Kruid v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co.

changed in tone and content. It is of consequence that in June,
he attempted to hide his authorship, in contrast to the February
exchange when he plainly identified himself. And, of course,
he knew after February 10 that Avery was finished with the
“discussion” and wanted no more e-mail from him. Therefore,
our affirmance of the conviction is based on the June e-mails,
not the exchange 4 months previously. The evidence is plainly
sufficient to sustain the conviction.
A ffirmed.
John K ruid, AppellAnt, v. fArm BureAu mutuAl
insurAnce compAny And Western AgriculturAl
insurAnce compAny, Appellees.
770 N.W.2d 652
Filed June 16, 2009. 	No. A-08-883.
1. Summary Judgment. Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings and admis-
sible evidence offered at the hearing show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material facts or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
2. Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error. In reviewing a summary judgment, the
court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the
judgment was granted, and the court gives that party the benefit of all reasonable
inferences deducible from the evidence.
3. Contracts. When the terms of a contract are clear, they are to be accorded their
plain and ordinary meaning.
4. Insurance: Contracts. An insurer may limit its liability and impose restrictions
and conditions upon its obligations under an insurance contract as long as the
restrictions and conditions are not inconsistent with public policy or statute.
5. Statutes: Insurance: Contracts. When an applicable statutory provision con-
flicts with the provisions of an insurance policy, the statute and not the insurance
policy controls.
6. Workers’ Compensation: Insurance: Contracts. All workers’ compensation
insurance policies shall include within their terms the payment of compensation
to all employees, officers, or workers who are within the scope and purview of
the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act.
7. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law.
8. Statutes. Absent anything to the contrary, statutory language is to be given its
plain meaning, and a court will not look beyond the statute or interpret it when
the meaning of its words is plain, direct, and unambiguous.
9. Jurisdiction: Courts: Legislature. The Legislature cannot limit or control the
jurisdiction of the district court.
kruId v. FArm bureAu muT. INS. Co. 	687
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 687
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:15 AM CST

10. Jurisdiction: Courts. Where the law does not mandate an exclusive forum for a
particular issue, the issue may be resolved in the district court according to the
constitutional grant of general jurisdiction in the district court.
11. Declaratory Judgments. An action for declaratory judgment is sui generis;
whether such action is to be treated as one at law or one in equity is to be deter-
mined by the nature of the dispute.
12. Contracts: Actions. A suit on a contract is an action at law.
13. Insurance: Contracts. An insurance policy is a contract, and its terms provide
the scope of the policy’s coverage.
14. Workers’ Compensation: Words and Phrases. Pursuant to Neb. rev. Stat.
§ 48-114(2) (reissue 2004), an employer is every person, firm, or corporation,
including any public service corporation, who is engaged in any trade, occupa-
tion, business, or profession as described in Neb. rev. Stat. § 48-106 (Cum. Supp.
2008), and who has any person in service under any contract of hire, express or
implied, oral or written.
15. ____: ____. Pursuant to Neb. rev. Stat. § 48-115(2) (Cum. Supp. 2008), an
employee is defined as every person in the service of an employer who is engaged
in any trade, occupation, business, or profession as described in Neb. rev. Stat.
§ 48-106 (Cum. Supp. 2008) under any contract of hire, expressed or implied,
oral or written.
16. Workers’ Compensation. If an employee subject to the Nebraska Workers’
Compensation Act suffers an injury on account of which he or she would other-
wise have been entitled to the benefits provided by such act, the employee shall
be entitled to the benefits provided under such act, if the injury occurred within
this state, or if at the time of such injury (1) the employment was principally
localized within this state, (2) the employer was performing work within this
state, or (3) the contract for hire was made within this state.
Appeal 	from 	the 	district 	Court 	for 	madison 	County:
roBert B. ensz, Judge. reversed and remanded for further
proceedings.
George H. moyer, of moyer, egley, Fullner & montag, for
appellant.
Anne e. Winner, of keating, o’Gara, Nedved & Peter, P.C.,
L.L.o., for appellees.
inBody, Chief Judge, and cAssel, Judge.
cAssel, Judge.
INTroduCTIoN
John kruid filed a declaratory action seeking a judgment
that his Nebraska workers’ compensation insurance policy
688 	17 NebrASkA APPeLLATe rePorTS

covered an employee working solely at kruid’s South dakota
business location. The district court granted the insurers’
motion for summary judgment on the basis that the terms
of the policy did not cover such an employee. because the
Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act) mandates that
workers’ compensation insurance policies cover all employees
who fall within the purview of the Act, we conclude that the
district court erred in finding that the terms of the policy lim-
ited coverage to employees located in Nebraska and in grant-
ing summary judgment.
bACkGrouNd
because the only motion for summary judgment filed was
that of the insurers, we state the facts in the light most favor-
able to kruid, the nonmoving party.
At some time during the spring of 2004, bruce knutson
claimed to have suffered a sciatic nerve injury while he was
employed by kruid. knutson worked at kruid’s business loca-
tion in Sioux Falls, South dakota, called Pax equipment.
knutson worked for kruid only in South dakota. kruid’s
workers’ compensation insurance carriers, Farm bureau mutual
Insurance 	Company 	and 	Western 	Agricultural 	Insurance
Company (collectively Farm bureau), denied coverage.
kruid 	owned 	madison 	Farm 	Supply 	(Farm 	Supply) 	in
madison, Nebraska. Farm Supply sells livestock feeding equip-
ment, assembles feed bins, and functions as a warehouse that
distributes Pax brand equipment to dealers. kruid has employ-
ees in madison who help him run the business.
In 1999, kruid purchased the Pax equipment location to
serve as a warehouse. kruid’s purpose in purchasing Pax
equipment was to provide his customers in South dakota,
minnesota, and Iowa with a more convenient location to pick
up the Pax merchandise they had ordered.
In kruid’s deposition, he testified that knutson was a full-
time employee of Farm Supply in 2004. kruid also responded
affirmatively to the statement that in “2004, . . . knutson . . .
came on board, allegedly originally intended to be a full-time
employee, but actually turned out [to be] a part-time employee
of Pax equipment.”
kruId v. FArm bureAu muT. INS. Co. 	689
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 687

kruid owned both business locations personally and did not
transact business through any form of business entity. kruid
conducted the administrative functions for both Farm Supply
and Pax equipment in madison and maintained all business
records there. Further, kruid ran both locations in conjunc-
tion with his sales job with the distributing company that
manufactured Pax brand equipment. In kruid’s deposition, he
specifically denied that he considered Farm Supply and Pax
equipment as separate businesses. He explained:
The only reason we kept Pax equipment o[r] Pax on the
building in Sioux Falls was to identify what the com-
pany was. . . . our feed bins, our brand names. We could
easily have called it madison Farm Supply, Sioux Falls
warehouse, but our dealers and customers would have no
idea what that was. We needed to keep the Pax logo on
the building.
kruid’s workers’ compensation insurance policy with Farm
bureau listed “John kruid d/b/A madison Farm Supply” as the
insured and typically listed “604 Industrial Pkw rd madison
Ne 68748” (one year’s policy had minor immaterial variations
in the address) as the location of the business insured. The
policy provided as follows regarding the locations it covered:
“E. Locations This policy covers all of your workplaces listed
in Items 1 or 4 of the Information Page; and it covers all other
workplaces in Item 3.A. states unless you have other insurance
or are self-insured for such workplaces.” No workplaces other
than the madison location were listed, and the only state listed
under 3.A. was Nebraska. No other portion of the policy pro-
vided coverage in states not listed.
After Farm bureau denied knutson’s claim, kruid filed a
complaint in the district court for madison County, Nebraska,
in which he alleged that the policy covered “his employees in
South dakota and, in particular, the claim of . . . knutson.”
kruid requested a judgment in the amount of the attorney fees
he had expended in defending knutson’s subsequent work-
ers’ compensation claim in South dakota and a declaration
that the policy covered his South dakota employees. kruid
also alleged a second cause of action for reformation of the
insurance contract. Farm bureau filed an amended answer
690 	17 NebrASkA APPeLLATe rePorTS

denying that coverage was provided under the policy and
alleging that kruid made misrepresentations on his application
for insurance.
Farm bureau moved for summary judgment on kruid’s first
cause of action only, which sought a declaratory judgment that
the policy provided coverage. kruid did not file a motion for
summary judgment.
The district court granted Farm bureau’s motion for sum-
mary judgment. The court reasoned that the terms of the
policy did not provide coverage for kruid’s employees in
South dakota. kruid then appealed to this court in case No.
A-08-443, which we summarily dismissed on June 2, 2008,
because of the unresolved second cause of action. After the
district court granted kruid’s motion to voluntarily dismiss his
second cause of action, he timely appealed to this court.
ASSIGNmeNTS oF error
kruid assigns that the district court erred in (1) finding that
Farm bureau’s workers’ compensation policies did not cover
employees working in South dakota and (2) sustaining Farm
bureau’s motion for summary judgment.
STANdArd oF reVIeW
[1,2] Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings and
admissible evidence offered at the hearing show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material facts or as to the ultimate
inferences that may be drawn from those facts and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Jardine
v. McVey, 276 Neb. 1023, 759 N.W.2d 690 (2009). In reviewing
a summary judgment, the court views the evidence in the light
most favorable to the party against whom the judgment was
granted, and the court gives that party the benefit of all reason-
able inferences deducible from the evidence. Id.
ANALYSIS
We find that the district court erred in granting Farm bureau’s
motion for summary judgment. Although in the instant case
the terms of the insurance policy cover only workplaces in
Nebraska, the Act mandates additional coverage and, to the
extent of any conflict, overrides the insurance contract.
kruId v. FArm bureAu muT. INS. Co. 	691
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 687

[3] kruid does not contend that the applicable policy, on
its face, covers employees located solely outside of Nebraska.
The plain language of the policy made it clear that the terms
of the policy did not cover employees working solely outside
of Nebraska. When the terms of a contract are clear, they are
to be accorded their plain and ordinary meaning. Pavers, Inc. v.
Board of Regents, 276 Neb. 559, 755 N.W.2d 400 (2008).
[4,5] kruid instead argues that even though the language of
the policy would exclude knutson’s claim, the policy neces-
sarily provides all coverage that is mandated by the Act. We
agree. An insurer may limit its liability and impose restric-
tions and conditions upon its obligations under an insurance
contract as long as the restrictions and conditions are not
inconsistent with public policy or statute. See Lynch v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 275 Neb. 136, 745 N.W.2d 291
(2008). However, when an applicable statutory provision con-
flicts with the provisions of an insurance policy, the statute
and not the insurance policy controls. Danner v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 7 Neb. App. 47, 578 N.W.2d 902 (1998).
See Rudder v. American Standard Ins. Co. of Wisconsin, 187
Neb. 778, 194 N.W.2d 175 (1972). In Rudder, an automobile
insurance company denied a claim because a clause in the
policy excluded coverage in certain circumstances where the
policy holder was not driving his own car. The Nebraska
Supreme Court held that because a statute required a motor
vehicle liability policy to provide coverage under the circum-
stances, the policy provided coverage even though the policy
language excluded coverage. Therefore, if the Act requires
coverage under the applicable facts, it would override the
insurance policy.
[6-8] The Act mandates that insurers cover all of the employ-
ees for which the employer is liable under the Act. Pursuant
to Neb. rev. Stat. § 48-146 (reissue 2004), all workers’ com-
pensation insurance policies “shall include within their terms
the payment of compensation to all employees, officers, or
workers who are within the scope and purview of the . . . Act.”
Statutory interpretation presents a question of law. Steffen v.
Progressive Northern Ins. Co., 276 Neb. 378, 754 N.W.2d 730
(2008). Absent anything to the contrary, statutory language is
692 	17 NebrASkA APPeLLATe rePorTS

to be given its plain meaning, and a court will not look beyond
the statute or interpret it when the meaning of its words is
plain, direct, and unambiguous. McNally v. City of Omaha,
273 Neb. 558, 731 N.W.2d 573 (2007). The plain language
of the statute requires that a workers’ compensation insur-
ance policy cover all employees that fall within the purview
of the Act.
As a respected commentator has explained, statutes similar
to the Act—which statutes purport to provide full coverage—
generally require “coverage of all employees of the assured
in all occupations and all businesses.” 9 Arthur Larson & Lex
k. Larson, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 151.02 at
151-3 (2007). Thus, under Nebraska’s full coverage statute,
Farm bureau’s policy covers all of kruid’s employees—includ-
ing knutson—so long as the employee falls within the scope
of the Act.
At oral argument, Farm bureau’s counsel conceded that the
Act is a “full coverage” statute, but asserted that the Nebraska
Workers’ Compensation Court had exclusive, original jurisdic-
tion to determine whether knutson was covered under the Act.
We disagree with counsel’s assertion that the compensation
court’s jurisdiction is exclusive. due to the nature of kruid’s
claim, the district court had jurisdiction to determine the extent
of the insurance coverage afforded to kruid.
[9] The Nebraska Supreme Court’s decision in Schweitzer
v. American Nat. Red Cross, 256 Neb. 350, 591 N.W.2d 524
(1999), explained the principles which support the conclusion
that the district court had jurisdiction to hear the instant case.
The Supreme Court described the effect of a 1990 amendment
to Neb. rev. Stat. § 48-161 (reissue 2004). Prior to the 1990
amendment, § 48-161 did not confer jurisdiction over workers’
compensation insurance coverage disputes upon the Workers’
Compensation Court. Thus, until the 1990 amendment, only
the district court had jurisdiction of issues of insurance cov-
erage pursuant to its general grant of jurisdiction under Neb.
Const. art. V, § 9. The 1990 amendment granted ancillary
jurisdiction of such disputes to the compensation court. The
Supreme Court then discussed the situation after the 1990
amendment and stated that although the existence of insurance
kruId v. FArm bureAu muT. INS. Co. 	693
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 687

may be decided in the Workers’ Compensation Court in a
claim before it pursuant to § 48-161, such jurisdiction is not
exclusive. The Supreme Court explained that the 1990 amend-
ment of § 48-161 did not destroy the district court’s jurisdic-
tion over coverage disputes because the district court’s general
jurisdiction emanates from the Nebraska Constitution itself
and that therefore the Legislature cannot limit or control the
jurisdiction of the district court. See Schweitzer v. American
Nat. 	Red 	Cross, 	supra. Additionally, 	the 	Supreme 	Court
observed that if the Legislature had designated the Workers’
Compensation Court as the exclusive forum for resolution of
coverage disputes, the parties would be required to submit
the dispute to the Workers’ Compensation Court in order to
obtain relief. However, the Supreme Court concluded that
this was not the case because there was no such requirement
in § 48-161. The Supreme Court emphasized that the district
court’s jurisdiction was appropriate because the underlying
claim in the suit before the district court was not derived from
the Act. In Schweitzer, the plaintiff had asserted a common-
law negligence claim.
[10-13] In the instant case, kruid asserted a claim founded
on breach of an insurance contract, and because the district
court has the constitutional authority to decide common-law
actions for breach of contract, the court had the power to
decide the insurance coverage dispute presented in the instant
case. Where the law does not mandate an exclusive forum for a
particular issue, the issue may be resolved in the district court
according to the constitutional grant of general jurisdiction
in the district court. Schweitzer v. American Nat. Red Cross,
supra. of course, an action for declaratory judgment is sui
generis; whether such action is to be treated as one at law or
one in equity is to be determined by the nature of the dispute.
City of Ashland v. Ashland Salvage, 271 Neb. 362, 711 N.W.2d
861 (2006). A suit on a contract is an action at law. Jeffrey Lake
Dev. v. Central Neb. Pub. Power, 262 Neb. 515, 633 N.W.2d
102 (2001). An insurance policy is a contract, and its terms
provide the scope of the policy’s coverage. Rickerl v. Farmers
Ins. Exch., 277 Neb. 446, 763 N.W.2d 86 (2009). Thus, the
694 	17 NebrASkA APPeLLATe rePorTS

district court was empowered to determine whether the insur-
ance contract at issue in the case before us afforded coverage
to kruid for knutson’s alleged injury.
Therefore, the pertinent question becomes whether the Act
could be applicable to knutson’s claim. bearing in mind that
this matter is before us on summary judgment, we do not
resolve factual disputes. If the facts viewed most favorably
to kruid would require coverage under the Act, the summary
judgment granted below cannot stand.
We conclude kruid has presented sufficient evidence to cre-
ate a question of material fact as to whether the Act applied.
The Act applies to “every resident employer in this state
and nonresident employer performing work in this state who
employs one or more employees in the regular trade, busi-
ness, profession, or vocation of such employer.” Neb. rev.
Stat. § 48-106(1) (Cum. Supp. 2008). Section 48-106 sets
forth certain exclusions, none of which are applicable to the
instant case.
[14] The record contains evidence which can be viewed as
showing that kruid is an “employer” within the meaning of the
Act. Pursuant to Neb. rev. Stat. § 48-114(2) (reissue 2004),
an “employer” is “every person, firm, or corporation, including
any public service corporation, who is engaged in any trade,
occupation, business, or profession as described in section
48-106, and who has any person in service under any contract
of hire, express or implied, oral or written.” kruid has created
a question of material fact as to whether he is an employer that
has contracted to hire employees to work in his “business . . .
as described in section 48-106” by adducing evidence that he
has employed one or more employees in his regular business
in madison.
[15] The record also contains evidence suggesting that
knutson qualified as an “employee” under the Act. Pursuant to
Neb. rev. Stat. § 48-115(2) (Cum. Supp. 2008), an employee
is defined as “[e]very person in the service of an employer
who is engaged in any trade, occupation, business, or profes-
sion as described in section 48-106 under any contract of hire,
expressed or implied, oral or written.” kruid adduced evidence
kruId v. FArm bureAu muT. INS. Co. 	695
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 687

that he employed knutson to work for his business. Certainly,
viewed in the light most favorable to kruid, this is sufficient to
raise an issue of fact as to whether knutson thereby fell within
the Act’s definition of an employee.
[16] The third paragraph of § 48-115(2) imposes an addi-
tional prerequisite to coverage under the Act, and provides
as follows:
If an employee subject to the . . . Act suffers an injury
on account of which he or she . . . would otherwise have
been entitled to the benefits provided by such act, the
employee . . . shall be entitled to the benefits provided
under such act, if the injury . . . occurred within this state,
or if at the time of such injury (a) the employment was
principally localized within this state, (b) the employer
was performing work within this state, or (c) the contract
of hire was made within this state.
Clearly, kruid adduced evidence that he fell within subsection
(b) by showing that he operated a business in madison. Further,
kruid’s testimony that he hired knutson as an employee of
Farm Supply, which is located in madison, raises at least an
inference that the contract of hire was made in Nebraska. on
summary judgment, the court does not resolve issues of mate-
rial fact. because kruid has demonstrated that Farm bureau
is not entitled to summary judgment as to whether the Act
required coverage, the district court erred in granting sum-
mary judgment for Farm bureau. on the other hand, kruid did
not move for summary judgment on his first cause of action.
Therefore, we express no opinion whether he would have been
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. because of the narrow
scope of this opinion, which holds only that the district court
erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Farm bureau,
numerous issues may have to be addressed in the first instance
by the district court on remand.
CoNCLuSIoN
because kruid adduced evidence sufficient to create a ques-
tion of material fact as to whether the Act covered knutson
at kruid’s South dakota location, the district court erred in
696 	17 NebrASkA APPeLLATe rePorTS

granting summary judgment. We therefore reverse the judg-
ment and remand for further proceedings.
reversed And remAnded for
further proceedings.
irWin, Judge, participating on briefs.
in re estAte of ermA r. sehi , deceAsed.
merle sehi et Al ., AppellAnts , v. John sehi ,
personAl representAtive , Appellee .
772 N.W.2d 103
Filed June 16, 2009. 	No. A-08-1239.
1. Statutes. Statutory interpretation is a question of law.
2. Decedents’ Estates: Judgments: Appeal and Error. When reviewing questions
of law in a probate matter, an appellate court reaches a conclusion independent of
the determination reached by the court below.
3. Supersedeas Bonds: Words and Phrases: Appeal and Error. A supersedeas
bond is an appellant’s bond to stay execution on a judgment during the pendency
of the appeal.
4. Supersedeas Bonds: Appeal and Error. Where the court has discretion to set the
amount of a supersedeas bond, the court should do so in a manner that will give
full protection to the appellee.
5. Decedents’ Estates: Appeal and Error. In all matters arising under the Nebraska
Probate Code, appeals may be taken to the Nebraska Court of Appeals in the
same manner as an appeal from district court to the Court of Appeals.
6. Decedents’ Estates: Supersedeas Bonds: Appeal and Error. When an appeal
under the Nebraska Probate Code is by someone other than a personal represent-
ative, conservator, trustee, guardian, or guardian ad litem, the appealing party
shall, within 30 days after the entry of the judgment or final order complained
of, deposit with the clerk of the county court a supersedeas bond or undertaking
in such sum as the court shall direct, with at least one good and sufficient surety
approved by the court, conditioned that the appellant will satisfy any judgment
and costs that may be adjudged against him or her, unless the court directs that
no bond or undertaking need be deposited.
7. Decedents’ Estates. A will contest proceeding in the district court constitutes a
matter arising under the Nebraska Probate Code.
8. Jurisdiction: Legislature. Where the district court’s jurisdiction arises out of
legislative grant, it is inherently limited by that grant.
9. Decedents’ Estates: Wills: Courts: Jurisdiction. The district court’s jurisdiction
to hear a will contest pursuant to Neb. rev. Stat. § 30-2429.01 (reissue 2008) is
limited to determining that matter alone, and the rest of the probate proceeding
remains in the jurisdiction of the county court.
IN re eSTATe oF SeHI 	697
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 697