Sappi North America v. Dyer

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STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT
CUMBERLAND, ss CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-19-15

SAPP! NORTH AMERICA,

Plaintiff
V. ORDER
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CHERYL DYER, AUG O2 2019 \'1: ~ i
Defendant
RECBVED ~
Before the court is a motion by defendant Cheryl Dyer to dismiss the complaint

filed by plaintiff Sappi North America. 1 Oral argument on the motion was held on July 31,

2019 to address a jurisdictional issue raised by the court.
In its complaint Sap pi alleges that Dyer has filed a petition for an award of workers

compensation death benefits pursuant to 39-A M.R.S. § 215 as the spouse of Joseph Dias.

The petition alleged that Dias had died on July 28, 2017 as a result of lung cancer resulting

from exposure to asbestos while he was employed at Sappi.Z
The complaint further alleges that Dyer had been Dias's "significant other" for many

years but that her status as Dias's spouse is based on a marriage that occurred on July 9,

2017, after Dias had apparently begun receiving in-home hospice services from the

Hospice of Southern Maine. Sappi alleges that shortly before the marriage Dias had been

evaluated as unable to answer questions and suffering from disorientation, delirium, and

impaired judgment and that Dias was not legally competent to marry on July 9, 2017.

1Also pending is a motion by Sappi to file a surreply brief on an issue raised for the first time in
Dyer's reply brief. Sappi's motion was not opposed and is granted.

z Pursuant to 39-A M.R.S. § 215(1), this would make Ms. Dyer potentially eligible, as a dependent of
a deceased employee, to receive 500 weeks of benefits.
Plaintiff-Caitlin Wahrer, Esq.
John Lambert, Esq.
Defendant-Katherin Gatti, Esq.
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Sappi's complaint seeks a declaratory judgment that Dyer was not legally married to
Dias at the date of his death, which would make Dyer ineligible to receive benefits as a
surviving spouse.

Dyer has moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to
state a claim. In her motion papers she argues that the court does not have subject matter

jurisdiction to consider a claim that is essentially a proceeding to annul a marriage.

With respect to the status of the workers compensation proceeding, Sappi alleges in
its complaint that when it sought to raise the validity of the marriage in the workers

compensation proceeding, Dyer responded that the validity of the marriage was not an

issue that the Workers Compensation Board could decide.3 Sappi thereafter brought a
motion to stay the workers compensation proceeding and filed this action. At oral

argument on July 31, the parties reported that by agreement the workers compensation
petition had been subsequently dismissed without prejudice with the statute of limitations
tolled to allow refiling.

After reviewing the papers filed by Dyer and Sappi on the pending motion to
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dismiss, the court requested oral argument to allow the parties to address a different issue
relating to subject matter jurisdiction - whether the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction

because issues relating to eligibility for workers compensation benefits are within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Workers Compensation Board.

Standard of Review
The issue of whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction for purposes of

M.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3) is an issue of law, and the court may consider material
outside of the pleadings. See 2 C. Harvey, Maine Civil Practice (3d. ed. 2011) § 12:7, citing
Guterriez v. Guterriez, 2007 ME 59 ,r,r 8-10, 921 A.2d 153.

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At oral argument on July 31, 2019 counsel for Dyer stated that she now agreed that the Workers
Compensation Board could consider Sappi's argument that Dyer did not qualify as a dependent spouse
for purposes of workers compensation.

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For purposes of a motion to dismiss under M.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the material

allegations of the complaint must be taken as admitted. Ramsey v. Baxter Title Co., 2012 ME

113 ,r 2, 54 A.3d 710. The complaint must be read in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff to determine if it sets forth elements of a cause of action or alleges facts that would

entitle plaintiff to relief pursuant to some legal theory. Bisson v. Hannaford Bros. Co., Inc.,

2006 ME 131 ,r 2, 909 A.2d 1010. Dismissal is appropriate only when it appears beyond

doubt that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any set of facts that he might prove in

support of his claim. Moody v. State Liquor & Lottery Commission, 2004 ME 20 ,r 7, 843 A.2d

43. However, a plaintiff may not proceed if the complaint fails to allege essential elements

of the cause of action. See Potter, Prescott, Jamieson & Nelson P.A. v. Campbell, 1998 ME 70

,r,r 6-7, 708 A.2d 283.
On a 12(b)(6) motion the court can consider official public documents, documents

that are central to the plaintiffs claim, and documents referred to in the complaint, but

cannot otherwise consider materials outside of the complaint without converting the

motion into a motion for summary judgment. Moody v. State Liquor & Lottery Commission,

2004 ME 20 ,r 10.

In this case the court does not have to consider Dyer's Rule 12(b)(6) motion

because it concludes that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking.4

Jurisdiction

4On the issue of whether the complaint states a claim, Dyer has offered documents to rebut Sappi's
argument that Dias was not legally competent atthe time of the marriage. However, on a 12 (b) (6)
motion, the court is limited to the allegations in the complaint. In addition to Sappi's challenge to
whether Dias was legally competent to marry, Sappi also raises claims of equitable estoppel and
champerty. However, the complaint is devoid of any factual allegations to support a claim that
Sappi has relied to its detriment on misrepresentations by Dyer and is also devoid of any factual
allegations that Dyer has promised anything of value to someone in order to collect on a civil
action.

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In her motion Dyer has offered facts and offered documents beyond those alleged in
the complaint, but none of the additional facts she recites or the exhibits she has annexed
affect the issue of subject matter jurisdiction.

Dyer characterizes this cases as an action to annul the marriage, which can only be
brought by one of the parties to the marriage under 19-A M.R.S. § 752(1), which provides:

"When the validity of a marriage is doubted, either party may file a complaint for
annulment."

It appears that standing to bring an annulment action is limited to the marital

couple and to a guardian of an incompetent person seeking annulment on behalf of the

ward. Inhabitants of Winslow v. Inhabitants of Troy, 97 Me. 130, 132, 53 A. 1008, 1009
(1902); Knightv. Radomski, 414 A.2d 1211, 1213 (Me.1980). Even ifan annulment action

could be brought by a third party such as Sap pi, such an action could only be brought in the
District Court. 4 M.R.S. § 152(11).

However, Sappi's response is that this is not an annulment action but an action for a
declaratory judgment as to the validity of the marriage, which falls within the general

jurisdiction of the Superior Court rather than the exclusive jurisdiction of the District
Court. Sap pi cites the Inhabitants of Winslow case, which states that if one of the parties to

the marriage was of unsound mind and incapable of contracting marriage, the marriage is
void ab initio and "may be impeached collaterally." 97 Me, at 133.

The court would be reluctant to rely heavily on Inhabitants of Winslow and on
Inhabitants of St. George v. City of Biddeford, 79 Me. 593 (1885), which are antiquated cases

involving disputes between municipalities as to the validity of marriages affecting
residency for purposes of supplies given to paupers. However, Sappi cites recent cases

from other states, particularly McLeod v. Mudlaff {In re Estate of Laubenheimer), 2013 WI
76 ,r,r 5-6, 83-85, 833 N.W.2d 735, in which the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that
annulment is not the only avenue to void a marriage and that a court may issue a

declaratory judgment to declare that a marriage was void. That case involved a dispute

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over an estate in which relatives of the deceased challenged the validity of a marriage that
the deceased had entered into three months before her death, after she had suffered

several strokes and allegedly was too incapacitated to have been legally competent to
marry.

The court ultimately does not reach the issue of whether the Law Court would
follow Wisconsin's decision in McLeod v. Mudlaff because it concludes that it does not have

subject matter jurisdiction to decide issues relating to eligibility for workers compensation
benefits.

In the court's view, Dyer's entitlement to workers compensation benefits is an issue

for the Workers Compensation Board to decide. Whether she may seek benefits under the
statute depends on whether she qualifies as a dependent. 5 In. other contexts the Workers
Compensation Board has made the determination of whether a person claiming benefits

qualifies as a dependent, and those decisions are reviewable on appeal by the Law Court.

See, e.g., Gribben v. Central Maine Home Improvements, 2000 ME 124, 754 A.2d 350; Ladner

v. Mason Mitchell Trucking Co., 434 A.2d 37 (Me. 1981); Lavoie v. International Paper Co.,

403 A.2d 1186 (Me. 1979).6

A party's rights under the Workers Compensation Act are purely statutory. Lavoie v.

Gervais, 1998 ME 158 ,r 11, 713 A.2d 335. Nowhere in the Workers Compensation statute

is there any provision for the Superior Court to consider and rule on issues relating to

whether a party qualifies for workers compensation benefits. The only statutory provision
addressing judicial involvement with respect to workers compensation is the provision for
appeals to the Law Court from decisions of the Workers Compensation Board or the

Appellate Division of the Workers Compensation Board. 39-A M.R.S. § 322.

SIf Dyer was the rightful spouse of Dias atthe time of his death, she would be conclusively
presumed to have been wholly dependent on Dias's earnings for purposes of the workers
compensation law. 39-A M.R.S. § 102(8)(A).

6The Lavoie case was decided under a prior procedure in which decisions by the Workers
Compensation Commission resulted in proforma decrees entered in the Superior Court which were
then reviewable on appeal by the Law Court.

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Accordingly, this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over Sappi's claim

that Dyer does not qualify as Dias's dependent spouse. In Lavoie v. Gervais, 1998 ME 158 ,r

1, the Law Court stated that the Superior Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction of a
claim based on fraud in the context of a worker's compensation proceeding. The same

conclusion applies here. Just as this court would not have jurisdiction to consider a
declaratory judgment action seeking a determination whether a worker's compensation

claimant had been injured on the job, it does not have jurisdiction to consider whether any

particular claimant qualifies as a "dependent" within the meaning of 39-A M.R.S. § 102 (8).
The Workers Compensation Board can decide that it will consider Sappi's argument

that the marriage is invalid. If it does, either party can appeal an adverse decision on that

issue. If the Board declines to look beyond the marriage certificate, Sappi can appeal that

decision.
At oral argument on July 31, counsel for Sappi contended that its declaratory

judgment action is not addressed to whether Dyer is a dependent for purposes of workers

compensation but more generally to whether the marriage is invalid. The only reason this
matters to Sappi, however, is because of the potential workers compensation claim. In that
context, any declaratory judgment issued by this court would invade the exclusive

jurisdiction of the Workers Compensation Board.

The entry shall be:
The complaint is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The clerk is

directed to incorporate this order in the docket by reference pursuant to Rule 79(a).

Dated: August '2.. 2019

Thomas D. Warren
Justice, Superior Court

Entered on the Docket:~
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