Gottwalt v. Phinney

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT

CUMBERLAND, ss. Civil Action
Docket No. AP-23-13

SAMANTHA GOTTWALT,

Plaintiff,
ORDER ON

v. SMALL CLAIMS APPEAL

KIMBERLY PHINNEY, d/b/a
LILAC CATERING AND
MIXOLOGY,

Defendant.

Before the court are Defendant-Appellant Kimberly Phinney d/b/a Lilac
Catering and Mixology’s (“Phinney”) appeal of a small claims judgment entered
against her in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee Samantha Gottwalt (“Gottwalt”) on
March 21, 2023 in the Portland District Court (Darvin, J.), and Phinney’s Motion
to Correct the Record. For the reasons discussed below, Appellant’s Motion to
Correct the Record is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part and Appellant’s
appeal is DENIED.

I. Motion to Correct the Record

Phinney has filed a Motion to Correct the Record to correct what she
contends are misstatements and errors contained within the District Court’s
Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (Def.’s Mot. Correct R.
1.) Although the Motion was filed on the same day as Phinney’s brief on her
small claims appeal, the Motion was docketed in the District Court’s docket

record. (id.) This Court first considers whether to address the Motion together

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with this appeal or whether the District Court should be the venue to rule on
the Motion.

Rule 76F(b) of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:

[ijf anything material to either party is omitted from the record on

appeal by error or accident or is misstated therein, ... the District

Court judge, either before or after the record is transmitted to the

Superior Court, or the Superior Court, on a proper suggestion or of

its own initiative, may direct that the omission or misstatement

shall be corrected.
M.R. Civ. P. 76F(b). The rule further provides that “if any difference arises as to
whether the record truly discloses what occurred, the difference shall be
submitted to and settled by the District Court judge and the record made to
conform to the truth.” Id. The purpose of this rule “is to ensure that the record
accurately reflects events that occurred during the hearing or trial, not to
provide an opportunity for retroactive alteration of those events.” Cf. U.S. Bank
Nat. Ass’n v. Curit, 2016 ME 17, 413, 131 A.3d 903 (quotation omitted)
(articulating the purpose of M.R. App. P 5(e) after observing the case law
regarding Rule 76F(b) and other predecessor and analogous rules). Rule 76F(b)
may not be used to introduce new evidence on appeal. Tisdale v. Rawson, 2003
ME 68, { 14, 822 A.2d 1136. “An appellate court must limit its review to the
record developed by the trial court.” Id. (quotation omitted).

Phinney identifies four alleged errors in the record she argues should be
corrected. This Court may correct the record on a proper suggestion or of its

own initiative. M.R. Civ. P. 76F(b). However, if this Court has any doubt as to

whether the record “truly discloses what occurred,” this Court must submit the
matter to the District Court judge to resolve. Id. This Court considers each
alleged error in turn.
a, Alleged Error 1

Phinney first argues that the District Court’s statement on page two of its
Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that plaintiff's
September 1, 2020 email included a “reduced selected menu” was an error
because the email contained selections for all of the food service items under
the contract and therefore the email did not contain any reductions in
selections of the menu. (Def.’s Mot. Correct R. 1-2.) Gottwalt’s Exhibit A, the
Event Catering Service Agreement, provides that Gottwalt was to choose three
appetizers, one salad, two main dishes, and two side dishes. (PI.’s Ex. A.} In the
referenced email, Gottwalt selected three appetizers, one salad, two main
dishes, and two side dishes, but told Phinney that the guest list would be
reduced from approximately 150 guests to between fifty and sixty guests. (Pl.’s
Ex, G.) The District Court’s full sentence reads as follows:

As part of the original acknowledgement of postponement, and in

anticipation of the first rescheduled November 7th wedding date,

plaintiff notified defendant in her email communication dated

9/1/2020 that she was reducing her expected guest list from the

prior estimate of “150-175” to “SO to 60” people, with a reduced

selected menu that still included a full catered meal.
(Suppl. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of L. 2.) The use of “reduced” in the
District Court’s Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law appears
to refer to the reduced number of guests, not menu category selections.

Regardless of what “reduced” is referring to, this part of the District Court’s

analysis is not material to the Superior Court’s analysis on appeal. See M.R.
Civ, P. 76F(b). With respect to alleged “Error 1,” Phinney’s Motion to Correct
the Record is DENIED.
b. Alleged Errors 2 and 3

Phinney next argues that the District Court’s statement on page two in
reference to a December 3, 2020 email from the defendant to the plaintiff, that
“(djefendant, without explanation, failed to respond for more than six months,
when she then finally sent an email on 7/20/21” contains two errors. (Def.’s
Mot. Correct R. 2.) First, Phinney argues that it was the plaintiff, not the
defendant, that failed to respond to the December 3, 2020 email. (Id.) Second,
Phinney argues that the District Court failed to recognize Gottwalt’s June 9,
2021 email to Phinney. (Id.)

After examining the District Court’s Supplemental Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and the relied upon exhibits, it is obvious to this Court
that “[djefendant, without explanation,” should be corrected to “Plaintiff,
without explanation .. .” because the District Court’s use of “defendant” was
an accidental misstatement. See M.R. Civ. P 76F(b). In context, it is clear that
Phinney could not be expected to respond to her own email, and Plaintiffs
Exhibit D shows that Phinney sent the December 3, 2020 email and Gottwalt
did not respond in the thread until over six months later. (Ex. D.) Therefore,
Phinney’s Motion with respect to “Error 2” is GRANTED.

Based on review of the relevant exhibits, it is also clear that Gottwalt did

respond to Phinney’s email on June 9, 2021, before she sent the July 20, 2021
email. (Exs, D, E.) Therefore, Phinney’s Motion with respect to “Error 3” is
GRANTED.

The record is ordered corrected to read as follows: “Plaintiff, without
explanation, failed to respond for more than six months, when she then finally
sent an email on June 09, 2021, informing Phinney that their original menu
picks “will be fine” and if Phinney could no longer offer those picks to just
choose something else as a replacement. Gottwalt again contacted Phinney on
July 20, 2021...”

c. Alleged Error 4

Phinney further argues that the District Court erred in its Supplemental
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in its statement that “[djefendant
seeks to rely on the ‘liquidated damages’ clause of the contract which allows
the defendant to retain the ‘50% deposit’ “ . . for any cancellations made”
because the contract had two liquidated damages clauses. (Def.’s Mot. Correct
R. 2-3.) Without having the transcript of the small claims hearing, this Court is
unable to evaluate whether this is a misstatement. Regardless of which
liquidated damages provision Phinney sought to rely on below, this sentence is
not material to the Superior Court’s analysis of the small claims appeal. See
M.R. Civ. P. 76F(b). Phinney’s Motion to Correct the Record with respect to
“Error 4” is DENIED,

Ik. Small Claims Appeal

a. Facts

The facts relevant to disposition of this appeal are as follows.
On October 9, 2018, Gottwalt and Phinney contracted for Phinney to
provide catering services for Gottwalt’s wedding, which was planned for May
16, 2020. (Suppl. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of L, 1.) The price of the
catering contract was estimated to be $9 000, and pursuant to the agreement,
Gottwalt paid a deposit of one half of the estimate, $4,500, at the time the
parties entered the catering contract. (Id.)

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, Gottwalt notified Phinney that the
wedding would need to be postponed to November 7, 2020, then again
postponed to September 19, 2021. (id. 1-2.} In anticipation of the November 7,
2020 wedding date, Gottwalt informed Phinney that she estimated her guest
list would be about fifty to sixty guests, rather than the original estimate of 150
to 175 guests. (Id. 2.)

After the second postponement, Phinney emailed Gottwalt on December
3, 2020 requesting an opportunity to review and revise the menu for the
postponed wedding on September 19, 2021. (Id.) Gottwalt did not respond to
this email for over six months. (Id.) When Gottwalt responded on June 9, 2021,
she directed Phinney to move forward with Gottwalt’s original menu choices of
to change the menu as Phinney saw fit if the original menu choices would not
be available for the September 19, 2021 date. (Ex. D,}

Gottwalt then contacted Phinney via email on July 20, 2021 seeking to
“touch base” and “tighten up details” for the upcoming September 19 wedding
date. (Suppl. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of L. 2.) On July 25, 2021, |

when Phinney had not responded to Gottwalt within five days, Gottwalt sent
another email stating that she was “freaked out” at the lack of Phinney’s
response to her July 20 communication. (Uid.; Ex. F.} On July 25, 2021, the
parties exchanged a series of emotionally laden and accusatory emails and the
communications and relationship between the parties quickly deteriorated.
(Suppl. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of L. 2.) During this exchange,
Gottwalt openly questioned whether or not she still wanted to do business with
Phinney, inquired about a full refund, and ultimately informed Phinney that
“fi]f you will not give us our money back we will continue to use you on a
limited basis and you will owe us money back.” (Id.; Ex. F.} Gottwalt then wrote
again and confirmed that “[mly husband and I decided we will use your
services for appetizers only” and that she expected a refund. (Suppl. Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of L. 2; Ex. F.)

Phinney responded that, “[a]s per our contract... there are no refunds
for cancellations within 90 days of the event, we consider a reduction in
services to be the same as a cancellation.” (Suppl. Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of L. 2; Ex. F.) Phinney further added that her company
“continue[d] to be ready and willing to provide you catering services for your
event. Please let me know what your decision is and menu desires are.” (Suppl.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of L. 2; Ex. F.)

Gottwalt’s fiancé, Josh Barber, then took up the correspondence and
communication on Gottwalt’s behalf and on August 4, 2021 presented Phinney
with a proposal to “offer one or two options to fulfill our contract.” (Suppl.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of L. 2; Ex. H.) Phinney could either “provide
approximately $1,000 of appetizers from the menu we had discussed to serve
our new guest list,” as Gottwalt and Barber had chosen to forgo the originally
planned dinner service, or Phinney could “[ajccept $1,000 from the existing
deposit... as an appreciation of your willingness to work with us.” (Suppl.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of L. 2; Ex. H.} Phinney responded via email
on August 9, 2021 that because Gottwalt had failed to provide a ninety-day
notice of cancellation, there are no refunds. (Suppl. Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of L. 2.) In this same correspondence, Phinney restated that her
company “continue[d] to be prepared to service [the] event” and requested
notification by September 1st of the couple’s final decision on whether or not to
move forward with Phinney’s catering services. (Suppl. Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of L. 2; Ex. H.)

Gottwalt’s counsel sent a letter to Phinney, dated August 25, 2021, in
which he expressed his legal opinion as to the enforceability and terms of the
original contract, but expressed a desire to “work with’ Phinney to provide
services at the September 21 wedding, including having Phinney “provide the
originally contemplated meal and beverage service but scaled to the actual
number of anticipated guests.” (Suppl. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of L.
2-3.) This letter was sent to Phinney’s prior business street address with no
follow up via email or other means, and Phinney did not receive the letter. (Jd.
3,} Gottwalt therefore “missed” the September 1 deadline set by Phinney, and
Phinney “missed” the September 7 deadline established by Gottwalt’s counsel

in his letter, Id.) Gottwalt then hired a different caterer to provide a sit-down
meal at the wedding for the reduced number of guests, spending approximately
$4 300 for the catering services. (/d.) Gottwalt then filed this small claims
action seeking full return of the $4,500 deposit paid to Phinney as well as
attorney’s fees and costs for an alleged violation of the Maine Unfair Trade

Practices Act. (Id.)

The District Court held a hearing on the small claims action on October
13, 2022 and entered judgment for Gottwalt on March 21, 2023. (Notice of J.)
With its Notice of Judgment, the District Court issued a Supplemental Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law in which it found that both parties breached
the contract. (Suppl. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of L. 5.) The District
Court awarded damages to Gottwalt in the amount of $3,500, representing the
$4 500 deposit less the $1,000 Gottwalt offered Phinney in recognition of
Phinney’s work prior to the wedding. (Id. 6.} The District Court also found that
Gottwalt failed to establish a claim under the Unfair Trade Practices Act and
therefore there was no basis to award her attorney’s fees. (/d.) Phinney timely
appealed the District Court’s judgment. (Notice of Small Claims Appeal.)

b, Standard of Review

“The Superior Court has specific but limited appellate authority in small
claims matters.” Cote v. Vallee, 2019 ME 156, ¢ 9, 218 A.3d 1148. When the
defendant appeals the district court’s decision and does not request a jury trial

de novo, the Superior Court’s review is limited to questions of law, and it has
no authority to make independent factual findings. M.R.S.C.P. 11(d)}(2); see
Taylor v. Walker, 2017 ME 218, J] 5-6, 10, 173 A.3d 539,
c. Discussion

On appeal, Phinney argues that the District Court erred as a matter of
law when it (1) failed to construe the intent of the parties based on the terms of
the written agreement; (2) failed to apply the “plain meaning” standard to the
phrase “menu changes;” (3} failed to include the whole instrument in its
analysis of the contract language; (4) rendered multiple provisions of the
contract meaningless; and (5) violated the basis tenets of contract law.
(Appellant’s Br. 2.) In essence, Phinney takes issue with the District Court’s
interpretation of the catering contract. Gottwalt argues that the District Court
did not err in finding the contract terms ambiguous and that its factual
determinations based on the contract’s ambiguities are not subject to review on
appeal and must be left undisturbed. (Appellee’s Br. 4.)

Contract interpretation, including whether the contract’s terms are
ambiguous, is a question of law reviewed de novo on appeal. InfoBridge, LLC v.
Chimani, Inc., 2020 ME 41, J 13, 228 A.3d 721. “Contract language is
ambiguous when it is reasonably susceptible of different interpretations.” Am.
Prot. Ins. Co. v. Acadia Ins. Co., 2003 ME 6, { 11, 814 A.2d 989 (quoting
Portland Valve, Inc. v. Rockwood Sys. Corp., 460 A.2d 1383, 1387 (Me. 1983)). If
this Court determines that the “contract is unambiguous, then its
interpretation is [] a question of law. On the other hand, if the contract is

ambiguous, then its interpretation is a question of fact for the factfinder, in

which case [this Court] review[s] the trial court’s conclusion for clear error.”
Brochu v. McLeod, 2016 ME 146, { 39, 148 A.3d 1220 (quoting Testa’s, Inc. v.
Coopersmith, 2014 ME 137, 4 11, 105 A.3d 1037}. When the contract is
ambiguous, “the trial court’s task is to ‘determine the intent of the parties in
entering [the] contract’ using extrinsic evidence, if appropriate.” Id. (quoting
Estate of Barrows, 2006 ME 143, § 13, 945 A.2d 1217), Ambiguous contract
agreements should be construed against the drafter. State v. Palmer, 2016 ME
120, { 14, 145 A.3d 561.

The District Court determined that “changes to the menu,” as used in the
contract, is ambiguous because reducing the menu to appetizers only could be
construed as a change to the menu and the contract fails to limit or define the
scope of what constitutes a change of menu. (Suppl. Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of L. 4-5.) The District Court further determined that the contract
fails to define cancellation or termination to include a “reduction in services.”
(id. 5.) The failure to include “reduction in services” within the definition of
termination or cancellation, combined with the contract’s provision allowing a
client to change the menu up to fourteen business days in advance of the
event, and the District Court’s determination that “changes to the menu” is
ambiguous led the District Court to conclude that Phinney breached the
contract by refusing to change the menu to appetizers only. (id.) The District
Court further concluded that Gottwalt also breached the contract by failing to

confirm the precise menu changes by the fourteen-day deadline. (Id.)
Phinney takes issue with the District Court’s contract interpretation on
four grounds: (1) the District Court failed to ascertain the parties’ intent by
failing to consider the whole document;! (2) the District Court failed to apply
the plain meaning of “menu change;” (3) the District Court’s interpretation
rendered several provisions of the contract meaningless; and (4) the District
Court “violated basic tenets of contract law” by adopting an interpretation that
allowed Gottwalt to unilaterally change the menu. This Court will address each
argument in turn,

1. The Parties’ Intent and the Whole Contract

Phinney first argues that the District Court failed to construe the
contract according to the intent of the parties. Phinney specifically contends
that the District Court failed to divine the parties’ intent from the fourth page
of the contract, which lists the food options for each course of the catered meal.
According to Phinney, the fourth page supplies the parties’ intent to enter into
a contract for a full catered meal and not a contract for $1,000 worth of
appetizers and the District Court’s failure to reference the intent of the parties
is unreasonable.

It is true that in Maine a contract should be “construed in accordance
with the intention of the parties, which is to be ascertained from an
examination of the whole instrument. All parts and clauses must be considered

together that it may be seen if and how one clause is explained, modified,

1 Phinney styles this point as two separate arguments but makes what amounts to the same
argument under each heading, therefore this Court will address this argument as one.
limited or controlled by the others.” Am. Prot. Ins. Co., 2003 ME 6,4 11, 814
A,2d 989 (quoting Peerless Ins. Co. v. Brennon, 564 A.2d 383, 384-85 (Me.
1989)). This rule applies when determining whether a contract is ambiguous.
Peerless Ins. Co., 564 A.2d at 384-85, The thrust of the rule directs courts to
resolve possible ambiguities with reference to other provisions of the contract
rather than taking contractual terms out of context.

As discussed above, this Court considers the issue of whether a contract
is ambiguous de novo. While the fourth page of the contract may provide some
insight into the parties’ intent in entering the catering contract, the fourth page
is not the exclusive source of the parties’ intent. Examining the whole
document reveals that the parties intended for Gottwalt to have the ability to
change the menu within fourteen business days of the event. (Ex. A, 7 9 (“The
Customer may notify the Caterer of desired changes to the menu up until
fourteen (14) business days before the event) [sic].”)} The menu change
provision conflicts with a later contract provision requiring “[a]ny amendment
or modification . . . or additional obligation” to be in writing signed by each
party to be binding. (See id., { 16.) The contract considered as a whole,
including the fourth page, is ambiguous as to the procedure and consequences
when the customer seeks to eliminate a category of menu offerings or reduce
the catering services. As the District Court observed, “changes to the menu” is
not defined, nor does the contract define “cancellation” or “termination” to

include a reduction in services.
This Court finds that the contract is ambiguous on the issue of menu
changes and whether a reduction in services is a menu change within the
meaning of the contract. Having found that the contract is ambiguous, this
Court must leave the factfinder’s interpretation of the contract undisturbed
unless its interpretation was clearly erroneous. Brochu, 2016 ME 146, 4 39,
148 A.3d 1220 (quoting Testa’s, Inc., 2014 ME 137, { 11, 105 A.3d 1037}. This
Court finds no clear error in the manner that the District Court interpreted the
contract and the parties’ intent. Contrary to Phinney’s argument that the
District Court failed to consider the whole contract, it is clear from the District
Court’s Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that the District
Court did in fact consider the contract as a whole. For example, the District
Court noted that the provision of the contract allowing the customer fourteen
days to make changes to the menu could be read to conflict with the clause
requiring any amendment or modification to the contract to be evidenced by a
mutual agreement in writing. (Suppl. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of L. 5
& n.11.) It was not clear error for the District Court to construe ambiguities
against Phinney, as the drafter of the contract, who had the ability to eliminate
these ambiguities but did not do so. See Palmer, 2016 ME 120, J 14, 145 A.3d
561.

2. Plain Meaning and “Menu Change”

Phinney argues that “menu change” plainly means swapping one food
item for another, not eliminating groups of food entirely, and therefore “menu

change” is unambiguous. It is self-evident to this Court that reducing a
catering menu from a full meal to appetizers only would change the menu.
Menu change could also mean simply changing one offered appetizer to
another appetizer option. Because “changes to the menu” is reasonably
susceptible to more than one interpretation, this Court agrees with the District
Court’s conclusion that the contract is ambiguous as to what constitutes a
menu change. See Am. Prot. Ins. Co., 2003 ME 6, q11, 814 A.2d 989 (quotation
omitted), This Court does not find the District Court’s conclusion that menu
changes include reducing the planned courses to appetizers only to be clear
error.

3, Contract Provisions Rendered Meaningless

Phinney contends that the District Court’s interpretation of the contract
rendered other provisions of the contract meaningless and therefore it’s
interpretation of the contract was unreasonable. Specifically, Phinney argues
that the District Court’s interpretation allowing the customer to unilaterally
cancel most of the menu items rendered meaningless: (1) the first paragraph of
the contract wherein the customer agrees to engage the caterer to cook the
“agreed menu;” (2) paragraph five of the contract requiring the parties to “do
everything necessary to ensure that the terms of this Agreement take effect,” (3)
paragraph sixteen requiring any amendment or modification to be agreed to in
writing by both parties; (4) paragraph eleven’s fifty percent non-refundable
deposit clause; and (5) paragraphs three and twelve’s liquidated damages

clauses for cancellations made within ninety days of the event.

While courts “seek to give effect to the plain meaning of the words used
in the contract and avoid rendering any part meaningless,” if there is “an
ambiguity that cannot be resolved from the four corners of the document, the
interpretation of the ambiguous language becomes a question for the fact-
finder to resolve by taking extrinsic evidence.” Dow v, Billing, 2020 ME 10, ¥
14, 224 A.3d 244. An interpretation that renders portions of a contract
redundant and superfluous is unreasonable when the contract is
unambiguous and not reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation.
See id. Jf 14, 22.

As established above, the catering contract is ambiguous as to what the
procedures and consequences are when the customer seeks to eliminate
groups of food offerings from the menu. The District Court’s analysis does not
render “agreed menu” meaningless because “agreed menu” could mean the
menu agreed upon with the customer’s changes, which appears to be allowed
by the clause of the contract allowing the customer to make changes within
fourteen business days of the event. The provision requiring amendments and
modifications to be agreed upon in writing is in conflict with the menu change
provision. In light of these ambiguities, there was not only one reasonable,
unambiguous interpretation of the contract that would give effect to both
provisions. In light of the ambiguous contract, the District Court’s conclusions,
as the fact-finder, are not clearly erroneous. Phinney appears to concede that
the District Court’s interpretation of the non-refundable deposit provision

which allows a reimbursement of unused funds is correct because Phinney
admits that the value of the contract, before the proposed change to $1,000 of
appetizers, was reduced to $4,320 due to the reduced size of the guest list,
which is less than the $4,500 deposit paid. (See Appellant’s Br. 5 n.4.) The
District Court’s interpretation of the contract does not render deposit provision,
cancellation provisions, and “everything necessary” provision meaningless
simply because the District Court did not apply them in this situation. In other
circumstances, those provisions may have applied.

4. “Basic Tenets of Contract Law”

Without citation to authority, Phinney finally argues that Gottwalt should
not have been able to unilaterally change the contract and the District Court's
judgment condoned that behavior. Generally, both parties must agree toa
contract modification. See Roy v. Danis, 553 A.2d 663, 664 (Me. 1989)
(“Although any contract may be modified by a subsequent agreement, the new
agreement must comply with the requirements of a valid contract.”), However,
both Gottwalt and Phinney agreed to this contract which appears to allow
Gottwalt, as the customer, the unilateral right to change the menu or to
“reschedule the catering services to another date or event.” (Ex. A, J 11.) As
discussed at length above, this contract is ambiguous, It was not clear error for
the District Court to construe the ambiguities against the drafter, who is in
control of the language of the agreement. See Barrett v. McDonald Invs., Inc.,

2005 ME 43, 77 17-18, 870 A.2d 146.
Phinney also takes issue with the District Court’s award of damages.
This Court first notes that the District Court found both parties te be in
breach, and the judgment for Gottwalt represented a reimbursement for her
overpayment, not an award for her breach. Phinney argues that the $1,000
offset was not a sufficient measure of her damages for her financial losses.

The valuation of damages is a question of fact. Tobin v. Barter, 2014 ME
51, 4 10, 89 A.3d 1088 (quoting Down E. Energy Corp. v. RMR, Inc., 1997 ME
148, | 7, 697 A.2d 417). Damages must be proven to a reasonable certainty.
Merrill Trust Co. v. State, 417 A.2d 435, 440 (Me. 1980). Appellate review of
damages is for clear error and damages awards should be affirmed as long as
there is any competent evidence in the record supporting the award. Brown v.
Compass Harbor Vill. Condo. Ass'n, 2020 ME 44, 229 A.3d 158.

Here, the District Court specifically noted that Phinney provided little
evidence on the issue of damages, with only generalized references to costs
incurred but no specific documentation or calculation of her damages. (Suppl.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of L. 6.) The District Court based its
calculation of Phinney’s damages on Gottwalt’s recognition and quantification
of Phinney’s work in the amount of $1,000. (id.) This measure of damages is
supported in the record, (Ex. H.), therefore this Court affirms the District

Court’s calculation of damages.

2 Phinney argues on appeal that this Court should adopt her interpretation of the contract
because Gottwalt’s interpretation of the contract was made in bad faith. The District Court did
not make a factual finding that Gottwalt acted in bad faith and this Court, on appeal, has no
authority to make independent factual findings. Taylor, 2017 ME 218, { 6, 173 A.3d 539. This
Court will not adopt Phinney’s interpretation on the basis of bad faith in the absence of a
factual finding of bad faith.
For the reasons discussed above, Phinney’s small claims appeal is
DENIED and the District Court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. Phinney’s Motion to
Correct the Record is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

Ill. Order

Accordingly, it is hereby ordered and the entry shall be: “J udgment of the
District Court is AFFIRMED.”

On page 2, paragraph 2 of the District Court’s Supplemental Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, the language “Defendant, without explanation,
failed to respond for more than six months, when she finally sent an email on”
is STRICKEN from the record and replaced with the following language:
“Plaintiff, without explanation, failed to respond for more than six months,
when she then finally sent an email on June 09, 2021, informing Phinney that
their original menu picks “will be fine” and if Phinney could no longer offer
those picks to just choose something else as a replacement, Gottwalt again
contacted Phinney on... .”

The clerk may enter this Order on the docket by reference pursuant to

M.R. Civ. P. 79{a).

SO ORDERED. Y
Dated Septem 19 oes KO

Deborah P. Cashman
Justice, Superior Court

Entered on the Docket: 02 2023 /