In re Interest of Tayla R.

lack jurisdiction over this appeal. When an appellate court is
without jurisdiction to act, the appeal must be dismissed. State
v. Dunlap, supra. Therefore, we dismiss this appeal.
A ppeAl dismissed.
in re interest of tAylA r., A child
under 18 yeArs of Age .
stAte of nebrAskA, Appellee , v.
christinA r., AppellAnt.
in re interest of leA d. et Al .,
children under 18 yeArs of Age .
stAte of nebrAskA, Appellee , v.
christinA r., AppellAnt.
767 N.W.2d 127
Filed May 12, 2009. 	Nos. A-08-1150, A-08-1151.
1. Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. Juvenile cases are reviewed de novo on the
record, and an appellate court is required to reach a conclusion independent of the
juvenile court’s findings.
2. Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. In a juvenile case, as in any
other appeal, before reaching the legal issues presented for review, it is the duty
of an appellate court to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the matter
before it.
3. Jurisdiction: Final Orders: Appeal and Error. For an appellate court to acquire
jurisdiction of an appeal, there must be a final order entered by the tribunal from
which the appeal is taken.
4. Final Orders: Appeal and Error. The three types of final orders which may be
reviewed on appeal are (1) an order which affects a substantial right and which
determines the action and prevents a judgment, (2) an order affecting a substantial
right made during a special proceeding, and (3) an order affecting a substantial
right made on summary application in an action after judgment is rendered.
5. Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. A proceeding before a juvenile court is a
special proceeding for appellate purposes.
6. Juvenile Courts: Parental Rights: Final Orders. Whether a substantial right of
a parent has been affected by an order in juvenile court litigation is dependent
upon both the object of the order and the length of time over which the parent’s
relationship with the juvenile may reasonably be expected to be disturbed.
7. Juvenile Courts: Parental Rights. A preadjudication order granting continued
detention affects a parent’s substantial right.
8. Juvenile Courts: Final Orders. Orders determining where a juvenile will be
placed are dispositional in nature.
IN re INTeresT OF TAylA r. 	595
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 595
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:15 AM CST

9. Juvenile Courts: Final Orders: Appeal and Error. Dispositional orders are
final and appealable.
10. Juvenile Courts: Parental Rights: Appeal and Error. In juvenile cases, where
an order from a juvenile court is already in place and a subsequent order merely
extends the time for which the previous order is applicable, the subsequent order
by itself does not affect a substantial right and does not extend the time in which
the original order may be appealed.
11. Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. A dispositional order which merely con-
tinues a previous determination is not an appealable order.
12. Juvenile Courts: Parental Rights: Appeal and Error. To determine whether an
order can be appealed, it is necessary to consider the nature of the order and what
parental rights, if any, the order affected.
13. Juvenile Courts: Proof. The state must prove the requirements of Neb. rev.
stat. § 43-254 (reissue 2008) by a preponderance of the evidence.
14. Evidence: Appeal and Error. When the evidence is in conflict, an appellate
court may consider and give weight to the fact that the trial court observed the
witnesses and accepted one version of the facts over the other.
Appeals from the separate Juvenile Court of lancaster
County: lindA s. porter, Judge. Judgment in No. A-08-1150
affirmed. Appeal in No. A-08-1151 dismissed.
David Kyker for appellant.
Gary lacey, lancaster County Attorney, and Jeremy P.
lavene for appellee.
inbody, Chief Judge, and sievers and cAssel, Judges.
cAssel, Judge.
I. INTrODUCTION
This appeal presents two juvenile cases which were consoli-
dated for briefing and oral argument. In case No. A-08-1150,
the juvenile court continued the out-of-home placement of a
newborn child, pending adjudication, and we conclude that a
preponderance of the evidence supports the court’s order. In
case No. A-08-1151, the review order appealed from continued
the out-of-home placement of the three oldest children and
changed the permanency goal from reunification to adoption,
but contained a rehabilitation plan with the same terms from
prior orders. We conclude that the order appealed from was not
a final order because, taken as a whole, it merely continued a
596 	17 NebrAsKA APPellATe rePOrTs

previous determination and did not affect a substantial right of
the mother.
II. bACKGrOUND
Christina r. is the mother of lea D., born in October 1994;
Charlie D., born in January 1997; sierra r., born in November
2000; and Tayla r., born in september 2008.
On May 25, 2007, the court entered an ex parte order plac-
ing temporary custody of lea, Charlie, and sierra with the
Nebraska Department of Health and Human services (DHHs).
On July 24, the court adjudicated lea, Charlie, and sierra. see
Neb. rev. stat. § 43-247(3)(a) (reissue 2008). The court found
that the children lacked proper parental care by reason of the
fault or habits of Christina or that the children were in a situa-
tion dangerous to life or limb or injurious to their health or
morals because on May 4, Christina became involved in a theft
by shoplifting while one or more of her children were with her
and because between February 1 and May 19, Christina sub-
jected one or more of the children to inappropriate discipline
which resulted in “physical and/or emotional injury or pain.”
The court ordered that the temporary legal and physical cus-
tody of the children remain with DHHs for placement, treat-
ment, and care.
On August 27, 2007, the court entered an order of disposi-
tion. The court found that reasonable efforts had been made
to return legal custody of the children to Christina, but that
returning legal custody to Christina would be contrary to the
children’s welfare because of the need to ensure the children’s
safety in Christina’s care and because Christina was not able to
demonstrate appropriate parenting skills and judgment, includ-
ing nonabusive discipline. The court ordered that the children
remain in the temporary legal custody of DHHs. The court
ordered Christina to comply with a number of provisions. The
court entered a similar order on October 10.
On January 11, 2008, the court entered an order of review.
The court stated that the primary permanency plan was for
reunification, and it approved DHHs’ plan as modified. On
April 14, the court ordered that Christina’s individual visitation
with the children be changed from supervised parenting time
IN re INTeresT OF TAylA r. 	597
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 595

to monitored parenting time. On May 2, the court entered an
order of review, which identified reunification as the perma-
nency plan.
A court report prepared on July 18, 2008, recommended
adoption as the primary permanency plan for lea, Charlie,
and sierra.
On september 16, 2008, Christina gave birth to Tayla. On
september 17, the court entered an ex parte order regarding
Tayla. The court found that Christina’s other children had
been removed from her care and that Christina had failed to
correct the conditions which led to the children’s removal
and continued placement outside her care and which placed
Tayla at risk of harm. The court ordered that DHHs have
continued temporary custody and placement pending a place-
ment hearing.
On september 18, 2008, the state filed a petition alleging
that Tayla was a child defined by § 43-247(3)(a) because she
lacked proper parental care by reason of the fault or habits of
Christina or because the child was in a situation dangerous to
life or limb or injurious to her health or morals. specifically,
the petition alleged that Christina’s other children had been
placed with DHHs for placement in a foster home. The peti-
tion alleged that a plan to correct the issues which led to the
adjudication of Christina’s other children had been adopted by
the court, but that Christina had failed to correct the conditions
that led to adjudication. Also on september 18, Christina filed
motions for custody of Tayla and sierra.
On september 22, 2008, the court held a review of dispo-
sition and permanency hearing regarding lea, Charlie, and
sierra. Christina’s counsel informed the court that he had filed
motions for temporary physical custody of Tayla and sierra
and that there would likely be an overlap of evidence. The
court and counsel agreed that testimony adduced at the hear-
ing could be considered with regard to the motion concerning
Tayla which was set for hearing on september 24. The court
further heard evidence on september 30, and attorneys for the
parties and the guardian ad litem agreed to consolidate the mat-
ters due to overlapping testimony.
598 	17 NebrAsKA APPellATe rePOrTs

Margaret 	snyder, 	a 	licensed 	mental 	health 	practitioner
and professional counselor, provided individual therapy for
Christina and home-based family therapy for Christina and her
children each saturday. snyder first met Christina in March
2007, and she has worked with Christina on parenting, man-
agement, and coping skills. snyder also worked with Christina
on dealing with feelings of depression, managing medication,
and utilizing supports. snyder believed that Christina had made
progress in her parenting skills because snyder saw Christina
as being more consistent and structured in her interactions with
the children.
Christina sees each child 2 days a week: once during the
week for individual parenting time and then on saturdays for
family therapy. Initially, Christina’s time with all of the chil-
dren was supervised, but the individual visits had since moved
from supervised to monitored visitation. snyder testified that
she recommended visitation be moved to monitored visitation
because she felt that the children’s behaviors had stabilized.
snyder testified that no concerns had been reported to her
regarding the monitored visitation.
snyder testified that the last family therapy session, which
included Tayla, was “okay” compared to past therapy sessions.
but snyder testified that there were some moments of conflict
with the children, because Charlie wanted to hold Tayla, and
Christina told him “no.” snyder testified that consistency had
been a problem throughout her time with Christina: Things
would go well for 3 or 4 weeks, then there would be 1 or 2
weeks where things were “kind of rocky,” but then there would
be structure again.
snyder testified that she was supportive of Tayla’s residing
with Christina “[w]ith the condition that there be supportive
services.” snyder testified that Christina had a crib, that her
home was ready for a baby, and that Tayla’s basic needs could
be met. snyder believed that Christina could keep both sierra
and Tayla safe at her home, and she hoped that Christina would
cooperate with any services that would be provided to allow
Tayla to come home. snyder did not have concerns regard-
ing a need for a transition period with Tayla, so long as there
IN re INTeresT OF TAylA r. 	599
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 595

was some family support. snyder had a concern regarding
Christina’s ability to nurture Tayla, and she explained that there
is a distinction between being able to meet the basic needs of a
child and nurturing the child.
Tesia risk, who is employed through region V in the inte-
grated care coordination unit, is assigned to the children’s
cases. risk testified that lea, Charlie, and sierra had been out
of the home for over 15 months. risk testified that Christina’s
boyfriend had sexually abused lea, that Christina knew of the
abuse, and that Christina did not do anything about it. risk
testified that DHHs’ biggest concern was Christina’s failure
to protect the children. risk testified that Tayla was removed
from Christina’s care at the hospital due to Christina’s failure
to complete the matters that her other three children were adju-
dicated on and due to Christina’s lack of consistency over the
last 6 months to 1 year.
risk identified the lack of consistency as her concern. she
testified that Christina had always said she was willing to
be cooperative with services and service providers, but that
she had not always done so. When asked if Christina cooper-
ated with the family support services that risk put in place,
risk answered, “I believe she cooperates and then there are
times that she doesn’t always follow the rules and things
like that.”
risk did not disagree with placing Tayla in Christina’s care,
but risk was concerned with Christina’s prior lack of consist-
ency and cooperation with services. risk testified that she did
not “necessarily feel that at this time I’m willing to take a
chance of her not being consistent or cooperative with services
when we’re talking about a newborn child.” To be supportive of
Tayla’s moving home, risk testified that DHHs would need to
see consistency and progress from Christina.
risk testified that Christina has a “pretty good” support base
and that numerous family members and friends attended a fam-
ily group conference and were very vocal and supportive, stat-
ing that they would be there to assist Christina. risk believed
that services necessary for Tayla were community support
services and things like the “WIC” nutrition program and food
banks. she testified that DHHs would not necessarily have
600 	17 NebrAsKA APPellATe rePOrTs

control over those services and that they would be things that
Christina would need to access.
On October 3, 2008, the court entered an order of review
concerning lea, Charlie, and sierra. The court found that rea-
sonable efforts had been made to return physical custody of the
children to Christina, but that the return of custody would be
contrary to the children’s best interests. The court found that
the primary permanency plan of adoption was supported by the
evidence, and the court approved the plan. The court approved
DHHs’ rehabilitation plan and set the next hearing to review
disposition for November 5.
On October 3, 2008, the court entered an order continu-
ing temporary custody of Tayla with DHHs. The court found
that reasonable efforts to prevent Tayla’s continued removal
from the parental home had been made in the form of ser-
vices offered in connection with the other children’s removal
from Christina’s care, including intensive family preserva-
tion, family support services, individual and family therapy,
psychological and parenting assessments of Christina, and
case management. The court found that return of legal cus-
tody to Christina would be contrary to Tayla’s health, safety,
and welfare due to Christina’s lack of progress in services
designated to assist her in having her other minor children
returned to her care, Christina’s impaired judgment and intel-
lectual limitations which continue to impact her parenting, and
her demonstrated inability to parent her children without full
supervision and limitation of her visitation to one child at a
time. The court found that Christina should have reasonable
rights of supervised visitation a minimum of three times per
week for a minimum of 3 hours per visit. On October 15, the
court entered an order continuing the adjudication hearing to
October 28.
On October 30, 2008, Christina filed a notice of appeal in
each case, seeking to appeal from the respective orders entered
on October 3.
III. AssIGNMeNTs OF errOr
Christina assigns that the juvenile court erred in two respects.
First, she alleges that the court erred by failing to return sierra
IN re INTeresT OF TAylA r. 	601
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 595

and Tayla to her care. second, Christina contends that the
court erred by changing the permanency goal to adoption
even though she continued to make progress toward the goal
of reunification.
IV. sTANDArD OF reVIeW
[1] Juvenile cases are reviewed de novo on the record, and
an appellate court is required to reach a conclusion indepen-
dent of the juvenile court’s findings. In re Interest of Taylor W.,
276 Neb. 679, 757 N.W.2d 1 (2008).
V. ANAlysIs
1. Jurisdiction
[2,3] In a juvenile case, as in any other appeal, before reach-
ing the legal issues presented for review, it is the duty of an
appellate court to determine whether it has jurisdiction over
the matter before it. In re Interest of Taylor W., supra. For an
appellate court to acquire jurisdiction of an appeal, there must
be a final order entered by the tribunal from which the appeal
is taken. In re Guardianship of Sophia M., 271 Neb. 133, 710
N.W.2d 312 (2006).
[4-6] The three types of final orders which may be reviewed
on appeal are (1) an order which affects a substantial right and
which determines the action and prevents a judgment, (2) an
order affecting a substantial right made during a special pro-
ceeding, and (3) an order affecting a substantial right made on
summary application in an action after judgment is rendered.
Id. A proceeding before a juvenile court is a “special proceed-
ing” for appellate purposes. In re Interest of Walter W., 274
Neb. 859, 744 N.W.2d 55 (2008). Thus, the pertinent inquiry
is whether the orders affect a substantial right of Christina.
“[W]hether a substantial right of a parent has been affected
by an order in juvenile court litigation is dependent upon
both the object of the order and the length of time over which
the parent’s relationship with the juvenile may reasonably be
expected to be disturbed.” In re Interest of R.G., 238 Neb.
405, 415, 470 N.W.2d 780, 788 (1991), disapproved on other
grounds, O’Connor v. Kaufman, 255 Neb. 120, 582 N.W.2d
350 (1998).
602 	17 NebrAsKA APPellATe rePOrTs

(a) Case No. A-08-1150
[7] Tayla has not been adjudicated, and the order appealed
from continued Tayla’s temporary custody with DHHs. A
preadjudication order granting continued detention affects a
parent’s substantial right. see In re Interest of R.G., supra.
We have jurisdiction because the order appealed from is a
final order.
(b) Case No. A-08-1151
[8-11] In this case, the children were adjudicated in July
2007 and have been in out-of-home placements for over 15
months. Orders determining where a juvenile will be placed
are dispositional in nature. In re Interest of Taylor W., supra.
Dispositional orders are final and appealable. Id. The court has
entered several review orders, which largely contained the same
terms and from which Christina did not appeal. In juvenile
cases, where an order from a juvenile court is already in place
and a subsequent order merely extends the time for which the
previous order is applicable, the subsequent order by itself does
not affect a substantial right and does not extend the time in
which the original order may be appealed. In re Guardianship
of Rebecca B. et al., 260 Neb. 922, 621 N.W.2d 289 (2000).
Thus, a dispositional order which merely continues a previous
determination is not an appealable order. In re Interest of Sarah
K., 258 Neb. 52, 601 N.W.2d 780 (1999).
[12] Christina appeals from the October 3, 2008, order of
review. The court found that reasonable efforts had been made
to return custody of lea, Charlie, and sierra to Christina, but
that such a return would be contrary to the children’s best inter-
ests. The court had made similar findings in its May 2 order
of review. Thus, the denial of the children’s placement with
Christina is not an appealable issue. However, the two orders
contain different primary permanency plans. The May 2 order
set forth a plan of reunification, whereas the October 3 order
contains a permanency objective of adoption. To determine
whether the order can be appealed in this case, it is necessary
to consider the nature of the order and what parental rights, if
any, the order affected. see, In re Guardianship of Rebecca B.
et al., supra; In re Interest of Sarah K., supra.
IN re INTeresT OF TAylA r. 	603
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 595

In In re Interest of Sarah K., the Nebraska supreme Court
examined orders from October 22 and December 22, 1998.
The October 22 order approved the case plan which provided
for long-term foster care for the child, supervised visitation by
the parents, and reunification as the goal. The December 22
order adopted the state’s permanency plan of long-term foster
care transitioning to independent living which provided for
the possibility of reunification. On appeal, the supreme Court
stated that the terms of the December order “merely repeat the
essential terms” of the October order, that “[t]here is nothing
inconsistent with the December 22 order compared to the plan
approved by the court in its October 22 order,” and that “[t]he
parents were not disadvantaged by the juvenile court’s order
of December 22, nor were their substantial rights changed
or affected thereby.” 258 Neb. at 58, 601 N.W.2d at 785.
The court further stated that the December order “effects no
change in the parents’ status or the plan to which the parents
and [child] were previously subject.” Id. at 59, 601 N.W.2d
at 785.
In the instant case, the order from October 3, 2008, changed
the permanency goal from reunification to adoption. Viewed in
isolation, this modification appears to affect Christina’s right to
reunification with the children. Neb. rev. stat. § 43-283.01(3)
(reissue 2008) states:
If continuation of reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify
the family is determined to be inconsistent with the per-
manency plan determined for the juvenile in accordance
with a permanency hearing under section 43-1312, efforts
shall be made to place the juvenile in a timely manner
in accordance with the permanency plan and to complete
whatever steps are necessary to finalize the permanent
placement of the juvenile.
reasonable efforts to reunify the family would be inconsistent
with the permanency plan of adoption. However, it appears
that the terms of the court’s order have the effect of continu-
ing reasonable efforts to preserve the family. The October 3
order approved, as modified, the rehabilitation plan of DHHs.
Whether there is still a plan allowing Christina to rehabili-
tate herself or to take steps to reunite with the children is a
604 	17 NebrAsKA APPellATe rePOrTs

pertinent inquiry. see In re Interest of Tabatha R., 255 Neb.
818, 587 N.W.2d 109 (1998). In In re Interest of Tabatha R.,
the Nebraska supreme Court determined that an initial disposi-
tional order which did not include a rehabilitation plan for the
parents deprived them of any opportunity for reunification with
their child and thus affected a substantial right.
In the case at hand, the October 3, 2008, order directed
Christina to maintain a safe home environment for the children,
to continue with weekly individual therapy sessions, to partici-
pate in family therapy, to have supervised/monitored visitation
with each child, to cooperate with family support services, to
continue seeing her psychiatrist, to not use physical discipline
on the children, and to maintain legal means of support. These
terms are the same as the terms contained in the May order.
even though the permanency objective changed from reuni-
fication, the order taken as a whole did not affect Christina’s
substantial rights. The court implemented a rehabilitation plan
with the same services provided. Christina’s visitation with the
children did not change, nor did her status. The state has not
filed a motion to terminate Christina’s parental rights, and no
adoption can occur until Christina’s parental rights are actu-
ally terminated. because the October order implicitly provides
Christina with an opportunity for reunification by complying
with the terms of the rehabilitation plan, which terms have
not changed from the previous order, we conclude that the
October 3 order does not affect a substantial right. Accordingly,
we dismiss the appeal in this case for lack of a final, appeal-
able order.
2. fAilure to return tAylA to christinA’s custody
[13] Christina argues that the state failed to prove under
Neb. rev. stat. § 43-254 (reissue 2008) that placement at
home would be contrary to Tayla’s welfare. section 43-254
states in pertinent part:
[T]he court may enter an order continuing detention or
placement upon a written determination that continuation
of the juvenile in his or her home would be contrary to
the health, safety, or welfare of such juvenile and that
reasonable efforts were made to preserve and reunify the
IN re INTeresT OF TAylA r. 	605
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 595

family if required under subsections (1) through (4) of
section 43-283.01.
The state must prove the requirements of § 43-254 by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. In re Interest of Borius H. et al.,
251 Neb. 397, 558 N.W.2d 31 (1997).
The evidence did not establish either unconditional support
or opposition to Tayla’s being returned home to Christina. The
testimony established that it was important for Tayla, who was
approximately 2 weeks old, to bond with her mother. snyder
supported Tayla’s residing with Christina “[w]ith the condition
that there be supportive services” and the hope that Christina
would cooperate with such services. risk was concerned with
Christina’s prior lack of consistency and cooperation with
services, especially where a newborn is involved. she testi-
fied that she did not disagree with returning Tayla home but
that DHHs was not supportive of Tayla’s being placed with
Christina until Christina showed consistency with services.
risk explained that it was not realistic to put in services for
Christina when Christina had not been cooperative with those
services. snyder testified that Christina’s home was ready for
a baby and that Tayla’s basic needs could be met, but snyder
was concerned about Christina’s ability to nurture Tayla. risk
testified that DHHs had concerns based on Christina’s failure
to protect her other children.
[14] The state needed to show only by a preponderance
of the evidence that placement with Christina would be con-
trary to Tayla’s health, safety, or welfare. Upon our de novo
review, we conclude that burden has been met. There appears
to be no dispute that Christina would need supportive services
if Tayla were returned to her care, and the evidence shows
that Christina has not consistently cooperated with services
that have been put in place for her. There is no dispute that
Christina expresses a willingness to comply. but the question
before this court is whether she will, in fact, do what she says.
When the evidence is in conflict, the appellate court may con-
sider and give weight to the fact that the trial court observed
the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts over the
other. In re Interest of Tyler F., 276 Neb. 527, 755 N.W.2d 360
(2008). We do so in this case. because the state proved by a
606 	17 NebrAsKA APPellATe rePOrTs

preponderance of the evidence that Tayla’s custody should con-
tinue to be withheld from Christina pending adjudication, we
affirm the court’s order.
VI. CONClUsION
In case No. A-08-1150, we conclude that a preponderance
of the evidence supports the court’s order placing Tayla out-
side of Christina’s physical custody pending adjudication. We
conclude that the order appealed from in case No. A-08-1151
is not a final order, and we dismiss the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction.
Judgment in no. A-08-1150 Affirmed.
A ppeAl in no. A-08-1151 dismissed.
komAlpreet bhuller , Appellee , v.
A mArdip s. bhuller , AppellAnt.
767 N.W.2d 813
Filed May 12, 2009. 	No. A-08-1195.
1. Judgments: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A jurisdictional question that does
not involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter of
law, which requires the appellate court to reach a conclusion independent of the
lower court’s decision.
2. Divorce: Judgments: Final Orders. In the context of a special proceeding,
which includes a dissolution proceeding, a final judgment must decide all of the
issues pending before the court.
3. Child Custody. Neb. rev. stat. § 43-2929 (reissue 2008) requires that a parent-
ing plan be developed and approved by the court in any dissolution proceeding
where the custody of a minor child is at issue.
Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: J. pAtrick
mullen, Judge. Appeal dismissed.
John A. Kinney and Jill M. Mason, of Kinney law, P.C.,
l.l.O., for appellant.
Mark Goodall for appellee.
inbody, Chief Judge, and sievers and cAssel, Judges.
bHUller v. bHUller 	607
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 607