or obtained
pursuant to a violation of this subsection . . . shall be admissible in any trial,
hearing, or other proceeding.” Code § 4.1-1302(A) (emphasis added). In
other words, the first portion of the statute (the “right” prong) gives
individuals a new right to be free from searches that are based solely on the
odor of marijuana. The second portion (the “remedy” prong) grants the
remedy of exclusion of evidence for a violation of that specific new right.

The single sentence is clear and unambiguous, and provides the
roadmap for its application. The ability to invoke the exclusionary “remedy”
prong of the statute is expressly contingent upon “discover[y of the evidence]
pursuant to a violation of [the ‘right’ prong of] this subsection.” Further, the
“right” prong – entitling individuals to be free from specified searches and
seizures based solely on the odor of marijuana – did not exist prior to the
effective date of the predecessor statute[.] Simply put, the 2019 search could
not violate a nonexistent statute, and the 2021 “remedy” provision contained
. . . in Code § 4.1-1302(A) consequently does not apply to that search. As a
result, a plain reading of the statute supports application of the general rule
that it does not apply retroactively.

Id. at 207 (internal citations omitted). 6

6
The Virginia Court also noted that “[b]ecause the language of the statute is clear,
we do not examine the nature of its provisions to classify them as procedural or
substantive[.]” Street, 876 S.E.2d at 209 n.10. The Court crystallized its conclusions:

In sum, because the statutory prohibition on searches based solely on
the odor of marijuana could not be violated before Code § 4.1-1302(A) or its
predecessor took effect, the General Assembly provided clear instruction that
the accompanying exclusionary provision applies only prospectively.
Therefore, under the express language of the statute, the trial court did not
err by denying the appellant’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a
result of the search of his vehicle.

Id. at 208.

10
In our discussion of relevant authority, we must examine In re M.P., which was

handed down a little more than a week before this case was argued. There, a 5-2 majority

of the Supreme Court of Maryland determined that a legislative change to the jurisdiction

of juvenile courts removing certain children under the age of thirteen from juvenile

proceedings applied to proceedings pending at the time the law took effect. 487 Md. at 62.

Specifically, the Court noted that “retroactive application of a jurisdictional amendment is

not at issue because the jurisdictional question here concerns the authority of the juvenile

court” to take action subsequent to the effective date of the legislation. Id. at 93. Thus,

applying the change to prevent any judicial action after the effective date is applying it

prospectively. The Majority noted that its conclusion was consistent with the principle that

the courts generally apply the law in effect when the case is considered, not when the

alleged offense occurred. The Court took pains to observe: “Nothing in this opinion should

be interpreted as concluding that a juvenile court would lack jurisdiction with respect to a

child under the age of 13 who had already been found delinquent at the time [the law took

effect].” Id. at 97 n.22. Finally, the Majority said that it reached its holding “[i]n the

absence of instruction otherwise from the General Assembly[.]” Id. at 85.

The Instant Case

Applying those principles to the instant case, we hold that CP § 1-211 is not

retroactive and is therefore inapplicable under the facts presented here. As with the statute

at issue in Street v. Commonwealth, CP § 1-211 has two relevant prongs: a “right” prong,

namely, that a law enforcement officer may not initiate a search of a vehicle based solely

on the odor of burnt or unburnt cannabis; and a “remedy” prong, namely, that “[e]vidence

11
discovered or obtained in violation of this section” is inadmissible. CP § 1-211(a), (c)

(emphasis added). By structuring the statute in such a manner, the Maryland General

Assembly clearly indicated that, for a defendant to avail himself of the “remedy” of

exclusion, the evidence at issue must have been discovered in violation of the “right”

established by the statute. Clearly, that “right” did not exist before the statute became

effective. Although cannabis reform in Maryland began in earnest in 2014 when the

General Assembly decriminalized the possession of less than ten grams of cannabis, see

2014 Md. Laws, ch. 158, our courts have consistently reaffirmed, as recently as 2022, the

general rule that the odor of cannabis is evidence of a crime and therefore justifies the

warrantless search of an automobile. E.g., Johnson, 254 Md. App. at 371. Moreover, we

could find nothing in the relevant case law to suggest that the changes to the cannabis laws

in 2022, which legalized the possession of a “personal use amount” and decriminalized the

possession of a “civil use amount,” would necessarily have resulted in our abrogating the

general rule permitting a search of a vehicle based on the odor of cannabis, particularly

given that the possession of cannabis beyond the “civil use amount” remained a crime

under the 2022 enactments. It was not until CP § 1-211 became effective that the “right”

at issue, i.e., the prohibition against warrantless searches of automobiles based solely on

the odor of cannabis, came to fruition. Importantly, because the exclusionary remedy

provided by CP § 1-211 was made contingent upon a violation of the right created by the

statute, the General Assembly sent a clear message that the statute was not merely

procedural or remedial, but rather was a substantive change to existing rights, as well as

12
the duties and obligations of law enforcement officers. Consequently, CP § 1-211 cannot,

and should not, be applied retroactively to the search at issue in the instant case.

Kelly contends that “an appellate court typically applies a change in criminal

procedure to cases that were pending on direct review when that change occurred.” Citing

that principle and the Supreme Court of Maryland’s holding in Waker v. State, 431 Md. 1

(2013), Kelly argues that CP § 1-211 should govern his appeal.

We do not find that case to be applicable under the facts presented here. There, the

defendant was arrested and charged with theft of property valued at $615, a crime that, at

the time, was punishable by imprisonment not exceeding ten years. Waker, 431 Md. at 2-

3. Prior to trial, the General Assembly amended the statute so that thefts of property valued

at less than $1,000 were punishable by imprisonment not exceeding eighteen months. Id.

at 2. The defendant was subsequently convicted and sentenced to ten years imprisonment,

despite the fact that the new theft statute had become effective prior to the defendant’s trial

and sentencing. Id. at 3. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Maryland held that the

defendant’s ten-year sentence was illegal because it violated the relevant statute in effect

at the time of the defendant’s trial and sentencing. Id. at 13.

Here, we are not concerned with the propriety of a sentence that was rendered in

violation of a statute that went into effect before the defendant was actually tried and

sentenced. Rather, we are tasked with deciding whether a defendant should receive the

benefit of a substantive (not procedural) change in the law affecting searches which did not

go into effect until after the search, conviction, and sentencing, where there was nothing

13
illegal about the search when it was conducted and where the language of the newly-created

law indicates that it is to be applied prospectively. As such, Waker is simply inapposite.

Nor does the Maryland Supreme Court’s recent decision in In re M.P., where the

practical equivalent of partial pipeline retroactivity was found, mandate a similar result

here. The Court declined to rest its decision on principles of retroactivity and additionally

declined to apply the law in question to juveniles already found delinquent. That is not the

case here, where Kelly was convicted and sentenced before the effective date of the

legislative change. But most importantly, this case noted the absence of “instruction

otherwise from the General Assembly[.]” 487 Md. at 85. Here, we have such instruction,

viz., an intent expressed in the language of the legislation that the law not be applied

retroactively.

Kelly argues, alternatively, that the legislative history of CP § 1-211 implies that the

General Assembly intended for it to apply retroactively. We disagree. To be clear, we see

no reason to delve at length into the snippets of legislative history set forth by Kelly,

because the General Assembly’s intent is clear based on the statute’s plain language. 7

Nevertheless, we do not mean to ignore legislative history materials suggesting that

CP § 1-211, at least in part, was intended to address racial disparities arising from stops

and seizures based on the odor of cannabis – arguments apparently aimed at the “rights”

7
In the pecking order of indicia of legislative intent, the text of the statute stands in
privileged status at the very pinnacle.

14
portions of the legislation. 8 Obviously, the “remedy” component of the statute, i.e., the

exclusionary rule, was intended to deter law enforcement officers from violating the

“rights” portion of the enactment.

We find persuasive, however, the cogent remarks of the Supreme Court of New

Jersey in State v. Burstein, 427 A.2d 525, 531 (N.J. 1981):

In cases where the new rule is an exclusionary rule, meant solely to deter
illegal police conduct, the new rule is virtually never given retroactive effect.
The reason is that the deterrent purposes of such a rule would not be advanced
by applying it to past misconduct.

The retroactivity of the exclusionary rule in CP § 1-211 does not sanction law enforcement

officers who did not act illegally before the effective date of the 2023 statute and does not

deter future conduct any more than the prospective provisions of CP § 1-211. The very

notion of determent of future misconduct is not served by retroactive application of an

exclusionary rule.

Conclusion

In sum, we hold that the text of CP § 1-211 demonstrates that it was intended to

apply prospectively from its effective date of July 1, 2023. Because the search at issue and

Kelly’s subsequent conviction and sentencing all occurred prior to that date, neither the

right nor the remedy provided by the statute is available to him. Accordingly, we affirm.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY AFFIRMED;
COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.

8
There is no contention that race played any role in the vehicle stop and search in
this case.

15