State v. Sutton -- supplemental opinion

James to pay $11,000 to be distributed to Cindy. With such pay-
ment, Cindy will have received $5,060.52 of the marital estate,
and James’ share will be reduced to $9,872.48.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Cindy a further pretrial conference or a settlement
conference, in the factual findings it made in the decree, or in
declining to recuse itself. However, we conclude that the court
erred in finding Cindy’s lump-sum Social Security disability
award to be a marital asset subject to division. We therefore
modify the court’s decree to equitably divide the marital estate
after eliminating from the marital estate the $27,000 in Social
Security disability benefits traceable to the modular home.
A ffirmed As modified .
stAte of nebrAsKA, Appellee , v .
W illiAm p. sutton , AppellAnt .
741 N.W.2d 713
Filed January 2, 2008. 	No. A-06-1297.
supplementAl opinion
Appeal from the District Court for Sheridan County: pAul d.
empson, Judge. Supplemental opinion: Former opinion modi-
fied. Motion for rehearing overruled.
Paul Wess for appellant.
Jon 	Bruning, 	Attorney 	general, 	and 	george 	R. 	Love
for appellee.
sievers , CArlson, and CAssel, Judges.
per C uriAm .
This matter is before the court upon the motion for rehear-
ing of the State regarding our opinion in State v. Sutton, ante
p. 185, 741 N.W.2d 713 (2007). While we overrule the motion
for rehearing, we modify our opinion as follows:
STATe v. SUTTON 	287
Cite as 16 Neb. App. 287
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:17 AM CST

In that portion of the opinion designated the “Analysis,” we
strike the following language from the opinion, id. at 193, 741
N.W.2d at 721:
[15] Intent is not an element of first degree sexual
assault as defined by § 28-319, one of the offenses with
which Sutton was charged. See State v. Sanchez, 257 Neb.
291, 597 N.W.2d 361 (1999). Intent, however, must be
proved with respect to the second degree assault charge.
We replace the stricken language with the following:
[15] First degree sexual assault under § 28-319(1)(a)
is a general intent crime. State v. Koperski, 254 Neb.
624, 578 N.W.2d 837 (1998). Intent must be proven with
respect to the second degree assault charge.
We also withdraw the language of syllabus point 15, and we
replace it with the following:
Sexual Assault: Intent. First degree sexual assault under
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-319(1)(a) (Reissue 1995) is a general
intent crime.
The remainder of the opinion shall remain unmodified.
former opinion modified .
motion for reheAring overruled .
288 	16 NeBRASkA APPeLLATe RePORTS