State v. Mata

cases determined
in the
supreme court of nebraska
()
S tate of N ebraSka , appellee , v .
raymoNd mata , J r ., appellaNt .
745 n.W.2d 229
filed february 8, 2008. 	no. s-05-268.
. Judgments: Appeal and Error. When an appellate court reviews questions of
law, it resolves the questions independently of the lower court’s conclusions.
2. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. if the district court lacked jurisdiction, an appel-
late court acquires no jurisdiction.
3. ____: ____. When a jurisdictional question does not involve a factual dispute, an
appellate court determines the issue as a matter of law.
4. Pleadings: Convictions: Sentences: Appeal and Error. a plea in bar is not a
proper procedure after a defendant’s conviction has been affirmed on appeal and
the cause is remanded only for resentencing.
5. Courts: Appeal and Error. When an appellate court remands a cause with
specific directions, the lower court has no power to do anything but to obey
the mandate.
6. Constitutional Law: Criminal Law: Sentences. mere procedural changes to
comply with new constitutional rules do not disadvantage a defendant or impose
additional punishment even if the procedures in effect when the defendant com-
mitted the offense are later declared unconstitutional.
7. Constitutional Law: Homicide: Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances.
the u.s. supreme court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 u.s. 584, 22 s. ct.
2428, 53 L. ed. 2d 556 (2002), is not a substantive change in sixth amendment
requirements and did not make aggravating circumstances essential elements of
capital murder.
8. Constitutional Law: Notice. the sixth amendment to the u.s. constitution
requires states to give defendants sufficient notice to ensure that they have an
opportunity to defend against the charges.
9. Constitutional Law: Homicide: Sentences: Aggravating and Mitigating
Circumstances: Notice: Proof. in a defendant’s resentencing for capital murder
necessitated by a new constitutional rule of procedure, the state was not required
to file a statutory notice of aggravators in a charging instrument when the defen-
dant had actual notice of the aggravators the state would seek to prove at the
resentencing hearing.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:55 AM CST

2 	275 nebraska reports
0. Appeal and Error. an argument that does little more than to restate an assign-
ment of error does not support the assignment, and an appellate court will not
address it.
. Constitutional Law: Criminal Law: Sentences. challenges under the u.s.
supreme court’s decision in United States v. Jackson, 390 u.s. 570, 88 s. ct.
209, 20 L. ed. 2d 38 (968), are limited to statutory schemes that allow a
defendant to completely avoid the punishment that a jury could impose.
2. Constitutional Law: Sentences: Death Penalty. the 8th amendment, made
applicable to the states through the 4th amendment, requires states authorizing
the death penalty to adopt procedures that will avoid imposing it in an arbitrary
and capricious manner.
3. ____: ____: ____. in death penalty cases, the eighth amendment requires that
() a state rationally narrow those eligible for the death penalty and (2) the
sentencer consider the individual circumstances of the defendant and his or
her crime.
4. Constitutional Law: Juries: Sentences. the u.s. supreme court’s decision in
Ring v. Arizona, 536 u.s. 584, 22 s. ct. 2428, 53 L. ed. 2d 556 (2002), has not
altered the court’s determination that jury sentencing is not required for eighth
amendment purposes.
5. Jury Instructions. Whether jury instructions given by a trial court are correct is
a question of law.
6. Sentences: Death Penalty. in death penalty cases, the key inquiry in examining
eligibility and selection factors is whether they are neutral and principled.
7. Constitutional Law: Sentences: Death Penalty: Aggravating and Mitigating
Circumstances. in determining whether an aggravating circumstance is unconsti-
tutionally vague, a court should consider whether it creates an unacceptable risk
of randomness, the mark of an arbitrary and capricious sentencing process.
8. Homicide: Sentences: Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances. an aggra-
vating factor must be sufficiently narrow so that it does not apply to everyone
convicted of first degree murder.
9. Constitutional Law: Sentences: Death Penalty: Appeal and Error. because
the proper degree of definition of eligibility and selection factors in death penalty
cases often is not susceptible of mathematical precision, a vagueness review is
quite deferential.
20. Constitutional Law: Sentences: Death Penalty: Jurors. in death penalty cases,
an eligibility or selection factor is not unconstitutional if it has some common-
sense core of meaning that a juror can understand.
2. Jury Instructions: Sentences: Death Penalty. a juror would clearly understand
that the term “apparently relished” in the supreme court’s five-factor test under
neb. rev. stat. § 29-2523()(d) (cum. supp. 2002) refers to his or her own per-
ception of the defendant’s conduct.
22. Jurors: Sentences: Death Penalty. Jurors are not required to unanimously agree
on the means by which a capital defendant manifests exceptional depravity under
neb. rev. stat. § 29-2523()(d) (cum. supp. 2002).
23. Sentences: Death Penalty: Appeal and Error. under neb. rev. stat. § 29-252.03
(reissue 995), the supreme court is required, upon appeal, to determine the pro-
priety of a death sentence by conducting a proportionality review.

24. ____: ____: ___. proportionality review requires the supreme court to compare
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances with those present in other cases
in which a district court imposed the death penalty to ensure that the sentence
imposed is no greater than those imposed in other cases with the same or similar
circumstances.
25. Constitutional Law: Death Penalty. the death penalty, when properly imposed
by a state, does not violate either the 8th or the 4th amendment to the u.s.
constitution or neb. const. art. i, § 9.
26. Death Penalty. capital punishment must not involve the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain.
27. ____. a method of execution violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment if there is a substantial foreseeable risk, inherent in the method, that
a prisoner will suffer unnecessary pain.
28. ____. a court must evaluate claims that punishment is cruel and unusual in the
light of contemporary human knowledge.
29. ____. a penalty of death must accord with the dignity of man, which is the basic
concept underlying the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
30. ____. barbarous punishments include those that mutilate the prisoner’s body even
if they do not cause conscious pain.
3. Death Penalty: Words and Phrases. in a method of execution challenge, “wan-
ton” means that the method itself is inherently cruel.
32. Constitutional Law: Death Penalty: Legislature: Intent. Whether the Legislature
intended to cause pain in selecting a punishment is irrelevant to a constitutional
challenge that a statutorily imposed method of punishment violates the prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment.
33. Death Penalty. the relevant legal standards in deciding whether electrocution is
cruel and unusual punishment are whether the state’s chosen method of execu-
tion () presents a substantial risk that a prisoner will suffer unnecessary and
wanton pain in an execution, (2) violates the evolving standards of decency that
mark a mature society, and (3) minimizes physical violence and mutilation of the
prisoner’s body.
34. Constitutional Law: Death Penalty: Judgments: Evidence: Appeal and Error.
in challenges to the constitutionality of a method of execution, the nebraska
supreme court determines whether the trial court’s conclusions are supported by
substantial evidence.
35. Death Penalty. Whether a method of inflicting the death penalty inherently
imposes a significant risk of causing pain in an execution is a question of fact.
36. Constitutional Law: Death Penalty. the ultimate issue, whether electrocution
violates the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, pre-
sents a question of law.
37. Criminal Law: Legislature: Sentences. Legislatures are not required to select
the least severe penalty possible, so long as the penalty selected is not cruelly
inhumane or disproportionate to the crime.
38. Constitutional Law: Death Penalty: Legislature. the prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment in the federal and state constitutions is a restraint upon
the exercise of legislative power.
state v. mata 	3
cite as 275 neb. 

4 	275 nebraska reports
39. Constitutional Law: Death Penalty: Legislature: Appeal and Error. the
Legislature determines the nature of the penalty imposed, and so long as that
determination is consistent with the constitution, it will not be disturbed by the
courts on review.
40. Constitutional Law: Criminal Law: Statutes: Presumptions: Appeal and
Error. When an appellate court reviews challenges to criminal statutes, it presumes
that the statutes are constitutional.
4. Constitutional Law: Statutes: Proof. the burden to clearly show that a statute
is unconstitutional rests upon the challenger.
42. Death Penalty. electrocution will unquestionably inflict intolerable pain unneces-
sary to cause death in enough executions so as to present a substantial risk that
any prisoner will suffer unnecessary and wanton pain in a judicial execution
by electrocution.
43. Constitutional Law: Death Penalty. death by electrocution as provided in neb.
rev. stat. § 29-2532 (reissue 995) violates the prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment in neb. const. art. i, § 9.
44. Statutes: Sentences: Death Penalty. nebraska’s statutes specifying electrocution
as the mode of inflicting the death penalty are separate, and severable, from the
procedures by which the trial court sentences the defendant.
45. Sentences: Death Penalty. that a method of execution is cruel and unusual pun-
ishment bears solely on the legality of the execution of the sentence and not on
the validity of the sentence itself.
46. Courts: Sentences: Death Penalty. the nebraska supreme court is charged with
the duty to administer and supervise the implementation of the death penalty by
appointing the day for execution of the sentence and issuing a death warrant.
appeal from the district court for keith county: robert o.
H ippe, Judge. sentence affirmed, and execution stayed.
James r. mowbray, Jerry L. soucie, and Jeff pickens, of
nebraska commission on public advocacy, for appellant.
Jon bruning, attorney General, and J. kirk brown for
appellee.
H eavicaN, 	c.J., 	W rigHt, 	coNNolly, 	gerrard, 	S tepHaN,
mccormack, and miller -lermaN, JJ.
coNNolly, J.
tabLe of contents
i. 	introduction ...................................................................... 	6
ii. 	background....................................................................... 	7
. events preceding mata’s direct appeal ...................... 	7
2. mata’s direct appeal and order of resentencing ...... 	8
3. resentencing proceedings ........................................... 	8

iii. assignments of error ....................................................... 0
iV. standard of review .......................................................... 
V. 	analysis ............................................................................ 
. Jurisdiction ................................................................... 
2. arguments that this court erred in ordering
mata’s resentencing under L.b.  ............................. 3
3. the exceptional depravity aggravator
is not unconstitutional................................................ 9
4. capital sentencing statutes did not prejudice
mata’s right to a Jury trial ........................................ 9
5. the division of roles between the Jury and the
three-Judge panel does not Violate the
8th and 4th amendments ........................................... 2
6. Jury Was properly instructed ...................................... 25
(a) use of the term “apparently relished”
did not render aggravator instruction
unconstitutionally Vague ...................................... 25
(b) Jury Was not required to unanimously
agree on alternative theories of
exceptional depravity ........................................... 28
7. proportionality review ................................................ 29
8. constitutionality of electrocution ............................... 3
(a) nebraska constitution Governs the issue ............. 32
(i) 	early u.s. supreme court decisions
on electrocution ............................................ 34
(ii) 	this court’s duty to safeguard
constitutional rights ..................................... 38
(b) Legal standards defining cruel and
unusual punishment.............................................. 40
(i) 	substantial risk that prisoner Will
suffer unnecessary and Wanton pain ........... 40
(ii) 	evolving standards of decency .................... 4
(iii) dignity of man .............................................. 44
(iv) no requirement to show Legislature
intended to cause pain or
Lingering death............................................. 45
(c) standard of review ............................................... 48
(i) 	Questions of Law and fact ........................... 48
(ii) 	deference due Legislature ............................ 49
state v. mata 	5
cite as 275 neb. 

6 	275 nebraska reports
(d) parties’ contentions............................................... 50
(e) nebraska statutes require a continuous
electric current but fail to specify
its strength or force ............................................. 50
(f) preparations for electrocution .............................. 52
(g) the prisoner’s body is burned............................. 52
(h) 2004 protocol Will not eliminate risk
of prisoner burning or catching fire ................... 54
(i) district court found some prisoners Would
experience unnecessary pain and torture ........... 55
(i) 	heart capable of restarting .......................... 58
(ii) 	state’s theories of instantaneous
Loss of brain function ................................. 58
(iii) defense experts reject state’s theories ...... 60
(iv) evidence shows some prisoners
still alive ....................................................... 63
(v) 	sources of pain in an electrocution.............. 64
(vi) evidence supports court’s finding that
some prisoners Will experience
unnecessary pain, suffering,
and torture .................................................... 65
(j) conclusion: electrocution is
cruel and unusual punishment............................. 67
(k) resolution .............................................................. 67
Vi. conclusion ....................................................................... 69
i. introduction
a jury convicted raymond mata, Jr., of first degree murder
and kidnapping. a three-judge panel sentenced mata to death
for the first degree premeditated murder of 3-year-old adam
Gomez. the presiding judge sentenced him to life imprison-
ment for kidnapping. between his sentencing and our decision
in his first direct appeal, the u.s. supreme court decided Ring
v. Arizona, which required juries to find whether aggravat-
ing circumstances exist in death penalty cases. in State v.
Mata (Mata I),2 we affirmed both of mata’s convictions, but,
 Ring v. Arizona, 536 u.s. 584, 22 s. ct. 2428, 53 L. ed. 2d 556 (2002).
2 State v. Mata, 266 neb. 668, 668 n.W.2d 448 (2003).

applying Ring, we vacated his death sentence and remanded
the cause for resentencing. after a jury found the existence of
an aggravating circumstance, a three-judge panel resentenced
mata to death.
in this appeal, mata argues that this court and the trial court
erred in numerous respects regarding his resentencing. he also
argues that electrocution is cruel and unusual punishment pro-
hibited by the u.s. and nebraska constitutions.
ii. backGround
in June 2000, a three-judge panel sentenced mata to death
for premeditated murder. the three-judge panel found the
existence of an aggravating circumstance, exceptional deprav-
ity, under neb. rev. stat. § 29-2523()(d) (cum. supp. 2002).
While mata’s direct appeal was pending, the u.s. supreme
court promulgated a new constitutional rule and the nebraska
Legislature responded by amending nebraska’s capital sen-
tencing statutes.
1. eveNtS precediNg mata ’S direct appeal
in June 2002, the u.s. supreme court decided Ring.3 the
court determined, under the sixth amendment, that arizona’s
aggravating circumstances in capital cases are the functional
equivalent of elements that expose a defendant to greater pun-
ishment. therefore, it determined that they must be found by a
jury. in november, the Governor signed into law L.b. ,4 emer-
gency legislation that reassigned responsibility for determining
the existence of aggravating factors from judges to juries, as
required by Ring, for any capital sentencing proceeding occur-
ring on or after november 23, 2002.
in march 2003, this court decided State v. Gales.5 We stated
that new constitutional rules apply to pending direct appeals.
therefore, under Ring, we vacated the defendant’s death sen-
tence because the sentencing judge, not a jury, had determined
the existence of aggravating circumstances. We remanded the
3 Ring, supra note .
4 2002 neb. Laws, L.b. .
5 State v. Gales, 265 neb. 598, 658 n.W.2d 604 (2003).
state v. mata 	7
cite as 275 neb. 

8 	275 nebraska reports
cause for resentencing and set out a new procedural rule for
capital cases in the wake of Ring. We recognized that L.b.
 had amended neb. rev. stat. § 29-603 (reissue 995) to
require that when the state seeks the death penalty, the infor-
mation must contain a “notice of aggravation which alleges one
or more aggravating circumstances.” but we concluded that
the notice requirement did not apply to the defendant’s resen-
tencing because it is a procedural rule that has no retroactive
effect.6 We limited, however, the aggravating circumstances the
state could seek to prove at the resentencing hearing to those
“which were determined to exist in the first trial, and as to
which [the defendant] is therefore on notice.”7
2. mata ’S direct appeal aNd order of reSeNteNciNg
in september 2003, this court affirmed mata’s convictions
and his sentence of life imprisonment for kidnapping in his
direct appeal.8 although mata had not raised the constitutional-
ity of nebraska’s capital sentencing scheme at trial, we vacated
his death sentence. We found plain error because a sentencing
panel had found the existence of a statutory aggravating circum-
stance. We recognized that double jeopardy concerns attach to
capital sentencing hearings in nebraska. but we decided that
mata’s resentencing would not violate the double Jeopardy
clause because the three-judge panel had not acquitted him of
the death penalty. there was no acquittal because the evidence
was sufficient to () find under § 29-2523 the existence of
aggravator ()(d) and (2) conclude that the aggravating factor
outweighed the mitigating factors. under Gales, we directed
that on remand, the state could attempt to prove only whether
aggravator ()(d) existed because that was the only aggravator
proved at the first trial.
3. reSeNteNciNg proceediNgS
on remand, before the jury trial on the aggravating circum-
stance, there were three hearings on defense motions. mata
6 Id.
7 Id. at 636, 658 n.W.2d at 63.
8 Mata I, supra note 2.

first moved to prohibit a trial on the existence of aggravator
()(d) because () the original information did not allege any
aggravators; (2) Ring had rendered unconstitutional the capital
sentencing procedures in effect in 999, when mata was origi-
nally charged by information; and (3) L.b.  had repealed the
death penalty statutes in effect in 999 and now mandated that
the state allege aggravators in the information. mata argued
that because the prosecutor had not alleged essential elements
of capital murder, the information was fatally defective and
the district court lacked jurisdiction. he also alleged that the
double Jeopardy clause prohibited jury factfinding on aggra-
vating circumstances because the jury had already convicted
him of noncapital murder.
in addition, mata alleged that this court’s attempt to cor-
rect the new capital sentencing proceedings had invaded the
Legislature’s province by creating special procedures contrary
to L.b. . mata also alleged that our directions for resen-
tencing () invaded the prosecutor’s discretionary charging
authority, (2) violated his due process right to rely on the
state’s compliance with a sentencing scheme, and (3) vio-
lated his eighth amendment right to be free from arbitrary
sentencing proceedings.
the court overruled that motion and ordered the state to file
a verified notice of aggravation. after the state filed the notice,
mata filed a plea in bar, making many of the same allegations.
the court determined it lacked jurisdiction to accept that plea.
it determined that a plea in bar was not an authorized procedure
in a resentencing proceeding after the conviction had become
final. mata then filed a notice of appeal.
While his appeal was pending, mata filed motions to ()
declare nebraska’s death penalty statutes at the time of the
murder unconstitutional under Ring; (2) declare that the stat-
utes at the time of the murder had been repealed; (3) demand
the imposition of a life sentence; (4) prohibit any further death
penalty proceedings under L.b.  as ex post facto legislation
because there was no constitutionally valid crime of capital
murder in 999; (5) declare the death penalty statutes unconsti-
tutional and aggravator ()(d) unconstitutional, facially and as
state v. mata 	9
cite as 275 neb. 

0 	275 nebraska reports
applied; and (6) stay the aggravation trial pending his appeal on
the denial of his plea in bar.
after hearing these motions, the court denied the stay because
mata had not been acquitted of the death penalty. thus, no
grounds existed for his plea in bar. it also ruled that it was
bound by the law of the case regarding his other motions.
mata then moved that the court instruct the jury that if it
unanimously found the existence of aggravator ()(d), it must
make written findings of all facts that supported the aggravat-
ing circumstance. the court did not give that instruction.
after the aggravation trial in January 2005, the jury returned
a verdict unanimously finding the existence of the excep-
tional depravity aggravator. this court dismissed mata’s appeal
regarding his plea in bar for lack of jurisdiction under neb. ct.
r. of prac. 7b() (rev. 200).9
in march 2005, the trial court heard a joint motion from
mata and Jeffrey hessler, another death row inmate, to declare
electrocution as the method of inflicting death unconstitutional.
after receiving evidence at a hearing, the court overruled the
motion in an extensive order, which we will discuss later in
addressing his claim that electrocution is cruel and unusual
punishment. it concluded that it was bound by appellate deci-
sions holding that electrocution did not constitute cruel and
unusual punishment.
in June 2005, a three-judge panel heard evidence on miti-
gation and sentencing disproportionality. the panel found no
statutory mitigating circumstances. it also considered five non-
statutory mitigating circumstances but concluded that they did
not approach or exceed the weight of the exceptional depravity
circumstance. after also concluding that the penalty was not
excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar
cases, the panel sentenced mata to death.
iii. assiGnments of error
mata assigns, renumbered and restated, that the district
court erred in resentencing him to death because () the court
did not have jurisdiction over the aggravation hearing pending
9 see State v. Mata, 269 neb. xxii (no. s-04-332, Jan. 20, 2005).

his appeal regarding his plea in bar, (2) the new sentencing
procedures could not be used when the information failed to
allege aggravating circumstances, (3) his death sentence vio-
lated prohibitions against double jeopardy and ex post facto
legislation, (4) the “exceptional depravity” aggravator could
not be rationally applied because this court has not sufficiently
defined it, (5) the role assignment of factfinding by the jury
and weighing by the three-judge panel violates the 8th and 4th
amendments, and (6) his right to a jury trial was prejudiced
because the sentencing scheme gives greater procedural protec-
tions to defendants who waive their right to a jury.
in addition, mata assigns that the court erred by () instruct-
ing the jury on alternative theories to prove the exceptional
depravity aggravator without requiring that the jurors unani-
mously agree on a theory and state which facts they unani-
mously found to support that theory and (2) giving the jury an
instruction on alternative theories when one of them was uncon-
stitutionally vague. finally, mata assigns that the district court
erred in failing to hold that electrocution as the sole method
of judicial execution under neb. rev. stat. § 29-2532 (reissue
995) is unconstitutional.
iV. standard of reVieW
[] except for mata’s claim that electrocution constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment, all mata’s assignments of error
present questions of law. When we review questions of law, we
resolve the questions independently of the lower court’s conclu-
sions.0 We discuss our standard of review for challenges to a
method of execution in section V8(c)(i) below.
V. anaLYsis
1. J uriSdictioN
[2,3] initially, we address mata’s jurisdictional argument. if
the district court lacked jurisdiction, we acquire no jurisdiction.
0 State v. Clapper, 273 neb. 750, 732 n.W.2d 657 (2007).
 see State v. Sklenar, 269 neb. 98, 690 n.W.2d 63 (2005).
state v. mata 	
cite as 275 neb. 

2 	275 nebraska reports
When a jurisdictional question does not involve a factual dis-
pute, we determine the issue as a matter of law.2
mata contends that the district court lacked jurisdiction to
conduct an aggravation hearing or impose the death sentence.
he argues the court lacked jurisdiction while the appeal from
his plea in bar was pending. the district court determined that
the plea in bar statute, neb. rev. stat. § 29-87 (reissue
995), only permits a defendant to file a plea in bar before
entering a plea to the general issues. because the jury had
already convicted mata and this court had affirmed his convic-
tions, the district court concluded that the statute did not autho-
rize a plea in bar for a resentencing proceeding. mata, however,
argues that because the district court required the state to file a
notice of aggravating circumstances, it effectively allowed the
state to amend the original information to charge the crime of
capital murder. so, he contends that he was required to file a
plea in bar and appeal to preserve the issues.
mata argues that in State v. Kula,3 this court recognized that
a defendant could file a plea in bar after a direct appeal. that
case, however, is distinguishable. in Kula, we had previously
reversed the defendant’s convictions because we concluded
that the trial court erred in failing to grant the defendant a new
trial for prosecutorial misconduct. on remand, the defendant
filed a plea in bar regarding the retrial. in contrast, in Mata I,
we affirmed mata’s convictions. moreover, we rejected mata’s
double jeopardy argument that the state had convicted him of
the lesser-included offense of noncapital murder and that the
state could not convict him of capital murder in a resentenc-
ing proceeding.4 thus, mata’s convictions were final after this
court’s decision in his first direct appeal. We remanded the
cause only for resentencing.
[4,5] the district court correctly determined that a plea in bar
was not a proper procedure under these circumstances. it was
bound by the law of the case; our order limited its authority.
2 see State v. Merrill, 273 neb. 583, 73 n.W.2d 570 (2007).
3 State v. Kula, 254 neb. 962, 579 n.W.2d 54 (998).
4 see Mata I, supra note 2.

it did not have authority to enter a judgment or order different
from, or in addition to, this court’s directions for resentencing.
When we remand a cause with specific directions, the lower
court has no power to do anything but to obey the mandate.5
moreover, a plea in bar was not necessary to preserve
these issues. the district court had previously addressed mata’s
motion to prevent an aggravation hearing, in which motion mata
raised the same arguments. the court overruled that motion and
apparently, out of an abundance of caution, ordered the state
to file a verified notice of aggravation. but the notice was not
required under our directions for resentencing. We explicitly
stated in Mata I that the notice requirement was a procedural
statute that was not applicable to steps already taken in mata’s
first capital sentencing hearing. and we limited the state’s case
to the aggravating circumstance that the three-judge panel had
previously found to exist in mata’s first sentencing hearing, of
which mata was on notice. but our conclusion that the further
notice was not required does not establish that we ordered mata
to be tried for capital murder on an information that failed to
allege the essential elements of capital murder.
2. argumeNtS tHat tHiS court erred iN orderiNg
mata ’S reSeNteNciNg uNder l.b. 1
mata argues that his original death sentence was void ab
initio because Ring invalidated nebraska’s capital sentencing
statutes that were in effect when he committed the murder. from
this premise, he advances a garden of arguments, claims, and
contentions. he argues that under the original statutes, the state
could not sentence him to death because those statutes did not
provide a constitutionally valid procedure for imposing a death
sentence and because the Legislature had repealed the statutes
since he committed the offense. therefore, he argues that the
jury had already convicted him of noncapital murder. he further
argues that L.b.  has created two substantive categories of first
degree murder: noncapital first degree murder, for which the
punishment is life imprisonment when a county attorney does
not allege aggravating circumstances, and capital first degree
5 see State v. Thomas, 268 neb. 570, 685 n.W.2d 69 (2004).
state v. mata 	3
cite as 275 neb. 

4 	275 nebraska reports
murder, for which the punishment is potentially death when the
county attorney alleges aggravating circumstances.
so, mata contends that when the county attorney filed notice
of an aggravator, it increased the charge to capital murder, which
violated the prohibition against double jeopardy.6 in the same
vein, mata argues that resentencing him under the new capital
sentencing procedures exposed him to greater punishment—
death—than he could have received under the original statutes.
he contends that this exposure to greater punishment violated
the prohibition against ex post facto legislation.7 also, mata
argues that in our opinion in Mata I, we did not have authority
to order the state to prosecute him for capital murder when the
information initially failed to allege aggravating circumstances.
finally, he contends that due process required the state to
allege the aggravating circumstances in the information. these
arguments sprout from the same soil—that under L.b. , aggra-
vating circumstances are essential elements of a newly created
offense of capital first degree murder. We plowed that ground
in Gales and Mata I.
in Gales, the defendant’s appeal was pending when Ring was
decided. We recognized that new constitutional rules apply to
all state or federal cases which are pending on direct review
or are not yet final when the rule is announced.8 We therefore
concluded that Ring required us to vacate the defendant’s death
sentence and remand the cause for resentencing under the new
procedures in L.b. . We held that the reassignment in L.b. 
from judges to juries to decide whether aggravating circum-
stances exist is a procedural change that does not violate ex
post facto principles.
We further recognized that the “aggravation hearing” under
neb. rev. stat. § 29-2520 (cum. supp. 2006) was triggered
by a notice of aggravation, which had not been filed. but the
6 see, Mata I, supra note 2 (explaining double jeopardy prohibitions); State
v. White, 254 neb. 566, 577 n.W.2d 74 (998).
7 see State v. Urbano, 256 neb. 94, 589 n.W.2d 44 (999) (explaining ex
post facto prohibitions).
8 see Mata I, supra note 2, citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 u.s. 34, 07 s.
ct. 708, 93 L. ed. 2d 649 (987).

aggravation notice requirement in L.b.  was a new procedure.
We therefore held it did not apply to the defendant’s resentenc-
ing because there was no requirement of such notice when the
state initially filed the information or at any time before the
defendant’s trial or first sentencing hearing. nonetheless, we
held that the state could “seek to prove only those aggravating
circumstances which were determined to exist in the first trial,
and as to which [the defendant] is therefore on notice.”9
in Mata I, we rejected mata’s argument that we had erred in
holding that the new “notice of aggravation” provision under
L.b.  was not applicable to resentencing proceedings. We
further rejected his argument that this holding amounted to our
overruling the Legislature. We reasoned that our procedural
rule—limiting the aggravating circumstances the state could
attempt to prove at resentencing to those that it proved in the
first trial—gave effect to the Legislature’s intent to give the
defendant notice of the aggravating factors that the state would
seek to prove.
mata contends that we incorrectly analyzed the ex post facto
issue because we failed to consider that Ring rendered uncon-
stitutional the death penalty statutes in effect when he com-
mitted the murder. We disagree. our conclusion that the state
could resentence mata under the new capital sentencing statutes
would not have been different if we had specifically held that
nebraska’s original sentencing statutes were unconstitutional.
the arizona and idaho supreme courts have rejected mata’s
“void ab initio” argument, despite holding that Ring invalidated
their capital sentencing statutes.20 both courts relied upon the
u.s. supreme court’s decision in Dobbert v. Florida,2 which
dealt with similar issues and arguments.
in Dobbert, at the time the defendant murdered his children,
florida’s capital sentencing statutes mandated death unless
the jury recommended mercy. after the defendant committed
9 Gales, supra note 5, 265 neb. at 636, 658 n.W.2d at 63.
20 see, State v. Ring, 204 ariz. 534, 65 p.3d 95 (2003); State v. Lovelace, 40
idaho 53, 90 p.3d 278 (2003).
2 Dobbert v. Florida, 432 u.s. 282, 97 s. ct. 2290, 53 L. ed. 2d 344
(977).
state v. mata 	5
cite as 275 neb. 

6 	275 nebraska reports
the murders, but before the state tried him, a new consti-
tutional rule led to the amendment of florida’s capital sen-
tencing statutes. first, the u.s. supreme court struck down
capital sentencing schemes that gave the jury complete discre-
tion whether to impose a death sentence.22 then, the florida
supreme court held that the state’s capital sentencing statute
was unconstitutional, and the florida Legislature amended the
statutes. the new statutes provided for the jury to render an
advisory recommendation of a life sentence or death and for
the judge to impose the actual sentence. the judge sentenced
the defendant to death despite the jury’s recommendation of a
life sentence.23
[6] the u.s. supreme court concluded that the amendment
“simply altered the methods employed in determining whether
the death penalty was to be imposed; there was no change in
the quantum of punishment attached to the crime.”24 it also
concluded that the statutory shift in sentencing from the jury to
the judge did not make a death sentence any more probable.25
Like mata, the defendant in Dobbert argued that the state could
not have sentenced him to death under the original statutes
because the florida supreme court later declared them uncon-
stitutional and that therefore, the procedural changes increased
his punishment. but the u.s. supreme court concluded that
“this sophistic argument mocks the substance of the Ex Post
Facto clause.”26 because florida’s statutes permitted the death
penalty for his offense at the time it was committed, the defen-
dant knew his crime was a capital offense.27 moreover, the
procedural change did not reflect a legislative intent to target
any specific persons or classes of persons.28 therefore, mere
22 see Furman v. Georgia, 408 u.s. 238, 92 s. ct. 2726, 33 L. ed. 2d
346 (972).
23 see Dobbert, supra note 2.
24 Id., 432 u.s. at 293-94.
25 see id.
26 Id., 432 u.s. at 297.
27 see id.
28 People v. District Court, 834 p.2d 8 (colo. 992).

procedural changes to comply with new constitutional rules do
not disadvantage a defendant or impose additional punishment
even if the procedures in effect when the defendant committed
the offense are later declared unconstitutional. under Dobbert,
mata’s argument that his punishment was increased by the
enactment of L.b.  fails.
similarly, mata incorrectly argues that L.b.  created a new
substantive crime of capital first degree murder, for which
aggravators are essential elements. the Legislature intended
L.b.  to comply with the u.s. supreme court’s decision in
Ring. it specifically stated that aggravating circumstances “are
not intended to constitute elements of the crime generally unless
subsequently so required by the state or federal constitution.”29
the u.s. supreme court rejected in Schriro v. Summerlin30 the
“elements” argument that mata makes here.
in Summerlin v. Stewart,3 the ninth circuit had concluded
that Ring announced a substantive rule that applied retroac-
tively. the ninth circuit reasoned that because Ring treated
aggravating circumstances as “‘the functional equivalent of . . .
element[s],’” the decision “reintroduced ‘capital murder’ as a
separate substantive, offense.”32 thus, the court concluded that
Ring redefined the substantive elements of capital murder. the
u.s. supreme court reversed the decision of the ninth circuit
and held that Ring was a procedural, not a substantive, deci-
sion. as we discussed in State v. Hessler,33 the court clarified
in Schriro that aggravating circumstances are not elements for
sixth amendment purposes.34
[7] We reaffirm our holding in Gales that Ring is not a sub-
stantive change in sixth amendment requirements and did not
make aggravating circumstances essential elements of capital
29 see neb. rev. stat. § 29-259 (cum. supp. 2006).
30 Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 u.s. 348, 24 s. ct. 259, 59 L. ed. 2d
442 (2004).
3 Summerlin v. Stewart, 34 f.3d 082 (9th cir. 2003).
32 Id. at 05-06.
33 State v. Hessler, 274 neb. 478, 74 n.W.2d 406 (2007).
34 see Schriro, supra note 30.
state v. mata 	7
cite as 275 neb. 

8 	275 nebraska reports
murder. instead, Ring extended sixth amendment jury protec-
tions to the finding of aggravating circumstances.35 because
the Legislature intended that aggravating circumstances not be
considered elements unless constitutionally required, L.b. 
also did not create new elements for first degree murder.
the federal courts of appeals’ decisions that mata relies
on are distinguishable. those courts held that in federal pros-
ecutions, aggravating factors must be included in a grand jury
indictment.36 but those decisions are based on the grand jury
clause of the fifth amendment, and this provision has not been
made applicable to the states.37
[8,9] the sixth amendment requires states to give defen-
dants sufficient notice to ensure that they have an opportunity
to defend against the charges.38 but other state courts have
specifically held that resentencing necessitated by the new rule
of procedure in Ring does not violate either the defendant’s
due process rights or the defendant’s sixth amendment right
to notice.39 Like this court, they concluded that the state
was not required to file a statutory notice of aggravators in
a charging instrument when the defendant had actual knowl-
edge of the aggravators the state would seek to prove at the
resentencing hearing.
constitutionally sufficient notice was not an issue for mata’s
resentencing. We specifically limited the state’s cause on
remand to attempting to prove the aggravator of which mata
had full notice. the state had already proved the exceptional
depravity aggravator at his first sentencing hearing and, addi-
tionally, filed a notice of aggravation before the resentencing
35 see Hessler, supra note 33.
36 see, U.S. v. Quinones, 33 f.3d 49 (2d cir. 2002); U.S. v. Higgs, 353 f.3d
28 (4th cir. 2003); U.S. v. Allen, 406 f.3d 940 (8th cir. 2005).
37 see, Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 u.s. 466, 20 s. ct. 2348, 47 L. ed. 2d
435 (2000); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 u.s. 625, 92 s. ct. 22, 3 L. ed.
2d 536 (972).
38 In re Oliver, 333 u.s. 257, 68 s. ct. 499, 92 L. ed. 682 (948).
39 see, Terrell v. State, 276 Ga. 34, 572 s.e.2d 595 (2002); Lovelace, supra
note 20; State v. Glass, 36 s.W.3d 496 (mo. 2004); State v. Hunt, 357 n.c.
257, 582 s.e.2d 593 (2003).

hearing. thus, mata’s due process and sixth amendment rights
to notice were not violated.
further, because aggravating circumstances are not essen-
tial elements of a new substantive crime of capital murder,
the county attorney did not increase the charge by filing an
aggravation notice. for the same reason, this court’s holding
that the notice of aggravation in L.b.  was not applicable to
mata’s resentencing did not invade the Legislature’s province
to define crime or the county attorney’s authority to charge
crimes. We reject mata’s arguments that we erred in ordering
his resentencing.
3. tHe exceptioNal depravity aggravator
iS N ot uNcoNStitutioNal
[0] mata assigns that the exceptional depravity prong of
§ 29-2523()(d) is unconstitutional, facially and as applied to
his case. in one sentence, he contends that neither the statute
nor our previous interpretations of it have sufficiently defined
this aggravator so that it can be rationally and consistently
applied. the eighth circuit court of appeals has held that this
court’s definition of the exceptional depravity definition under
§ 29-2523()(d) is constitutional.40 mata does not explain why
aggravator ()(d) has not been sufficiently narrowed in the face
of this authority. an argument that does little more than to
restate an assignment of error does not support the assignment,
and this court will not address it.4
4. capital S eNteNciNg S tatuteS did N ot preJudice
mata ’S rigHt to a J ury trial
the jury instruction on exceptional depravity provided three
alternative theories that would prove the existence of aggrava-
tor ()(d). under neb. rev. stat. § 29-252(b)(2) (cum. supp.
2006), if mata had waived his right to a jury trial, the members
of the three-judge panel would have been required to make
written findings of the facts that they unanimously found to
40 see State v. Palmer, 257 neb. 702, 600 n.W.2d 756 (999), citing Joubert
v. Hopkins, 75 f.3d 232 (8th cir. 996).
4 see Livingston v. Metropolitan Util. Dist., 269 neb. 30, 692 n.W.2d
475 (2005).
state v. mata 	9
cite as 275 neb. 

20 	275 nebraska reports
exist in support of an aggravating circumstance. the statutory
procedures do not also require the jury to unanimously find the
existence of an alternative theory showing exceptional deprav-
ity. thus, mata argues, the statutes have a chilling effect on
his right to choose a jury trial under the sixth amendment.
mata relies on the u.s. supreme court’s decision in United
States v. Jackson.42
in Jackson, the court declared that the death sentence pro-
vision of a criminal statute was unconstitutional. under the
statute, a court could sentence a defendant to death only
if the jury recommended death in its verdict. a defendant
could therefore completely avoid a death sentence by plead-
ing guilty or waiving a jury trial, which needlessly coerced
defendants to give up these constitutional rights. but “Jackson
did not hold, as subsequent decisions have made clear, that the
constitution forbids every government-imposed choice in the
criminal process that has the effect of discouraging the exercise
of constitutional rights.”43
[] for example, the u.s. supreme court held that Jackson
did not invalidate new Jersey’s capital sentencing statute.44
that statute allowed the judge, in accepting a no contest plea, to
impose a term less than the mandatory life sentence required if
a jury convicted the defendant of first degree murder. because
the judge could also impose the maximum punishment, the
defendant could not avoid that punishment by pleading no
contest. the court held that his right to a jury trial was not
unconstitutionally burdened.45 therefore, Jackson challenges
are limited to statutory schemes that allow a defendant to com-
pletely avoid the punishment that a jury could impose.
42 United States v. Jackson, 390 u.s. 570, 88 s. ct. 209, 20 L. ed. 2d
38 (968).
43 Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 42 u.s. 7, 30, 93 s. ct. 977, 36 L. ed. 2d
74 (973).
44 see Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 u.s. 22, 99 s. ct. 492, 58 L. ed. 2d
466 (978).
45 see id.

We rejected a Jackson challenge in Hessler.46 the defendant
argued that nebraska’s capital sentencing scheme violated the
sixth amendment. he claimed that it forces a defendant to
waive his right to a jury’s determination of aggravating circum-
stances if the defendant prefers to have the same fact finder
determine both the aggravating circumstances and the sentence.
We concluded that Jackson was not applicable because the
defendant could not avoid the risk of death by waiving his right
to a jury. We reasoned that there was no clear advantage to for-
going a jury. We stated that while a sentencing panel might be
more versed if it had also found the aggravating circumstances,
this does not mean that its sentence would necessarily be more
favorable to the defendant.47
the same reasoning applies here. requiring three judges
to unanimously agree on any fact supporting an aggravating
circumstance does not necessarily make a favorable sentence
more likely than requiring 2 jurors to unanimously agree under
alternative theories. because mata could not avoid the risk
of death by waiving his right to a jury, we conclude that his
Jackson challenge fails.
5. tHe diviSioN of roleS betWeeN tHe J ury aNd
tHe tHree -J udge paNel doeS N ot violate
tHe 8 tH aNd 14 tH ameNdmeNtS
under nebraska’s capital sentencing scheme, a jury, if not
waived, only determines the existence of aggravating circum-
stances.48 a three-judge panel determines the existence of miti-
gating circumstances, weighs aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances, and determines the sentence.49 mata contends that
a three-judge panel cannot properly weigh aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. he argues the panel has no guidance
from the jury as to the weight to apply to aggravators com-
pared to mitigators. he contends that the sentencing scheme
46 Hessler, supra note 33.
47 see id.
48 see § 29-2520.
49 see § 29-252.
state v. mata 	2
cite as 275 neb. 

22 	275 nebraska reports
is therefore arbitrary and capricious and violates the 8th and
4th amendments.
[2] the 8th amendment, made applicable to the states
through the 4th amendment,50 requires states authorizing the
death penalty to adopt procedures that will avoid imposing it in
an arbitrary and capricious manner.5
in Gales,52 we determined that for sixth amendment pur-
poses, Ring did not require jury sentencing in capital cases,
as long as the jury determined the existence of aggravating
circumstances. but we also discussed eighth amendment chal-
lenges to capital sentencing schemes. We pointed out in Gales
that the u.s. supreme court had upheld florida’s capital sen-
tencing scheme against eighth amendment arbitrary and capri-
cious challenges twice.53 nebraska’s and florida’s sentencing
schemes are similar in the limited role that juries play in sen-
tencing capital defendants.54
before the Legislature enacted L.b.  in response to Ring,
juries in nebraska had no participation in capital sentenc-
ing procedures. the jury’s role was limited to determining
whether the defendant was guilty of first degree murder.55
under florida’s sentencing scheme, the jury’s verdict regard-
ing whether a court should sentence the defendant to death
is only advisory. “[t]he actual sentence is determined by the
trial judge.”56 in Proffitt v. Florida,57 an eighth amendment
50 see Gales, supra note 5.
5 see id., citing Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 u.s. 420, 00 s. ct. 759, 64 L. ed.
2d 398 (980).
52 Gales, supra note 5.
53 see, Spaziano v. Florida, 468 u.s. 447, 04 s. ct. 354, 82 L. ed. 2d
340 (984); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 u.s. 242, 96 s. ct. 2960, 49 L. ed. 2d
93 (976).
54 see State v. Simants, 97 neb. 549, 250 n.W.2d 88 (977) (discussing
capital sentencing procedures), disapproved on other grounds, State v.
Reeves, 234 neb. 7, 453 n.W.2d 359 (990), vacated 498 u.s. 964, 
s. ct. 425, 2 L. ed. 2d 409.
55 see id.
56 Proffitt, supra note 53, 428 u.s. at 249.
57 Id., 428 u.s. at 252.

case involving florida’s statutes, the u.s. supreme court com-
mented on jury sentencing:
this court has pointed out that jury sentencing in a capital
case can perform an important societal function . . . but it
has never suggested that jury sentencing is constitution-
ally required. and it would appear that judicial sentencing
should lead, if anything, to even greater consistency in the
imposition at the trial court level of capital punishment,
since a trial judge is more experienced in sentencing than
a jury, and therefore is better able to impose sentences
similar to those imposed in analogous cases.
relying on Proffitt, this court has held that the absence of jury
sentencing in nebraska’s sentencing scheme does not violate
the due process clause.58
[3] Later, in Spaziano v. Florida,59 the u.s. supreme court
rejected a challenge that a florida trial judge’s imposition of
the death penalty after the jury had recommended a life sen-
tence violated the eighth amendment. the court’s statement in
Spaziano emphasizes that judicial sentencing does not violate
the eighth amendment’s twin procedural requirements in death
penalty cases that () a state rationally narrow those eligible for
the death penalty and (2) the sentencer consider the individual
circumstances of the defendant and his or her crime.
“[T]he purpose of the death penalty is not frustrated by, or
inconsistent with, a scheme in which the imposition of the
penalty in individual cases is determined by a judge.” . . .
“. . . [W]e are unwilling to say that there is any one right
way for a state to set up its capital sentencing scheme.”60
similarly, the court rejected a challenge that alabama’s sen-
tencing scheme violated the eighth amendment.6 at that time,
alabama’s statutes required the jury to fix the punishment at
death if it convicted the defendant of a specified aggravating
58 see Simants, supra note 54.
59 Spaziano, supra note 53.
60 Gales, supra note 5, 265 neb. at 62-3, 658 n.W.2d at 66 (emphasis in
original), quoting Spaziano, supra note 53.
6 see Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 u.s. 372, 05 s. ct. 2727, 86 L. ed. 2d
300 (985).
state v. mata 	23
cite as 275 neb. 

24 	275 nebraska reports
circumstance. but the trial judge could refuse to accept the
jury’s death penalty and impose a life sentence instead. after
the conviction, the judge received evidence of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances and independently determined
whether the aggravating circumstances outweighed the miti-
gating circumstances. the jury’s sentence would have been
unconstitutional if dispositive, and the court clearly questioned
the wisdom of the scheme and pointed out that alabama had
abandoned it. nonetheless, it held that the scheme did not vio-
late the eighth amendment because the trial judge was the true
sentencing authority and was not required to give any deference
to the jury’s sentence.
[4] since Ring, of course, the sixth amendment requires
that juries determine the existence of aggravating circumstances
before a defendant can be considered eligible for the death pen-
alty. but this role change in nebraska’s sentencing procedures is
not significantly different from the advisory role that juries play
under the florida scheme or the jury’s mandatory death sen-
tence under the alabama scheme. in both cases, the jury effec-
tively determined that the defendant was death eligible. the trial
judge, who was the actual sentencing authority, considered the
individual circumstances of the defendant and his crime.62 Ring
has not altered the court’s determination that jury sentencing
is not required for eighth amendment purposes. as we pointed
out in Gales, one justice in Ring concurred in the decision that
juries must determine the existence of aggravators because he
believed that the eighth amendment requires jury sentencing.63
but no other justice joined this concurrence.
the u.s. supreme court has recognized that not all experts
agree jury sentencing is desirable in capital cases.64 it has
explicitly stated that judicial sentencing could lead to greater
consistency in the imposition of capital punishment.65 but
“[w]hatever the relative merits of sentencing by a judge or
62 see, e.g., Kansas v. Marsh, 548 u.s. 63, 26 s. ct. 256, 65 L. ed. 2d
429 (2006).
63 see Ring, supra note  (breyer, J., concurring in judgment).
64 see Chaffin, supra note 43.
65 see Proffitt, supra note 53.

jury may be, we need not consider them. our concern is the
constitutionality of the nebraska system, under the federal and
state constitutions.”66
absent any authority to the contrary, we conclude that judi-
cial sentencing is an acceptable means of ensuring that this
state does not sentence defendants to death in an arbitrary and
capricious manner. We have already held that neither due proc-
ess nor the sixth amendment requires jury sentencing.67 We
conclude that the eighth amendment similarly does not require
jury sentencing.
6. J ury WaS properly iNStructed
mata assigns that the district court improperly instructed
the jury in two respects. first, he argues the court should have
required jurors to reach a unanimous decision on the state’s
alternative theories of exceptional depravity. second, he con-
tends that the wording of one of the alternative theories was
unconstitutionally vague. We reject both arguments.
(a) use of the term “apparently relished” did not render
aggravator instruction unconstitutionally Vague
mata contends that the district court erred in instructing
the jury that the state can satisfy the “exceptional depravity”
aggravator in § 29-2523()(d) by proving that “the defen-
dant apparently relished the murder.” (emphasis supplied.)
he argues that the use of the term “apparently relished” ren-
dered the instruction unconstitutionally vague. he contends it
is not clear whether the term refers to the juror’s perception
or the defendant’s mental state. mata cites no authority for
this argument.
[5-20] Whether jury instructions given by a trial court are
correct is a question of law.68 in death penalty cases, the key
inquiry in examining eligibility and selection factors is whether
66 Simants, supra note 54, 97 neb. at 559, 250 n.W.2d at 888.
67 see, Gales, supra note 5; Simants, supra note 54.
68 see Hessler, supra note 33.
state v. mata 	25
cite as 275 neb. 

26 	275 nebraska reports
they are neutral and principled.69 in determining whether an
aggravating circumstance is unconstitutionally vague, the court
should consider whether it “creates an unacceptable risk of ran-
domness, the mark of [an] arbitrary and capricious sentencing
process.”70 an aggravating factor must be sufficiently narrow
so that it does not apply to everyone convicted of first degree
murder.7 but “[b]ecause ‘the proper degree of definition’ of eli-
gibility and selection factors often ‘is not susceptible of math-
ematical precision,’ [a] vagueness review is quite deferential.”72
“[a] factor is not unconstitutional if it has some ‘common-sense
core of meaning’” that a juror can understand.73
Jury instruction no. 2, in relevant part, provided:
the state of nebraska has alleged the following aggravat-
ing circumstance existed at the time the defendant com-
mitted the crime of first degree murder:
“that the murder manifested exceptional depravity by
ordinary standards of morality and intelligence”
the aggravating circumstance is presumed not to exist.
that means you may not return a verdict that it does exist
unless you unanimously decide the state has proved its
existence beyond a reasonable doubt.
. . . .
the essential elements necessary to prove the alleged
aggravating 	circumstance 	of 	exceptional 	depravity 	are
either that:
. the defendant apparently relished the murder; or
2. the defendant inflicted gratuitous violence on the
victim; or
3. the defendant needlessly mutilated the victim.
these three alternative theories come directly from this
court’s five-factor test for applying the “exceptional depravity”
69 Tuilaepa v. California, 52 u.s. 967, 4 s. ct. 2630, 29 L. ed. 2d
750 (994).
70 Id., 52 u.s. at 974.
7 Tuilaepa, supra note 69.
72 Id., 52 u.s. at 973 (citations omitted).
73 Id.

aggravator.74 as noted, the eighth circuit has held these five
factors are constitutional.75 in addition, we have previously con-
cluded that the phrase “apparent effort to conceal” in aggravator
()(b) of the earlier version of § 29-2523 referred to the fact
finder’s perspective of the defendant’s conduct.
before 998, aggravator ()(b) provided: “the murder was
committed in an apparent effort to conceal the commission of
a crime . . . .” in State v. Reeves,76 we agreed with the federal
district court that “‘apparent’” means “‘readily perceptible’”
and further agreed that aggravator ()(b) “‘cannot be applied
in speculative situations or where a strained construction is
necessary to fulfill it.’” after the Legislature removed “appar-
ent” from aggravator ()(b) in 998, the defendant in State v.
Lotter77 argued that the change had narrowed this aggravator’s
application, which necessitated resentencing. thus, we consid-
ered the effect that change had on what the sentencing panel
must conclude to find the existence of this aggravator.78 We first
considered the meaning of the phrase “apparent effort” before
the amendment. We noted that “readily perceptible” means eas-
ily capable of being noticed. We stated that before the amend-
ment, “apparent effort” meant that “for the sentencing panel to
conclude that [the defendant] murdered . . . in an ‘“apparent
effort to conceal the commission of a crime,”’ it must have
been obvious to the panel that that was [the defendant’s]
purpose.”79 We concluded that “apparent” had no substantive
meaning and was an obtuse way of stating that the aggravator
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
[2] although the challenge in Lotter was different, we
concluded that “apparent” clearly refers to the fact finder’s
perception. by analogy, we conclude that a juror would have
74 see State v. Palmer, 224 neb. 282, 399 n.W.2d 706 (986).
75 see Palmer, supra note 40, citing Joubert, supra note 40. see, also, Palmer
v. Clarke, 408 f.3d 423 (8th cir. 2005).
76 Reeves, supra note 54, 234 neb. at 754, 453 n.W.2d at 386.
77 State v. Lotter, 255 neb. 456, 586 n.W.2d 59 (998).
78 Id.
79 Id. at 52-22, 586 n.W.2d at 635 (emphasis supplied).
state v. mata 	27
cite as 275 neb. 

28 	275 nebraska reports
clearly understood that the term “apparently relished” in our
five-factor test under § 29-2523()(d) referred to his or her own
perception of mata’s conduct. the instruction was therefore not
unconstitutionally vague.
(b) Jury Was not required to unanimously agree on
alternative theories of exceptional depravity
mata contends that the district court erred in instructing the
jury on three alternative theories that would prove the aggra-
vating circumstance of “exceptional depravity.” he contends
that the court should have required the jury to unanimously
agree on a theory and to state the facts and theory it had
unanimously found.
a jury need not be unanimous on which theory it relies on to
convict a defendant of first degree murder, as long as each juror
is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant com-
mitted the crime.80 in State v. White,8 we stated that a plurality
of the u.s. supreme court had agreed the mens rea element of
first degree murder could be satisfied by proving that the defen-
dant committed either premeditated murder or felony murder.
mata contends that although we have referred to this plurality
opinion, we have not applied its test. he further contends that
instructing on alternate theories of exceptional depravity was
improper under this test because the theories do not carry equal
weight of culpability.
in Schad v. Arizona,82 the plurality adopted a due process
“fundamental fairness” test for determining whether a court
should treat alternative theories as separate offenses. under that
test, if a jury could never reasonably consider alternative theo-
ries as moral equivalents, then the jury must unanimously agree
on a theory. even if we applied this test, the question would be
whether the alternative theories of exceptional depravity may
ever be treated as moral equivalents.83
80 see, e.g., id.; White, supra note 6.
8 State v. White, 239 neb. 554, 477 n.W.2d 24 (99), citing Schad v.
Arizona, 50 u.s. 624,  s. ct. 249, 5 L. ed. 2d 555 (99).
82 Schad, supra note 8, 50 u.s. at 637.
83 see Schad, supra note 8.

more recently, however, in Richardson v. United States,84 the
u.s. supreme court, citing Schad, stated: “[t]his court has
indicated that the constitution itself limits a state’s power to
define crimes in ways that would permit juries to convict while
disagreeing about means, at least where that definition risks
serious unfairness and lacks support in history or tradition.” the
court explained that juries need not unanimously agree on
which of several possible sets of underlying brute facts
make up a particular element, say, which of several pos-
sible means the defendant used to commit an element of
the crime. . . . Where, for example, an element of robbery
is force or the threat of force, some jurors might conclude
that the defendant used a knife to create the threat; others
might conclude he used a gun. but that disagreement—a
disagreement about means—would not matter as long as
all 2 jurors unanimously concluded that the Government
had proved the necessary related element, namely, that the
defendant had threatened force.85
[22] these u.s. supreme court decisions are dealing with
elements of crimes, and we have determined aggravators are
not elements of the crime of capital murder. our five-factor
test may be analogous to the “means” by which the state can
establish the aggravator of exceptional depravity. but it nonethe-
less makes no difference whether the jurors divided on whether
the state proved mata apparently relished the murder, inflicted
gratuitous violence on the victim, or needlessly mutilated the
victim. under Richardson, the jurors were not required to unani-
mously agree on the means by which mata manifested excep-
tional depravity under § 29-2523()(d). We conclude that this
assignment of error is without merit.
7. proportioNality revieW
[23,24] under neb. rev. stat. § 29-252.03 (reissue 995),
we are required, upon appeal, to determine the propriety of a
84 Richardson v. United States, 526 u.s. 83, 820, 9 s. ct. 707, 43 L. ed.
2d 985 (999).
85 Id., 526 u.s. at 87.
state v. mata 	29
cite as 275 neb. 

30 	275 nebraska reports
death sentence by conducting a proportionality review.86 this
review requires us to compare the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances with those present in other cases in which a dis-
trict court imposed the death penalty. this is to ensure that the
sentence imposed here is no greater than those imposed in other
cases with the same or similar circumstances.87
both a three-judge panel after mata’s trial, and a jury after
we remanded for resentencing, have unanimously found that
the state proved the exceptional depravity aggravator beyond a
reasonable doubt. at his resentencing, after the jury returned its
verdict on aggravator ()(d), the three-judge panel received evi-
dence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and sentence
proportionality. the evidence from the trial is set forth in more
detail in Mata I.88 for proportionality review, it is sufficient to
say that the evidence at the aggravation hearing showed adam’s
skull had been fractured by multiple blows of blunt force trauma
at or near the time of death and that mata had dismembered
adam’s body and disposed of it in pieces. experts were unable
to determine the cause or time of adam’s death. the sentencing
panel concluded the evidence showed that mata had relished
killing adam with gratuitous violence and unnecessary mutila-
tion. the panel concluded that mata did this to affect adam’s
mother because he believed she was pushing him out of her life
in favor of adam’s father.
the sentencing panel found that the aggravating circum-
stance under these facts was sufficient to justify the death
penalty. it further concluded that the weight of the nonstatu-
tory mitigating circumstances it considered did not approach or
exceed the weight of the exceptional depravity circumstance.
the sentencing panel stated that “[t]he depravity shown from
these facts stands out and sets this case apart from [other
nebraska cases where the death sentence was not imposed]. it
shows a mind so bereft of redemption that justice demands a
sentence of death.”
86 see Hessler, supra note 33.
87 see, id.; State v. Gales, 269 neb. 443, 694 n.W.2d 24 (2005).
88 Mata I, supra note 2.

We have reviewed our relevant decisions on direct appeal
from other cases in which a district court found aggravating
circumstances and imposed the death penalty.89 We take particu-
lar notice of cases involving gratuitous violence inflicted upon
young children.90 having reviewed the relevant cases, we find
that the imposition of the death sentence is proportional to that
in the same or similar circumstances.
8. coNStitutioNality of electrocutioN
mata contends that the district court erred in failing to find
that death by electrocution under § 29-2532 unconstitutionally
imposes cruel and unusual punishment. the state, however,
contends that mata has failed to carry his burden of proof that
electrocution is cruel and unusual punishment. it further con-
tends no precedent exists to support mata’s position because
neither this court nor the u.s. supreme court has ever held that
a method of inflicting death is unconstitutional.
[25] We pause to clarify what this case is not about. mata
does not argue that the death penalty, in any form, violates the
u.s. and nebraska constitutions, nor could he. “[t]he death
penalty, when properly imposed by a state, does not violate
either the eighth or [the] fourteenth amendment [to] the united
states constitution or neb. const. art. [i], § 9.”9 so the issue
before us is not whether mata will be executed, but only whether
the current statutory method of execution is constitutional.
We have affirmed mata’s conviction and death sentence; we
have affirmed the jury’s finding that his crime was exception-
ally depraved; and we have determined that the imposition of
the death sentence in this case is proportional to that in the
same or similar circumstances. but this court’s finding that
mata’s crime was heinous does not negate our duty to safeguard
our state constitution.
89 see, e.g., Gales, supra note 87 (and cases cited therein).
90 see, e.g., id.; State v. Joubert, 224 neb. 4, 399 n.W.2d 237 (986);
Simants, supra note 54.
9 State v. Anderson and Hochstein, 207 neb. 5, 7-72, 296 n.W.2d 440,
453 (980).
state v. mata 	3
cite as 275 neb. 

32 	275 nebraska reports
obviously, all capital offenses involve heinous crimes. the
people of nebraska, through the Legislature, have determined
that in some circumstances, the state may impose the death
penalty. and we may not interfere unless the state’s procedures
in executing the prisoner violate constitutional requirements.
We limit our analysis to whether the state may constitution-
ally execute a sentence of death by electrocution. We must
decide whether electrocution is prohibited by the nebraska
constitution’s proscription against inflicting cruel and unusual
punishment. that 	determination, 	however, 	does 	not 	affect
mata’s sentence of death.
(a) nebraska constitution Governs the issue
it is correct that we have held that electrocution does not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of
the u.s. or nebraska constitution.92 but we have not previously
had the opportunity to review a factual record showing electro-
cution’s physiological effects on a prisoner, nor have we relied
on any case in which such evidence was reviewed. instead, we
have relied on u.s. supreme court decisions. as explained
below, those cases contain factual assumptions that some of the
court’s more recent cases have called into question.
unlike other recent cases where we declined to revisit this
issue, mata’s constitutional challenge to electrocution is not
procedurally barred93 and the parties have presented us with
a full evidentiary record.94 We also declined to address the
issue in mata’s first appeal because we remanded the cause for
resentencing. “[t]he possibility remain[ed] that mata [would]
not be resentenced to death, or that the nebraska Legislature
[would] address this issue prior to the conclusion of mata’s
resentencing.”95 but the Legislature did not address the issue.
in this appeal, we have a full evidentiary record. We conclude
92 State v. Bjorklund, 258 neb. 432, 604 n.W.2d 69 (2000); State v. Ryan,
248 neb. 405, 534 n.W.2d 766 (995); State v. Alvarez, 82 neb. 358, 54
n.W.2d 746 (967).
93 see State v. Moore, 272 neb. 7, 78 n.W.2d 537 (2006).
94 see Gales, supra note 87.
95 see Mata I, supra note 2, 266 neb. at 702, 668 n.W.2d at 479.

that evolving standards of decency are applicable to method-
of-execution challenges. those standards require that we now
review the evidence presented in this case in the light of mod-
ern scientific knowledge.
at the trial level, mata moved for a declaration that electro-
cution is cruel and unusual punishment under both the federal
and state constitutions. the issue was developed and tried as a
challenge under both constitutions. although in his brief, mata
assigned that electrocution violates the u.s. constitution, he did
not specifically cite to the nebraska constitution’s prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment. under our court rules,
this oversight could preclude us from considering the state
constitutional issue. however, because of the death penalty’s
severity and irrevocability, we have not strictly enforced briefing
rules on capital defendants.96
moreover, for reasons explained below, we conclude that
the nebraska constitution governs this issue. We have already
decided that we have a constitutional responsibility to deter-
mine whether electrocution is lawful. We stayed the execution
of carey dean moore, another death row inmate, pending the
outcome of that determination.97 also, three other cases on our
docket have raised the constitutionality of electrocution under
the nebraska constitution.98 We conclude that it is imperative
for this court to resolve this issue. in fulfilling our responsibil-
ity and in the interest of judicial economy, we excuse the tech-
nical omission in mata’s brief.
the nebraska constitution, article i, § 9, mirrors the u.s.
constitution’s eighth amendment: “excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishment inflicted.”99 obviously, we cannot, under the u.s.
constitution, declare that electrocution violates its cruel and
unusual punishment provision because the u.s. supreme court
has held otherwise. and we have stated that the nebraska
96 see Ryan, supra note 92.
97 State v. Moore, 273 neb. 495, 730 n.W.2d 563 (2007).
98 State v. Galindo, case no. s-04-326; State v. Sandoval, case no. s-05-42;
State v. Vela, case no. s-07-38.
99 u.s. const. amend. Viii; neb. const. art. i, § 9.
state v. mata 	33
cite as 275 neb. 

34 	275 nebraska reports
constitution’s cruel and unusual punishment provision “‘does
not require more than does the [eighth amendment to the] u.s.
constitution.’”00 but as we will explain, we now believe this
issue should be resolved by this court.
Like this court, the u.s. supreme court has never reviewed
objective evidence regarding electrocution’s constitutionality.
the supreme court based its holdings on state courts’ factual
assumptions, which, in turn, relied on untested science from
890. because we conclude that we can no longer rely on those
factual assumptions and because no other state imposes electro-
cution as its sole method of execution, we will decide the issue
under the nebraska constitution.
(i) Early U.S. Supreme Court Decisions on Electrocution
in 890, in In re Kemmler,0 the u.s. supreme court decided
the state of new York could proceed with the first execution
by electrocution. new York had carried out death sentences
by hanging until the governor recommended in 886 that the
Legislature find a less barbarous method.02 commercially avail-
able electricity was new, and states had not used it for an
execution.03 but after a legislative commission reported in 888
that electrocution was the most humane and practical method
of execution known to modern science,04 the state enacted
electrocution as its mode of execution. William kemmler, the
first prisoner scheduled to die by electrocution, challenged the
method as cruel and unusual punishment. he alleged electrocu-
tion violated his right to due process under both the state and
federal constitutions.05
00 State v. Hurbenca, 266 neb. 853, 862, 669 n.W.2d 668, 675 (2003), quoting
State v. Moore, 256 neb. 553, 59 n.W.2d 86 (999).
0 In re Kemmler, 36 u.s. 436, 0 s. ct. 930, 34 L. ed. 59 (890).
02 Id. see, also, Campbell v. Wood, 5 u.s. 9, 4 s. ct. 225, 28 L. ed.
2d 682 (994) (blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
03 see deborah W. denno, Is Electrocution an Unconstitutional Method of
Execution? The Engineering of Death Over the Century, 35 Wm. & mary
L. rev. 55 (994).
04 Kemmler v. Durston, 9 n.Y. 569, 24 n.e. 6 (890).
05 In re Kemmler, supra note 0.

the trial court concluded that kemmler had failed to over-
come the statute’s presumption of constitutionality. it deter-
mined that he failed to show “‘beyond doubt’” that “‘a force
of electricity [sufficient] to kill any human subject with celerity
and certainty, when scientifically applied, cannot be gener-
ated.’”06 the new York court of appeals affirmed. it concluded
that the statute’s presumption of constitutionality could not be
overcome by evidence outside the statute, other than what the
court could judicially notice.07 it therefore “held that the mode
. . . might be said to be unusual because it was new, but that it
could not be assumed to be cruel in the light of that common
knowledge which has stamped certain punishments as such.”08
but the court of appeals agreed the evidence showed that a cur-
rent sufficient to produce instantaneous, and therefore painless,
death could be applied.09
on appeal, the u.s. supreme court said that cruel and
unusual punishment could not be defined with precision. it
stated, however, that certain types of punishment clearly fell
within the eighth amendment’s prohibition: “punishments are
cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the
punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that
word as used in the constitution. it implies there [is] something
inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extin-
guishment of life.”0
over the last 8 years, the In re Kemmler standard has
remained the baseline criterion under the eighth amendment
for evaluating a method of execution. the court did not,
however, apply this standard in In re Kemmler to new York’s
newly enacted method, nor did it independently review the
evidence regarding electrocution. instead, it held that the 8th
amendment’s protections were not applicable to state actions
through the 4th amendment: “the decision of the state courts
06 Id., 36 u.s. at 442.
07 Kemmler, supra note 04.
08 see In re Kemmler, supra note 0, 36 u.s. at 447.
09 see id.
0 Id., 36 u.s. at 447.
state v. mata 	35
cite as 275 neb. 

36 	275 nebraska reports
sustaining the validity of [electrocution] under the state consti-
tution is not re[e]xaminable here . . . .” the court limited the
4th amendment’s protections to the prohibition of “arbitrary
deprivation of life, liberty, or property,” and “equal protec-
tion to all under like circumstances.”2 under that standard, it
concluded the state’s new execution method did not violate the
prisoner’s federal due process rights.3
therefore, the court did not decide the case under the eighth
amendment, and there was scant evidence about electrocution in
890. Yet, lower courts, including this court, have traveled the
well-worn path of summarily rejecting claims that electrocution
is cruel and unusual punishment. courts have “typically [relied]
on the strength of th[e] court’s opinion in In re Kemmler.”4
in Malloy v. South Carolina,5 a 95 case, the court held
that south carolina’s statutory change from hanging to electro-
cution did not constitute ex post facto punishment. it concluded
that the penalty for murder—death—had not been increased.
although the eighth amendment was not at issue, the court
judicially noticed that  other states, including nebraska, had
adopted electrocution after new York did. “[t]his result is the
consequent of a well-grounded belief that electrocution is less
painful and more humane than hanging.”6 thus, the court’s
reasoning, in part, relied on its factual assumption that elec-
trocution did not increase a condemned prisoner’s punishment
because electrocution was more humane than hanging.
as in In re Kemmler, the court in Malloy did not review
any evidence underlying that assumption. instead, it cited its
“approval” of electrocution in In re Kemmler and the approval
 Id. see, also, Weems v. United States, 27 u.s. 349, 30 s. ct. 544, 54 L. ed.
793 (90) (discussing holding in In re Kemmler, supra note 0).
2 In re Kemmler, supra note 0, 36 u.s. at 448-49.
3 Id.
4 see Glass v. Louisiana, 47 u.s. 080, 08, 05 s. ct. 259, 85 L. ed.
2d 54 (985) (brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari; marshall,
J., joins).
5 Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 u.s. 80, 35 s. ct. 507, 59 L. ed. 905
(95), cited in Alvarez, supra note 92.
6 Id., 237 u.s. at 85.

of 	massachusetts 	and 	new 	Jersey 	state 	courts. Yet, 	the
massachusetts supreme court assumed—without reviewing evi-
dence regarding the physiological effect of electrocution on the
human body—that electrocution is an instantaneous and painless
method of inflicting death.7 the new Jersey court declined to
“assume” electrocution was unconstitutional, and the opinion
shows that no evidence was presented on the issue.8
in Francis v. Resweber,9 a 946 case challenging electrocu-
tion, eight justices assumed without deciding that a violation of
the 8th amendment would violate a prisoner’s due process rights
under the 4th amendment. the issue was whether Louisiana
could conduct a second electrocution after the prisoner’s first
electrocution failed to result in death—not whether electrocution
was inherently cruel or unusual.
the four-justice plurality concluded: “the cruelty against
which the constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty
inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suf-
fering involved in any method employed to extinguish life
humanely.”20 the prisoner’s psychological hardship in facing
a second attempt to electrocute him was the result of an unfor-
tunate accident. it did not result in making “his subsequent
execution any more cruel in the constitutional sense than any
other execution.”2 the four-justice dissent concluded that elec-
trocution is not cruel and unusual punishment when painless and
instantaneous: “electrocution has been approved only in a form
that eliminates suffering.”22
thus, in Resweber, both the plurality and the dissent con-
cluded that electrocution could be constitutional. however, both
the plurality and the dissent again relied on In re Kemmler, in
which the court had refused to apply the eighth amendment
7 see Storti v. Commonwealth, 78 mass. 549, 60 n.e. 20 (90).
8 State v. Tomassi, 75 n.J.L. 739, 747, 69 a. 24, 28 (n.J. 908).
9 Francis v. Resweber, 329 u.s. 459, 462, 67 s. ct. 374, 9 L. ed. 422
(947). see, also, Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, 492 u.s.
257, 09 s. ct. 2909, 06 L. ed. 2d 29 (989).
20 Resweber, supra note 9, 329 u.s. at 464.
2 Id.
22 Id., 329 u.s. at 474 (burton, J., dissenting).
state v. mata 	37
cite as 275 neb. 

38 	275 nebraska reports
and had deferred to the new York court of appeals’ decision.
Resweber left intact the presumption that when properly carried
out, electrocution is an instantaneous and painless method of
inflicting death.
our review of these early cases illustrates that the u.s.
supreme court’s case law on electrocution relies on unexam-
ined factual assumptions about an electric current’s physiologi-
cal effects on a human. this obvious omission in the court’s
jurisprudence results from three factors: () the court’s limited
knowledge about an electrocution’s effect on the human body,
(2) the states’ desire to find a more humane method of execution
than hanging, and (3) the court’s view, when electrocution was
first introduced, that the eighth amendment was not intended as
a restraint on state legislatures’ determinations of punishment.
but that view has changed. the supreme court has specifically
held that the eighth amendment is a restraint on legislative power
to impose punishment.23 and it has held the 8th amendment
applies to the states through the 4th amendment.24
Yet since deciding Resweber in 946, the u.s. supreme
court has not addressed the constitutionality of any method
of execution,25 and only indirectly in that case. We agree with
Justice souter that in light of modern knowledge about elec-
trocution, the court’s decisions do not constitute a dispositive
response to the issue.26
(ii) This Court’s Duty to Safeguard Constitutional Rights
it is our duty to protect the constitutional rights afforded under
both the federal and the state constitutions.27 We conclude
23 see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 u.s. 53, 96 s. ct. 2909, 49 L. ed. 2d 859
(976).
24 see Robinson v. California, 370 u.s. 660, 82 s. ct. 47, 8 L. ed. 2d 758
(962).
25 State v. Webb, 252 conn. 28, 750 a.2d 448 (2000).
26 see Poyner v. Murray, 508 u.s. 93, 3 s. ct. 2397, 24 L. ed. 2d 299
(993) (souter, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari; blackmun and
stevens, JJ., join). accord Glass, supra note 4 (brennan, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari; marshall, J., joins).
27 neb. const. art. XV, § ; Fisher v. State, 40 neb. 26, 299 n.W. 50
(94); Wilson v. State, 87 neb. 638, 28 n.W. 38 (90).

that we can no longer rely on the factual assumptions implicit
in u.s. supreme court precedent pertaining to the constitution-
ality of execution by electrocution. because we are now pre-
sented with evidence of a nature and quality that the supreme
court never considered when it held electrocution was not
cruel and unusual punishment, we cannot rationally defer to
federal precedent.
as discussed, we cannot determine how the u.s. supreme
court would decide a challenge to electrocution as a method
of execution under the federal constitution if it were presented
with this evidence. but we note that some of the court’s recent
decisions and dissents have called attention to outdated factual
assumptions in the court’s precedent.28 We also know that the
court is highly unlikely to accept an appeal on the issue from
any other jurisdiction that has electrocution as an alternative
method of execution. the court has held that a condemned
prisoner waives a constitutional challenge to a method of
execution if he or she voluntarily selects that method.29 only
in nebraska is electrocution the mandated method of execution;
there is no alternative.30
We reject the dissent’s suggestion that we are bound by ques-
tionable federal precedent and should allow mata to attempt a
further appeal to the u.s. supreme court. it is not our function
to predict whether the supreme court would grant a writ of cer-
tiorari in this case. but it is our duty as constitutional officers to
decide the challenge presented in this automatic appeal, based
on the record of the case, as tried and decided. and we will not
shirk or abdicate our duty to safeguard the constitutional rights
afforded by our state constitution. We conclude that whether
electrocution is cruel and unusual punishment is an issue that
has fallen to this court to determine.
28 see, Moore, supra note 97; Gales, supra note 87; Mata I, supra note 2.
29 Stewart v. LaGrand, 526 u.s. 5, 9 s. ct. 08, 43 L. ed. 2d
96 (999).
30 see, e.g., ellen kreitzberg & david richter, But Can It Be Fixed? A Look
at Constitutional Challenges to Lethal Injection Executions, 47 santa clara
L. rev. 445 (2007).
state v. mata 	39
cite as 275 neb. 

40 	275 nebraska reports
(b) Legal standards defining cruel
and unusual punishment
although we conclude that the nebraska constitution gov-
erns this issue, because both the federal and state constitutions
prohibit cruel and unusual punishment, we look to federal
precedent for guidance regarding general standards to maintain
harmony between parallel constitutional provisions.
(i) Substantial Risk That Prisoner Will Suffer
Unnecessary and Wanton Pain
[26] the baseline criterion in a challenge to a punishment is
whether it imposes torture or a lingering death that is unnec-
essary to the mere extinguishment of life.3 “the traditional
humanity of modern anglo-american law forbids the infliction
of unnecessary pain in the execution of the death sentence” and
cruelty inherent in the execution method itself.32 “[t]he execu-
tion shall be so instantaneous and substantially painless that
the punishment shall be reduced, as nearly as possible, to no
more than that of death itself.”33 capital punishment “must not
involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”34
[27] a single accident, however, does not show that a
method of execution is inherently cruel.35 but a pattern of
prisoners suffering unnecessary pain presents a different circum-
stance. a method of execution violates the prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment if there is a substantial foresee-
able risk, inherent in the method, that a prisoner will suffer
unnecessary pain.36
prisoners are not required to show that their execution will
actually result in unnecessary pain. the human body does not
3 In re Kemmler, supra note 0.
32 Resweber, supra note 9, 329 u.s. at 463 (four-justice plurality opinion).
33 Id., 329 u.s. at 474 (four-justice dissenting opinion).
34 Gregg, supra note 23, 428 u.s. at 73.
35 see Resweber, supra note 9.
36 see, Taylor v. Crawford, 487 f.3d 072 (8th cir. 2007); Fierro v. Gomez,
77 f.3d 30 (9th cir. 996), vacated on other grounds 59 u.s. 98, 7 s.
ct. 285, 36 L. ed. 2d 204; Harbison v. Little, 5 f. supp. 2d 872 (m.d.
tenn. 2007).

respond uniformly to electric current. and, obviously, there
are no first-person accounts of an execution that a court can
consult.37 so, courts must necessarily deal with probabilities.38
the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, how-
ever, protects prisoners against sufficiently imminent dangers
and current infliction of unnecessary pain.39
(ii) Evolving Standards of Decency
the state argues the u.s. supreme court applies distinct and
separate constitutional standards under the eighth amendment.
it argues that the standard depends upon whether the defendant
claims that a punishment is disproportionate or that the method
of inflicting the punishment is cruel. the state further argues
under this disjunctive scheme that “subjective” standards of
decency are not applicable to method-of-punishment claims.
and so, according to the state, the only relevant inquiry is
whether the method is cruel or barbarous. the state further
claims the “unusual” component is the only relevant inquiry in
claims that a punishment is excessive or disproportionate. We
disagree with the state’s analysis.
[28] the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
is not a static concept and “must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.”40 a court must evaluate claims that pun-
ishment is cruel and unusual “in the light of contemporary
human knowledge.”4
the state incorrectly asserts that a court’s evaluation of
contemporary values is subjective. the u.s. supreme court
looks to objective criteria for this inquiry, the most reliable
of which is legislation enacted by this nation’s legislatures.42
37 see Harbison, supra note 36.
38 Id.
39 Taylor, supra note 36.
40 Trop v. Dulles, 356 u.s. 86, 0, 78 s. ct. 590, 2 L. ed. 2d 630 (958)
(quoted in Gregg, supra note 23).
4 Robinson, supra note 24, 370 u.s. at 666.
42 see Atkins v. Virginia, 536 u.s. 304, 22 s. ct. 2242, 53 L. ed. 2d
335 (2002).
state v. mata 	4
cite as 275 neb. 

42 	275 nebraska reports
We acknowledge that the court has stated that an excessive-
ness claim is judged under currently prevailing standards of
decency.43 but it has also considered both cruelty and unusual-
ness when dealing with disproportionality claims.44 contrary
to the state’s argument, the court has indicated that evolving
standards of decency are relevant to methods of execution:
[t]he court has not confined the prohibition embodied
in the eighth amendment to “barbarous” methods that
were generally outlawed in the 8th century. instead, the
amendment has been interpreted in a flexible and dynamic
manner. the court early recognized that “a principle to
be vital must be capable of wider application than the
mischief which gave it birth.” Weems v. United States, 27
u.s. 349, 373 (90). thus, the clause forbidding “cruel
and unusual” punishments “is not fastened to the obso-
lete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes
enlightened by a humane justice.” Id. at 378.45
the u.s. supreme court has never held that state legisla-
tures’ uniform rejection of a method of execution is irrelevant
to whether that method is cruel and unusual punishment.46 it
has considered whether a method of execution was unusual
in a challenge to execution by firing squad.47 and in Gregg v.
Georgia,48 the court rejected a challenge that the death penalty
was cruel and unusual punishment under all circumstances.
the court reasoned, in part, that 35 state legislatures had
enacted new death penalty statutes to comply with its decision
in Furman v. Georgia,49 which invalidated many states’ capital
sentencing procedures.50
43 see id.
44 see, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 50 u.s. 957,  s. ct. 2680, 5 L. ed.
2d 836 (99). compare Weems, supra note .
45 Gregg, supra note 23, 428 u.s. at 7.
46 see Campbell, supra note 02 (blackmun, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari).
47 see Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 u.s. 30, 25 L. ed. 345 (878).
48 Gregg, supra note 23.
49 Furman, supra note 22.
50 see Gregg, supra note 23 (plurality opinion).

We decline to hold that under the nebraska constitution,
evolving standards of decency apply only to claims of dispro-
portional punishment. We conclude that evolving standards of
decency must apply to claims that the state’s intended method
of execution inflicts unnecessary and wanton pain. to hold
otherwise would not comport with the u.s. supreme court’s
consistent holdings since Furman that the death penalty is dif-
ferent, both in its severity and irrevocability.5 the constitu-
tional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment would
be meaningless if the punishment would have to be rejected by
every state before it could be cruel and unusual.52
regarding evolving standards, the evidence showed that by
949, 26 states had changed their execution method from hang-
ing to electrocution, but that no state had adopted electrocution
since. instead, states began adopting lethal gas as their execu-
tion method. by 973, 2 states were using lethal gas and 20
states were using electrocution. then, in 977, lethal injection
was introduced.
by 999, of the 38 states that permitted capital punish-
ment, 34 states offered lethal injection as either a choice or the
exclusive method of execution and only four states authorized
electrocution as their exclusive method of execution.53 in 2000,
Georgia switched from electrocution to lethal injection as its
sole method of execution for capital offenses committed on
or after may , 2000.54 florida also switched in 2000 from
electrocution to lethal injection unless the person sentenced
to death affirmatively elects electrocution.55 finally, in 2002,
alabama followed florida’s lead.56 thus, as of July , 2002,57
5 see, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 u.s. 399, 06 s. ct. 2595, 9 L. ed. 2d
335 (986).
52 see Campbell, supra note 02 (blackmun, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari).
53 Provenzano v. Moore, 744 so. 2d 43 (fla. 999) (harding, c.J.,
specially concurring).
54 see Dawson v. State, 274 Ga. 327, 554 s.e.2d 37 (200).
55 fla. stat. ann. § 922.05 (West 200).
56 ala. code § 5-8-82. (cum. supp. 2007).
57 see id.
state v. mata 	43
cite as 275 neb. 

44 	275 nebraska reports
nebraska is the only state in the nation to require electrocution
as its sole method of execution.
responding to horror stories of “botched” electrocutions
in florida, some states selected lethal injection.58 it has been
stated that courts have switched to lethal injection “because it
is universally recognized as the most humane method of execu-
tion, least apt to cause unnecessary pain.”59
faced 	with 	changing 	societal 	values, 	we 	cannot 	ignore
nebraska’s status as the last state to retain electrocution as its
sole method of execution. but this is not our only consideration.
We must also consider whether electrocution comports with the
“eighth amendment’s protection of ‘the dignity of man.’”60
(iii) Dignity of Man
[29] “a penalty also must accord with ‘the dignity of man,’”
which is the basic concept underlying the prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment.6 regarding executions, the
four-justice dissent in Resweber stated: “taking human life
by unnecessarily cruel means shocks the most fundamental
instincts of civilized man. it should not be possible under the
constitutional procedure of a self-governing people.”62 the u.s.
supreme court has implicitly condemned some punishments as
barbaric, such as beheading and drawing and quartering, that
inflict unnecessary physical violence.63 as Justice brennan
stated: “[b]asic notions of human dignity command that the
state minimize ‘mutilation’ and ‘distortion’ of the condemned
prisoner’s body,” irrespective of the pain that such violence
might inflict.64 another jurist has observed:
58 see Provenzano, supra 	note 53, 744 	so. 2d at 450 (pariente,
J., dissenting).
59 Webb, supra note 25, 252 conn. at 45, 750 a.2d at 457.
60 see, Glass, supra note 4, 47 u.s. at 085 (brennan, J., dissenting;
marshall, J., joins), quoting Trop, supra note 40.
6 Gregg, supra note 23, 428 u.s. at 73, quoting Trop, supra note 40.
62 Resweber, 	supra 	note 	9, 	329 	u.s. 	at 	473-74 	(four-justice
dissenting opinion).
63 see Wilkerson, supra note 47.
64 Glass, supra note 4, 47 u.s. at 085 (brennan, J., dissenting).

[W]hile beheading results in a quick, relatively painless
death, it entails frank violence . . . and mutilation . . .
and disgrace . . . and thus is facially cruel. post-execution
disfigurement . . . and displaying of the mutilated corpse
similarly would be forbidden even though this practice
involves no conscious pain.65
the Georgia supreme court has similarly concluded that
conscious suffering cannot be the only consideration in consti-
tutional challenges to a method of execution:
such a limited focus would lead to the abhorrent situation
where a condemned prisoner could be burned at the stake
or crucified as long as he or she were rendered incapable
by medication of consciously experiencing the pain, even
though such punishments have long been recognized as
“manifestly cruel and unusual.”66
[30] We agree that barbarous punishments include those that
mutilate the prisoner’s body even if they do not cause conscious
pain. We conclude that such punishments do not comport with
the eighth amendment’s dignity of man standard.
(iv) No Requirement to Show Legislature Intended
to Cause Pain or Lingering Death
the state argues that the prisoner must show that the
Legislature intended to inflict unnecessary pain or a lingering
death. in the cases it relies on, however, the issue was whether
a prisoner must show that prison officials were deliberately
indifferent to a risk of pain in an execution protocol. the issue
was not whether a state legislature intended the method to
cause pain. even so, the federal courts do not agree whether a
plaintiff must show prison officials’ deliberate indifference. the
seventh circuit held that a prisoner must show two things: that
there is a significant risk of unnecessary pain during the execu-
tion and that prison officials have been deliberately indifferent
to that risk in developing an execution protocol.67 We believe,
65 Provenzano, supra note 53, 744 so. 2d at 428-29 (shaw, J., dissenting).
66 Dawson, supra note 54, 274 Ga. at 334, 554 s.e.2d at 43, citing and quot-
ing In re Kemmler, supra note 0.
67 see Lambert v. Buss, 498 f.3d 446 (7th cir. 2007).
state v. mata 	45
cite as 275 neb. 

46 	275 nebraska reports
however, that the eighth circuit stated a stronger rationale for
rejecting a subjective intent requirement.68
in Taylor v. Crawford,69 the eighth circuit distinguished
condition-of-confinement claims from state sanctioned penal-
ties and held that a prisoner does not need to show a prison
official’s state of mind when the official is carrying out a state
sanctioned penalty. in Taylor, missouri relied on Resweber.70 it
argued that in Resweber, the u.s. supreme court held that the
prison officials’ second attempt at electrocution was not uncon-
stitutional because there was no purpose to inflict unnecessary
pain. the eighth circuit, however, concluded that an inquiry
into state of mind was necessary in Resweber because the sec-
ond attempt was outside what the statute authorized.
also, a federal district court similarly reasoned that a prison
official’s subjective intent is presumptively shown when the
pain inflicted is formally meted out as punishment.7 relying
on u.s. supreme court precedent, the court reasoned that a
prison official’s subjective intent is normally relevant only when
the pain inflicted is not meted out as punishment by a statute or
sentencing judge. When the official is carrying out an official
penalty, however, there is no rationale for requiring the prisoner
to show “an additional culpable mental state on behalf of any
individual state actors.”72 this reasoning applies even more
strongly to state legislatures.
[3] although the state and federal constitutions prohibit the
“unnecessary and wanton” infliction of pain, we do not believe
“wanton” in the context of state sanctioned punishment implies
a mental state. in a method of execution challenge, “wanton”
means that the method itself is inherently cruel.73 We believe
that if a prisoner were required to show a legislature’s malicious
intent in selecting a method of punishment, it is unlikely that
68 see Taylor, supra note 36.
69 Id.
70 Resweber, supra note 9.
7 see Harbison, supra note 36.
72 Id., 5 f. supp. 2d at 894.
73 see Resweber, supra note 9 (four-justice plurality opinion).

courts would ever find any punishment to be unconstitutional.
and, undoubtedly, a punishment may be cruel and unusual
despite legislative approval.74
in Trop v. Dulles,75 the u.s. supreme court held that a
statute punishing wartime desertion by forfeiture of citizenship
was cruel and unusual punishment. notably, the court stated
it was not entirely clear that “congress fully appreciated the
fact that [the statute] rendered a convicted deserter stateless.”76
the court further stated that while congress had amended the
statute to ameliorate its effects, the amendments actually cre-
ated graver problems by allowing military officials to arbitrarily
decide which offenders would be rendered stateless.77 the
court was unconcerned whether congress intended to inflict
cruel and unusual punishment, and it pointedly recognized that
congress probably did not have this intent. Trop clearly shows
that legislative intent to inflict cruel and unusual punishment is
not a relevant consideration in a method-of-punishment chal-
lenge. similarly, four justices in Resweber concluded that state
officials’ lack of intent to cause pain was irrelevant.78
[32] scientific knowledge about electricity and its effects
on the human body has vastly expanded since 93, when the
nebraska Legislature first selected electrocution over hang-
ing.79 “time works changes, brings into existence new condi-
tions and purposes.”80 We presume that the Legislature intended
to select an execution method within constitutional bounds. but
we conclude that whether the Legislature intended to cause pain
in selecting a punishment is irrelevant to a constitutional chal-
lenge that a statutorily imposed method of punishment violates
the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
74 see Trop, supra note 40.
75 Id.
76 Id., 356 u.s. at 89 n.4.
77 Id.
78 see Resweber, supra note 9.
79 see 93 neb. Laws, ch. 32, § 27, p. 08.
80 Weems, supra note , 27 u.s. at 373.
state v. mata 	47
cite as 275 neb. 

48 	275 nebraska reports
[33] in sum, we conclude that the relevant legal standards in
deciding whether electrocution is cruel and unusual punishment
are whether the state’s chosen method of execution () presents
a substantial risk that a prisoner will suffer unnecessary and
wanton pain in an execution, (2) violates the evolving stan-
dards of decency that mark a mature society, and (3) minimizes
physical violence and mutilation of the prisoner’s body. having
established the relevant legal standards, we turn to our standard
of review.
(c) standard of review
(i) Questions of Law and Fact
[34] this challenge to the constitutionality of electrocution
as a method of execution presents a mixed question of law and
fact. in constitutional challenges presenting mixed questions
of law and fact, we normally review the district court’s find-
ings of fact for clear error.8 here, however, the constitutional
implications involved in any death penalty case require us to
independently and scrupulously examine the entire record. in
challenges to the constitutionality of a method of execution,
we determine whether the trial court’s conclusions are sup-
ported by substantial evidence.82 on questions of law, we
resolve issues independently of the determination reached by
the court below.83
[35,36] Whether a method of inflicting the death penalty
inherently imposes a significant risk of causing pain in an
execution is a question of fact.84 the ultimate issue, whether
electrocution violates the constitutional prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment, presents a question of law.85
8 see, e.g., State v. Bakewell, 273 neb. 372, 730 n.W.2d 335 (2007); State v.
Sims, 272 neb. 8, 725 n.W.2d 75 (2006); State v. Fernando-Granados,
268 neb. 290, 682 n.W.2d 266 (2004); State v. Burdette, 259 neb. 679, 6
n.W.2d 65 (2000).
82 see Webb, supra note 25.
83 see State v. Tompkins, 272 neb. 547, 723 n.W.2d 344 (2006).
84 see, Taylor, supra note 36; Fierro, supra note 36.
85 see Fierro, supra note 36.

(ii) Deference Due Legislature
[37-39] Legislatures are not required to select the least
severe penalty possible, so long as the penalty selected is not
cruelly inhumane or disproportionate to the crime.86 regarding
statutory punishments, however, on three occasions we have
overstated the Legislature’s authority under the constitutional
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. We stated
that the constitutional provision preventing cruel and unusual
punishment was not intended to abridge the Legislature’s power
to select such punishment as it deems most effective in the
suppression of crime.87 this statement is clearly too broad. its
roots can be traced to case law preceding the u.s. supreme
court’s application in 962 of the 8th amendment to the
states through the 4th amendment.88 as noted, the supreme
court has specifically held that “the eighth amendment is a
restraint upon the exercise of legislative power,”89 as is the
nebraska constitution’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. more recently, however, we have stated: “‘the
Legislature determines the nature of the penalty imposed, and
so long as that determination is consistent with the constitution,
it will not be disturbed by the courts on review.’”90
[40,4] When we review challenges to criminal statutes,
we presume that the statutes are constitutional.9 and the bur-
den to clearly show that a statute is unconstitutional rests
upon the challenger.92 Yet presumptions can be overcome,
and the Legislature cannot establish a method of execution
86 State v. Michalski, 22 neb. 380, 377 n.W.2d 50 (985), citing Gregg,
supra note 23.
87 Michalski, supra note 86; State v. Ruzicka, 28 neb. 594, 357 n.W.2d 457
(984); State v. Tucker, 83 neb. 577, 62 n.W.2d 774 (968).
88 see Robinson, supra note 24.
89 Gregg, supra note 23, 428 u.s. at 74.
90 In re Petition of Nebraska Community Corr. Council, 274 neb. 225, 230,
738 n.W.2d 850, 854 (2007), quoting State v. Divis, 256 neb. 328, 589
n.W.2d 537 (999).
9 see Thomas, supra note 5.
92 see State v. Hynek, 263 neb. 30, 640 n.W.2d  (2002).
state v. mata 	49
cite as 275 neb. 

50 	275 nebraska reports
that offends the constitutional guarantee against cruel and
unusual punishment.
(d) parties’ contentions
mata contends that his challenge to electrocution is not limited
to the current protocol, which the department of correctional
services adopted in 2004. he argues that electrocution is cruel
because it burns and mutilates the body and presents an unnec-
essary risk of pain. he also argues that electrocution no longer
comports with evolving standards of decency because every
state that authorizes the death penalty, except nebraska, has
rejected electrocution.
the state, of course, views the matter differently. the state
contends that the district court concluded mata failed to carry
his burden of proof under the appropriate constitutional stan-
dard. that argument, however, relies upon a constitutional
standard that we have rejected—a requirement that the prisoner
show a legislative intent to cause pain and suffering. the state
also argues that even if the prisoner remains conscious for 5
to 30 seconds, no basis exists for concluding that electrocution
involves unnecessary pain. finally, the state argues that it is
“undisputed that electrocution can and does cause the instanta-
neous death of a condemned prisoner.”93
although mata contends that his challenge is directed at
electrocution and not at the current protocol, an understanding
of the current protocol is important because of its similarity to
earlier electrocution procedures. We begin by explaining why
the protocol was changed in 2004.
(e) nebraska statutes require a continuous electric current
but fail to specify its strength or force
in 2000, the district court determined, in part, that the state’s
994 electrocution protocol did not comply with § 29-2532
because the current was not continuous. this order was part
of the record in Mata I. section 29-2532 provides in part that
“[t]he mode of inflicting the punishment of death, in all cases,
shall be by causing to pass through the body of the convicted
93 brief for appellee at 46.

person a current of electricity of sufficient intensity to cause
death; and the application of such current shall be contin-
ued until such convicted person is dead.” the 994 protocol
required prison officials to apply two 30-second sequences of
electric current for a 55-pound person, with a 20-second pause
in between shocks. in each sequence, the protocol called for
officials to apply 2,450 volts for 8 seconds, followed by 480
volts for 22 seconds. in the 990’s, prison officials applied four
sequences of current to electrocute three prisoners.
in response to the district court’s order, prison officials
changed the protocol in 2004. the new protocol is also stan-
dardized to a 55-pound person. but the new protocol requires
prison officials to apply 2,450 volts of electric current in one
5-second continuous application.
the exact strength of the current is unknown. the protocol
does not specify the amperage, which is the measure of elec-
trical energy in a current. a retired prison administrator who
developed the original protocol in the 980’s testified that he
had an ammeter installed. he explained that he did this because
the risk of fire from the sponges drying out increases if 8 to 0
amperes are applied for too long. he stated that the state uses
6 to 8 amperes and no more than 0. but the executing official
for the 990 electrocutions believed the ammeter simply showed
the system was working within the correct range. he did not
recall the amperage used or watch the voltage meter during the
990 electrocutions. during electrocutions, prison officials do
not record the amperage or voltage or use a regulator to ensure
that the voltage does not drop below the required amount.
the strength of an electric current flowing through a conduc-
tor can be calculated if the voltage and a conductor’s resistance
to a current are known. but as the district court noted, experts
do not agree on the human body’s resistance as a conductor.
ronald k. Wright, m.d., the certified pathologist who recom-
mended the state’s 2004 protocol, testified that it would be
unethical for physicians to make these determinations and that
states do not measure the voltage exiting a prisoner’s body
during an electrocution. because he had to rely on medical
journals from the 890’s, he did not know whether a prisoner’s
size or height would affect the body’s resistance. because there
state v. mata 	5
cite as 275 neb. 

52 	275 nebraska reports
has never been monitoring, the strength of the current flow-
ing through a prisoner’s body in nebraska electrocutions is
unknown. this evidence supports the district court’s finding
that the effect of electric current in a prisoner’s body cannot
be predicted.
(f) preparations for electrocution
before the execution, the prisoner’s head and left leg are
shaved where the electrodes will be placed. both the state and
defense experts agree that a high voltage electric current causes
the body to violently react with muscle contractions. shock
victims have been known to suffer broken bones and dislocated
joints from the force of these contractions. consequently, offi-
cials must tightly strap the prisoner’s torso, hips, arms, legs,
ankles, and wrists to the electric chair. Witnesses observed
prisoners slamming against these straps during an electrocution.
also, officials fasten the prisoner’s head to the chair with a wide
leather strap across the face, with a cutout for the nose.
after the prisoner is strapped in tightly, officials place a
3⁄4-inch circular electrode plate on the crown of the prisoner’s
head and a similar grounding electrode on the prisoner’s left
calf to create a circuit path through the body. they place larger
natural sponges, which have been soaked in a saline solution,
under each electrode next to the prisoner’s skin. the saline ions
form a bridge between the prisoner’s body and the electrodes
and are intended to keep the electricity from flowing outside
the body. electricity follows ions and will seek the path of least
resistance. Wright testified that the sponge must be damp or the
sponge and the prisoner may catch on fire.
(g) the prisoner’s body is burned
burning of the prisoner’s body is an inherent part of an
electrocution. Wright testified that under the protocol he recom-
mended, there would be burning and the possibility of severe
skin burns in the last seconds of the 5-second application. he
stated that the prisoner’s skin could reach a temperature of 200
degrees. the protocol shows that the state expects burning and
keeps a fire extinguisher close by.

during an electrocution, the executing official watches for
smoke coming from the prisoner’s head or leg. but the execut-
ing official for the three electrocutions performed in the 990’s
testified that only smoke from the head would require interrup-
tion of the current, not smoke from the leg. further, the proto-
col requires officials to interrupt the current only for extensive
smoke; officials anticipate smoke equivalent to a burning cigar.
if flames appear, the protocol requires officials to stop the cur-
rent to check the sponges and tighten the electrodes.
under the 994 protocol used during the three 990’s elec-
trocutions, witnesses testified that they saw smoke coming from
the prisoner’s leg and could smell burning flesh in the view-
ing room. a media witness of the 997 electrocution reported
seeing smoke coming from the prisoner’s head also. a prison
official testified that he had smelled a lingering odor of burning
flesh in the death chamber after all three electrocutions. the
coroner’s reports showed that there were severe ring burns on
the prisoners’ heads where officials had attached the electrode
plate. a witness also testified to viewing a prisoner’s body after
an electrocution. she reported sagging skin on the sides of the
prisoner’s head from the temple areas and cheeks to above and
behind the ears.
the state concedes that burning is an inherent part of an
electrocution but contends that it is localized. the district court,
however, found that current density is highest at the electrodes
and especially in the left leg. the left leg is where all of the
current must pass to exit to the ground electrode. third-degree
burns and charring often appear at the head and left leg elec-
trodes. defense experts reviewing post mortem photographs of
the prisoners concluded the electric current was causing severe
burning and charring of the prisoners’ left legs from the knee
to the foot. in addition, the current vaporizes water in the skin
causing severe steam burns and blistering, and leaving the skin
in some areas separated and sagging following an electrocution.
We disagree with the state’s characterization of the burning as
localized. the evidence shows that severe burning is also likely
to be present under the 2004 protocol.
state v. mata 	53
cite as 275 neb. 

54 	275 nebraska reports
(h) 2004 protocol Will not eliminate risk of
prisoner burning or catching fire
in 994, prison officials changed the protocol to remove
medical personnel from execution activities. also, the 2004
protocol does not require a physician to be present. under
the 2004 protocol, after officials stop the current, they must
wait 5 minutes before calling a coroner. the protocol, how-
ever, does not specify what officials should do if the coroner
finds that a prisoner is still alive. but the warden testified
that if a prisoner were alive after 8 minutes, an official
would repeat the sequence. the executing official for the
990’s electrocutions also testified that if a prisoner were still
alive, an official, after checking the equipment, would repeat
the sequence.
Wright admitted that under the 2004 protocol, the sponge
could be dry by the time a coroner arrives. he stated that the
drying out of the sponge is one reason the current cannot be
applied much longer than 5 seconds. he explained that the
possibility of a fire is why officials must have a fire extin-
guisher close. so, by the time a coroner is called, 5 minutes
after the current is stopped, if the prisoner is still alive, prison
officials will need to replace the sponges before reapplying
the current to avoid a fire from a dry sponge. but even if
they do this, the risk remains that the prisoner’s leg will burn
at the exit point because the tissue will have already been
deeply burned.
nebraska used imported executioners to perform electrocu-
tions from 920 to 959, and they employed different methods.
for example, in 959, the executioner applied 2,200 volts to
the prisoner five separate times. in 929, however, the state
applied 2,300 volts for 9 seconds, which is a similar applica-
tion to that of the 2004 protocol. because physicians deter-
mined that the prisoner was still alive, officials applied the
current again. heavy brown smoke from the prisoner’s burning
leg filled the room. this shows the current protocol will con-
tinue the mutilation of prisoners’ bodies. it also supports the
district court’s conclusion that some prisoners will be tortured
during electrocutions.

(i) district court found some prisoners Would
experience unnecessary pain and torture
the district court’s 2005 order in this appeal illuminates an
electrocution’s gruesome effects and refutes the state’s argu-
ment that the court found mata failed to meet his burden of
proof. We summarize the important points.
the court made six specific findings regarding an electric
current’s physiological effects on humans. first, high voltage
causes intolerable pain sensations by direct excitation of periph-
eral sensory nerves. second, electricity causes widespread exci-
tation of brain neurons. third, applying external electricity to
the brain can damage brain neurons by interrupting their natural
polarity and lead to the loss of neuron function. the court con-
cluded, however, that the loss of function was most critical in
the brain stem because those neurons are the most indispens-
able to respiration and life. fourth, high voltage causes intense
muscle contractions throughout the body, called muscle tetany.
the muscles remain locked in full contraction as long as the
current is applied. fifth, high voltage will not cause fibrilla-
tion of the heart. fibrillation is an arrhythmia in which the
heart quivers in a chaotic pattern instead of intermittently con-
tracting.94 sixth, current flowing through the body will cause
thermal heating, known as joule heating. but it is impossible
to predict heating in any particular part of the body because of
wide variations in the current flow.
the court concluded that it was unknown what path the cur-
rent would take from the head electrode to the ground electrode
on the left leg. it stated that experts sharply disagreed over the
mechanism of death in an electrocution. the state’s experts
believed that electroporation of neurons would cause instan-
taneous and irreversible loss of brain function. the defense
experts believed that the current caused damage to essential
organs of the body and that death eventually resulted from the
lack of oxygenated blood. the court concluded that the state’s
theory of instantaneous death assumed a substantial amount
of current going to the brain, which was impossible to know.
the court observed, “[i]f the state’s explanation of the logic
94 dorland’s illustrated medical dictionary 625 (27th ed. 994).
state v. mata 	55
cite as 275 neb. 

56 	275 nebraska reports
of the mechanisms of electrocution and its merit as a means
of executing the death penalty are true, it is hard to understand
why virtually all of the world has abandoned the practice except
for nebraska.”
the court found that the skull would limit how much current
went to the brain. apart from the current’s full power exiting
the left leg, the court did not believe the current going to other
parts of the body, including the brain, could be determined.
such a determination was difficult because the body is a large
mass and humans are not predictable conductors. but because
the current would result in the frozen contraction of muscles,
it found that a prisoner’s heart would be unable to pump blood
during the application of current. this would starve the brain
and other vital organs of oxygenated blood and cause uncon-
sciousness within 5 to 30 seconds.
nonetheless, the court recognized that hearts frequently
restart on their own. it noted that nebraska’s history, and the
history of electrocutions overall, showed that one application of
current will sometimes not kill a condemned prisoner. “since
it is clear that there is still a pulse or breathing in a number of
instances . . . it seems equally clear that an inmate could revive
and regain consciousness after application of current under the
980s nebraska protocol and that some have revived after pro-
tocols used in other cases.” it found that whether nebraska’s
inmates had regained consciousness and experienced unneces-
sary pain during an electrocution is unknown. it observed that
the state will obviously reapply the current until the prisoner is
dead but stated that it was impossible to know which prisoners
would require a second jolt.
because the current’s strength and density in different parts
of the body could not be predicted, the court concluded that
experts for both sides would sometimes be correct about the
mechanism of death. the court summed up its own findings and
conclusions as follows:
the proposition that judicial electrocutions always result
in instantaneous and irreversible brain death with the brain
approaching the boiling point is a myth. it is probably
the case that some instances of judicial electrocutions do

result in instantaneous brain death. it is certainly true that
all of them do not.
. . . electrocution as a method of executing condemned
prisoners is an extremely violent method of accomplish-
ing death. it includes some burning, smoke, and involves
extreme contortion of muscles and tissue of almost every
part of a person’s body. it includes no effort at all to anes-
thesize the person into unconsciousness before the mecha-
nisms of death are employed.
. . . .
. . . the current mode used for an electrocution in
nebraska . . . will result in instantaneous death in some
cases, and will almost certainly not result in death at all in
some cases. in still others, it will result in a mechanism of
death from anoxia with the condemned most likely being
unconscious during much of the time it takes to die. it is
unknown what the number of cases will be, nor is it pos-
sible to predict which case will have which result. the
current mode used for a judicial electrocution is untested
. . . .
. . . .
. . . [t]here is no question that the nebraska practice of
executing condemned prisoners exclusively by electrocu-
tion is unique, outdated, and rejected by virtually all the
rest of the world; including practices for the euthanasia of
non-human animals. there is also no question that its con-
tinued use will result in unnecessary pain, suffering, and
torture for some, but not all of [the] condemned murder-
ers in this state. Which ones or how many will experience
this gruesome form of death and suffer unnecessarily; and
which ones will pass with little conscious suffering cannot
be known.
contrary to the state’s argument, the court did not find that
mata had failed to meet his burden of proof. nothing in the
evidence or the court’s order supports the state’s argument
that electrocution indisputably results in instantaneous death.
the experts clearly dispute this contention. notwithstanding
its findings, the court concluded that it was bound by this
court’s decisions and must overrule mata’s motion to declare
state v. mata 	57
cite as 275 neb. 

58 	275 nebraska reports
electrocution unconstitutional as a matter of law. Yet, it clearly
found that some prisoners would remain conscious for 5 to
30 seconds or during the entire application of the current. it
further found it was unknown whether the three nebraska pris-
oners electrocuted in the 990’s had regained consciousness
during the pauses between sequences. but the court found that
some prisoners could revive and have revived and regained
consciousness under similar protocols and other protocols. the
evidence fully supports those findings and undercuts the state’s
theory of instantaneous death.
(i) Heart Capable of Restarting
the district court correctly noted that the experts do not
agree on how death occurs in an electrocution. all the experts
testifying about the effect of a high voltage current on the heart
believed that the heart could sometimes beat again after the cur-
rent was stopped. this is because the heart has built-in regulators
independent of the brain. only a forensic pathologist for the
defense believed that in most cases, a prisoner’s heart could not
recover its normal rhythm after the current was stopped.
as the district court found, however, physicians have detected
heartbeats after the current is stopped—notably in nebraska’s
929 execution. a physicist for the defense explained that there
is a well-recognized range of electrical strengths that will cause
fibrillation of the heart. electric currents with strengths above
or below this range will not cause fibrillation, and 2,450 volts
is above the range. While the heart will not effectively pump
blood during the application of the current, he believed it would
almost always recover.
similarly, Wright, the state’s expert, had assisted with a few
autopsies after judicial electrocutions and believed the autop-
sies showed that the prisoners’ hearts almost always start beat-
ing again. this evidence supports the district court’s finding
that some prisoners’ hearts will beat rhythmically again after
the current is stopped.
(ii) State’s Theories of Instantaneous Loss of Brain Function
the defense experts disputed the state’s theory that prisoners
would always lose consciousness. the state’s contention that

electrocution does not subject prisoners to unnecessary pain
depends on Wright’s theories: the electric current would cause
instantaneous and irreversible electroporation of brain neurons
or thermal heating of neurons would reach the point of causing
cell death within 4 to 5 seconds. if correct, either theory would
mean instantaneous or near-instantaneous loss of brain function
and consciousness.
Wright testified that under the nebraska protocol, irrevers-
ible loss of brain functioning would occur within  second, or
“the speed of light.” he had suggested applying the electric
current for 5 seconds to cover any possible variations. he
believed the mechanism of death in a judicial electrocution
is asphyxiation: the prisoner is unable to breathe because
of instantaneous electroporation of neurons. another state’s
expert, b.J. Wilder, m.d., a neurologist, also testified that the
brain would be instantly depolarized, causing cell death. as the
district court explained, electric current can disrupt the natural
polarity of neurons. if the electroporation is severe enough and
long enough, it causes denaturation of the neurons. denaturation
is a disruption of a cell’s protein configuration, which damages
the physical properties of the cell’s proteins and results in its
loss of function. it can be caused by heat or other physical
or chemical means.95 Wright believed a secondary cause of
death was joule heating, which would cause the brain to reach
a temperature of 0 degrees and to stop functioning within
4 to 5 seconds.
Wright based his theories on a few autopsies of electrocuted
prisoners in which he had assisted. his theory also relied on
temperature recordings of prisoners’ cerebrums after their elec-
trocutions in florida. the cerebrum is the main two-hemisphere
portion of the brain in the upper part of the cranial cavity.96
Wright had recorded the brain temperatures of between 6 and
2 prisoners between 977 and 993. the bodies had been
removed from the prison to a location about ⁄2 hours away
before the brain temperatures were taken. Wright did not have
specific data, but he remembered that many temperatures were
95 Id. at 440.
96 see id. at 302.
state v. mata 	59
cite as 275 neb. 

60 	275 nebraska reports
around 98 to 00 degrees and that one temperature had been as
high as 2 degrees.
Wright stated that he knew the brains had denatured because
normally they have the consistency of gelatin but they had
firmed up. he testified that there is no microscopic evidence that
neurons have denatured due to thermal heating or depolariza-
tion because the heating is not high enough to cause observable
post mortem changes. he did not report discoloration of brain
tissue and specifically stated that the brain looked normal.
(iii) Defense Experts Reject State’s Theories
the defense experts who disputed Wright’s theories included
thomas L. bennett, m.d., a forensic pathologist; donald d.
price, ph.d., a neurophysicist; and John p. Wikswo, Jr., ph.d.,
a physicist who had studied the effects of electrical injury.
they rejected Wright’s theories of instantaneous depolarization
and denaturation of neurons because they believed he based
his theories on an assumption that all of the current enters
the brain.
Wright admitted that he based his calculation of thermal
heating of the brain on his belief that all of the current enters
the brain. he also admitted that a significant delay had occurred
before anyone took the brain temperatures he had recorded
and that he did not know the ambient temperatures during the
delay. finally, he admitted that florida applied current to pris-
oners for almost twice as long as nebraska’s 2004 protocol
requires and that many of the temperatures were around 98 to
00 degrees.
the defense experts believed that only 5 to 0 percent of the
electric current, and possibly as little as 2 percent of the cur-
rent, would pass through the skull to the brain. they explained
that because the skull is a poor conductor of electricity, it will
shunt the current away from the brain. that is, the path of least
resistance is around the prisoner’s head.
they believed that cell death is a process and that instan-
taneous loss of brain function was highly unlikely. they also
believed that the deeper parts of the brain controlling con-
sciousness and respiration could function even if some parts are
damaged. they testified that after an electrocution, there is no

medical evidence of massive damage in the brain, which would
indicate instantaneous death, or total loss of neuron function.
although there are other pathways through which an electric
current could enter the brain—e.g., veins and nerves—Wikswo
did not believe that the current would follow those pathways in
a judicial electrocution. he explained that the grounding elec-
trode on the prisoner’s leg would generally cause the current to
move from the top down.
several physical observations supported these opinions. for
example, most of the physical damage is on the outside of the
body. the burn rings frequently noted on prisoners’ heads show
that the electric current arcs around the sponge and moves
out from the electrode radially around the head. if the current
were going straight down, there would be a burn disk. bennett
reviewed photographs of all three prisoners electrocuted in
nebraska during the 990’s. he noted that the burning on one
prisoner’s scalp was consistent with arcing from the sponge and
the skin’s resistance to current. he believed that the circular
burning on the sides of another prisoner’s head showed the
current—following the path of least resistance—had gone down
the sides of his scalp to his neck and body. similarly, Wikswo
noted that in a judicial electrocution in nebraska, a burn on the
side of a prisoner’s neck showed that the current had gone around
the outside of his head and entered his body at the neck.
in addition, Wikswo and price had reviewed autopsy reports
from other states and testified that there was no evidence of
massive damage of prisoners’ brains and only isolated spots
of denaturation in those brains. price disagreed with Wright
that there is no microscopic evidence of denaturation. he had
deliberately denatured cells and observed the structural disorga-
nization caused by the breakdown of protein. he testified that
microscopic observation of brain sections from electrocuted
prisoners showed no signs of denaturation. regarding Wright’s
testimony that the brains of electrocuted prisoners were “firmed
up,” bennett testified that denaturation of the brain is a process
that continues after death so that findings in an autopsy do not
necessarily reflect the brain’s condition at death.
in contrast to Wright’s testimony, Wikswo testified that the
primary indication of thermal denaturation of brain tissue is
state v. mata 	6
cite as 275 neb. 

62 	275 nebraska reports
discoloration. reports of isolated spots showing denaturation
could have been caused by secondary heating of the skull under
the electrode or by the current passing through the skull. but
if a significant amount of the current was entering the brain,
Wikswo and price testified that they would have expected to
see more damage to other parts of the brain. instead, other
parts of the brain showed no discoloration. price testified that
the isolated spots indicated that the current, which did enter the
brain, was not uniform.
although the experts disputed much of the physical evidence
regarding denaturation, the strongest physical evidence that
undercuts Wright’s theories of total loss of brain function are
signs of respiration.
defense experts explained that parts of the brain located in
the brain stem and extending up to the midbrain area control
respiration and consciousness. these areas are deep within
the brain, away from the skull where the electrode plate is
attached. these areas of the brain are also the most resilient.
because consciousness and respiratory control centers are in
close proximity, if a prisoner is still breathing after the current
is stopped, then it is likely that neither area has been depolarized
to the point of incapacity. bennett explained that even if elec-
troporation had injured neuron cells to the point that they will
die, the effect is like a bad burn to a body. the person does not
die immediately but dies as the effects keep overwhelming the
person’s ability to recover. he stated that even after prolonged
exposure to high voltage, persons still have brain function; they
do not die immediately.
regarding loss of brain function, Wright testified that the
best indication of brain death was whether a person can breathe
unassisted. Yet, he admitted that if a prisoner were still breath-
ing, it indicated significantly less current had passed through
the brain than he had predicted. also, he admitted that evidence
of respiration could not be reconciled with his theory that the
brain instantly stops functioning. finally, he admitted that if
the prisoner were still able to breathe after the current were
stopped, the prisoner could obtain more brain function and even
possibly survive.

(iv) Evidence Shows Some Prisoners Still Alive
the state does not conduct autopsies of electrocuted prison-
ers to review the effects of electric current on the body or the
condition of internal organs. but physicians were present at
all of the electrocutions in nebraska before 994 and checked
prisoners for signs of life. nebraska electrocuted 5 men from
920 to 997. there are obviously no longer witnesses of the
early executions, so we refer to newspaper accounts in those
cases that are part of this record. the evidence shows that in
three known executions, or 20 percent of the total, physicians
or eyewitnesses reported that the prisoner was still breathing or
alive after the initial application of current. the most dramatic
account of a prisoner’s being alive after the current was stopped
involved almost the same voltage and length as are provided for
in the 2004 protocol.
in the 929 electrocution discussed above, the executioner
applied a current with 5 amperes and 2,300 volts for 9 sec-
onds. after officials removed the straps, the physicians exam-
ined the prisoner. during the second physician’s examination,
the prisoner’s chest moved, and “[c]onvulsive heaving of the
youth’s chest and a deep throaty rattle soon gave evidence that
[the prisoner] was still breathing.” this movement continued at
intervals that became shorter and shorter, followed by a throaty
rattle “like a deep snore” that also continued at intervals. the
physicians again listened for his heartbeat and signaled to the
executioner to reapply the current.
furthermore, the evidence indicates that in the 994 elec-
trocution, the state applied 2,450 volts for 7 seconds and that
the prisoner was still breathing afterward. as noted, the 994
protocol required prison officials to apply two sequences of
current: 2,450 volts for 8 seconds, followed by 480 volts for 22
seconds. however, the prison administrator who developed the
994 protocol testified that in 994, he recommended officials
apply the 2,450-volt current for 7 seconds instead of 8 seconds
in the first sequence, because the prisoner weighed 22 pounds.
he believed his recommendation was accepted. no other testi-
mony refutes or confirms this alteration. but if true, in 994,
the state had to apply 2,450 volts for 2 seconds longer than
the 5 seconds required by the 2004 protocol. an eyewitness
state v. mata 	63
cite as 275 neb. 

64 	275 nebraska reports
testified that the prisoner appeared to be breathing after the
executioner stopped the initial current and that she heard him
make a low guttural growl near the end of the second jolt.
as the district court noted, nebraska is not unique in reports
of prisoners breathing after the current is stopped. a defense
expert, who had extensively reviewed eyewitness accounts of
electrocutions in other states, testified that prisoners occa-
sionally show signs of consciousness during an electrocution.
for example, he stated that a second application of current
was required in 5 percent of the electrocutions conducted in
Virginia. he had also reviewed 5 narrated audiotapes of judi-
cial electrocutions in Georgia. in two cases, there were signs of
consciousness. one prisoner had a nervous tic and was bobbing
his head when he was led into the death chamber. after the first
current sequence, the officials noted that he was still breathing
and then started to bob his head again.
similarly, defense experts testified that many reports exist of
prisoners still breathing after the current is stopped. they also
pointed out there are many examples of high voltage shock vic-
tims who survived. those victims reported remaining conscious
throughout the shock, even when their head is the point of
contact with a high voltage current. bennett testified that indi-
viduals had retained full consciousness about 50 percent of the
time. persons who survived these shocks reported excruciating
pain. defense experts do not believe that prisoners are rendered
instantly unconscious in a judicial electrocution and that they
suffer similarly while conscious.
(v) Sources of Pain in an Electrocution
obviously, a conscious prisoner would suffer excruciating
pain from the electrical burning that is occurring in the body.
but defense experts explained that there are other ways a high
voltage current causes pain. price had extensively researched
pain mechanisms in the brain. he explained that the electric cur-
rent that did enter the brain would excite multiple areas in the
brain known to cause pain when electrically stimulated. also,
alternating current, which alternates in polarity 60 times per
second and is used in electrocutions, is known to repetitively
excite nerve tissue. price also testified that a prisoner would

experience extreme air hunger because the prisoner cannot
breathe while his or her diaphragm is rigidly contracted.
bennett testified that he did not believe a prisoner’s thalamus,
which is the sensory relay center in the midbrain area, is com-
pletely destroyed in an electrocution; thus, a prisoner experi-
ences extreme pain and suffering from electrical stimulation of
sensory nerves in the skin and muscles. he explained that the
skin is rich in nerve fibers with skin receptors that send mes-
sages to the brain when stimulated. Wikswo explained that the
brain could not distinguish between different types of stimula-
tions of pain receptors in the body or skin. muscles also have
pain receptors, so the violent contractions of muscles through-
out the body would be painful. in addition, the heart’s contrac-
tion is like the pain of a heart attack.
Wright admitted that when an electric current passes through
the body from hand to hand, shock victims who suffer depolar-
ization in their joints do not instantly lose functioning in their
arms and hands and still feel intense pain. further, his admis-
sions during cross-examination bolster the defense experts’
opinions that this type of conscious suffering is possible.
(vi) Evidence Supports Court’s Finding That Some
Prisoners Will Experience Unnecessary
Pain, Suffering, and Torture
this evidence substantially supports the district court’s con-
clusion that electrocution “will result in unnecessary pain, suf-
fering, and torture” for some condemned prisoners. contrary
to the state’s argument, there is abundant evidence that pris-
oners sometimes will retain enough brain functioning to con-
sciously suffer the torture high voltage electric current inflicts
on a human body. the evidence supports the district court’s
statement that instantaneous and irreversible brain death is a
myth. as Wright admitted, “[i]f you reduce the amount of cur-
rent or you interpose something with a high resistance in that
same pathway, then you will create an implement of torture.”
according to the evidence, that “something” in some cases is
the prisoner’s skull.
the evidence also supports the district court’s statement that
the evidence shows one application of current will not always
state v. mata 	65
cite as 275 neb. 

66 	275 nebraska reports
kill a prisoner. and sometimes, a prisoner will die more slowly
from oxygen deprivation and damage to the body’s vital organs.
the state’s expert admitted that a prisoner who can breathe
could survive and regain more brain function, even assuming
that the prisoner lost total consciousness during the application
of the current. no one knows how long a prisoner could lan-
guish in agony, attempting to breathe, while the state passively
waits to see if he or she dies.
this evidence shows that death and loss of consciousness
is not instantaneous for many condemned prisoners. far from
the assumption in early u.s. supreme court decisions that
“[e]lectrocution has been approved only in a form that elimi-
nates suffering,”97 the evidence here shows that electrocution
inflicts intense pain and agonizing suffering. the record sup-
ports the district court’s statement that no expert could predict
with certainty the result for any particular condemned prisoner.
but certainty is not required. the standard is whether the pun-
ishment creates a substantial risk that a prisoner will suffer
unnecessary and wanton pain in an execution.
We reject the state’s argument that electrocution would not
be cruel and unusual punishment if a prisoner remained con-
scious for 5 to 30 seconds. fifteen to thirty seconds is not a
blink in time when a human being is electrically on fire. We
reject the state’s argument that this is a permissible length of
time to inflict gruesome pain. it is akin to arguing that burn-
ing a prisoner at the stake would be acceptable if we could be
assured that smoke inhalation would render him unconscious
within 5 to 30 seconds.
[42] Given the evidence and the district court’s finding
thereon, we conclude that electrocution will unquestionably
inflict intolerable pain unnecessary to cause death in enough
executions so as to present a substantial risk that any prisoner
will suffer unnecessary and wanton pain in a judicial execution
by electrocution.
97 Resweber, supra note 9, 329 u.s. at 474 (four-justice dissent-
ing opinion).

(j) conclusion: electrocution is cruel and
unusual punishment
[43] besides presenting a substantial risk of unnecessary
pain, we conclude that electrocution is unnecessarily cruel in
its purposeless infliction of physical violence and mutilation of
the prisoner’s body. electrocution’s proven history of burning
and charring bodies is inconsistent with both the concepts of
evolving standards of decency and the dignity of man. other
states have recognized that early assumptions about an instan-
taneous and painless death were simply incorrect and that there
are more humane methods of carrying out the death penalty.
examined under modern scientific knowledge, “[electrocution]
has proven itself to be a dinosaur more befitting the labora-
tory of baron frankenstein than the death chamber” of state
prisons.98 We conclude that death by electrocution as provided
in § 29-2532 violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment in neb. const. art. i, § 9.
(k) resolution
having concluded that electrocution is cruel and unusual
punishment, we face the question of how to dispose of this
appeal. the fact remains that although the nebraska stat-
utes currently provide no constitutionally acceptable means
of executing mata, he was properly convicted of first degree
murder and sentenced to death in accord with nebraska law.
We have already affirmed his conviction.99 his sentence of
death, although it cannot be implemented under current law,
also remains valid.
[44,45] under nebraska law, the sentencing panel can fix
the sentence either at death or at life imprisonment.200 because
a panel’s sentencing authority does not extend beyond that, the
method of imposing a death sentence is not an essential part of
98 Jones v. State, 70 so. 2d 76, 87 (fla. 997) (shaw, J., dissenting).
99 see Mata I, supra note 2.
200 see neb. rev. stat. § 29-2522 (cum. supp. 2006).
state v. mata 	67
cite as 275 neb. 

68 	275 nebraska reports
the sentence.20 and nebraska’s statutes specifying electrocu-
tion as the mode of inflicting the death penalty are separate,
and severable, from the procedures by which the trial court
sentences the defendant.202 in short, that a method of execution
is cruel and unusual punishment “‘“bears solely on the legality
of the execution of the sentence and not on the validity of the
sentence itself.”’”203 because we find no error in imposing a
sentence of death, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
[46] on direct appeal in a capital case, our responsibility
extends beyond the validity of the conviction and sentence. We
are also charged with the duty to administer and supervise the
implementation of the death penalty by appointing the day for
execution of the sentence and issuing a death warrant.204 it is
in exercising that duty that we have considered whether elec-
trocution is constitutional.205 and obviously, the state cannot
carry out mata’s sentence without a constitutionally acceptable
method of execution.
thus, although we affirm the judgment, we decline to “appoint
a day certain for the execution of the sentence”206 and stay
mata’s execution.207 When the state moves that an execution
20 see, State v. McDermott, 200 neb. 337, 263 n.W.2d 482 (978); Iron Bear
v. Jones, 49 neb. 65, 32 n.W.2d 25 (948). cf., Malloy, supra note
5; Poland v. Stewart, 7 f.3d 094 (9th cir. 997); State v. Jones, 200
La. 808, 9 so. 2d 42 (942); State v. Brown, 342 mo. 53, 2 s.W.2d 568
(938); State v. Fitzpatrick, 2 mont. 34, 684 p.2d 2 (984); Alberty
v. State, 0 okla. crim. 66, 40 p. 025 (94); Ex parte Granviel, 56
s.W.2d 503 (tex. crim. app. 978) (en banc).
202 see, § 29-2532 and neb. rev. stat. § 29-2533 (reissue 995); 93 neb.
Laws, ch. 32, § , p. 08. cf. Dawson, supra note 54.
203 see, People v. Samayoa, 5 cal. 4th 795, 864, 938 p.2d 2, 48, 64 cal. rptr.
2d 400, 446 (997). accord People v. Holt, 5 cal. 4th 69, 937 p.2d 23,
63 cal. rptr. 2d 782 (997). see, also, Com. v. Terry, 53 pa. 38, 52 a.2d
398 (987).
204 see, Moore, supra note 97; State v. Palmer, 246 neb. 305, 58 n.W.2d 899
(994); neb. rev. stat. § 29-2528 (reissue 995).
205 see Moore, supra note 97.
206 § 29-2528.
207 see Moore, supra note 97.

date be set, in addition to the other requirements for such a
motion,208 the state should allege, and be prepared to demon-
strate, that a constitutionally acceptable method of carrying out
mata’s sentence is available.
Vi. concLusion
mata’s sentence of death is affirmed. but under our system
of government, while the Legislature may vote to have the death
penalty, it must not create one that offends constitutional rights.
We recognize the temptation to make the prisoner suffer, just
as the prisoner made an innocent victim suffer. but it is the
hallmark of a civilized society that we punish cruelty without
practicing it. condemned prisoners must not be tortured to
death, regardless of their crimes.
and the evidence clearly proves that unconsciousness and
death are not instantaneous for many condemned prisoners.
these prisoners will, when electrocuted, consciously suffer the
torture that high voltage electric current inflicts on the human
body. the evidence shows that electrocution inflicts intense pain
and agonizing suffering. therefore, electrocution as a method
of execution is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the nebraska constitution, article i, § 9. and, without a consti-
tutionally acceptable method of execution, mata’s sentence of
death is stayed.
S eNteNce affirmed , aNd executioN Stayed .
208 see Palmer, supra note 204.
heavicaN, c.J., concurring in part, and in part dissenting.
although i agree with the first seven parts of the majority’s
analysis, i respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion
that electrocution—a means of execution used in america for
well over a century—is no longer constitutional. i therefore
write separately to not only voice my dissent from that con-
clusion, but also to express sincere reservations with several
aspects of the analysis used to generate it.
i.
early in its analysis, the majority acknowledges that the
u.s. supreme court has indicated electrocution is not cruel
state v. mata 	69
cite as 275 neb. 

70 	275 nebraska reports
and unusual. accordingly, the majority concedes that it has
no authority to hold that electrocution violates the eighth
amendment. but as it is this court’s “duty to safeguard our
state constitution,” the majority purports to resolve whether
“electrocution is prohibited by the nebraska constitution’s pro-
scription against inflicting cruel and unusual punishment.” after
a lengthy analysis, the majority concludes that electrocution is,
in fact, a violation of the nebraska constitution.
the concern, of course, is that we have long held that our
constitution’s cruel-and-unusual-punishment provision is no
more stringent than is the eighth amendment to the federal
constitution. thus, if the nebraska constitution does not
require anything more than the federal constitution regarding
cruel and unusual punishment, and the u.s. supreme court has
indicated that electrocution is not cruel and unusual under the
federal constitution, i cannot see how electrocution violates the
nebraska constitution.
a.
conceivably, the majority could have reached its result by
merely overruling the cases which established the similarity
between the nebraska and federal constitutions. however, the
majority’s opinion lacks any such declaration. i trust that if the
majority intended such a sweeping change in our constitutional
doctrine, it would have done so explicitly.
moreover, even if the majority had held that the nebraska
constitution requires more than the federal constitution, such a
position would be difficult to defend. as the majority acknowl-
edges, the cruel-and-unusual-punishment provision in article
i, § 9, of the nebraska constitution contains the exact same
language as that found in the eighth amendment. both provi-
sions provide that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment[s]
 State v. Hurbenca, 266 neb. 853, 669 n.W.2d 668 (2003); State v. Moore,
256 neb. 553, 59 n.W.2d 86 (999); State v. Michalski, 22 neb. 380,
377 n.W.2d 50 (985); State v. Brand, 29 neb. 402, 363 n.W.2d
56 (985).

inflicted.”2 of course, it would be exceedingly difficult—and
perhaps a touch disingenuous—to insist that identical language
has two different meanings.
it should be indisputable that either the nebraska constitution
is a mirror of the eighth amendment, in which case u.s.
supreme court precedent is conclusive, or that the nebraska
constitution requires more than the eighth amendment, in
which case this court would not be bound by u.s. supreme
court case law. by contradicting u.s. supreme court precedent
and yet declining to say that article i, § 9, is any different than
the eighth amendment, the majority has left us in a sort of
constitutional limbo: our state’s constitutional limit on cruel and
unusual punishment is not quite like the federal constitution,
yet not quite distinct from it either.
the confusion surrounding the majority’s constitutional anal-
ysis is heightened when the majority relies on “federal precedent
for guidance” on this issue. the numerous subsequent cites to
federal case law confirm that the majority retained federal court
approaches to this eighth amendment question, yet jettisoned
the u.s. supreme court’s ultimate answer. in other words, the
majority relied upon those aspects of federal law that supported
its conclusion and ignored the remainder that did not.
b.
indeed, the unmistakable tone of the majority opinion is that
In re Kemmler3—the u.s. supreme court decision most often
cited as support for the constitutionality of electrocution—is an
anachronism. the majority relies upon the dissent to Glass v.
Louisiana,4 in which Justice brennan expresses the belief that In
re Kemmler “was grounded on a number of constitutional prem-
ises that have long since been rejected and on factual assump-
tions that appear not to have withstood the test of experience.”
2 u.s. const. amend. Viii; neb. const. art. i, § 9.
3 In re Kemmler, 36 u.s. 436, 0 s. ct. 930, 34 L. ed. 59 (890).
4 Glass v. Louisiana, 47 u.s. 080, 08, 05 s. ct. 259, 85 L. ed. 2d
54 (985) (brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari; marshall,
J., joins).
state v. mata 	7
cite as 275 neb. 

72 	275 nebraska reports
accordingly, Justice brennan—and, indeed, the majority here—
regards In re Kemmler as “antiquated authority.”5
not long after expressing such sentiment, the majority points
out that nebraska is the only state that mandates electrocu-
tion and that the u.s. supreme court will almost certainly not
“accept an appeal on the issue from any other jurisdiction.” as
such, the majority feels an ultimate determination as to the con-
stitutionality of electrocution “has fallen to this court.”
these comments suggest the majority believes that by strik-
ing down electrocution under the nebraska constitution, it is
doing what the modern u.s. supreme court would do under the
eighth amendment if it, too, were “presented with evidence of
a nature and quality that the supreme court never considered
when it held electrocution was not cruel and unusual punish-
ment.” this would explain the majority’s decision to resolve this
case under article i, § 9, of the nebraska constitution—a move
that obviates the need to defer to “antiquated” u.s. supreme
court authority—yet nonetheless rely entirely on federal eighth
amendment precedent.
of course, if the majority were truly confident that it is not
doing anything the u.s. supreme court itself would not do
today, it would not have been necessary to draw the nebraska
constitution into the question. instead, the majority could have
simply emphasized In re Kemmler’s antiquity, highlighted the
uniqueness of this factual record, and then expressed that it
wished it could—but was unable to—reach a different result.6
this would have given the u.s. supreme court the opportu-
nity to grant certiorari and overrule precedent the majority
believes is so clearly outdated. instead, the majority chooses
to essentially retain the eighth amendment’s proscriptions but
avoids the problem of having to overrule a u.s. supreme
court decision by purporting to reach its result under the
nebraska constitution.
5 Id., 47 u.s. at 083.
6 see, e.g., Trident Center v. Connecticut General Life Ins., 847 f.2d 564 (9th
cir. 988) (discussing Pacific Gas & E. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage etc.
Co., 69 cal. 2d 33, 442 p.2d 64 (968)).

While this approach may serve the majority’s purpose, i
believe it does so at the expense of clarity in our constitutional
doctrine. before today’s decision, lower courts could rest with
confidence on the belief that our constitution requires noth-
ing more than the eighth amendment with regard to methods
of punishment. by reaching a conclusion that contradicts u.s.
supreme court precedent, this decision will give lower courts
reason to question that belief. at a minimum, attorneys may
exploit the ambiguity in today’s decision in subsequent cases.
c.
Given the majority’s reliance on the nebraska constitution,
there may be speculation that today’s decision is immune
from certiorari review. if true, the majority’s decision would
conclusively 	resolve 	the 	constitutionality 	of 	electrocution
because, as the last state that mandates electrocution, the u.s.
supreme court could only address the constitutionality of
execution on an appeal from this court. for reasons set forth
below, i am of the belief that today’s decision is not immune
from certiorari review despite the majority’s references to the
nebraska constitution.
it is well settled that the u.s. supreme court is precluded
from hearing an appeal from a state’s highest court where
that court’s decision was the product of state law—statu-
tory or constitutional.7 this rule of independent and adequate
state grounds reflects the principle that state courts are the
final arbiters of their own laws.8 in such cases, it would be
superfluous, and thus a violation of article iii’s proscription
against advisory opinions, for the court to resolve any remain-
ing federal issues.9 the question, however, is how to identify
whether a state court’s decision truly rests on independent and
7 John e. nowak & ronald d. rotunda, constitutional Law § 2.3 (7th
ed. 2004).
8 Michigan v. Long, 463 u.s. 032, 03 s. ct. 3469, 77 L. ed. 2d
20 (983).
9 Id.
state v. mata 	73
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74 	275 nebraska reports
adequate state grounds. the court addressed this very question
in Michigan v. Long.0
at issue in Long was whether a police officer could con-
duct a protective search of the passenger compartment of an
automobile that had been lawfully stopped. citing its state
constitution, the fourth amendment, and federal case law, the
michigan supreme court concluded that such a search was ille-
gal. the u.s. supreme court granted certiorari. before address-
ing the merits of the case, the respondent argued that the
u.s. supreme court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case
because the michigan supreme court’s decision was based on
the michigan constitution and thus had an independent and
adequate state ground.
in response to that argument, the u.s. supreme court
announced that when
a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on
federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and
when the adequacy and independence of any possible
state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion,
we will accept as the most reasonable explanation that
the state court decided the case the way it did because it
believed that federal law required it to do so.
the rationale is that when a state court construes state law in
light of federal authorities, “[t]he state ground is not really
‘independent’ of the federal ground.”2 in that case, “the u.s.
supreme court may review because the state court may have
misapprehended federal law.”3
applying its rule to the case before it, the u.s. supreme
court in Long concluded that the michigan supreme court’s
decision did not rest on independent and adequate state grounds.
the court noted that “[a]part from its two citations to the state
constitution, the [michigan supreme court] relied exclusively
0 Long, supra note 8.
 Id., 463 u.s. at 040-4.
2 nowak & rotunda, supra note 7 at 2.
3 Id.

on its understanding of . . . federal cases.”4 moreover, the court
observed that “[n]ot a single state case was cited to support the
state court’s holding that the search of the passenger compart-
ment was unconstitutional.”5
the same is true of the majority’s opinion in this case.
although the majority refers to the nebraska constitution, it
fails to cite to a single nebraska case in support of its conclu-
sion that electrocution is unconstitutional. the entirety of the
majority’s analysis is based on cites to federal case law. indeed,
the majority itself conceded that it “look[ed] to federal prec-
edent for guidance” in deciding this issue. under Long, such
reliance suggests that the majority’s decision is without an inde-
pendent state ground.
the majority’s assertion that “the nebraska constitution gov-
erns this issue” does not at all diminish this fact. first, the
majority never declares that the nebraska constitution is more
restrictive than the eighth amendment. but even if it had, that
alone would almost certainly not have been enough to overcome
the effect of the majority’s reliance on federal case law in light
of Long: “even if we accept that the michigan constitution
has been interpreted to provide independent protection for cer-
tain rights also secured under the fourth amendment, it fairly
appears in this case that the michigan supreme court rested its
decision primarily on federal law.”6 as a result, the majority’s
“references to the state constitution in no way indicate that the
decision below rested on grounds in any way independent from
the state court’s interpretation of federal law.”7
ii.
i am also hesitant about the majority’s conclusion that “[a]
method of execution violates the prohibition against cruel and
4 Long, supra note 8, 463 u.s. at 043 (emphasis in original).
5 Id.
6 Id., 463 u.s. at 044. see, also, South Dakota v. Neville, 459 u.s. 553,
03 s. ct. 96, 74 L. ed. 2d 748 (983); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 u.s.
648, 99 s. ct. 39, 59 L. ed. 2d 660 (979); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., 433 u.s. 562, 97 s. ct. 2849, 53 L. ed. 2d 965 (977).
7 Long, supra note 8, 463 u.s. at 044 (emphasis in original).
state v. mata 	75
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76 	275 nebraska reports
unusual punishment if there is a substantial foreseeable risk,
inherent in the method, that a prisoner will suffer unnecessary
pain.” my concerns with this standard are twofold.
first, i note that in numerous cases, the u.s. supreme court
has held that capital punishment “must not involve the unneces-
sary and wanton infliction of pain.”8 Yet in a subtle shift, the
majority dropped the words “and wanton” from its standard
so that it speaks only to an unnecessary infliction of pain. the
result is that a prisoner need not show any culpability on the
part of the government to invalidate a method of execution.
in justifying the decision to omit “and wanton” from the
opinion, the majority explained that it does “not believe ‘wan-
ton’ in the context of state sanctioned punishment implies
a mental state.” rather, the majority believes that the u.s.
supreme court’s use of “wanton” was superfluous and sim-
ply another way of saying “inherently cruel.” accordingly, the
majority concludes that a “legislative intent to inflict cruel and
unusual punishment is not a relevant consideration in a method-
of-punishment challenge.” as support for this conclusion, the
majority relies on the supreme court’s opinions in Trop v.
Dulles9 and Francis v. Resweber.20 i believe the majority’s reli-
ance is misplaced.
Trop dealt with the constitutionality of a statute which offi-
cially divested wartime deserters of their status as american citi-
zens. but only four justices—chief Justice Warren and Justices
black, douglas, and Whittaker—addressed the statute’s constitu-
tionality under the eighth amendment. Justice brennan, writing
separately, found that the law exceeded congress’ authority “to
raise and maintain military forces to wage war.”2 consequently,
8 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 u.s. 53, 73, 96 s. ct. 2909, 49 L. ed. 2d 859
(976) (emphasis supplied). accord, Nelson v. Campbell, 54 u.s. 637, 24
s. ct. 27, 58 L. ed. 2d 924 (2004); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 u.s. 730, 22
s. ct. 2508, 53 L. ed. 2d 666 (2002); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 u.s. 97, 97
s. ct. 285, 50 L. ed. 2d 25 (976).
9 Trop v. Dulles, 356 u.s. 86, 78 s. ct. 590, 2 L. ed. 2d 630 (958)
(plurality opinion).
20 Francis v. Resweber, 329 u.s. 459, 67 s. ct. 374, 9 L. ed. 422 (947).
2 Trop, supra note 9, 356 u.s. at 07 (brennan, J., concurring).

Justice brennan never addressed the statute’s constitutionality
under the eighth amendment and does not provide a fifth vote
for the plurality’s eighth amendment analysis. therefore, to the
extent that Trop does, in fact, show that a legislative intent to
inflict pain is irrelevant in assessing the cruelty of a punishment,
that premise would be one without majority support.
much the same can be said of Resweber. as the majority
readily concedes, Resweber was also a four-justice plurality
decision. in fact, rather than standing for the proposition that
“state officials’ lack of intent to cause pain was irrelevant,”
Resweber arguably suggests the opposite. the plurality’s con-
clusion that what transpired in Louisiana was not cruel or
unusual was based, at least in part, on the fact that “[t]here
[wa]s no purpose to inflict unnecessary pain . . .” attributable
to the government.22 at a minimum, Trop and Resweber show
that the idea that a lack of intent to inflict pain is irrelevant in
the cruel-and-unusual-punishment analysis is an idea that has
never received majority support from the u.s. supreme court
at any given time.
instead of Trop or Resweber, i would point to the u.s.
supreme court’s more recent decision in Wilson v. Seiter23 to
help resolve this issue. in Wilson, a majority of the supreme
court reemphasized that “only the ‘“unnecessary and wan-
ton infliction of pain”’ implicates the eighth amendment.”24
accordingly, the court held that “a prisoner advancing such
a claim must, at a minimum, allege ‘deliberate indifference’”
because “‘[i]t is only such indifference’ that can violate the
eighth amendment . . . .”25 i think the court’s statements in
Wilson are sufficiently clear to conclude that “wanton” as used
in the eighth amendment standard is not superfluous but actu-
ally requires at least deliberate indifference, if not outright
intent, on the part of the government.
22 Resweber, supra note 20, 329 u.s. at 464 (emphasis supplied).
23 Wilson v. Seiter, 50 u.s. 294,  s. ct. 232, 5 L. ed. 2d 27 (99).
24 Id., 50 u.s. at 297 (emphasis in original) (quoting Estelle, supra
note 8).
25 Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Estelle, supra note 8).
state v. mata 	77
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78 	275 nebraska reports
my second concern with the majority’s formulation is that
when used independently, the word “unnecessary” creates “too
much leeway for a court to declare one method of execution
unconstitutional merely because it found another was better.”26
if the majority’s use of “unnecessary” is strictly construed, even
an extremely small amount of discomfort would be “unneces-
sary” if some other method—even one far more costly and
burdensome—resulted in no pain at all.
a simple hypothetical illustrates this point. suppose that
tomorrow a skin patch is developed which, when applied to an
inmate’s arm, results in as quick and painless a death as lethal
injection now offers. as compared to the skin patch, all the
discomfort associated with the injection process—bracing the
prisoner’s arm, attaching the intravenous bracket, fumbling for
a vein, and of course, inserting the needle—would technically
be “unnecessary.” as a result, lethal injection would be uncon-
stitutional under the majority’s standard.
it seems, therefore, that a standard which prohibits the use
of “unnecessary pain” is really a standard which demands the
least painful method. it is beyond dispute, however, that neither
the eighth amendment nor the nebraska constitution requires
the least painful method of execution; those provisions prohibit
only the use of cruel and unusual methods.27 this is evident
from the structure and language of the constitutional provisions
themselves. had those provisions been intended to require the
least painful method of execution, they would have been written
as directives, not limitations.
Whether or not a least-painful standard was the majority’s
intent, its formulation is open to such an interpretation. to
avoid this pitfall, i would refrain from using the phrase “unnec-
essary pain” as the guiding principal in the analysis. rather, i
believe prior references to “unnecessary pain” refer to methods
of execution that are “manifestly cruel and unusual,”28 such as
26 brief for amicus curiae of the criminal Justice Legal foundation in support
of respondents at 7, Baze v. Rees, case no. 07-5439 (u.s. July , 2007).
27 Gregg, supra note 8; Michalski, supra note .
28 In re Kemmler, supra note 3, 36 u.s. at 446.

those involving torture, a lingering death,29 or other hallmarks
of a “purpose to inflict unnecessary pain.”30 relying upon the
discussion of deliberate indifference from above, one way such
a standard might be formulated is to say that constitutional bans
on cruel and unusual punishment prohibit “deliberate indif-
ference to an unreasonable risk of severe and prolonged pain
in execution.”3 While this may not be an ideal standard, at a
minimum, such language would avoid the confusion inherent in
the majority’s formulation and, in my view, move us closer to
the eighth amendment’s true proscriptions.
iii.
having detailed several concerns with the majority’s opinion,
i come now to what i believe is its most troublesome aspect:
reliance on so-called evolving standards of decency.
the concern with evolving standards of decency in the
cruel-and-unusual-punishment context can be traced back to
the plurality opinion in Trop.32 there, a plurality of the court
remarked that the constitution prohibits punishments that run
contrary to the “evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.”33 at least initially, the primary
indicia of changes in societal standards were “statutes passed
by society’s elected representatives.”34
it is true that electrocution has fallen into disfavor among
american jurisdictions. nebraska is the only jurisdiction that
retains the electric chair as the sole method of execution and
is one of a handful of states that uses the electric chair at all.
even so, it is not necessarily true that the movement away
from electrocution has been uniformly precipitated by concerns
29 see id.
30 Resweber, supra note 20, 329 u.s. at 464.
3 brief for amicus curiae of the criminal Justice Legal foundation in support
of respondents, supra note 26 at 8.
32 Trop, supra note 9.
33 Id., 356 u.s. at 0.
34 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 u.s. 36, 370, 09 s. ct. 2969, 06 L. ed. 2d 306
(989), abrogated on other grounds, Roper v. Simmons, 543 u.s. 55, 25
s. ct. 83, 6 L. ed. 2d  (2005).
state v. mata 	79
cite as 275 neb. 

80 	275 nebraska reports
regarding decency. it may be, for example, that states widely
favor lethal injection over electrocution simply because lethal
injection is a more practical method of terminating a life.
there is also reason to believe that “[t]he nationwide change
to lethal injection was motivated at least as much by a desire
to end the litigation over the previous methods [of execution]
and the attendant delays as it was by the actual desire to aban-
don the old methods [themselves].”35 for example, there is
evidence that the change from cyanide gas to lethal injection
in california was prompted not by humanitarian concerns, but,
rather, to avoid protracted and costly legal challenges to the
use of cyanide gas by death row inmates.36 it is tempting to
speculate that florida’s legislature may have been motivated by
similar concerns when it changed from electrocution to lethal
injection after the u.s. supreme court agreed to review the
florida supreme court decision upholding electrocution.37 but
even if the trend away from electrocution could be explained
solely on the basis of humanitarian concerns, i would still
not be convinced that such a concern should factor into our
constitutional analysis.
a.
the most significant difficulty with a concern for contempo-
rary standards is that it inherently tempts judges to inject their
own subjective values into the constitutional analysis. the dan-
ger in such subjectivity is subtle but nonetheless potent. Judges
do not sit as a body of elected representatives, as do legislatures.
While this distinction provides a degree of independence neces-
sary for judges to make the unpopular decisions that a neutral
reading of the law sometimes compels,38 it also renders courts
35 brief for amicus curiae of the criminal Justice Legal foundation in support
of respondents, supra note 26 at .
36 Id.
37 see Bryan v. Moore, 528 u.s. 960, 20 s. ct. 394, 45 L. ed. 2d 306 (999)
(granting certiorari to Provenzano v. Moore, 744 so. 2d 43 (fla. 999)).
38 see William h. rehnquist, Act Well Your Part: Therein All Honor Lies, 7
pepp. L. rev. 227 (980).

ill suited “to respond to the will and consequently the moral
values of the people.”39
although some may view the constitution as an invitation to
“our judges, to expand on the . . . freedoms that are uniquely
our heritage,”40 this view somewhat naively assumes that judges
will always seek to “expand” rather than constrict liberties. if
left free to supplant their own values on the cases before them,
judges may just as easily seek to limit individual rights as
expand them. this, of course, is to say nothing of the fact that
a true expansion of rights is a practical impossibility. it is often
the case that an expansion of rights for one group results in a
loss of rights for others.4 in this way, subjective judicial deci-
sionmaking paves “a two-way street that handles traffic both to
and from individual rights”42 and therefore presents a danger to
any and all ideologies.
the majority downplays the concern that “a court’s evalu-
ation of contemporary values is subjective” by pointing out
that the u.s. supreme court looks only “to objective criteria
for this inquiry.” however, one can argue that recent supreme
court history confirms that even courts which initially intend
to keep the inquiry into evolving standards truly objective
will inevitably allow subjective value judgments to creep into
the analysis.
in Stanford v. Kentucky,43 the u.s. supreme court addressed
whether executing individuals older than 6, but younger than
8, constituted cruel and unusual punishment. in the course
of holding that such executions were not cruel and unusual,
a four-member plurality observed that a court’s role under
the eighth amendment “is to identify the ‘evolving standards
39 Furman v. Georgia, 408 u.s. 238, 383, 92 s. ct. 2726, 33 L. ed. 2d 346
(972) (burger, c.J., dissenting).
40 see, e.g., Laurence h. tribe, God save this honorable court 45 (985).
4 see, e.g., Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 52 u.s. 753, 4 s. ct.
256, 29 L. ed. 2d 593 (994); Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Com’n,
02 p.3d 937 (alaska 2004).
42 antonin scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 u. cin. L. rev. 849,
856 (989).
43 Stanford, supra note 34.
state v. mata 	8
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82 	275 nebraska reports
of decency’; to determine, not what they should be, but what
they are.”44 as a result, the plurality held that an evaluation of
contemporary standards should be based solely on the objective
reality of legislative pronouncements, not “the preferences of a
majority of this court.”45
a fifth justice, Justice o’connor, essentially agreed with this
premise, yet wrote separately to emphasize her belief that a
court’s own judgment is relevant when determining “whether the
‘“nexus between the punishment imposed and the defendant’s
blameworthiness”’ is proportional.”46 proportionality analysis is
irrelevant when assessing the majority of eighth amendment
issues,47 including the constitutionality of a method of execution
as opposed to the propriety of a death sentence itself. therefore,
for all practical purposes, Justice o’connor added a fifth vote
in support of the notion that a court’s own judgment had no
place in most eighth amendment debates.
but when the u.s. supreme court revisited the issue some
5 years later in Roper v. Simmons,48 it held that the ulti-
mate “task of interpreting the eighth amendment remains
our responsibility.”49 on that basis, the court held that exe-
cuting minors offended conventional standards of decency.50
Juxtaposing Stanford and Roper shows that even courts which
initially set out with intent to objectively identify what con-
ventional standards of decency are, will likely succumb to the
ever-present temptation to subjectively say what those conven-
tional standards should be. there is no doubt that the tempta-
tion for judges to inject subjective values into their decisions is
always present. but assigning weight to conventional standards
of decency does not merely open the door to subjectivity; it
invites it.
44 Id., 492 u.s. at 378 (plurality opinion) (emphasis in original).
45 Id., 492 u.s. at 379.
46 Id., 492 u.s. at 382 (o’connor, J., dissenting).
47 see id.
48 Roper, supra note 34.
49 Id., 543 u.s. at 575.
50 Id.

b.
there is also the possibility that concern for contemporary
standards of decency will eventually lead courts to rely on for-
eign law. in Stanford, a majority of the court emphasized that
only “American conceptions of decency are dispositive”5 and
therefore rejected the contention that “sentencing practices of
other countries . . . serve to establish . . . that the practice is
accepted among our people.”52 but in Roper, the majority openly
cited a number of foreign laws and ultimately gave weight to
the fact that “the united states now stands alone in a world that
has turned its face against the juvenile death penalty.”53
such an observation may well be true, but i do not believe
it is relevant to our analysis. i agree that a legislature assessing
the wisdom of a law might want to consider how business is
done elsewhere. but a court’s role is not to speculate on how a
law might be written more effectively; its role is to assess what
laws are forbidden by our constitutions. and yet all pretense of
state or federal constitutional interpretation is lost the moment
a judge looks to foreign law. Roper shows that a concern
with contemporary standards of decency will inevitably lead
to reliance on foreign law. after all, although our nation has a
unique experience with constitutional interpretation, we have no
monopoly on humanity.
of course, it would be naive to assume that the influence of
foreign law will always result in an “expansion” of personal
liberties. for example, Justice scalia has observed that reli-
ance on foreign law would jeopardize the fourth amendment’s
exclusionary rule, abortion rights, and our nation’s adherence to
the separation of church and state.54 therefore, the specter that
judges will rely on foreign law when interpreting our state and
federal constitutions is a broad-based concern.
5 Stanford, supra note 34, 492 u.s. at 369 n. (emphasis in original).
52 Id.
53 Roper, supra note 34, 543 u.s. at 577.
54 Roper, supra note 34 (scalia, J., dissenting).
state v. mata 	83
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84 	275 nebraska reports
c.
however, the problems with evolving standards of decency
would not be eliminated even if we could somehow guarantee
that the inquiry would be based solely on laws enacted by
american legislatures. to begin, it is not at all clear exactly
how such an objective analysis should proceed. for example,
how many american jurisdictions are needed to show that soci-
ety’s standards of decency have evolved? in Stanford, the court
observed that only 5 of the 37 death penalty states refused to
impose capital punishment on 6-year-old offenders and only
2 refused to do so for 7-year-old offenders.55 in the 5 years
between Stanford and Roper, a total of 8 state legislatures—or
48 percent of death penalty states—prohibited the execution of
minors.56 despite a slight change in otherwise modest figures,
the Roper majority declared a national “consensus” against the
juvenile death penalty.57 this declaration prompted a flurry of
dissenting opinions from the four remaining members of the
court. in the close cases, even a reliance on solely objective
indicia will lead to a vexing and contentious debate over how
to read the numbers.
moreover, all of this ignores the “danger in inferring a
settled societal consensus from [such] statistics.”58 as Justice
o’connor observed in her concurring opinion in Thompson v.
Oklahoma,59 the death penalty has historically undergone dra-
matic fluctuations in social acceptance, reaching almost total
extinction in the late 960’s and early 970’s.60 as such, when
the court addressed the constitutionality of the death penalty in
972, a reliance on evolving standards of decency would have
compelled the conclusion that “the [death penalty] had become
55 Stanford, supra note 34.
56 Roper, supra note 34 (scalia, J., dissenting).
57 Id., 543 u.s. at 567 (majority opinion).
58 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 u.s. 85, 854, 08 s. ct. 2687, 0 L. ed. 2d
702 (988) (o’connor, J., concurring in judgment).
59 Id.
60 Id.

a relic, implicitly rejected by a new societal consensus.”6
through hindsight, we now know that “any inference of a soci-
etal consensus rejecting the death penalty would have been mis-
taken.”62 but because “legislatures would very likely not have
been able to revive” execution in the wake of a u.s. supreme
court pronouncement that the practice violated the constitution,
the court’s mistaken assumption “would have been frozen into
constitutional law.”63
the final problem with drawing inferences from legisla-
tive responses to the death penalty is that such a practice
fundamentally misunderstands the intent of constitutional pro-
hibitions on cruel and unusual punishment. in concluding that
electrocution is cruel and unusual, the majority points out
that virtually every other death penalty state now uses lethal
injection as their primary, if not solitary, method of execution.
according to the majority, the switch to lethal injection has
come “‘because it is universally recognized as the most humane
method of execution.’”
however, as noted previously, the eighth amendment only
prohibits governments from using cruel methods of punishment;
it does not demand that they use the most humane methods. as
such, it makes no sense to interpret that provision by looking
to legislative enactments prompted by the desire to minimize
cruelty. a legislative consensus that lethal injection is more
humane than electrocution does not mean that electrocution is
cruel in a more absolute sense. and yet, it seems to me that a
more absolute definition of cruelty is, or at least should be, the
concern under our constitutions.
the majority’s alternative—a preoccupation with national
consensus—is at once too lax and too strict in limiting methods
of punishment. it is too lax because “[i]t reduces the function
of the [e]ighth [a]mendment to bringing the occasionally devi-
ant state into line with the rest.”64 as professor chemerinsky
6 Id., 487 u.s. at 855.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 erwin chemerinsky, The Vanishing Constitution, 03 harv. L. rev. 43, 88
n.200 (989).
state v. mata 	85
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86 	275 nebraska reports
observed, such an “approach would mean that horrible torture
would be permitted under the constitution so long as most
states engaged in the practice.”65
the skin-patch hypothetical illustrates why reliance on con-
temporary standards of decency is too strict. to refresh, assume
that a skin patch is developed which, when applied to an
inmate’s arm, executes a prisoner as quickly and painlessly as
lethal injection. assume further that only one state continues
to use lethal injection and every other death penalty jurisdic-
tion switches to the skin patch. Would such a shift render lethal
injection cruel and unusual punishment? it would if “cruel and
unusual” is defined according to contemporary standards. but
it would be a stretch to say that simply having one’s arm held
down while attendants search for a vein and insert a needle is
unconstitutionally “cruel.”
for these reasons, i believe that evolving standards of decency,
even when based solely on evidence of legislative action, are
best left out of the constitutional analysis. as alluded to above,
i believe it far more accurate to say that the eighth amendment
and article i, § 9, were designed solely to protect against
“deliberate indifference to an unreasonable risk of severe and
prolonged pain in execution.”66
regardless of the precise standard we use, hopefully the
above has demonstrated that there is nothing to gain and much
to lose by attempting to rely on contemporary standards of
decency in assessing the constitutionality of a punishment. of
course, the u.s. supreme court’s current case law forecloses
us from construing the eighth amendment in line with these
views. it does not, however, prevent us from refusing to make
such an approach part and parcel of this state’s constitution.
iV.
because i sincerely believe this precedent will have adverse
consequences in future cases, i respectfully dissent from the
portion of the majority opinion that finds electrocution to be
unconstitutional.
65 Id.
66 brief for amicus curiae of the criminal Justice Legal foundation in support
of respondents, supra note 26 at 8.