State v. Patterson

the exercise of eminent domain indirectly enhances economic
development. Therefore, Haltom’s argument—which focuses
on a collateral consequence of eminent domain as opposed to
its primary purpose—is without merit.
CONCLUSION
We first conclude that although the deceleration lane has
been constructed, we may consider Haltom’s appeal on its mer-
its because the public interest exception to the mootness doc-
trine applies. We also conclude that the district court did not
err in granting the City’s motion for partial summary judgment,
because § 76-710.04 does not, as a matter of law, prohibit the
City from using its eminent domain powers to acquire property
for the purpose of constructing a deceleration lane on an exist-
ing public road for traffic control and safety purposes.
A ffirmed.
StAte of NebrASkA, Appellee , v.
H eNry e. pAtterSoN, Jr ., AppellANt.
778 N.W.2d 756
Filed February 9, 2010. 	No. A-09-385.
1. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law,
in connection with which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an inde-
pendent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the court below.
2. Costs: Appeal and Error: Words and Phrases. The words “on appeal” in Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 25-2307 (Reissue 2008) follow the requirement that a party be per-
mitted to proceed in forma pauperis and precede the requirement that the county
pay for printing of the appellate briefs; therefore, the logical interpretation is that
the expense of printing of appellate briefs is to be reimbursed to a party who is
allowed to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.
3. Jurisdiction: Costs: Appeal and Error. A district court has jurisdiction to hear
a motion for reimbursement of costs sought under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2307
(Reissue 2008), and an order entered thereon is appealable as a summary applica-
tion in an action after judgment.
Appeal 	from 	the 	District 	Court 	for 	Douglas 	County:
J. micHAel coffey, Judge. Reversed and remanded for further
proceedings.
Henry E. Patterson, Jr., pro se.
STATE v. PATTERSON 	255
Cite as 18 Neb. App. 255
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:13 AM CST

Jon Bruning, Attorney General, and Kimberly A. Klein for
appellee.
iNbody, Chief Judge, and cArlSoN and moore, Judges.
moore, Judge.
INTRODUCTION
This appeal arises from the denial of a motion for reim-
bursement of costs sought by Henry E. Patterson, Jr., under
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2307 (Reissue 2008). Because the dis-
trict court had jurisdiction to hear the motion, we reverse the
order denying the motion and remand the cause for an eviden-
tiary hearing.
BACKGROUND
Patterson filed a motion for postconviction relief in the
district court on October 25, 2004. Following a hearing, the
court denied Patterson’s motion, which denial was affirmed
by this court in a memorandum opinion filed on June 26,
2008, in case No. A-07-809. The Nebraska Supreme Court
denied Patterson’s petition for further review on August 27.
On September 5, Patterson filed a motion in the district court
seeking reimbursement in the total sum of $96.19 for photo-
copies and postage in connection with his brief and petition
for further review, citing a duty by the State to pay the costs
under § 25-2307. On January 23, 2009, Patterson filed an
“Application and Notice for Default Judgment,” asserting
that the State had failed to file a timely response. On March
9, the district court entered an order overruling the motion,
finding that both the motion for reimbursement and the appli-
cation for default judgment were without merit and failed to
state a cause of action. The court further found that it did
not have jurisdiction over the pleadings. The order does not
indicate the presence of either party or that any evidence was
adduced at the hearing. There is no bill of exceptions from the
March 9 hearing. On March 17, Patterson filed a motion for
reconsideration, which motion was denied by the court in an
order entered April 1. Patterson’s notice of appeal was filed
April 8.
256 	18 NEBRASKA APPELLATE REPORTS

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Patterson asserts, restated, that the district court erred in
determining that it did not have jurisdiction to award reim-
bursement for expenses associated with the appeal process and
in denying Patterson’s application under § 25-2307.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, in
connection with which an appellate court has an obligation to
reach an independent conclusion irrespective of the decision
made by the court below. Heathman v. Kenney, 263 Neb. 966,
644 N.W.2d 558 (2002).
ANALYSIS
The district court did not elaborate on why it determined
that it did not have jurisdiction over the motion for reimburse-
ment. Section 25-2307 provides:
In any civil or criminal case in which a party is permit-
ted to proceed in forma pauperis, on appeal the court shall
direct that the expense of printing of the appellate briefs,
if such printing is required by the court, be paid by the
county in the same manner as other claims are paid.
The State argues that the words “on appeal” contained in the
statute mean the motion for reimbursement must be filed while
the appeal is pending and that because the motion was not filed
until after the petition for further review had been denied, and
the mandate issued, the district court was without jurisdiction
to enter an order granting reimbursement.
The State relies on the case of Heathman v. Kenney, supra,
as partial support for its argument. In Heathman, the appellant,
who had been granted in forma pauperis status, filed a request
for reimbursement of photocopying expenses for the appellate
briefs during the pendency of the appeal. The district court
denied the request, finding that the statute covered only print-
ing briefs, not the cost of photocopies. On appeal, the Supreme
Court first discussed the issue of jurisdiction as the appellee
had questioned whether the appellant’s request for reimburse-
ment was filed at the appropriate stage of the proceedings. The
appellee suggested that the conclusion of litigation would be
STATE v. PATTERSON 	257
Cite as 18 Neb. App. 255

a more appropriate time to seek reimbursement of expenses,
although conceding that the in forma pauperis statutes do not
indicate the appropriate time to seek reimbursement. The court
concluded that it had jurisdiction of the matter, finding that
the order denying the request for reimbursement was an order
affecting a substantial right made upon a summary application
in an action after judgment. The court also concluded that the
expense of photocopying is included in the expense of “print-
ing” under the statute and reversed the district court’s denial of
the request for reimbursement.
[2,3] We conclude that neither § 25-2307 nor the Heathman
decision supports a conclusion that a request for reimburse-
ment of printing costs must be made during the pendency of
the appeal. The words “on appeal” in the statute follow the
requirement that a party be permitted to proceed in forma
pauperis and precede the requirement that the county pay for
printing of the appellate briefs. The logical interpretation is
that the expense of printing of appellate briefs is to be reim-
bursed to a party who is allowed to proceed in forma pauperis
on appeal. The statute does not contain any direction as to
the procedure for requesting reimbursement, or any specifi-
cation as to the time for such action. Further, Heathman v.
Kenney, 263 Neb. 966, 644 N.W.2d 558 (2002), implies that
there is not a specific timeframe for a request for reimburse-
ment under this statute. We conclude that the district court
had jurisdiction to hear Patterson’s motion. As the court in
Heathman concluded, we find that the district court’s order in
this case is appealable as a summary application in an action
after judgment.
The State argues alternatively that the district court was
correct in denying Patterson’s motion because it was accom-
panied only by copies of prison “kites” which purport to detail
Patterson’s expenses, which are not sworn or otherwise reli-
able documents. The State also argues that Patterson includes
expenses for postage and supplies for mailing which are not
covered expenses under the statute.
From our review of the record, it appears that the district
court’s order was entered sua sponte, without notice to the par-
ties, without the presence of the parties, without the receipt of
258 	18 NEBRASKA APPELLATE REPORTS

evidence, and without a record being made. Accordingly, we
reverse the order of the district court which denied the motion
for reimbursement and remand the cause for further eviden-
tiary proceedings.
CONCLUSION
The district court had jurisdiction to determine Patterson’s
motion for reimbursement of expenses. The order denying the
motion is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further evi-
dentiary proceedings.
reverSed ANd remANded for
furtHer proceediNgS.
iN re iNtereSt of preSteN o.,
A cHild uNder 18 yeArS of Age .
StAte of NebrASkA, Appellee , v.
cryStAl W., AppellANt.
iN re iNtereSt of porSHA o.,
A cHild uNder 18 yeArS of Age .
StAte of NebrASkA, Appellee , v.
cryStAl W., AppellANt.
778 N.W.2d 759
Filed February 9, 2010. 	Nos. A-09-623, A-09-624.
1. Juvenile Courts: Parental Rights: Guardians Ad Litem: Appeal and Error.
Appointment of a guardian ad litem for a parent that is allegedly incompetent
because of mental illness or mental deficiency is mandatory, and the failure to
appoint a guardian ad litem is plain error which requires reversal of the order
terminating the parent’s rights.
Appeal 	from 	the 	County 	Court 	for 	Deuel 	County:
rANdiN rolANd, Judge. Reversed and remanded for further
proceedings.
Joel B. Jay for appellant.
Douglas D. Palik, Deuel County Attorney, for appellee.
iNbody, Chief Judge, and irWiN and cArlSoN, Judges.
IN RE INTEREST OF PRESTEN O. 	259
Cite as 18 Neb. App. 259