Bhuller v. Bhuller

preponderance of the evidence that Tayla’s custody should con-
tinue to be withheld from Christina pending adjudication, we
affirm the court’s order.
VI. CONCLUSION
In case No. A-08-1150, we conclude that a preponderance
of the evidence supports the court’s order placing Tayla out-
side of Christina’s physical custody pending adjudication. We
conclude that the order appealed from in case No. A-08-1151
is not a final order, and we dismiss the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction.
Judgment in no. A-08-1150 Affirmed.
A ppeAl in no. A-08-1151 dismissed.
KomAlpreet Bhuller , Appellee , v.
A mArdip s. Bhuller , AppellAnt.
767 N.W.2d 813
Filed May 12, 2009. 	No. A-08-1195.
1. Judgments: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A jurisdictional question that does
not involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter of
law, which requires the appellate court to reach a conclusion independent of the
lower court’s decision.
2. Divorce: Judgments: Final Orders. In the context of a special proceeding,
which includes a dissolution proceeding, a final judgment must decide all of the
issues pending before the court.
3. Child Custody. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-2929 (Reissue 2008) requires that a parent-
ing plan be developed and approved by the court in any dissolution proceeding
where the custody of a minor child is at issue.
Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: J. pAtricK
mullen, Judge. Appeal dismissed.
John A. Kinney and Jill M. Mason, of Kinney Law, P.C.,
L.L.O., for appellant.
Mark Goodall for appellee.
inBody, Chief Judge, and sievers and cAssel, Judges.
bhULLeR v. bhULLeR 	607
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 607
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:15 AM CST

cAssel, Judge.
INTRODUCTION
Amardip S. bhuller appeals from a decree of dissolution
entered on November 13, 2008. We consider the motion of
Komalpreet bhuller for summary dismissal. because the decree
did not incorporate a parenting plan as required by Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 43-2929 (Reissue 2008), the decree was not a
final, appealable order. We therefore lack jurisdiction to hear
this appeal.
bACKGROUND
The instant case arises out of a dissolution proceeding in
which the parties disputed parenting time. On November 12,
2008, Amardip appealed from a “Decree of Dissolution” signed
by the district court on November 12 and entered on November
13. In the decree, primary physical custody of the minor child
was placed with Komalpreet. The decree provided as follows
regarding visitation: “In order to preserve and promote the
bond between [the minor child] and his father, liberal visitation
is ordered. The parties shall participate in mediation to deter-
mine the parameters of visitation.”
On December 11, 2008, Amardip filed a motion in which he
requested that the court order a parenting schedule and alleged
that the parties had not reached an agreement regarding parent-
ing time in mediation. On February 2, 2009, the district court
entered an “Order for Parenting Schedule.” The February 2
order set forth the dates and length of Amardip’s visitation with
the minor child.
In 	response 	to 	Amardip’s 	appeal, 	Komalpreet 	filed 	a
motion for summary dismissal pursuant to Neb. Ct. R. App. P.
§ 2-107(b)(1).
ASSIGNMeNTS OF eRROR
because we resolve the instant appeal on jurisdictional
grounds, we do not reach Amardip’s assigned errors, which
asserted, as restated, that the district court erred in (1) permit-
ting Komalpreet to remove the minor child from the state, (2)
granting Komalpreet physical custody of the minor child, (3)
awarding alimony, and (4) ordering mediation to resolve a par-
enting plan.
608 	17 NebRASKA APPeLLATe RePORTS

STANDARD OF ReVIeW
[1] A jurisdictional question that does not involve a factual
dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter of law,
which requires the appellate court to reach a conclusion inde-
pendent of the lower court’s decision. In re Interest of Taylor
W., 276 Neb. 679, 757 N.W.2d 1 (2008).
ANALYSIS
The district court’s failure to include a parenting plan in
the decree prevents the decree from being a final, appeal-
able judgment. Therefore, this appeal from the decree was
premature.
[2] In the context of a special proceeding, which includes
a dissolution proceeding, a final judgment must “decide all of
the issues pending before the court.” Jacobson v. Jacobson,
10 Neb. App. 622, 625, 635 N.W.2d 272, 276 (2001). Further,
the final judgment must “[dispose] of all the issues presented
by the pleadings.” Wagner v. Wagner, 275 Neb. 693, 699, 749
N.W.2d 137, 142 (2008).
Where an issue implicated by the pleadings has not been
determined, the order is not a final, appealable order. For
example, in Johnson v. Johnson, 15 Neb. App. 292, 726 N.W.2d
194 (2006), we decided that an order modifying child custody
which did not include a child support calculation was not a
final order. We reasoned that, even though the party requesting
modification failed to request a modification of child support, a
final order must include a child support determination because
it is an “inherent part of a custody modification action.” Id. at
296, 726 N.W.2d at 197.
The Nebraska Supreme Court dealt with a similar matter
in Wagner v. Wagner, supra. In Wagner, the Supreme Court
decided that a dissolution proceeding “order” in which the
district court “had not found that the marriage was irretrievably
broken, or dissolved the marriage,” could not be a final judg-
ment. Id. at 699, 749 N.W.2d at 142. The Supreme Court deter-
mined that the order did not dispose of all the issues implicated
by the pleadings, because Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-361(1) (Reissue
2008) required the district court to make a finding as to whether
the marriage was “irretrievably broken.”
bhULLeR v. bhULLeR 	609
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 607

[3] because the parties’ pleadings in the instant case raised
the issue of child custody, § 43-2929 required the final judg-
ment to incorporate a parenting plan which resolved the issue
of visitation. Section 43-2929 provides as follows:
(1) In any proceeding in which parenting functions for
a child are at issue under Chapter 42, a parenting plan
shall be developed and shall be approved by the court.
Court rule may provide for the parenting plan to be devel-
oped by the parties or their counsel, a court conciliation
program, an approved mediation center, or a private medi-
ator. When a parenting plan has not been developed and
submitted to the court, the court shall create the parenting
plan in accordance with the Parenting Act. A parenting
plan shall serve the best interests of the child pursuant to
sections 42-364 and 43-2923 and shall:
. . . .
(b) Include, but not be limited to, determinations of the
following:
. . . .
(ii) Apportionment of parenting time, visitation, or
other access for each child . . . .
The plain language of § 43-2929 requires that a parenting plan
be developed and approved by the court in any dissolution pro-
ceeding where the custody of a minor child is at issue. Clearly,
in the case before us, the issue of child custody and parenting
time was both raised in the pleadings and tried to the district
court. The instant case is very similar to Wagner in that the
district court failed to resolve an issue that the court by statute
was required to resolve. The court’s failure to do so precludes
us from having jurisdiction over this appeal.
Amardip states that pursuant to Huffman v. Huffman, 236
Neb. 101, 105, 459 N.W.2d 215, 219 (1990), an order is not
final for purposes of appeal only if the order “reserv[es] some
issue or issues for later determination.” Amardip argues that
because the order “outsourced” the issue of visitation but did
not reserve it for later determination, the decree was a final
order. however, whether or not the court intended to reserve
the issue of visitation is not relevant. In interpreting the terms
of a decree, the Nebraska Supreme Court has stated, “‘[T]he
610 	17 NebRASKA APPeLLATe RePORTS

fact is that neither what the parties thought the judge meant
nor what the judge thought he or she meant, after time for
appeal has passed, is of any relevance. . . .’” Gutierrez v.
Gutierrez, 5 Neb. App. 205, 217, 557 N.W.2d 44, 52 (1996).
What the decree, as it became final, means as a matter of law
as determined from the four corners of the decree is what
is relevant. Id. because the decree left unresolved an issue
that the court was required by statute to resolve, it cannot be
a final order no matter how the district court characterized
its actions.
CONCLUSION
because the decree from which Amardip appealed does not
incorporate a parenting plan as is required by § 43-2929, we
conclude that the decree was not a final, appealable order and
that we must dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
A ppeAl dismissed.
bhULLeR v. bhULLeR 	611
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 607