Stoetzel v. Neth

268 Neb. 660, 686 N.W.2d 582 (2004); State v. Atchison, 15
Neb. App. 422, 730 N.W.2d 115 (2007). An abuse of discretion
occurs when a sentencing court’s reasons or rulings are clearly
untenable and unfairly deprive the litigant of a substantial right
and a just result. Id. In considering a sentence to be imposed,
the sentencing court is not limited in its discretion to any
mathematically applied set of factors. State v. Griffin, 270
Neb. 578, 705 N.W.2d 51 (2005); State v. Atchison, supra. The
appropriateness of a sentence is necessarily a subjective judg-
ment and includes the sentencing judge’s observation of the
defendant’s demeanor and attitude and all the facts and circum-
stances surrounding the defendant’s life. Id.
Here, the trial court sentenced Petersen to incarceration of
3 to 5 years. A violation of § 28-320.02 is a Class IIIA felony,
punishable by up to 5 years’ imprisonment, a $10,000 fine, or
both. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-105 (Cum. Supp. 2006). Petersen’s
sentence is within the statutory limits. Further, the record con-
tains no indication that the trial court abused its discretion. We
conclude that Petersen’s sentence is not excessive.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that Sarpy County was a proper venue in which
to conduct Petersen’s trial, that there is sufficient evidence to
convict Petersen of enticement of a child for sexual purposes
through the use of a computer, that his motion to continue
sentencing and request for a new PSI was properly overruled,
and that his sentence is not excessive. Accordingly, Petersen’s
conviction and sentence are affirmed.
A ffirmed .
mArk A. S toetzel , Appellee , v . B everly N eth , director ,
depArtmeNt of motor vehicleS of the
S tAte of N eBrASkA, AppellANt .
744 N.W.2d 465
Filed January 29, 2008. 	No. A-06-678.
1. Administrative Law: Drunk Driving: Licenses and Permits: Revocation:
Blood, Breath, and Urine Tests. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-498.01(5)(a) (Reissue
348 	16 NebRASkA APPeLLATe RePORTS
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:15 AM CST

2004) requires that a sworn report include the date the officer received the blood
test results.
2. Administrative Law: Drunk Driving: Licenses and Permits: Revocation:
Jurisdiction. The test to determine whether an omission on a sworn report is
a jurisdictional defect rather than a technical one should be whether, notwith-
standing the omission, the sworn report conveys the information required by the
applicable statute.
3. Administrative Law: Drunk Driving: Licenses and Permits: Revocation:
Words and Phrases. A sworn report in an administrative license revocation pro-
ceeding is, by definition, an affidavit.
4. Affidavits: Words and Phrases. An affidavit is a written or printed declaration
or statement of facts, made voluntarily, and confirmed by the oath or affirmation
of the party making it, taken before a person having authority to administer such
oath or affirmation.
5. Affidavits: Proof. An affidavit must bear on its face, by the certificate of the
officer before whom it is taken, evidence that it was duly sworn to by the party
making the same.
6. Public Officers and Employees: Records. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 64-107 (Reissue
2003) mandates that a properly notarized document contain both the notary’s
signature and seal.
7. Administrative Law: Drunk Driving: Licenses and Permits: Revocation:
Time: Jurisdiction. The 10-day time period for submitting a sworn report under
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-498.01(5)(a) (Reissue 2004) is mandatory, and if the sworn
report is submitted after the 10-day period, the Department of Motor Vehicles
lacks jurisdiction to revoke a person’s driver’s license.
Appeal from the District Court for buffalo County: J ohN p.
iceNogle, Judge. Affirmed.
Jon 	bruning, 	Attorney 	General, 	Laura 	L. 	Neesen, 	and
kevin J. edwards for appellant.
Greg C. Harris for appellee.
irwiN, S ieverS, and moore, Judges.
irwiN, Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
The director of the Nebraska Department of Motor Vehicles
(the Department) appeals the judgment of the district court
which reversed an order of the Department revoking Mark A.
Stoetzel’s driver’s license. After our review of the record, we
find that a properly completed sworn report was not timely
received by the Department and that, as a result, the Department
did not have jurisdiction to revoke Stoetzel’s driver’s license.
We affirm the decision of the district court.
STOeTzeL v. NeTH 	349
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II. bACkGROUND
We limit our recitation of facts to those relevant to the nar-
row issue presented. On February 18, 2006, an officer with the
buffalo County sheriff’s office arrested Stoetzel for driving
under the influence of alcohol. Upon Stoetzel’s arrest, Sgt.
Wyatt Hoagland transported him to a hospital, where Stoetzel
submitted to a blood test. The blood test was then sent to a
laboratory to determine Stoetzel’s blood alcohol content.
On March 2, 2006, Sergeant Hoagland received the results
of the blood test. The test results indicated that Stoetzel had
a blood alcohol content of .19 of a gram of alcohol per 100
milliliters of blood. After receiving the test results, the sergeant
completed the “Notice/Sworn Report/Temporary License” form
(sworn report) and forwarded it to the Department.
On March 6, 2006, the Department received the sworn report.
However, the sworn report did not indicate the date that Sergeant
Hoagland had received the blood test results. The Department
returned the report to the sergeant, requesting that he provide
the omitted information.
On March 7, 2006, the Department sent Stoetzel a “Notice
of Administrative 	License 	Revocation 	Temporary 	License.”
In 	response 	to 	this 	notice, 	Stoetzel 	timely 	requested 	an
administrative hearing.
On March 17, 2006, the Department received an amended
sworn report from Sergeant Hoagland. The amended report was
the same sworn report the Department received on March 6, but
it had been altered to include the date the sergeant received the
blood test results (“3-2-06”).
On March 31, 2006, an administrative license revocation
(ALR) hearing was held. At the hearing, Stoetzel objected
to the admissibility of the sworn report. Stoetzel argued that
pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-498.01(5)(a) (Reissue 2004),
the sworn report was not timely received by the Department,
because a properly completed sworn report was not received
until March 17, which was more than 10 days after the ser-
geant had received the results of the blood test. The hearing
officer overruled this objection and allowed the sworn report
into evidence.
350 	16 NebRASkA APPeLLATe RePORTS

After the conclusion of the ALR hearing, the director of the
Department revoked Stoetzel’s operator’s license and privi-
lege to operate a motor vehicle in the State of Nebraska for
a period of 1 year. Stoetzel challenged the revocation in the
district court.
On May 17, 2006, a hearing was held in district court. At the
hearing, Stoetzel again argued, inter alia, that the Department
did not receive a timely submitted sworn report. Stoetzel
further argued that as a result of the Department’s failure to
receive a timely submitted sworn report, it lacked jurisdiction
to revoke Stoetzel’s driver’s license. The district court found
that a properly completed sworn report was not received by the
Department until more than 10 days after the sergeant received
the blood test results and that the Department lacked jurisdiction
to revoke Stoetzel’s driver’s license. As such, the court reversed
the Department’s revocation of Stoetzel’s driver’s license.
The Department timely appeals.
III. ASSIGNMeNTS OF eRROR
On appeal, the Department alleges that the district court
erred in determining that a properly completed sworn report
was not timely submitted to the Department and in conclud-
ing that as a result of the untimely submission of the sworn
report, the Department lacked jurisdiction to revoke Stoetzel’s
driver’s license.
IV. ANALYSIS
1. S tANdArd of review
A judgment or final order rendered by a district court in a
judicial review pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act
may be reversed, vacated, or modified by an appellate court
for errors appearing on the record. Robbins v. Neth, 273 Neb.
115, 728 N.W.2d 109 (2007). When reviewing an order of the
district court under the Administrative Procedure Act for errors
appearing on the record, the inquiry is whether the decision
conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and
is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable. Id. Whether a
decision conforms to the law is by definition a question of law,
STOeTzeL v. NeTH 	351
Cite as 16 Neb. App. 348

in connection with which an appellate court reaches a conclu-
sion independent of that reached by the lower court. Id.
Interpretation of statutes presents a question of law, and an
appellate court is obligated to reach an independent conclu-
sion, irrespective of the decision made by the court below,
with deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regula-
tions, unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent. Morrissey v.
Department of Motor Vehicles, 264 Neb. 456, 647 N.W.2d 644
(2002), disapproved on other grounds, Hahn v. Neth, 270 Neb.
164, 699 N.W.2d 32 (2005); Scott v. State, 13 Neb. App. 867,
703 N.W.2d 266 (2005).
2. UNtimely SUBmiSSioN of S worN report
The Department first asserts that the district court erred in
determining that a properly completed sworn report was not
timely submitted to the Department. The Department alleges
that it received a properly completed sworn report within 10
days after Sergeant Hoagland, as the arresting officer, obtained
the results of the blood test, pursuant to § 60-498.01(5)(a).
We disagree.
[1] While the Department did receive a sworn report within
10 days after the arresting officer obtained the blood test
results, the officer omitted from this report the date that he
obtained the blood test results. We hold that § 60-498.01(5)(a)
requires that a sworn report include the date the officer received
the blood test results. We hold this because without this infor-
mation as a requirement of the sworn report, there is no way
for the Department to determine, in any given case, whether
the officer in fact submitted the sworn report within 10 days
after obtaining the blood test results. Therefore, we find that
the initial sworn report was not properly completed and was not
sufficient to confer authority on the Department to begin license
revocation proceedings.
The Department did not receive an amended report which
included the date the arresting officer obtained the blood test
results until 15 days after the officer had obtained the blood
test results. Section 60-498.01(5)(a) requires that the arrest-
ing officer submit the sworn report to the Department within
10 days after obtaining the blood test results. As a result, the
352 	16 NebRASkA APPeLLATe RePORTS

amended report was untimely, since it was not received by the
Department within 10 days of the date the officer received the
blood test results.
Furthermore, as we will discuss more fully in the following
section of the analysis, the amended report did not constitute a
“sworn report” as required by § 60-498.01(5)(a), because the
change to the report was not properly notarized.
(a) March 6, 2006, Sworn Report
In an ALR proceeding, if the Department can establish that
the arresting officer provided a sworn report containing the reci-
tations required by the applicable statute, it has made a prima
facie case for license revocation, and the director is not required
to prove that the recitations contained in the sworn report are
true. See Hahn v. Neth, supra. because of the significant weight
given to the sworn report in an ALR proceeding, it is essential
that the report is properly completed. See id.
[2] In Hahn v. Neth, 270 Neb. 164, 699 N.W.2d 32 (2005),
the Nebraska Supreme Court examined the issue of whether an
incomplete sworn report was sufficient to confer authority on
the director of the Department to revoke a motorist’s operator’s
license. The court concluded that the test to determine whether
an omission on a sworn report is a jurisdictional defect rather
than a technical one “should be whether, notwithstanding the
omission, the sworn report conveys the information required by
the applicable statute.” Id. at 171, 699 N.W.2d at 38.
In the instant case, the record reveals that Stoetzel was
arrested for driving under the influence on February 18, 2006.
Subsequent to his arrest, he submitted to a blood test. This
blood test was sent to a laboratory for analysis, and the results
of the test were therefore not immediately available.
The arresting officer received the results of Stoetzel’s blood
test on March 2, 2006. The officer submitted a report to the
Department on March 6, approximately 4 days after he received
the blood test results. However, the officer neglected to com-
plete the portion of the form which asked when he received the
results of the blood test from the laboratory.
Section 60-498.01(5)(a) provides the procedural steps for
revoking a person’s license when, like Stoetzel, the person
STOeTzeL v. NeTH 	353
Cite as 16 Neb. App. 348

submitted to a blood test, but the results of that blood test were
not available while the person was still in custody. Section
60-498.01(5)(a) states:
If the results of a chemical test indicate the presence of
alcohol in a concentration specified in section 60-6,196,
the results are not available to the arresting peace officer
while the arrested person is in custody, and the notice of
revocation has not been served as required by subsection
(4) of this section, the peace officer shall forward to the
director a sworn report containing the information pre-
scribed by subsection (3) of this section within ten days
after receipt of the results of the chemical test. If the
sworn report is not received within ten days, the revoca-
tion shall not take effect.
Pursuant to the Nebraska Supreme Court’s decision in Hahn,
we must determine whether the original report submitted to
the Department on March 6, 2006, conveyed the information
required by § 60-498.01(5)(a) in order to decide whether or
not the Department received a properly completed and timely
submitted sworn report. If the March 6 sworn report lacked
information mandated by statute, it could not confer authority
on the Department to revoke Stoetzel’s driver’s license.
The Department argues that the March 6, 2006, report was
properly completed and timely filed. In making its argument,
the Department cites to the language of § 60-498.01(5)(a) which
requires the arresting officer to complete a sworn report con-
taining the information prescribed by § 60-498.01(3). Section
60-498.01(3) requires the following information to be in a
sworn report: (a) that a person was arrested as described in
subsection (2) of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6,197 (Reissue 2004) and
the reasons for such arrest, (b) that the person was requested to
submit to the required test, (c) that the person submitted to the
test, and (d) the type of test to which he or she submitted and
the results of the test.
The Department contends that the arresting officer supplied
all of the necessary information required by § 60-498.01(3) and
that, as such, the original report was sufficient to confer author-
ity to revoke Stoetzel’s driver’s license. The Department further
asserts that the date the arresting officer received the blood
354 	16 NebRASkA APPeLLATe RePORTS

test results is not statutorily required by the language of either
§ 60-498.01(3) or (5)(a). We disagree.
While the statutory language of § 60-498.01(5)(a) does not
explicitly require on the sworn report the inclusion of the date
the arresting officer received the blood test results, the language
does state that revocation proceedings shall not take effect if the
report is received more than 10 days after the officer receives
the test results. Implicit in the statutory language, then, is that
the Department must know when the officer received the test
results in order to know if it has authority to begin license revo-
cation proceedings. because the officer omitted this information
from the March 6, 2006, report, the Department did not know,
and could not have known, whether or not it had the authority to
institute revocation proceedings. As a result, the March 6 sworn
report did not convey all of the statutorily required informa-
tion and did not confer authority on the Department to revoke
Stoetzel’s driver’s license.
We also note that the Department provides the sworn report
to arresting officers and that such form is designed to facilitate
the accurate completion of the sworn report. The sworn report
filled out by the arresting officer in this case provided space for
the officer to indicate the date he received Stoetzel’s blood test
results. A box, located next to the space asking for the blood test
results, contains the preprinted phrase “Date blood Test Results
Received:” and space for the officer to fill in the relevant date.
The arresting officer left this box blank when he first submitted
the report to the Department on March 6, 2006.
We digress for a moment to point out that the district
court based its reversal of the Department’s decision to revoke
Stoetzel’s driver’s license on its finding that the arresting officer
incorrectly completed the March 6, 2006, report when he stated
that Stoetzel failed a breath test rather than a blood test. The
district court found that this was not a “technical error” and that,
as a result, the March 6 report was not properly completed.
However, the record indicates that the arresting officer made
this change prior to the first submission of the report on March
6, 2006. both the March 6 report and the March 17 report
reveal that the officer initially marked a box to indicate that
Stoetzel failed a breath test. The officer then crossed out this
STOeTzeL v. NeTH 	355
Cite as 16 Neb. App. 348

marking, initialed next to the change, and marked a box to
indicate that Stoetzel had, in fact, failed a blood test. because
this change was present on the March 6 report, it did not affect
a determination of whether or not the March 6 report was prop-
erly completed. However, based on our discussion above, the
district court reached the correct result, albeit for the wrong
reason, when it found that the March 6 sworn report was not
properly completed and, thus, was not timely filed. A proper
result will not be reversed merely because it was reached for
the wrong reason. In re Trust Created by Cease, 267 Neb. 753,
677 N.W.2d 495 (2004).
We find that the March 6, 2006, report was not properly
completed and was not sufficient to confer authority on the
Department to revoke Stoetzel’s driver’s license, because the
arresting officer omitted the date he obtained the blood test
results from the report. Section 60-498.01(5)(a) requires that
a properly completed sworn report include the date the arrest-
ing officer obtained the results of the blood test so that the
Department knows whether or not it received the report within
10 days after the officer obtained the results of the blood test.
(b) March 17, 2006, Sworn Report
After receiving the original, incomplete report, the Department
returned the report to the arresting officer, asking the officer to
include the date that he received the blood test results. The
officer amended the report by adding the date the blood test
results were received, but did not submit the second report
to the Department until March 17, 2006, 15 days after the
officer received the blood test results on March 2. because
§ 60-498.01(5)(a) requires the arresting officer to submit a
report “within ten days after receipt of the results of the chemi-
cal test,” we find the amended report to be untimely.
[3-5] In addition to finding that the arresting officer did not
timely submit the amended report to the Department, we note
that it appears this amended report is not “sworn,” as is required
by § 60-498.01(5)(a). A sworn report in an ALR proceeding
is, by definition, an affidavit. Valeriano-Cruz v. Neth, 14 Neb.
App. 855, 716 N.W.2d 765 (2006). See, also, Hass v. Neth, 265
Neb. 321, 657 N.W.2d 11 (2003). An affidavit is a written or
356 	16 NebRASkA APPeLLATe RePORTS

printed declaration or statement of facts, made voluntarily, and
confirmed by the oath or affirmation of the party making it,
taken before a person having authority to administer such oath
or affirmation. Id. An affidavit must bear on its face, by the cer-
tificate of the officer before whom it is taken, evidence that it
was duly sworn to by the party making the same. Id.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 64-107 (Reissue 2003) empowers a notary
public to administer oaths and affirmations in all cases and
contemplates proof of those acts as follows: “Over his signature
and official seal, he shall certify the performance of such duties
so exercised and performed under the provisions of this section,
which certificate shall be received in all courts of this state as
presumptive evidence of the facts therein certified to.”
The March 17, 2006, report revealed on its face that a notary
had certified that the arresting officer swore to the veracity of
the contents of the report when it was first completed on March
6. However, the amended report contained additional informa-
tion. The arresting officer altered the March 6 report so that it
included the date he received the blood test results. As such, the
amended report should have been notarized again, to indicate
on its face that the arresting officer swore to the veracity of all
the information contained in the updated report, including the
date the officer received the blood test results.
[6] However, while the amended report did contain the
official seal of a notary, it did not contain the signature of the
notary. After the arresting officer added to the report the date
he received the blood test results, he signed his initials next to
this information. A notary then affixed her seal above the newly
added information and wrote the date above the seal. The notary
did not sign the form. Section 64-107 mandates that a properly
notarized document contain both the notary’s signature and
seal. Without both the signature and the seal, the report cannot
be considered sworn, as is required by § 60-498.01(5)(a).
We conclude that the Department did not receive a prop-
erly completed and timely submitted sworn report. The March
6, 2006, report did not contain the date the arresting officer
received the blood test results. Section 60-498.01(5)(a) man-
dates the inclusion of this information, and as a result, we find
that the Department was without authority to institute revocation
STOeTzeL v. NeTH 	357
Cite as 16 Neb. App. 348

proceedings upon receiving the March 6 report. In addition, the
March 17 report was not timely submitted and was not sworn.
We find there is no merit to this assignment of error.
3. JUriSdictioN
The Department next asserts that the omission from the
original sworn report of the date the arresting officer received
the blood test results was merely a “technical defect” and
that “its absence did not impede the conferral of jurisdiction
on the Department.” brief for appellant at 9. We find that the
language in § 60-498.01(5)(a) mandates that the sworn report
be submitted to the Department within 10 days after the arrest-
ing officer receives the chemical test results, because a person
arrested pursuant to this section does not receive prior notice
of the possibility of revocation proceedings. If the sworn report
is submitted after the 10-day period, the Department lacks
jurisdiction to revoke a person’s driver’s license. We affirm the
decision of the district court which found that the Department
lacked jurisdiction to revoke Stoetzel’s driver’s license, because
the Department did not receive a properly completed and timely
submitted sworn report.
Section 	60-498.01 	provides 	the 	procedures 	for 	admin-
istratively revoking a person’s driver’s license. Specifically,
§ 60-498.01(2) provides the procedures for revoking a person’s
driver’s license when the person refuses to submit to a chemical
test of blood, breath, or urine; § 60-498.01(3) provides the pro-
cedures for revoking a person’s driver’s license when the person
submits to a chemical test of blood or breath, the test discloses
the presence of alcohol, and the test results are available to the
arresting officer while the person is still in custody; and, as
discussed above, § 60-498.01(5)(a) provides the procedures for
revoking a person’s driver’s license when the results of a chemi-
cal test indicate the presence of alcohol and the results are not
available while the person is still in custody.
Section 60-498.01(5)(a) provides:
If the results of a chemical test indicate the presence of
alcohol in a concentration specified in section 60-6,196,
the results are not available to the arresting peace officer
while the arrested person is in custody, and the notice of
358 	16 NebRASkA APPeLLATe RePORTS

revocation has not been served as required by subsec-
tion (4) of this section, the peace officer shall forward
to the director a sworn report containing the information
prescribed by subsection (3) of this section within ten
days after receipt of the results of the chemical test. If the
sworn report is not received within ten days, the revoca-
tion shall not take effect.
(emphasis supplied.) Under § 60-498.01(5)(a), the arrested per-
son does not receive immediate notice of license revocation
proceedings, because the results of the chemical test are not
readily available. In these situations, the arrested person does
not receive notice of the revocation until after the Department
has received a sworn report from the arresting officer. Section
60-498.01(5)(b) requires the Department to serve notice of
revocation on a person by certified or registered mail only after
it has received a sworn report. It seems logical that because
of this delay in notification, the Legislature included the last
sentence of § 60-498.01(5)(a), which specifically precludes the
Department from taking action if the sworn report is submitted
after the 10-day period.
While § 60-498.01(2) and (3) also contain language instruct-
ing an arresting officer to submit a sworn report within 10 days,
these sections provide for immediate notification of pending
license revocation proceedings to an arrested person. Section
60-498.01(2) and (3) state that the arresting peace officer,
as agent for the director, “shall verbally serve notice to the
arrested person of the intention to immediately confiscate and
revoke the operator’s license of such person.” In addition,
§ 60-498.01(2) and (3) do not contain language like that found
in the last sentence of § 60-498.01(5)(a), which explicitly pre-
cludes the Department from beginning revocation proceedings
if the sworn report is not submitted within 10 days.
For 	the 	sake 	of 	a 	thorough 	discussion, 	we 	know 	this
court recently held that the 10-day time limitation set out in
§ 60-498.01(2) and (3) is directory and not mandatory and
that the failure to strictly abide by the 10-day time limit does
not invalidate license revocation proceedings or take away the
jurisdiction of the Department. See, Thomsen v. Nebraska Dept.
of Motor Vehicles, 16 Neb. App. 44, 741 N.W.2d 682 (2007);
STOeTzeL v. NeTH 	359
Cite as 16 Neb. App. 348

Forgey v. Nebraska Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 15 Neb. App. 191,
724 N.W.2d 828 (2006).
In Forgey, we held that the language in § 60-498.01(2),
which states that “[t]he arresting peace officer shall within ten
days forward to the director a sworn report,” was directory and
not mandatory, because “there is no sanction attached to an
officer’s failure to file the sworn report with the Department
within 10 days.” 15 Neb. App. at 197, 724 N.W.2d at 833.
In Thomsen, we further explained our decision to make the
time limitation in § 60-498.01(2) and (3) directory. In doing
so, we specifically distinguished § 60-498.01(2) and (3) from
§ 60-498.01(5)(a):
[U]nder § 60-498.01(5)(a), motorists do not receive notice
at the time of arrest of the intention to confiscate and revoke,
in contrast to the notice provided to motorists in situations
controlled by [§§ 60-498.01(2) and] 60-498.01(3). . . .
[S]ound policy reasons exist for requiring the time provi-
sion of § 60-498.01(5)(a) to be mandatory.
16 Neb. App. at 50, 741 N.W.2d at 686.
The reasons for requiring the 10-day time provision in
§ 60-498.01(5)(a) to be mandatory include both the statu-
tory language of § 60-498.01(5)(a), precluding the Department
from acting if the sworn report is not timely received, and
the need for prompt notice of license revocation proceedings.
Under § 60-498.01(5)(a), an arresting officer must submit a
sworn report to the Department within 10 days of receiving the
chemical test results, not only to ensure “the swift and certain
revocation of the operator’s license of any person who has
shown himself or herself to be a health and safety hazard,” as
§ 60-498.01(1) generally suggests, but also to promptly notify a
driver that he or she is subject to such revocation proceedings.
[7] We 	hold 	that 	the 	10-day 	time 	period 	for 	submit-
ting a sworn report under § 60-498.01(5)(a) is mandatory
and that if the sworn report is submitted after the 10-day
period, the Department lacks jurisdiction to revoke a person’s
driver’s license.
In the present case, Stoetzel submitted to a blood test, but
the results of the test were not available while he was still in
custody. He did not receive immediate notification that he was
360 	16 NebRASkA APPeLLATe RePORTS

subject to license revocation proceedings. The record reflects
that on March 7, 2006, the Department sent a letter notifying
Stoetzel of the pending revocation proceedings. As discussed
in the previous section, the Department received a report from
the arresting officer on March 6, but this report was not prop-
erly completed and was not sufficient to confer authority on
the Department to institute revocation proceedings, because the
officer neglected to include the date he obtained the blood test
results and § 60-498.01(5)(a) requires such date on a properly
completed sworn report. The Department did not receive a
report which included the date the officer received the blood test
results until March 17.
Accordingly, when the Department sent the notification let-
ter to Stoetzel on March 7, 2006, it was only in receipt of the
improperly completed March 6 report, and thus, it did not have
the authority to begin license revocation proceedings pursuant
to § 60-498.01(5)(a), which implicitly requires the Department
to be in receipt of a properly completed sworn report before it
can proceed. The statute does not provide an exception to this
rule when the arrested person receives actual notice of revo-
cation proceedings within 10 days after the arresting officer
obtained the results of the blood test. because the Department
lacked the authority to begin the proceedings, the March 7 let-
ter to Stoetzel was ineffectual and is of no consequence to our
discussion of whether or not the Department had jurisdiction to
institute revocation proceedings.
Furthermore, the Department never acquired the authority
to revoke Stoetzel’s driver’s license, because it never received
a properly completed and timely submitted sworn report. The
amended report submitted to the Department on March 17,
2006, was untimely and was not sworn. As a result of these
findings, we conclude that the Department lacked jurisdiction to
institute license revocation proceedings against Stoetzel, and we
find this assignment of error to be without merit.
V. CONCLUSION
We find that a properly completed sworn report was not
timely submitted to the Department, because the original sworn
report failed to include the date the arresting officer received
STOeTzeL v. NeTH 	361
Cite as 16 Neb. App. 348

the blood test results and because the amended sworn report
was received more than 10 days after the receipt of the blood
test results and was not properly sworn. We also find that under
§ 60-498.01(5)(a), an arresting officer must submit a sworn
report within 10 days after receiving the blood test results to
provide the Department with jurisdiction over revocation pro-
ceedings. As such, we find that the Department failed to obtain
jurisdiction to revoke Stoetzel’s driver’s license. We affirm the
decision of the district court to reverse the Department’s revo-
cation of Stoetzel’s license.
A ffirmed .
S tAte of N eBrASkA, Appellee , v .
rodNey e. B lAkemAN, AppellANt .
744 N.W.2d 717
Filed January 29, 2008. 	No. A-07-103.
1. Judgments: Speedy Trial: Appeal and Error. As a general rule, a trial court’s
determination as to whether charges should be dismissed on speedy trial grounds
is a factual question which will be affirmed on appeal unless clearly erroneous.
2. Speedy Trial. The final trial date under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207 (Reissue 1995)
is determined by excluding the date the information was filed, counting forward
6 months, and then backing up 1 day.
3. Speedy Trial: Indictments and Informations: Complaints. Although Nebraska’s
speedy trial act expressly refers to indictments and informations, the act also
applies to prosecutions on complaint.
4. Speedy Trial: Complaints: Time. In cases commenced and tried in county court,
the 6-month period within which an accused must be brought to trial begins to run
on the date the complaint is filed.
5. Speedy Trial: Indictments and Informations: Time. When considering felony
offenses, it is well established that the statutory 6-month speedy trial period com-
mences to run from the date the information is filed in district court and not from
the time a complaint is filed in county court.
Appeal from the District Court for box butte County: B riAN
S ilvermAN, Judge. Affirmed.
bell 	Island, 	of 	Island, 	Huff 	& 	Nichols, 	P.C., 	L.L.O.,
for appellant.
362 	16 NebRASkA APPeLLATe RePORTS