In re Estate of Sehi

granting summary judgment. We therefore reverse the judg-
ment and remand for further proceedings.
R eveRsed and Remanded foR
fuRtheR pRoceedings.
iRwin, Judge, participating on briefs.
in Re estate of eRma R. sehi , deceased.
meRle sehi et al ., appellants , v. John sehi ,
peRsonal R epResentative , appellee .
772 N.W.2d 103
Filed June 16, 2009. 	No. A-08-1239.
1. Statutes. Statutory interpretation is a question of law.
2. Decedents’ Estates: Judgments: Appeal and Error. When reviewing questions
of law in a probate matter, an appellate court reaches a conclusion independent of
the determination reached by the court below.
3. Supersedeas Bonds: Words and Phrases: Appeal and Error. A supersedeas
bond is an appellant’s bond to stay execution on a judgment during the pendency
of the appeal.
4. Supersedeas Bonds: Appeal and Error. Where the court has discretion to set the
amount of a supersedeas bond, the court should do so in a manner that will give
full protection to the appellee.
5. Decedents’ Estates: Appeal and Error. In all matters arising under the Nebraska
Probate Code, appeals may be taken to the Nebraska Court of Appeals in the
same manner as an appeal from district court to the Court of Appeals.
6. Decedents’ Estates: Supersedeas Bonds: Appeal and Error. When an appeal
under the Nebraska Probate Code is by someone other than a personal represent-
ative, conservator, trustee, guardian, or guardian ad litem, the appealing party
shall, within 30 days after the entry of the judgment or final order complained
of, deposit with the clerk of the county court a supersedeas bond or undertaking
in such sum as the court shall direct, with at least one good and sufficient surety
approved by the court, conditioned that the appellant will satisfy any judgment
and costs that may be adjudged against him or her, unless the court directs that
no bond or undertaking need be deposited.
7. Decedents’ Estates. A will contest proceeding in the district court constitutes a
matter arising under the Nebraska Probate Code.
8. Jurisdiction: Legislature. Where the district court’s jurisdiction arises out of
legislative grant, it is inherently limited by that grant.
9. Decedents’ Estates: Wills: Courts: Jurisdiction. The district court’s jurisdiction
to hear a will contest pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2429.01 (Reissue 2008) is
limited to determining that matter alone, and the rest of the probate proceeding
remains in the jurisdiction of the county court.
INR e eSTATe oFS ehI 	697
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 697
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:15 AM CST

Appeal from the District Court for Antelope County: patRick
g. RogeRs, Judge. Motion sustained.
James G.e gley, of Moyer,e gley, Fullner & Montag, for
appellants.
Bradley 	C.e 	asland, 	of 	Johnson, 	Morland,e 	asland 	&
Lohrberg, P.C., for appellee.
inbody, Chief Judge, and sieveRs and cassel, Judges.
cassel, Judge.
INTRoDUCTIoN
We consider an interlocutory motion to require the appel-
lants, Merle Sehi, Patriciah ruby, and Kathleen Dubas, to file
a supersedeas bond. To decide the motion, we must determine
whether a party appealing from a district court’s resolution of
a will contest, after a transfer to such court pursuant to Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 30-2429.01 (Reissue 2008), must provide the
supersedeas bond required by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-1601(3)
(Reissue 2008). Because the district court’s jurisdiction to
adjudicate the will contest arises solely under the Nebraska
Probate Code, we conclude that the appellants must file a
supersedeas bond.
BACKGRoUND
on August 7, 2007, the appellants filed a petition in county
court to set aside an informal probate proceeding to probate
the 1996 will ofe rma R. Sehi. The appellants claimed that (1)
the will was not validly executed, (2) the will was the result
of undue influence, and (3) the will was the result of fraud,
duress, and the mistake of the decedent. The appellants trans-
ferred the proceeding from county court to district court pur-
suant to § 30-2429.01.
Although we do not have the motion in our record, the
personal representative, John Sehi, moved for summary judg-
ment on the appellants’ claims. The district court granted sum-
mary judgment against the appellants on the issues of valid
execution and undue influence, but denied the motion as to the
issues of fraud, duress, and mistake. The parties waived a jury
698 	17N eBRASKAAPP eLLATeR ePoRTS

trial, and the matter was tried to the bench. After the trial, the
court dismissed the appellants’ remaining claim. The appel-
lants moved for a new trial, which the district court denied.
Subsequently, the appellants filed a notice of appeal and a $75
cash bond with the district court.
John filed a “Motion for Supersedeas Bond” with this court
in which he requested that we enter an order requiring the appel-
lants to deposit a supersedeas bond pursuant to § 30-1601(3).
John requested that the bond be set at $500,000 and attached
an inventory of the estate and an appraisal of the estate’s real
property to substantiate that $500,000 was the approximate
value of the estate. In the instant opinion, we dispose only of
John’s “Motion for Supersedeas Bond.”
STANDARDo F ReVIeW
[1,2] Statutory interpretation is a question of law. In re
Estate of Chrisp, 276 Neb. 966, 759 N.W.2d 87 (2009). When
reviewing questions of law in a probate matter, we reach a con-
clusion independent of the determination reached by the court
below. Id.
ANALYSIS
[3,4] We begin by recalling the basic function of a super-
sedeas bond. A supersedeas bond is “[a]n appellant’s bond
to stay execution on a judgment during the pendency of the
appeal.” Black’s Law Dictionary 190 (8th ed. 2004). It sus-
pends further proceedings on the judgment from which the
appeal is taken. See, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1916 (Reissue
2008); Tilt-Up Concrete v. Star City/Federal, 261 Neb. 64, 621
N.W.2d 502 (2001). In an appeal from a typical case arising in
the district court, the supersedeas bond is set pursuant to the
requirements of § 25-1916.e xcept in cases where the judg-
ment is a specified dollar amount, § 25-1916 accords the judge
discretion in setting the bond—except the bond cannot exceed
the lesser of $50 million or 50 percent of the appellant’s net
worth. Where the court has discretion to set the amount of
the supersedeas bond, the court “should do so in a manner
that will give full protection to the appellee.” 4 C.J.S. Appeal
and Error § 542 at 498 (2007). Where the judgment is for a
specified dollar amount, the bond amount is further limited by
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the total of the amount of the judgment, interest, and cost of
the appeal.
Normally, where a case originates in the district court and a
party desires to appeal from the district court’s judgment, the
party is not required to post a supersedeas bond in order to
take the appeal. If the appellant chooses not to seek a super-
sedeas, the judgment may be enforced during the pendency
of the appeal. Where the appellant does not obtain a super-
sedeas, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1914 (Reissue 2008) requires the
appellant to file a cost bond or cash deposit of at least $75.
Unlike a supersedeas bond, however, the cost bond does not
stay the enforcement of the judgment. See § 25-1916. Thus,
in an ordinary appeal from a judgment in a case originating in
the district court, the appellant may choose whether to seek a
supersedeas bond.
however, in appeals from probate cases, the law in some
instances imposes a mandatory requirement of supersedeas.
Below, we discuss six aspects of the question. First, we find
that § 30-1601 applies to appeals “[i]n all matters arising under
the Nebraska Probate Code.” § 30-1601(1). Second, we observe
that a supersedeas bond is mandatory in a probate appeal
unless the appellant is a party specifically exempted from the
requirement pursuant to § 30-1601(3). Third, we note that some
language in § 30-1601 does not seem to apply to decisions of
the district court. Fourth, we recognize that the historical devel-
opment of § 30-1601, as well as the laws governing appeals
from the county court in probate matters, demonstrates a legis-
lative intent to subject appeals of will contests transferred to
district courts to the mandatory supersedeas requirement of
§ 30-1601(3) in probate appeals. Fifth, the jurisdictional status
of a will contest proceeding in the district court indicates that
it is part of the larger county court probate proceeding and
subject to the same requirements. Finally, we conclude that a
contrary rule would lead to absurd results.
[5,6] We first consider the specific language of § 30-1601.
Section 30-1601, in the relevant portion, provides as follows:
(1) In all matters arising under the Nebraska Probate
Code and in all matters in county court arising under the
Nebraska Uniform Trust Code, appeals may be taken to
700 	17N eBRASKAAPP eLLATeR ePoRTS

the Court of Appeals in the same manner as an appeal
from district court to the Court of Appeals.
. . . .
(3) When the appeal is by someone other than a per-
sonal representative, conservator, trustee, guardian, or
guardian ad litem, the appealing party shall, within thirty
days after the entry of the judgment or final order com-
plained of, deposit with the clerk of the county court a
supersedeas bond or undertaking in such sum as the court
shall direct, with at least one good and sufficient surety
approved by the court, conditioned that the appellant will
satisfy any judgment and costs that may be adjudged
against him or her, including costs under subsection (6)
of this section, unless the court directs that no bond or
undertaking need be deposited. If an appellant fails to
comply with this subsection, the Court of Appeals on
motion and notice may take such action, including dis-
missal of the appeal, as is just.
(4) The appeal shall be a supersedeas for the matter
from which the appeal is specifically taken, but not for
any other matter. . . .
(5) The judgment of the Court of Appeals shall not
vacate the judgment in the county court. The judgment of
the Court of Appeals shall be certified without cost to the
county court for further proceedings consistent with the
determination of the Court of Appeals.
[7] In the statutory scheme, a will contest proceeding in the
district court constitutes a matter “arising under the Nebraska
Probate Code.” See § 30-1601(1). The statute authorizing the
transfer of a will contest proceeding to the district court is
found at § 30-2429.01. This statute falls within the range
of statutes specifically described as composing the Nebraska
Probate Code. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2201 (Reissue 2008)
(“[s]ections 30-2201 to 30-2902 shall be known and may be
cited as the Nebraska Probate Code”). Thus, a will contest
transferred to the district court would appear to be subject to
§ 30-1601.
Second, it is clear that the appellants are not among the
individuals exempted from the bond requirement pursuant to
INR e eSTATe oFS ehI 	701
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§ 30-1601(3). The appellants have not resisted their apparent
status as “someone other than a personal representative, con-
servator, trustee, guardian, or guardian ad litem.” See id.
Third, we concede that the language of the current ver-
sion of § 30-1601 generates some confusion as to whether
the appeal procedure contained therein—and thus the super-
sedeas bond requirement—is applicable to a will contest
transferred to the district court. Although § 30-1601(1) states
that it applies to “all matters arising under the Nebraska
Probate Code,” other language suggests that § 30-1601 per-
tains expressly to appeals from county court probate proceed-
ings. Subsection 30-1601(1) provides that an appeal is taken
“in the same manner as an appeal from district court.” This
language may be read as indicative that an appeal pursuant
to this statute is not an appeal from district court. Subsection
30-1601(3) provides that the bond is submitted to the “clerk
of the county court.” Usually, an appeal bond or cost deposit
is posted or deposited with the court from which the appeal is
taken. See, §§ 25-1914 and 25-1916 (district court); Neb. Rev.
Stat. §§ 25-2729 and 25-2730 (Reissue 2008) (county court).
In addition, § 30-1601(5) states that “[t]he judgment of the
Court of Appeals shall not vacate the judgment in the county
court” and “shall be certified without cost to the county court”
but does not mention a district court judgment. Again, this
suggests that § 30-1601 pertains particularly to appeals from
county court.
however, turning to our fourth point, the history of previ-
ous enactments of § 30-1601 and related statutes demonstrates
that the Legislature intended the supersedeas bond requirement
contained in § 30-1601(3) to apply in a will contest heard in
district court.
historically, an appeal from a will contest always required
a supersedeas bond.o riginally, all appeals in probate matters,
including will contests, required a supersedeas bond due to
the statutory framework governing the appeal process. Probate
matters—including will contests—were first heard in county
court, and all appeals were taken from county court to district
court and governed by the supersedeas bond requirement now
contained in § 30-1601.
702 	17N eBRASKAAPP eLLATeR ePoRTS

Prior to 1970, Neb. Const. art. V, § 16 (repealed 1970),
placed original jurisdiction of all probate matters with the
county court. Section 30-1601 (Reissue 1956) provided as
follows regarding appeals: “In all matters of probate jurisdic-
tion, appeals shall be allowed from any final order, judgment
or decree of the county court to the district court by any
person against whom any such order, judgment or decree
may be made or who may be affected thereby.” Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 30-1603 (Reissue 1956) imposed a supersedeas bond
requirement in all appeals governed by § 30-1601. Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 30-1604 (Reissue 1956) limited the effect of the super-
sedeas bond to the specific matter appealed only. Section
30-1603 was similar in content to the current § 30-1601(3)
(Reissue 2008). Prior to 1972, appeals to the district court
in probate matters were tried de novo. See, In re Estate of
Hagan, 143 Neb. 459, 9 N.W.2d 794 (1943); Neb. Rev. Stat.
§§ 24-544, 27-1305, and 30-1606 (Reissue 1956). Under the
procedures then existing, all will contests were necessarily
heard in county court in the first instance and became subject
to the supersedeas bond requirement on appeal to the district
court. There was no mechanism for transfer of a will contest
to the district court, because an appeal de novo automatically
ran to such court. Because the appeal was a true de novo pro-
ceeding in the district court, there was an entirely new trial
and all issues pertaining to the will would be tried afresh in
the district court. Under such scheme, a transfer procedure
would have made no sense.
But as a result of legislation enacted in 1969 and intended
to accomplish a complete restructuring of the county courts
and to eliminate all justice of the peace courts, a constitutional
amendment was placed before the voters at the 1970 general
election, which measure included the repeal of article V, § 16.
The voters approved the measure. In 1972, the Legislature
implemented the constitutional revisions and adopted Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 24-517 (Cum. Supp. 1972) to define the jurisdic-
tion of the county court. See 1972 Neb. Laws, L.B. 1032,
§ 17. We observe that this did not modify the county court’s
jurisdiction substantively in any way that pertains to the
instant case.
INR e eSTATe oFS ehI 	703
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 697

After the 1972 reorganization of county courts, appeals in
probate matters continued to be heard de novo on appeal to
the district court. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-541 (Reissue 1975).
In 1974, the Legislature adopted the Nebraska Probate Code,
to become effective on January 1, 1977. See In re Estate of
Kentopp, 206 Neb. 776, 295 N.W.2d 275 (1980).h owever,
the probate code revisions did not affect the appeal stat-
utes codified in chapter 30, article 16, of the Nebraska
Revised Statutes.
In 1981, the Legislature revised the probate appeal pro-
cedure pursuant to 1981 Neb. Laws, L.B. 42, § 6, so that
the district court reviewed appeals from county court in
probate (and other civil) matters “for error appearing on the
record.” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-541.06(1) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
Pursuant to L.B. 42, the Legislature consolidated the probate
appeal procedure with the appeal procedure for appeals from
county court, thereby imposing a uniform standard of review
on appeal. See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 24-541.01 to 24-541.10
(Cum. Supp. 1982) and 24-551 (Reissue 1985).h owever, the
Legislature simultaneously enacted § 30-2429.01 (Cum. Supp.
1982), which permitted the parties to transfer a will contest
from county court to district court so that it could be heard in
the first instance in district court. See 1981 Neb. Laws, L.B.
42, § 18. This in essence preserved the old appeal “de novo”
procedure for will contests inasmuch as a will contest could
be tried in district court on the merits. Further, although the
supersedeas bond requirement for probate appeals changed
location, a supersedeas bond was still required for appeals
“[i]n matters arising under the Nebraska Probate Code.”
§ 24-541.02(4)(a).
From the plain language of L.B. 42, we conclude that the
Legislature did not intend to modify the appeal procedure in
a will contest by permitting parties to remove it from county
court to district court. The Legislature instead sought only to
preserve the district court’s ability to serve as a trial court in
a will contest. We reach this conclusion because L.B. 42 con-
tains no language that sets forth a separate appeal procedure or
purports to abolish the supersedeas bond requirement for a will
contest heard in district court.
704 	17N eBRASKAAPP eLLATeR ePoRTS

Further revisions to the probate appeal procedure have not
modified the applicability of the appeal procedure. In 1995,
the Legislature modified the probate appeal procedure so that
appeals in “matters arising under the Nebraska Probate Code”
were taken in the first instance to the Court of Appeals, and
not to the district court. 1995 Neb. Laws, L.B. 538, § 7. L.B.
538 also moved the entire probate appeal procedure back to
§ 30-1601 (Reissue 1995) and thus separated probate appeals
from other appeals from county court proceedings.h owever,
L.B. 538 appears to be derived from the previous appeal stat-
utes (Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2728 et seq. (Reissue 1989 & Cum.
Supp. 1994)), and it imposed a nearly identical supersedeas
bond requirement.
We conclude that the current version of § 30-1601 (Reissue
2008) was not enacted with the intent to exclude will contests
heard in district court from the supersedeas bond require-
ment contained in § 30-1601(3). It is important to note that
in enacting § 30-2429.01, the Legislature sought to preserve a
procedure in which the district court served as a trial court and
in which a supersedeas bond was necessarily required in an
appeal. Further, pursuant to pre-1981 procedure, a supersedeas
bond was already in place prior to any further appeal from the
district court’s de novo determination to the Nebraska Supreme
Court. Because a supersedeas bond was required in the initial
appeal to a district court, it remained in effect as a supersedeas
during the pendency of any subsequent appeal to the Nebraska
Supreme Court. See In re Estate of Mathews, 125 Neb. 737,
252 N.W. 210 (1933). We can find no evidence of any legisla-
tive intent to destroy this requirement.
[8,9] Fifth, the nature of the district court’s jurisdiction to
hear a will contest indicates a will contest is an inseverable
part of the county court probate proceeding and thus cannot
be treated differently from matters decided in county court
for purposes of appeal. The district court’s jurisdiction over
a will contest stems from Neb. Const. art. V, § 9. Article V,
§ 9, provides that in addition to “chancery and common law
jurisdiction,” which has been termed the district court’s “gen-
eral” jurisdiction, the district court has “such other jurisdiction
as the Legislature may provide.” Because the district court’s
INR e eSTATe oFS ehI 	705
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 697

general jurisdiction, by its very nature, does not extend to pro-
bate matters, its jurisdiction over probate matters is limited to
instances where the Legislature has created a statutory grant
of jurisdiction. Where the district court’s jurisdiction arises
out of legislative grant, it is inherently limited by that grant.
See Cummins Mgmt. v. Gilroy, 266 Neb. 635, 667 N.W.2d 538
(2003). Therefore, the district court’s jurisdiction to hear a
will contest pursuant to § 30-2429.01 is limited to determin-
ing that matter alone and the rest of the probate proceeding
remains in the jurisdiction of the county court. Further, pursu-
ant to the operation of § 30-2429.01, a will contest heard in
district court is actually part of the overall probate proceeding
in county court. This is evidenced by the fact that once the
district court’s decision in the will contest becomes final, it is
incorporated into the county court’s probate proceedings. As
§ 30-2429.01(5) provides, “[t]he final decision and judgment in
the matter transferred shall be certified to the county court, and
proceedings shall be had thereon necessary to carry the final
decision and judgment into execution.” Thus, a will contest is
an integral part of a county court probate proceeding. This is
distinguishable from a situation where an appeal is taken from
the district court’s general jurisdiction to hear an entire case or
controversy. Therefore, it makes little sense to characterize one
part of a probate proceeding—a will contest—as distinct from
any other part for purposes of appeal and treat it like an appeal
from the district court’s general jurisdiction.
Finally, any alternative construction of the supersedeas bond
requirement in § 30-1601(3) would lead to an absurd result.
When possible, an appellate court will try to avoid a statutory
construction that would lead to an absurd result. In re Estate of
Cooper, 275 Neb. 297, 746 N.W.2d 653 (2008). If we adopted
a contrary interpretation, we would be required to determine
that a supersedeas bond was mandatory in an appeal from a
will contest heard in county court but not in a will contest
heard in district court. Because we can find no language in the
statute which indicates that this was the Legislature’s intent, we
refrain from doing so.
We therefore conclude that the appellants in the instant
case are subject to the supersedeas bond requirement of
706 	17N eBRASKAAPP eLLATeR ePoRTS

§ 30-1601(3). John has requested that the supersedeas bond be
set in the amount of $500,000, stating that “this is the approxi-
mate amount of value of this estate [which] has not been dis-
tributed due to the [w]ill contest and subsequent appeal filed
by the appellants.” The appellants have not filed any response
to the motion. John’s motion includes a copy of the inventory
of the estate. The estate is composed almost entirely of real
estate. While such real estate is not liable to loss by destruc-
tion, it is susceptible of loss in value during the pendency of
the appeal. In addition, the costs on appeal potentially include
attorney fees. We conclude that a bond of $100,000 is sufficient
to give full protection to John. We also observe that the appel-
lants’ failure to respond to the motion necessarily means that
they have failed to show that the supersedeas bond amounts
to a sum in excess of 50 percent of their net worth—thus, this
limitation prescribed by § 25-1916 has no application to the
instant case.
CoNCLUSIoN
Because the appellants appeal from a matter “arising under
the Nebraska Probate Code,” see § 30-1601(1), and are not
among those specifically exempted from filing a supersedeas
bond pursuant to § 30-1601(3), we find that the appellants must
file a supersedeas bond to pursue this appeal. We therefore sus-
tain John’s motion to require a supersedeas bond and direct the
appellants to file a supersedeas bond or undertaking in the sum
of $100,000 with the clerk of the county court, conditioned
that the appellants will satisfy any judgment and costs that may
be adjudged against them, including costs and attorney fees,
within 14 days of the date of this opinion. If the appellants fail
to comply, on motion and notice, the appeal shall be subject
to dismissal.
motion sustained.
INR e eSTATe oFS ehI 	707
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 697