Wood v. Maine Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT
ANDROSCOGGIN, ss. CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. AP-22-04

DANIEL WOOD,

Petitioner

V. DECISION AND ORDER

MAINE DEPARTMENT OF INLAND
FISHERIES AND WILDLIFE,

Respondent

The matter before the court is petitioner Daniel Wood's appeal ofa decision by the

Commissioner of the Maine Department oflnland Fisheries and Wildlife (the "Commissioner")

suspending his hunting and guide licenses, pursuant 5 M.R.S. § 11001-11007 and M.R. Civ. P.

80C.

Background

On January 6, 2022, Mr. Wood was convicted of Reckless Conduct, Class D, pursuant to

17-A M.R.S. § 221. (R. 14.) The conviction was based on Mr. Wood's conduct on November 22,

2018, when he shot and killed a deer that was within 100 yards of a residence from the side of

No Name Road in Lewiston, Maine. (R. 6, 19-20.) Mr. Wood pleaded to the charge, but the

Information and the judgment and commitment that Mr. Wood pleaded to did not contain any

reference to hunting.

Based on his conviction for Reckless Conduct, the Commissioner notified Mr. Wood on

January 25, 2022, that his hunting license was being suspended for 3 years, starting on January 6,

2022. (R. 1-2.) 12 M.R.S. § 10902(4)(A) provides that "[i]f a person holding a license or permit

under this chapter is convicted of the violation of any provision of Title 17-A while on a hunting

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or fishing trip or in the pursuit of wild animals, wild birds or fish, the commissioner shall revoke

the license or permit held by that person for a period of at least one year.... " § 10902(1) further

enables the Commissioner to exercise their discretion to impose a longer suspension. The

Commissioner based 1 year of this revocation on the mandatory revocation imposed by §

10902(4)(A) and added an additional 2-year discretionary revocation period. (R. 1-2.) On the

same date, the Commissioner notified Mr. Wood that his guide license would be revoked for 1

year, starting on January 25, 2022. (R. 4.)

Mr. Wood timely filed an administrative appeal of both revocations on February 21,

2022. (R. 37.) The Depaiiment held a hearing on the matter on April 27, 2022. (R. 38.) The

Commissioner reviewed the hearing record and issued a written decision on May 27, 2022,

upholding the suspension decisions. (R. 40-41.) Mr. Wood subsequently appealed to the Superior

Comi pursuant to 5 M.R.S. § 11001-11007 and M.R. Civ. P. 80C.

Standard

In Rule 80C appeals, the reviewing court "is limited to determining whether the [agency]

correctly applied the law and whether its fact findings are supported by competent evidence."

McPherson Timberlands v. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 1998 ME 177, ~ 6,714 A.2d 818. "An

administrative decision will be sustained if, on the basis of the entire record before it, the agency

could have fairly and reasonably found the facts as it did." Seider v. Bd. of Examiners of

Psychologists, 2000 ME 206, ~ 9,762 A.2d 551. The burden of proof is on the claimant to prove

that "no competent evidence supports the [agency's] decision and that the record compels a

contrary conclusion." Bischoffv. Bd. a/Trustees, 661 A.2d 1202, 1207-08 (Me. 1982). The court

may not substitute its judgment for the agency's simply because the evidence could give rise to

more than one result. See Dodd v. Sec. of State, 526 A .2d 583, 584 (Me. 1987).

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Discussion

Mr. Wood argues on appeal, as he did before the Department, that the statute does not

require a mandat01y suspension based on his conviction, which did not contain any references to

hunting or fishing. Further, Mr. Wood argues that if the statute were to be applied to him in spite

of the particulars of his plea, it is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The comi disagrees.

The due process clauses of the Maine and United States Constitutions require that a

statute "must provide reasonable and intelligible standards to guide the futme conduct of

individuals and to allow the courts and enforcement officials to effectuate the legislative intent in

applying these laws." State v. Peck, 2014 ME 74, 110, 93 A.3d 256 (quoting Shapiro Bros. Shoe

Co., Inc. v. Lewiston-Auburn Shoeworkers Protective Ass'n, 320 A.2d 247,253 (Me. 1974)). "A

statute may be void for vagueness when people of common intelligence must guess at its

meaning." State v. Witham, 2005 ME 79, 17, 876 A.2d 40. "In examining the sufficiency of

statutmy language, [o]bjective quantification, mathematical ce1iainty, and absolute precision are

not required." Id.

The statute's language is clear, "[i]f a person holding a license or permit under this

chapter is convicted of the violation of any provision of Title 17-A while on a hunting or fishing

trip or in the pursuit of wild animals, wild birds or fish, the commissioner shall revoke the

license or permit held by that person for a period of at least one year...." 12 M.R.S. §

10902(4)(A). The statute does not state that a person has to be convicted for a hunting or fishing

related crime or that his conviction must contain references to hunting or fishing related activity

to trigger a period of mandatory suspension. The statute's language is clear that whether a person

violated Title 17-A and whether the violation occurred in pursuit of wild animals, birds or fish

are separate findings. If the Commissioner finds that a violation of Title 17-A occurred while in

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pursuit of wild animals, birds, or fish, she is required to suspend the person's license for at least

one year. See State v. Conroy, 2020 ME 22, ,i 19, 225 A.3d 1011 (Maine courts look first to plain

language of statutes if doing so does not produce absurd, illogical, or inconsistent results). There

is nothing about the statute that would cause a person of common intelligence to be uncertain as

to its meaning.

Further, it is unambiguous that the statute does apply to Mr. Wood, as he has not disputed

that he was convicted of Reckless Conduct and that he was in pursuit of a deer when he engaged

in that conduct. His argument that the statute does not apply to him because the information and

judgment and commitment do not contain explicit references to hunting is unpersuasive in light

of the plain language of the statute.

Mr. Wood also suggests that the statute unconstitutionally delegates legislative authority

to the Commissioner. "[L ]egislation delegating discretionary authority to an administrative

agency is unconstitutional if it fails to contain standards sufficient to guide administrative

action." Uliano v. Bd. OfEnvtl. Prat., 2009 ME 89, ,i 15, 977 A.2d 400 (quotations omitted).

Vagueness and unlawful delegation are often raised simultaneously and treated as a single

inquiry. Id. The mandatory suspension provision provides clear standards guiding agency action.

Mr. Wood argues that even if the mandatory suspension of 1 year was appropriate, the

additional 3-year concurrent suspension of his hunting license and the 1-year suspension of his

guide license pursuant to the Commissioner's discretionary authority was not appropriate. Mr.

Wood argues that the discretionary authority of the Commissioner to impose suspensions is void

for vagueness or delegates too much authority to the Commissioner. Mr. Wood argues that the

record does not reveal who made the determination that a discretionary suspension was

warranted, how that decision was made, and what standards were applied in making the

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determination. In summary, Mr. Wood argues that the process created by the Depmtment is

arbitrary and inconsistently enforced against individuals.

The Law Comt has held that "in such cases in which the statutory enactment of detailed

specific standards is impossible, the presence of adequate procedural safeguards to protect

against an abuse of discretion by the administrators of the law[] compensates substantially for the

want of precise legislative guidelines and may be taken into consideration in resolving the

constitutionality of the delegation of power." Uliano, 2009 ME 89, ~ 15,977 A.2d 400 (citing

Finks v. Me. State Highway Comm 'n, 328 A.2d 791, 796 (Me. 1974)).

A person who has their license suspended under § 10902(4)(A) has the right to a hearing

upon written request. 12 M.R.S. § 10905. At that hearing, the Commissioner may reduce a

discretionary period of suspension if she finds that it would be in the best interests of justice to

do so. § 10905(2). The phrase "in the best interests of justice" is broad, but it does guide the

agency's discretion. It would not be possible for the Legislature to furnish detailed standards for

eve1y situation the Commissioner may be called upon to consider, as these cases are specific to

each individual. Thus, the procedural safeguards provided by the right to a hearing before the

Commissioner, and the subsequent right to appeal the Commissioner's decision to the Superior

Court, protects against potential abuses of discretion. Any concern with the fact that Mr. Wood

may not know who made the initial determination to suspend his license is remedied by the fact

that Mr. Wood has the chance to present evidence in his defense and appeal the Commissioner's

final decision to the Superior Court for review.

There is no constitutional problem with the suspension of Mr. Woods's guide license

either. Pursuant to 12 M.R.S. § 10908(1)(A), the Commissioner may suspend the license ofa

guide who fails to meet the competency sta11dards established by the Department by rule in

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accordance with 12 M.R.S. § 12851. The Law Court has been clear that agency promulgation of

rules like this is not an unconstitutional delegation of authority, as agency rulemaking comes

with the procedural protections of the Administrative Procedure Act. See Doane v. HHS, 2021

ME 28,122, 250 A.3d 1101. As for the period of the suspension, Mr. Wood's guide license

suspension is subject to the same procedural safeguards and standards as his hunting license

suspension. Neither process involves an unconstitutional delegation of authority.

Next, the court turns to the Commissioner's exercise of her discretion. There was ample

evidence for the Commissioner to make the factual findings she made. Mr. Wood objects to

several factual findings for a variety of reasons, but the narrative report from the game warden

who originally investigated Mr. Woods's conduct, included in the administrative record,

provides ample support for the findings that Mr. Wood fired his rifle within 10 feet of the

roadway and within 100 feet of a residence. (R. 19-20.) That report also supports the finding that

Mr. Wood parked his tiuclc in the roadway while taking the shot and fired in the direction of a

residence. (Id.) In light of these facts, it was not an abuse of discretion to suspend Mr. Wood's

hunting license for 3 years, and his guide license for 1 year. Mr. Wood has not met his heavy

burden to prove that "no competent evidence supports the [agency's l decision and that the record

compels a contrary conclusion." Bischoff, 661 A.2d at 1207-08. Similarly, Mr. Wood has

provided no evidence to suggest the decision of the Commissioner was motivated by bias against

him, as he suggests.

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The entry is

The decision of the Commissioner of the Maine
Department oflnland Fisheries and Wildlife is hereby
AFFIRMED.

The Clerk is directed to enter this order into the docket by
reference pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 79(a). / ---7;:;;:-· - -,\
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Date: November '.2J , 2022 A -7--- ! ......,~

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Harold Stewart, II
Justice, Superior Court

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