In re Interest of Taylor W.

iN Re iNteRest of tayloR W., a cHild uNdeR 18 yeaRs of age .
state of N ebRaska , appellee , v . tayloR W.,
appellee , aNd depaRtMeNt of H ealtH
aNd H uMaN seRvices , office of
J uveNile seRvices , appellaNt .
iN Re iNteRest of levi c., a cHild uNdeR 18 yeaRs of age .
state of N ebRaska , appellee , v . levi c.,
appellee , aNd depaRtMeNt of H ealtH
aNd H uMaN seRvices , office of
J uveNile seRvices , appellaNt .
757 N.W.2d 1
Filed October 24, 2008. 	Nos. S-08-026, S-08-074.
1. Moot Question: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Mootness does not prevent
appellate jurisdiction, but because mootness is a justiciability doctrine that oper-
ates to prevent courts from exercising jurisdiction, an appellate court reviews
mootness determinations under the same standard of review as other jurisdic-
tional questions.
2. Judgments: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A jurisdictional question that does
not involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter of
law, which requires the appellate court to reach a conclusion independent of the
lower court’s decision.
3. Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. Juvenile cases are reviewed de novo on the
record, and an appellate court is required to reach a conclusion independent of the
juvenile court’s findings.
4. Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. In a juvenile case, as in any
other appeal, before reaching the legal issues presented for review, it is the duty
of an appellate court to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the matter
before it.
5. Juvenile Courts: Final Orders. Orders determining where a juvenile will be
placed are dispositional in nature.
6. Juvenile Courts: Final Orders: Appeal and Error. Dispositional orders are
final and appealable.
7. Moot Question. A case becomes moot when the issues initially presented in
litigation cease to exist or the litigants lack a legally cognizable interest in the
outcome of litigation.
8. Moot Question: Appeal and Error. An appellate court may choose to review
an otherwise moot case under the public interest exception if it involves a matter
affecting the public interest or when other rights or liabilities may be affected by
its determination. This exception requires a consideration of the public or private
nature of the question presented, the desirability of an authoritative adjudication
for future guidance of public officials, and the likelihood of future recurrence of
the same or a similar problem.
IN RE INTEREST OF TAYLOR W. 	679
Cite as 276 Neb. 679
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:52 AM CST

Appeals from the Separate Juvenile Court of Lancaster
County: toNi g. tHoRsoN, Judge. Appeals dismissed.
Jon bruning, Attorney General, b. Gail Steen, Special
Assistant Attorney General, and Jodi M. Fenner for appellant.
Gary 	E. 	Lacey, 	Lancaster 	County Attorney, 	barbara 	J.
Armstead, Shellie Sabata, and Richard C. Grabow, Senior
Certified Law Student, for appellee State of Nebraska.
H eavicaN, 	c.J., 	WRigHt , 	coNNolly , 	geRRaRd , 	stepHaN,
M ccoRMack , and M illeR-leRMaN, JJ.
H eavicaN, c.J.
FACTUAL bACkGROUND
Taylor W. and Levi C., the minors in these two cases which
were consolidated for briefing and oral argument, were adju-
dicated under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247(1) (Cum. Supp. 2006)
(misdemeanor law violation). both Taylor and Levi were “com-
mitted” by the separate juvenile court of Lancaster County
into the custody of the Office of Juvenile Services (OJS), an
office of the Department of Health and Human Services (col-
lectively DHHS). The “commitment” was for purposes of an
evaluation pending the disposition of petitions filed against
each juvenile. We interpret the juvenile court’s use of the word
“committed” to mean “placed” in accordance with Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 43-413(1) (Reissue 2004), which provides that a court
may “place a juvenile” with OJS or the Department of Health
and Human Services for “an evaluation to aid the court in the
disposition.” In addition to ordering the evaluations, the juve-
nile court further ordered that both Taylor and Levi be detained
at the Lancaster County Youth Services Center for purposes of
their respective evaluations.
Following the entry of the order placing Levi at the Lancaster
County Youth Services Center, DHHS filed a motion to remove
him from detention. DHHS argued that the juvenile court
exceeded its statutory authority in ordering a specific place-
ment for Levi during his evaluation. The motion was denied.
No such motion was filed with respect to Taylor. DHHS then
filed these timely appeals from the placement orders in each
case. We moved these cases to our docket pursuant to our
680 	276 NEbRASkA REpORTS

authority to regulate the dockets of this court and the Court
of Appeals.1
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
On appeal, DHHS assigns that the juvenile court exceeded
its statutory authority in ordering specific placements for Taylor
and Levi.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1,2] Mootness does not prevent appellate jurisdiction, but
because mootness is a justiciability doctrine that operates to
prevent courts from exercising jurisdiction, we have reviewed
mootness determinations under the same standard of review as
other jurisdictional questions.2 A jurisdictional question that
does not involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate
court as a matter of law, which requires the appellate court to
reach a conclusion independent of the lower court’s decision.3
[3] Juvenile cases are reviewed de novo on the record, and
an appellate court is required to reach a conclusion indepen-
dent of the juvenile court’s findings.4
[4] In a juvenile case, as in any other appeal, before reach-
ing the legal issues presented for review, it is the duty of an
appellate court to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the
matter before it.5
ANALYSIS
Final Order.
The first issue presented by these appeals is whether the
juvenile court’s orders were final.
[5,6] We have previously held that orders determining where
a juvenile will be placed are dispositional in nature.6 And we
1 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Reissue 1995).
2 BryanLGH v. Nebraska Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 276 Neb. 596,
755 N.W.2d 807 (2008).
3 Id.
4 See In re Interest of Walter W., 274 Neb. 859, 744 N.W.2d 55 (2008).
5 In re Interest of Anthony R. et al., 264 Neb. 699, 651 N.W.2d 231 (2002).
6 See In re Interest of R.G., 238 Neb. 405, 470 N.W.2d 780 (1991), dis-
approved on other grounds, O’Connor v. Kaufman, 255 Neb. 120, 582
N.W.2d 350 (1998).
IN RE INTEREST OF TAYLOR W. 	681
Cite as 276 Neb. 679

have further concluded that dispositional orders are final and
appealable.7 As such, the juvenile court’s placement orders in
these cases are final and appealable.
Mootness.
[7,8] We are next asked to decide whether these appeals are
moot. A case becomes moot when the issues initially presented
in litigation cease to exist or the litigants lack a legally cogni-
zable interest in the outcome of litigation.8 However, an appel-
late court may choose to review an otherwise moot case under
the public interest exception if it involves a matter affecting
the public interest or when other rights or liabilities may be
affected by its determination. This exception requires a consid-
eration of the public or private nature of the question presented,
the desirability of an authoritative adjudication for future guid-
ance of public officials, and the likelihood of future recurrence
of the same or a similar problem.9
The parties are in agreement that the evaluations of Taylor
and Levi have been completed, and thus judicial relief is
unavailable. However, DHHS and the county attorney dis-
agree on whether the public interest exception should apply
to allow this court to review the issues presented on appeal.
DHHS argues that “[i]t would be virtually impossible for a
case raising the issue of placement during [a Department of
Health and Human Services]/OJS evaluation to be heard at the
appellate level before the underlying case reached disposition,
given that the statutory scheme anticipates the evaluation to
be completed within thirty days.”10 DHHS further notes that
this problem is likely to recur. The county attorney, however,
contends that each of these cases “require[s a] case-by-case
7 See In re Interest of R.A. and V.A., 225 Neb. 157, 403 N.W.2d 357 (1987),
overruled on other grounds, State v. Jacob, 242 Neb. 176, 494 N.W.2d 109
(1993). See, also, In re Interest of Jeremy T., 257 Neb. 736, 600 N.W.2d
747 (1999).
8 Stenger v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 274 Neb. 819, 743 N.W.2d 758
(2008).
9 In re Applications of Koch, 274 Neb. 96, 736 N.W.2d 716 (2007).
10 brief for appellant at 13.
682 	276 NEbRASkA REpORTS

analysis, and a ruling on either would not be instructive to the
courts for future proceedings.”11
We disagree with the county attorney’s characterization of
these cases as requiring a “case-by-case analysis.” Rather, the
issue presented by these appeals is a purely legal one—whether
the juvenile court has the authority to order a specific place-
ment under these circumstances. It is apparent that this issue is
capable of recurring, because we are now presented with two
cases raising the same legal issue and the Court of Appeals
has previously been presented with this same issue on at least
one occasion.12 because of the nature of juvenile cases, this
action is essentially unreviewable without the application of the
public interest exception. We therefore conclude that this issue
merits review under the public interest exception to the moot-
ness doctrine in order to provide guidance to the juvenile court,
DHHS, county attorneys, and other interested parties.
Authority of Juvenile Court to Order Specific Placement.
We now turn to DHHS’ sole assignment of error: that the
juvenile court exceeded its statutory authority in ordering a
specific placement for Taylor and Levi.
The juvenile court may place a juvenile with DHHS for pur-
poses of an evaluation as set forth in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-281
(Reissue 2004) and § 43-413. Section 43-281 provides that
“[f]ollowing an adjudication of jurisdiction and prior to final
disposition, the court may place the juvenile with [OJS] or the
Department of Health and Human Services for evaluation. The
office or department shall make arrangements for an appropri-
ate evaluation.” Section 43-413(1) states that “[a] court may,
pursuant to section 43-281, place a juvenile with [OJS] or the
Department of Health and Human Services for an evaluation
to aid the court in the disposition.” Section 43-413(3) further
provides that “[a]ll juveniles shall be evaluated prior to com-
mitment to [OJS]. The office may place a juvenile in resi-
dential or nonresidential community-based evaluation services
11 brief for appellee at 9.
12 In re Interest of Ashley D., Nos. A-01-111, A-01-250, 2002 WL 798653
(Neb. App. Apr. 30, 2002) (not designated for permanent publication).
IN RE INTEREST OF TAYLOR W. 	683
Cite as 276 Neb. 679

for purposes of evaluation to assist the court in determining the
initial level of treatment for the juvenile.”
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-414 (Reissue 2004) further sets forth
OJS’ role in the evaluation process: “Each juvenile placed for
evaluation with [OJS] shall be subjected to medical examina-
tion and evaluation as directed by the office.” And Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 43-415 (Reissue 2004) provides that “[a] juvenile placed
for evaluation with [OJS] shall be returned to the court upon
the completion of the evaluation or at the end of thirty days,
whichever comes first.” This section also grants to the juvenile
court the authority to extend this 30-day time period.
The county attorney argues that nothing in the language of
§§ 43-281, 43-413, and 43-414 “specifically limits the discre-
tion of the juvenile court in ordering the continued detention
of a juvenile at a specific detention facility during the pend-
ency of an OJS evaluation.”13 Instead, he cites to Neb. Rev.
Stat. §§ 43-253, 43-284, and 43-289 (Reissue 2004) in support
of his contention that “[t]he juvenile court has authority to
determine a juvenile’s placement and care pending the adju-
dication of a case, at adjudication (pending disposition), and
post-disposition.”14 The county attorney further contends that
“[i]n light of the juvenile court’s authority to determine place-
ment and care at each step of a juvenile’s interaction with the
juvenile court, it would be inconsistent to read . . . § 43-413 as
cutting the juvenile court out of the decision making regarding
the placement of a juvenile for evaluation.”15
We have examined the cited statutes and conclude that the
statutes do not provide the overarching authority of the juvenile
court suggested by the county attorney.
Section 43-253 is primarily concerned with the authority of
a probation officer to take a juvenile into temporary custody:
the only authority given to the juvenile court in this section
is the ability to “admit such juvenile to bail by bond.” This
section provides no authority to the juvenile court to make
specific placements.
13 brief for appellee at 11.
14 Id.
15 Id.
684 	276 NEbRASkA REpORTS

The other two statutes cited by the county attorney—
§§ 43-284 and 43-289—do arguably grant the juvenile court
authority to specifically place a juvenile, but only under cir-
cumstances which are not presented by these cases. Section
43-284 provides the juvenile court the authority to make a
placement of juveniles adjudicated under § 43-247(3) (abuse
and neglect), (4) (traffic infractions), and (9) (guardianships).
but in these cases, both Taylor and Levi were adjudicated
under § 43-247(1). And § 43-289 authorizes the juvenile court
to make a placement only in the limited instance where it is
necessary to admit a juvenile into a hospital, a situation not
presented by these cases.
We note that Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 43-254 and 43-258 (Reissue
2004), which were not cited by the county attorney in sup-
port of his argument, do grant to the juvenile court the power
to make a specific placement prior to adjudication. These
provisions are, of course, inapplicable in this case, because
both Taylor and Levi have been adjudicated. but beyond
this, we conclude that these statutes, even considered along
with §§ 43-284 and 43-289, are insufficient to support the
“authority to determine placement and care at each step of a
juvenile’s interaction with the juvenile court,” which author-
ity the county attorney contends the juvenile court has. Our
review of the applicable statutes has revealed no such author-
ity. Indeed, our review suggests the opposite: the fact that the
ability to order a specific placement is provided for some of
the time suggests that it was not intended to be provided in
other instances.
Other than the power to order an evaluation and to extend
the time in which to complete an evaluation, there is no
statutory authority granting the juvenile court any control
over the evaluation. However, as is demonstrated above, there
is plainly discretion given to OJS in the performance of these
court-ordered evaluations. In particular, § 43-281 provides
that OJS or the Department of Health and Human Services
“shall make arrangements for an appropriate evaluation,”
while § 43-414 notes that juveniles placed with OJS are sub-
ject to examination and evaluation “as directed by the office.”
And § 43-413(3) specifically permits OJS, not the juvenile
IN RE INTEREST OF TAYLOR W. 	685
Cite as 276 Neb. 679

court, to place juveniles in residential or nonresidential eval-
uation services.
We conclude that DHHS, and not the juvenile court, has
the authority to direct the performance of an evaluation under
§§ 43-281 and 43-413. This authority includes the ability to
place the juvenile during the performance of the evaluation.
The juvenile court therefore exceeded its authority in ordering
specific placements in these cases.
CONCLUSION
The juvenile court acted in excess of its statutory author-
ity when it ordered specific placements for Taylor and Levi.
However, because the instant appeals are moot, and our conclu-
sion reached under the public interest exception to the moot-
ness doctrine, we dismiss the present appeals.
appeals disMissed .
686 	276 NEbRASkA REpORTS