Kimberly A. Quinty v. Steven W. Johnson — 2017 ME 117

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 	Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 	2017 ME 117
Docket: 	Yor-16-482
Submitted
On Briefs: May 25, 2017
Decided: 	June 8, 2017
Panel: 	SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
KIMBERLY A. QUINTY
v.
STEVEN W. JOHNSON
ALEXANDER, J.
[¶1] Kimberly A. Quinty appeals from the judgment of the District Court
(York, Janelle, J.) granting Steven W. Johnson’s motion to dismiss her motion
to 	extend 	the 	spousal 	support 	provision 	of 	the 	couple’s 	2011 	divorce
judgment. 	Quinty argues on appeal that the court misapplied 19-A M.R.S.
§ 951-A(4) and (9) (2016) when it concluded that reinstating the award of
spousal support after the obligation to pay spousal support had expired was
prohibited by law. We affirm the judgment.
I. CASE HISTORY
[¶2] Quinty and Johnson were married in 1991. After eighteen years of
marriage, Quinty filed a complaint for divorce from Johnson in 2010. 	On
March 9, 2011, after an uncontested hearing, the parties were divorced by

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entry of a divorce judgment (Cantara, J.), which incorporated the parties’
negotiated settlement agreement, dated February 24, 2011. 	Pursuant to that
agreement, Johnson was ordered to pay Quinty general spousal support for a
period of five years, beginning on March 1, 2011, and ending with a final
payment on February 29, 2016.
[¶3] 	On July 8, 2016, Quinty filed a motion to modify the divorce
judgment to reinstate and to extend the term of the spousal support obligation
pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(4). 	Johnson timely filed a motion to dismiss,
arguing that Quinty’s motion failed to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. 	See M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 	Johnson asserted that when his spousal
support 	obligation 	terminated 	on 	February 29, 2016, 	Quinty’s 	ability 	to
request a modification expired. 	Quinty objected to Johnson’s motion to
dismiss, arguing that the divorce judgment did not expressly terminate the
court’s authority to modify the spousal support award.
[¶4] 	On 	September 	23, 	2016, 	the 	court 	(Janelle, 	J.) 	held 	a
non-testimonial hearing on 	the motion 	to dismiss and 	issued an order
granting the motion that day. 	Citing 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(9) and Pettinelli v.
Yost, 2007 ME 121, ¶ 19, 930 A.2d 1074, the court concluded that Johnson’s
obligation to pay spousal support had ceased on February 29, 2016, and that

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Quinty’s “belated attempt to reinstate spousal support” was barred by both
statute and case law. 	Quinty timely filed a notice of appeal. 	See 14 M.R.S.
§ 1901 (2016); M.R. App. P. 2.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
[¶5] 	When we review a trial court’s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss, we review the legal sufficiency of the pleading de novo and view the
pleading 	in the light most favorable to the 	party filing the pleading 	to
determine whether it sets forth elements of a cause of action or alleges facts
that 	would 	entitle 	that 	party 	to 	relief 	pursuant 	to 	some 	legal 	theory.
See Andrews v. Sheepscot Island Co., 2016 ME 68, ¶ 8, 138 A.3d 1197.
[¶6] 	A court may award spousal support to a party in a divorce
proceeding pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A (2016). 	For a spousal support
award issued before October 1, 2013, section 951-A(4) provides: “An award of
spousal support issued before October 1, 2013[,] is subject to modification
when it appears that justice requires unless and to the extent the order
awarding or modifying spousal support expressly states that the award, in
whole or in part, is not subject to future modification.” 	However, “[t]he
complete termination of a spousal support award pursuant to the terms of the

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award or a final post-judgment order forever precludes the reinstatement of
spousal support in that action.” Id. § 951-A(9).
[¶7] The terms of the parties’ settlement agreement, incorporated into
the divorce judgment, 	specified that 	Johnson’s 	five-year 	spousal support
obligation terminated on February 29, 2016. 	Quinty filed her motion to
modify four months after that obligation had expired. 	The court correctly
concluded that its authority to reinstate the spousal support award had
ceased, and, therefore, that Quinty’s untimely motion failed to allege facts that
would entitle her to relief pursuant to some legal theory. 	See Pettinelli,
2007 ME 121, ¶ 19, 930 A.2d 1074; 	Raisen v. Raisen, 2006 ME 49, ¶ 8,
896 A.2d 268 (stating that a party who was awarded general spousal support
for a fixed term of five years could request an extension of spousal support “by
timely motion”); 	Spencer v. Spencer, 1998 ME 252, ¶ 12, 720 A.2d 1159
(“Because the court cannot alter or amend that which does not exist, a motion
to reestablish an award of spousal support cannot be entertained by a court
after the date of complete termination of an outstanding award.”).
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.

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Dana E. Prescott, Esq., Prescott Jamieson Murphy Law Group, LLC, Saco, for
appellant Kimberly A. Quinty
Amy T. Robidas, Esq., Robidas Law, LLC, Portland, for appellee Steven W.
Johnson
York District Court docket number FM-2010-126
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY