Alex Titcomb v. Secretary of State

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2025 ME 63
Docket: Cum-25-284
Argued: July 8, 2025
Decided: July 11, 2025

Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD,* HORTON, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, DOUGLAS, and
LIPEZ, JJ.

ALEX TITCOMB et al.

v.

SECRETARY OF STATE et al.

STANFILL, C.J.

[¶1] Alex Titcomb and four other registered Maine voters1 (collectively,

Titcomb) appeal from a judgment entered by the Superior Court (Cumberland

County, O’Neil, J.) affirming the Secretary of State’s determination of the

wording of a ballot question for citizen-initiated legislation that would amend

Maine voting laws. Titcomb argues that the wording of the question does not

meet the statutory requirements that it be “understandable to a reasonable

voter reading the question for the first time and . . . not mislead a reasonable

* Although not available at oral argument, Justice Mead participated in the development of this
opinion. See M.R. App. P. 12(a)(2) (“A qualified Justice may participate in a decision even though
not present at oral argument.”).
1 The four other voters are Heather Sirocki, Kevin Murphy, George Colby, and Randall Adam
Greenwood.
2
voter who understands the proposed legislation into voting contrary to that

voter’s wishes,” 21-A M.R.S. § 905(2) (2025), and that it be written “in a clear,

concise and direct manner that describes the subject matter of the . . . direct

initiative as simply as is possible,” 21-A M.R.S. § 906(6)(B) (2025). Having

reviewed the Secretary’s decision independently, we affirm the judgment of the

Superior Court.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] In February 2024, Titcomb applied to the Secretary for approval to

circulate a petition for a citizen initiative proposing legislation that would

amend election laws. See 21-A M.R.S. § 901 (2025); Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 18,

cl. 1. After the Secretary of State revised and approved the form of the petition,

Titcomb circulated the petition and filed the signed petition forms with the

Secretary on January 6, 2025. See 21-A M.R.S. §§ 901, 901-A, 902, 903, 903-A

(2025); Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 18, cls. 1, 2. In February 2025, the Secretary

certified that the initiators of the legislation had obtained sufficient valid

signatures on the petition. See 21-A M.R.S. § 905(1) (2025); Me. Const. art. IV,

pt. 3, § 18, cls. 1, 2.

[¶3] On March 12, 2025, the Secretary released a proposed ballot

question for public comment for the requisite thirty-day period. See

21-A M.R.S. §§ 901(4), 905-A, 906(6). That proposed question read as follows:
3
Do you want to change Maine election laws to require voters to
show ID before voting, end ongoing absentee voting for seniors and
people with disabilities, ban prepaid postage on absentee ballot
return envelopes, prohibit requests for absentee ballots by phone
or family members, eliminate two days of absentee voting, and
make other changes to our elections?

[¶4] Meanwhile, the Legislature considered legislation to enact the

content of the initiative, “An Act to Require an Individual to Present

Photographic Identification for the Purpose of Voting,” L.D. 1149 (132d Legis.

2025), but did not act on it. See Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 18, cls. 1, 2.

[¶5] The public comment period on the proposed ballot question closed

on April 11, 2025. After consideration of the 318 comments she received, on

May 5, 2025, the Secretary decided on the final wording for the ballot question

as required by 21-A M.R.S. § 905-A:

Do you want to change Maine election laws to eliminate two days
of absentee voting, prohibit requests for absentee ballots by phone
or family members, end ongoing absentee voter status for seniors
and people with disabilities, ban prepaid postage on absentee
ballot return envelopes, limit the number of drop boxes, require
voters to show certain photo ID before voting, and make other
changes to our elections?

[¶6] On May 14, 2025, Titcomb filed in the Superior Court a timely

petition for judicial review of the Secretary’s decision. See 21-A M.R.S.

§§ 901(7), 905(2); M.R. Civ. P. 80C. The court granted a motion to intervene

filed by Victoria Kornfield, Lisa Buck, DSCC (Democratic Senatorial Campaign
4
Committee), DCCC (Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee), and the

Democratic Governors Association.

[¶7] Titcomb argued to the court that the drafted question was

misleading because it improperly singled out the proposal’s effect on the

ongoing absentee voter status of seniors and people with disabilities when a

recent amendment made that status available to any voter effective December

31, 2025. See P.L. 2023, ch. 404, §§ 1, 2 (to be codified at 21-A M.R.S.

§ 753-A(8)). He further argued that the question was not understandable to

the average voter because it used the confusing technical term “ongoing

absentee voter status” and used vague language in the final catch-all phrase

“other changes to our elections.” He argued that the question failed to

represent the proposal’s subject matter accurately and was not sufficiently

concise.

[¶8] The court considered these arguments and those of the Secretary

and issued a decision on June 13, 2025, affirming the Secretary’s decision. The

Superior Court concluded that the language of the question was

understandable and not misleading.2 Titcomb timely appealed. See 21-A M.R.S.

2 The Secretary argued to the Superior Court, and to us, that Titcomb waived any objection to the

Secretary’s formulation of the question because he did not object during the public comment period.
See New England Whitewater Ctr., Inc. v. Dep’t of Inland Fisheries & Wildlife, 550 A.2d 56, 58-61 (Me.
1988). The Superior Court opted not to address the issue, nor do we find it necessary to do so given
our holding.
5
§ 905(3). We issued an expedited briefing schedule and received briefs from

the parties; the intervenors; and amici curiae League of Women Voters of

Maine, Disability Rights Maine, Legal Services for Maine Elders, and political

science professors Amy Fried, David Kimball, Carrie LeVan, and Daniel Smith.

We then heard oral arguments from the parties and intervenors.

II. DISCUSSION

[¶9] We begin with a summary of our standard of review, the relevant

constitutional and statutory provisions, and our precedent interpreting the law

governing the Secretary’s drafting. We then proceed to an analysis of the issues

presented.

A. Standard of Review and Pertinent Law

[¶10] Our “standard of review must be the same as for the Superior

Court.” 21-A M.R.S. § 905(3). Thus, we review the Secretary’s wording of the

ballot question directly to “determine whether the description of the subject

matter is understandable to a reasonable voter reading the question for the first

time and will not mislead a reasonable voter who understands the proposed

legislation into voting contrary to that voter’s wishes.” Id. § 905(2); see Jortner

v. Sec’y of State, 2023 ME 25, ¶ 8, 293 A.3d 405; Olson v. Sec’y of State, 1997 ME

30, ¶ 4, 689 A.2d 605. “This standard of review subsumes our review of

whether the Secretary of State met her constitutional obligation to ‘prepare the
6
ballots in such form as to present the question or questions concisely and

intelligibly,’ Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 20, and her statutory obligation to ‘write

the question in a clear, concise and direct manner that describes the subject

matter of the . . . direct initiative as simply as is possible,’ 21-A M.R.S.

§ 906(6)(B).” Jortner, 2023 ME 25, ¶ 8, 293 A.3d 405. The burden of persuasion

rests with the party challenging the Secretary’s action. See id.

[¶11] The constitutional and statutory requirements for ballot questions

on initiated legislation are “designed to ensure that voters, who may be reading

the question for the first time in the voting booth, will understand the subject

matter and the choice presented.” Id. ¶ 12 (quotation marks omitted). Voters

are not expected to “rely on the ballot question alone in order to understand

the proposal,” however, because voters are presumed to have “discharged their

civic duty to educate themselves about the initiative” before reading the

question. Id. ¶¶ 11-12 (quotation marks omitted).

[¶12] Section 905 does not require “that the description be

understandable to a voter who is reading both the question and the legislation

for the first time.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). The statute requires us to ask

whether “a reasonable voter who understands the proposed legislation” would

be unable to understand the question or misled into voting contrary to that

voter’s wishes when reading the question for the first time. Id. ¶ 13 (quotation
7
marks omitted); see 21-A M.R.S. § 905(2). We are not deciding “whether a voter

who does not understand the proposed legislation would be able to fully

understand it based on the question alone.” Jortner, 2023 ME 25, ¶ 13, 293 A.3d

405.

[¶13] The Secretary’s drafted question also “need not provide complete,

comprehensive information about the legislation or its effect.” Id. “Merely

demonstrating that the question creates a misleading impression about the

legislation is not enough” to justify our rejection of the wording. Olson, 1997

ME 30, ¶ 7, 689 A.2d 605. We consider whether a reasonable, informed voter

would either misunderstand what the ballot question is asking about the

proposed legislation or be misled into voting against the voter’s intent. See

21-A M.R.S. § 905(2); Jortner, 2023 ME 25, ¶ 14, 293 A.3d 405; Olson, 1997 ME

30, ¶ 9, 689 A.2d 605; Wagner v. Sec’y of State, 663 A.2d 564, 568 (Me. 1995).

[¶14] In short, the statute creates guardrails around the Secretary’s

discretion in formulating the ballot question. Within those guardrails, the

Secretary has broad flexibility in how she drafts the question, and we do not

constrain that flexibility. We review only whether the Secretary strayed

beyond the guardrails created by statute by formulating the question in a way

that either is not understandable or is misleading. 21-A M.R.S. § 905(2).
8
B. Review of the Ballot Question

[¶15] The proposed legislation at issue here is entitled “An Act to Require

an Individual to Present Photographic Identification for the Purpose of Voting,”

L.D. 1149, but it addresses much more than photographic identification. It

contains twenty-seven amendments affecting multiple aspects of Maine

election law, some of which are not related to photographic identification. The

summary for the legislation hints at its scope:

This initiated bill requires the presentation of photographic
identification for in-person and absentee voting. Acceptable forms
of photographic identification include an unexpired Maine driver’s
license, nondriver identification card, interim identification form
issued by the Secretary of State, United States passport or United
States passport card, United States military identification card,
Maine National Guard identification card and United States
Department of Veterans Affairs identification card. The bill directs
the Secretary of State to provide free nondriver identification cards
for photographic identification. The bill allows voters without
photographic identification to complete a challenged ballot and
within 4 days after the date of the election appear before the
registrar of voters and present photographic identification. The
bill also provides an exception for voters with religious objections
to being photographed. The bill removes provisions of law that
allow voters to make telephone applications for absentee ballots
and that allow voters to automatically receive absentee ballots for
each election without submitting a separate request for each
election. It also provides that a municipality may have only one
secured drop box for the return of absentee ballots.

The Secretary provided a comprehensive summary of the initiated legislation

in her decision:
9
Among other things, the Act would: (1) require people voting
in-person in Maine elections to show one of several forms of
government-issued photo identification; (2) require elections
officials to challenge the ballot of any voter unable to show the
proper ID; (3) bar such challenged ballots from being counted
unless the voter presents photo identification to the registrar
within 4 days of the election; (4) limit municipalities to using a
single drop box for absentee ballots; (5) require the clerk to ensure
that the two-person team servicing the drop box is bipartisan,
(6) substantially rewrite the provision governing the process for
requesting an absentee ballot to eliminate the ability of a family
member to request a ballot and to require voters to provide
additional information on the application; (7) eliminate the right to
request an absentee ballot by telephone; (8) eliminate the last two
days of the no-excuse absentee voting period; (9) eliminate the
right of individuals who are over 65 or disabled to request ongoing
absentee voter status, where they are automatically sent an
absentee ballot before each election; (10) require absentee voters
to fill out an “identification envelope” to be provided with the
absentee ballot, which must include a driver’s license or nondriver
identification card number or a photocopy of the voter’s
photographic identification, the voter’s date of birth, the type and
date of the election in which they are voting, and other information;
(11) prohibit public offices, officials, and employees from
prepaying return postage for an absentee ballot; (10) prohibit
election officials from preprinting any responses required by the
newly required identification envelope; (12) eliminate the ability
of family members to return a voter’s absentee ballot by mail;
(13) prohibit municipalities from allowing absentee ballots to be
returned to more than one municipal office; and (14) repeal the
procedures governing voting when a ballot is delivered or returned
by a 3rd person.

[¶16] Presented with initiated legislation proposing these various

amendments to Maine election laws, the Secretary decided to list the six most

significant changes and indicate that the list was not exhaustive. She
10
determined the order for listing the proposed amendments by prioritizing the

changes to absentee voting procedures, which she found “are more extensive

and wide-ranging than its changes to in-person voting procedures.” She opted

to refer to “certain photo ID” instead of using the generic “ID” because the

definition of “photographic identification” in the proposed legislation is

limited.3 L.D. 1149, § 4. She also clarified the term “ongoing absentee voting”

in reference to seniors and people with disabilities by using the statutory

language that the initiated legislation seeks to repeal: “ongoing absentee voter

status.” 21-A M.R.S. § 753-A(8).

[¶17] We review whether (1) the drafted question is misleading because

it improperly singles out the proposed legislation’s effect on seniors and people

with disabilities when a recent amendment will, when it takes effect, make

“ongoing absentee voter status” available to all voters and (2) the question is

understandable to a reasonable voter despite the use of the terms “ongoing

absentee voter status,” “certain photo identification,” and “other changes to our

elections,” and despite the changed ordering of the listed proposed

amendments.

Significantly, it is narrower than the forms of identification currently accepted in verifying the
3

identity of an applicant who is registering to vote. See 21-A M.R.S. § 112-A (2025); L.D. 1149, § 4
(132d Legis. 2025).
11
1. Whether the Question is Misleading in Referring Specifically
to Seniors and People with Disabilities

[¶18] Titcomb argues that the Secretary’s question is misleading because

it indicates that the proposed legislation, which would repeal 21-A M.R.S.

§ 753-A(8), targets seniors and people with disabilities. The statute currently

in effect, which will still be in effect at the time of the vote on the initiated

question, authorizes “[a] voter who will be at least 65 years of age by the next

election or who self-identifies as having a disability to apply for status as an

ongoing absentee voter.” Id. Effective December 31, 2025, however, any voter

may apply for ongoing absentee voter status. P.L. 2023, ch. 404, §§ 1, 2 (codified

under the December 31, 2025, effective date at 21-A M.R.S. § 753-A(8) (2025)).

[¶19] The phrase indicating that the proposed legislation would “end

ongoing absentee voter status for seniors and people with disabilities” is

accurate. They are the only groups whose “ongoing absentee voter status” will

be ended by the proposed legislation. That the Secretary did not indicate that

the proposal would have a broader effect beginning on December 31, 2025,

does not make the question she drafted inaccurate or misleading, particularly

given that we assume that a voter is a reasonable, informed voter who

understands the proposed legislation, which references P.L. 2023, ch. 404—the

legislation authorizing any voter to seek ongoing absentee voter status. See L.D.
12
1149, § 19; 21-A M.R.S. § 905(2); Jortner, 2023 ME 25, ¶ 14, 293 A.3d 405; Olson,

1997 ME 30, ¶ 9, 689 A.2d 605; Wagner, 663 A.2d at 568.

[¶20] Moreover, a misrepresentation in a ballot question is not

necessarily sufficient to invalidate the question. See Wagner, 663 A.2d at 568.

Section 905(2) demands more: a ballot question is fatally misleading only if a

voter would be led to vote contrary to the voter’s intent. See id. In one case, we

concluded that the use of the term “putting” in the following question was not

misleading: “Should spraying pesticides from the air or putting pesticides in

Maine’s waters be a Class A crime?” Olson, 1997 ME 30, ¶¶ 3, 7-9, 689 A.2d 605

(quotation marks omitted). We reached this conclusion because the meaning

of “putting” was similar to what was proposed in the act, which criminalized

“caus[ing], by any means, the introduction of” pesticides in Maine waters.

Olson, 1997 ME 30, ¶¶ 7-9, 689 A.2d 605 (quotation marks omitted). The

drafted question said nothing about a state-of-mind requirement, and we

concluded that the word “putting” would not mislead a voter familiar with the

initiative into thinking that the statute would prohibit only intentional conduct.

Id. ¶¶ 8-9.

[¶21] Here, a reasonable, informed voter familiar with the proposed

legislation will be aware of P.L. 2023, ch. 404, which the proposal explicitly

references in connection with the proposed repeal of section 753-A(8). See L.D.
13
1149, § 19. Although the Secretary could have chosen different language, the

language of the question is not misleading.

2. Whether Language in the Question is Not Understandable to a
Reasonable Voter

[¶22] Titcomb argues that the question is not understandable because it

does not accurately present the legislation’s primary purpose of requiring

voters to present identification. We disagree. The Secretary’s listing of the

absentee voting provisions first is consistent with her assessment that the

proposed changes to absentee voting are the most extensive changes to existing

law. See L.D. 1149. Several public comments emphasized the importance of

conveying the full scope of the proposal to voters, particularly as it affects

absentee voting. The Secretary’s question accurately identifies the legislation

to voters by summarizing its contents to “ensure that voters, who may be

reading the question for the first time in the voting booth, will understand the

subject matter and the choice presented.” Jortner, 2023 ME 25, ¶ 12, 293 A.3d

405 (emphasis omitted). We assume that a voter reads the whole question, and

we disagree that the Secretary’s ordering of the accurate summaries of the

proposed amendments makes the question not understandable. 4

4The title of the proposed act does not control the Secretary’s assessment of the act’s primary
purpose. Cf. Denutte v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 2019 ME 124, ¶ 18 n.7, 213 A.3d 619 (“[A] heading is not part
14
[¶23] Titcomb next contends that the average voter would not

understand from the drafted question what the term “ongoing absentee voter

status” means, what “certain photo identification” means, and what “other

changes to our elections” would include.

[¶24] We disagree with Titcomb that the Secretary’s reference to

“ongoing absentee voter status” is confusing. The Secretary used specific

statutory language from the title of the Maine Revised Statutes that the initiated

legislation aims to amend—a practice we approved in Olson, 1997 ME 30,

¶¶ 10-11, 689 A.2d 605 (holding that the term “Class A crime,” when viewed

with existing statutes in Title 17-A, was understandable to reasonable voters

who discharged the civic duty to educate themselves). Here, the language is

even more precisely tailored than in Olson because the language is drawn

directly from the subsection that the initiated legislation would repeal. See

21-A M.R.S. § 753-A(8).

[¶25] Moreover, unlike in Jortner, where we held that the term

“quasi-governmental” lacked a commonly understood meaning, 2023 ME 25,

¶ 25, 293 A.3d 405, the term “ongoing” commonly means “continuing,”

of the legal provision for purposes of our statutory construction analysis.”). The Secretary properly
looked to the content of the proposed act itself to determine the order in which to list the summaries
of the proposed amendments. See id.
15
Ongoing, New Oxford American Dictionary (3d ed. 2010), which plainly and

accurately conveys to a voter that having “ongoing absentee voter status”

would establish continuing status as an absentee voter. See 21-A M.R.S.

§ 753-A(8).

[¶26] The use of the term “certain photo identification” is similarly

understandable to a reasonable, informed voter. The use of the term “certain”

makes clear to a voter that not all forms of photo identification would satisfy

the voting procedure statute, 21-A M.R.S. § 671 (2025), as it is proposed to be

amended. See L.D. 1149, § 4. The proposed legislation would require a voter to

display “photographic identification” and defines that term to include only

certain forms of identification, excluding other common forms of identification

that satisfy voter registration requirements. See 21-A M.R.S. § 112-A (2025);

L.D. 1149, §§ 1, 4. A reasonable, informed voter familiar with the proposal will

not find the question confusing.

[¶27] Nor are we persuaded that the catchall language at the end of the

question undermines a voter’s understanding of the question. Indeed, a failure

to include such an indication could lead to voter confusion because the

proposed legislation includes amendments beyond those explicitly

summarized in the question. In essence, the final portion of the question

reflects the reality that, given the requirement that the question be concise, it
16
cannot enumerate all changes proposed in the initiative. The question viewed

in its entirety is sufficiently clear that a voter familiar with the proposed

legislation will know how to mark the ballot to indicate the voter’s intent.

[¶28] Titcomb also argues, citing section 906(6)(B), that the question is

not concise and understandable because it is longer than questions presented

to the public in earlier elections. As we have stated in other contexts, however,

the requirement of conciseness is subsumed in our standard of review set forth

in section 905(2). See Jortner, 2023 ME 25, ¶ 8, 293 A.3d 405; Olson, 1997 ME

30, ¶ 6, 689 A.2d 605. The length of the question matters only if it prevents a

reasonable, informed voter from understanding the question. Here, the

question is certainly longer than many other questions placed on the ballot in

Maine. See Maine State Legislature, Citizen Initiated Legislation, 1911-Present,

https://www.maine.gov/legis/lawlib/lldl/citizeninitiated/ [https://perma.cc

/L3NN-VP7E] (listing initiated legislation through 2024). Nonetheless, we

conclude that given the many disparate provisions in the proposed legislation,

the length of the Secretary’s question listing the proposed statutory changes

does not render the question incomprehensible or misleading. Although

initiated legislation may contain a variety of provisions with different purposes,

it is subject to a single yes-or-no vote. See Caiazzo v. Sec’y of State, 2021 ME 42,

¶¶ 24, 27, 256 A.3d 260. It is appropriate for the Secretary to list phrases
17
describing the various proposed changes in a single ballot question. Id. Here,

although the question is longer than most have been in the past, that is because

it lists the salient features of the legislation in short, easily understood phrases.

The wording may be complex, but it is not complicated.5

[¶29] Because we conclude that the Secretary’s question “is

understandable to a reasonable voter reading the question for the first time and

will not mislead a reasonable voter who understands the proposed legislation

into voting contrary to that voter’s wishes,” 21-A M.R.S. § 905(2), we affirm the

judgment of the Superior Court.

The entry is:

Judgment affirmed.

Patrick Strawbridge, Esq. (orally), and Brandon Haase, Esq., Consovoy
McCarthy PLLC, Boston, Massachusetts, and Benjamin E. Hartwell, Esq., Steve
Smith Trial Lawyers, Augusta, for appellants Alex Titcomb, Heather Sirocki,
Kevin Murphy, George Colby, and Randall Adam Greenwood

Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, Jonathan Bolton, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), and
Paul E. Suitter, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for
appellee Secretary of State

5 “Complex” means “[c]onsisting of interconnected or interwoven parts; composite,” Complex,

American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (5th ed. 2016), as distinguished from
“complicated,” which means “[n]ot easy to understand or analyze because of being intricate,”
Complicated, American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language.
18
Aria C. Branch, Esq., Christopher D. Dodge, Esq. (orally), and Omeed Alerasool,
Esq., Elias Law Group LLP, Washington, District of Columbia, and James G.
Monteleone, Esq., and Katherine R. Knox, Esq., Bernstein Shur, Portland, for
appellees Victoria Kornfield, Lisa Buck, DSCC, DCCC, and the Democratic
Governors Association

Peter Rice, Esq., and Lauren Wille, Esq., Disability Rights Maine, Augusta, and
Benjamin Jenkins, Esq., Legal Services for Maine Elders, Augusta, for amici
curiae Disability Rights Maine and Legal Services for Maine Elders

Matthew P. Schaefer, Esq., SchaefferLaw LLC, Portland, for amicus curiae
League of Women Voters of Maine

Benjamin Gaines, Esq., Gaines Law, LLC, Brunswick, for amici curiae Amy Fried,
David Kimball, Carrie LeVan, and Daniel Smith

Cumberland County Superior Court docket number AP-2025-15
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY