County of Sarpy v. City of Papillion

jurisdiction to exercise its inherent power, as an intermediate
appellate court, to vacate its previous ruling. And Hausmann
timely appealed within 30 days of the district court’s October
22 order.45 Therefore, we find merit to Hausmann’s assignment
of error on further review.
[9] We recognize that upon reversing a decision of the
Nebraska Court of Appeals, we may consider, if appropri-
ate, some or all of the assignments of error that the Court of
Appeals did not reach.46 In this case, however, the Court of
Appeals did not proceed past the jurisdictional issue presented,
and neither of the State’s briefs has discussed the underlying
merits of the appeal. We conclude that those issues should be
briefed by the State and addressed by the Court of Appeals in
the first instance.
CONCluSION
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cause
remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
R eveRsed and Remanded foR
fuRtheR pRoceedings.
WRight, J., participating on briefs.
45 See Interstate Printing Co., supra note 8.
46 Incontro v. Jacobs, ante p. 275, 761 N.W.2d 551 (2009).
the county of saRpy, nebRaska , a body coRpoRate and
politic , appellee and cRoss -appellant, v. the city of
papillion, nebRaska , a municipal coRpoRation,
appellant and cRoss -appellee .
765 N.W.2d 456
Filed May 22, 2009. 	No. S-08-166.
1. Annexation: Ordinances: Equity. An action to determine the validity of an
annexation ordinance and enjoin its enforcement sounds in equity.
2. Equity: Appeal and Error. On appeal from an equity action, an appellate court
decides factual questions de novo on the record and, as to questions of both
fact and law, is obligated to reach a conclusion independent of the trial court’s
determination.
COuNTyOFSA rpy v.CIT yOF pApIllION 	829
Cite as 277 Neb. 829
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:50 AM CST

3. Standing: Counties: Annexation. If a county alleges that a city, through an
unlawful annexation plan, has encroached upon its governmental function, it has
alleged an injury sufficient to give it standing to challenge the annexation plan.
4. Municipal Corporations: Annexation. A municipal corporation has no power
to extend or change its boundaries otherwise than as provided by constitutional
enactment or as it is empowered by thel egislature by statute to do.
5. Municipal Corporations: Annexation: Statutes. The power delegated to munici-
pal corporations to annex territory must be exercised in strict accord with the
statute conferring it.
6. Annexation: Ordinances: Proof. The burden is on one who attacks an annexa-
tion ordinance, valid on its face and enacted under lawful authority, to prove facts
to establish its invalidity.
7. Municipal Corporations: Statutes: Annexation. Cities of the first class are
given authority under chapter 16 of the Nebraskar evised Statutes, and specifi-
cally Neb.r ev. Stat. § 16-117 (reissue 2007), to extend their city limits, subject
to certain limitations.
8. Annexation: Words and Phrases. The terms contiguous and adjacent in annexa-
tion statutes are synonymous.
9. ____: ____. The terms contiguous and adjacent mean “adjoining,” “touching,”
and “sharing a common border.”
10. Annexation: Statutes. In order to satisfy the requirements of Neb.r ev. Stat.
§ 16-117 (reissue 2007), the boundaries must be “sufficiently” or “substantially”
joined together.
11. Municipal Corporations: Annexation. Substantial adjacency between a munici-
pality and annexed territory exists when a substantial part of the connecting
boundary of the annexed land is adjacent to a segment of the boundary of the city
or village.
12. ____: ____. A municipality may annex several tracts as long as one tract is
substantially adjacent to the municipality and the other tracts are substantially
adjacent to each other.
13. Municipal Corporations. As to territorial extent, the idea of a city is one of unity,
not of plurality; of compactness or contiguity, not separation or segregation.
14. Municipal Corporations: Annexation: Highways. The annexation of a portion
of a highway extending away from the municipality, connected only by the width
of that highway, is an invalid strip or corridor annexation.
15. Ordinances. Generally, the partial invalidity of an ordinance does not necessarily
make the remaining provisions of the ordinance ineffective.
16. ____. If a city ordinance contains valid and invalid provisions, the valid portion
will be upheld if it is a complete law, capable of enforcement, and is not depen-
dent upon that which is invalid.
Appeal from the District Court for Sarpy County: W illiam
b. Z asteRa, Judge. Affirmed.
Michael N. Schirber, of Schirber & Wagner,l .l.p., for
appellant.
830 	277N ebrASkA repOrTS

l.k ennethp olikov, Sarpy County Attorney, Michael A.
Smith, andk erry A. Schmid for appellee.
heavican , 	c.J., 	WRight , 	connolly , 	geRRaRd , 	stephan ,
mccoRmack, and milleR-leRman, JJ.
mccoRmack, J.
NATure OF CASe
The County of Sarpy, Nebraska (Sarpy), challenged two ordi-
nances passed by the City ofp apillion, Nebraska (papillion),
that purported to annex land and portions of several streets,
including Highway 370. Sarpy also challenged the ordinance
that redrew the zoning area forp apillion as a result of the
newly acquired land. Sarpy alleged that the annexations were
null and void and that an injunction should be issued against
the ordinances, because the properties were not contiguous
to the municipality, as required by Neb.r ev. Stat. § 16-117
(reissue 2007).p apillion disagreed and argued that Sarpy
lacked standing to bring its challenge.
The district court found all parts of the annexations to be
adequately contiguous, with the exception of two “tails” run-
ning the approximate width of two roads traveling away from
the farthest ends of larger annexation areas.b ecause the land
in ordinance No. 1527 was described altogether in a single
paragraph, the court found the entirety of that ordinance to be
ineffective.b ecause ordinance No. 1526 involved more com-
plex descriptions of four separate areas, one being simply the
tail, the court found that tail to be severable from the remainder
of the ordinance and found that ordinance enforceable with
the exception of the paragraph describing the tail. The court
granted a permanent injunction consistent with these conclu-
sions, but did not specifically state in its conclusion that any
ordinance was null and void.p apillion appeals, and Sarpy
cross-appeals.
FACTS
Appendix A to this opinion is a map ofp apillion and the
proposed annexations.p apillion, shown in the area shaded
light gray, is shaped like a rectangular puzzle piece.e specially
on the west and east sides,p apillion’s border does not run in
COuNTyOFSA rpy v.CIT yOF pApIllION 	831
Cite as 277 Neb. 829

a smooth line.p apillion passed ordinance No. 1526 to annex
land and roads to the west and southwest of the city. It passed
ordinance No. 1527 to add land and portions of a road directly
to the south of the city limits. Ordinance No. 1529 did not
annex any property, but simply changed the official zoning map
of the city to reflect the newly annexed areas.
The area to be annexed by ordinance No. 1526 is a complex
shape and was described in four separate metes and bounds
descriptions. First, the ordinance sought to annex Highway
370, along with varying degrees of land surrounding Highway
370, from 84th Street to a point west of 96th Street, shown in
the map as 1526, section “A.”p ortions of Highway 370 were
already part ofp apillion as it ran from the east end through
the city. This part of ordinance No. 1526 sought domain over
Highway 370 as it continued to run adjoining along the north
side of a jagged southern edge of the city. It also sought to
annex the highway as it ran approximately a quarter mile from
one part of the city to another.
After passing this most southwestern point of the previ-
ous city limits, near 96th Street, the area to be annexed
expands beyond simply the highway corridor, into an approxi-
mate quarter-mile-wide parcel labeled section “b,” filling
in gaps between the jagged edges of the city. This quarter-
mile area continues west and becomes part of a large square
shape, 	section 	“e,” 	that 	encompasses 	the 	Walnut 	Creek
lake andr ecreation Area and thep apillion-la Vista South
High School.
After 108th Street, the square, sectione , ends, and the area
to be annexed becomes simply a corridor around Highway 370
as it continues west away fromp apillion for approximately
4 miles until it reaches Interstate 80. This highway corridor,
designated on the map as section “F,” is described in a single
metes and bounds description in the second paragraph of
the ordinance.
back toward the preexisting city limits, to the north of
Highway 370, ordinance No. 1526 sought to annex approxi-
mately 1.4 miles of 96th Street as it runs parallel to the city
until it reaches a portion of 96th Street already part ofp apillion.
This area is referred to in the map as section “C.”
832 	277N ebrASkA repOrTS

Finally, ordinance No. 1526 sought to annex First Street
from an eastern point deep inside and completely surrounded
by the city limits, through an approximate quarter-mile corri-
dor not touching city land, but then reconnecting alongside the
city at its most western point. This portion of the annexation is
designated in the map as section “D.”
The area sought to be annexed by ordinance No. 1527 was
simpler. It is a triangular area of land bordered on its north
side by approximately one-half mile of the southern limits of
the city, and another side on the west side by 84th Street. This
is shown on the map as 1527, section “A.”b ut the ordinance
also sought to annex what is shown on the map as section “b”:
the 84th Street corridor running almost three-quarters of a mile
beyond the corner of the triangle until reaching Capehartr oad.
All of the property to be annexed was described in ordinance
No. 1527 as a single area, with a single metes and bounds
description set forth in a single paragraph.
Sarpy filed a complaint with the district court asking that it
issue a temporary injunction prohibiting enforcements of ordi-
nances Nos. 1526, 1527, and 1529 and that upon a final hear-
ing, the court permanently enjoinp apillion from implementing
the annexations. Sarpy also asked that the court declare these
ordinances null, void, and of no legal effect. The parties stipu-
lated that ordinances Nos. 1526 and 1527 complied with Neb.
rev. Stat. § 16-405 (reissue 2007) and that the language of
the ordinances was sufficient to effectuate the annexation of
the described tracts. The dispute thus centered on whether the
areas to be annexed were “adjacent” to the city, as required by
§ 16-117(1).
At trial, Sarpy presented witnesses and affidavits testifying
to the fact that the annexation of these areas byp apillion would
cause the Sarpy County building and planning departments to
lose approximately 25 percent of their revenue because of lost
zoning administration and development administration fees.
And it presented maps, drawn to scale, reflecting the areas
sought to be annexed.p apillion presented the testimony of
Arthurb eccard, a professional engineer, who concluded that
the areas described in the ordinances were “adjacent” to the
city.b eccard stated that the length of the adjacency of the
COuNTyOFSA rpy v.CIT yOF pApIllION 	833
Cite as 277 Neb. 829

land described in ordinance No. 1526 was 3.59 miles and that
the length of the adjacency of the land in ordinance No. 1527
was .48 miles, although he did not testify in any detail as to
the areas measured.b eccard also described the land to be
annexed by ordinance No. 1526, including the three-quarter-
mile corridor of 84th Street, as a single “tract” of land.b eccard
explained that some of the gaps in the annexation areas were
agricultural lands.
The district court concluded that ordinance No. 1526 was
a lawful annexation with the exception of the Highway 370
tail, section F of the appendix A map. The court concluded
that because the tail was described separately in the ordinance,
it could be severed from the rest of the ordinance. The court
found the 84th Street tail, sectionb 	of 1527 on the map, also
violated the statutory adjacency requirements.b ut because the
land to be annexed by ordinance No. 1527 was described as a
single unit, the court concluded that the entirety of that ordi-
nance was unlawful. The court granted a permanent injunction
as to the entirety of ordinance No. 1527 and as to the second
paragraph of ordinance No. 1526.p apillion appeals, and Sarpy
cross-appeals.
ASSIGNMeNTS OFerr Or
papillion asserts that the district court erred in granting
Sarpy a permanent injunction as to part of ordinance No. 1526
and as to ordinance No. 1527.
Sarpy cross-appeals, asserting that the district court (1) erred
in failing to declare the ordinances null and void, rather than
simply ordering a permanent injunction, and (2) erred in not
enjoining the entirety of ordinance No. 1526.
STANDArD OFre VIeW
[1,2] An action to determine the validity of an annexation
ordinance and enjoin its enforcement sounds in equity.1 On
appeal from an equity action, an appellate court decides factual
questions de novo on the record and, as to questions of both
1 City of Elkhorn v. City of Omaha, 272 Neb. 867, 725 N.W.2d 792 (2007).
834 	277N ebrASkA repOrTS

fact and law, is obligated to reach a conclusion independent of
the trial court’s determination.2
DISCuSSION
standing
[3] First, we addressp apillion’s allegation that Sarpy lacked
standing to bring this action for temporary and permanent
injunctions. In County of Sarpy v. City of Gretna,3 we held that
a county’s governmental function is a legally protectable inter-
est and that annexation of county property by a city infringes
upon, in a variety of ways, that function. Therefore, we said,
if a county alleges that a city, through an unlawful annexa-
tion plan, has encroached upon its governmental function, it
has alleged an injury sufficient to give it standing to challenge
the annexation plan.4 In this case, Sarpy has illustrated that its
governmental functions are infringed upon by the annexations,
both fiscally and in other ways. We find that Sarpy has stand-
ing in this suit.
We thus consider whether the district court was correct in
its evaluation of what was and was not a valid annexation by
the ordinances. In essence,p apillion asserts that all of the
annexations were proper and that the district court should not
have granted Sarpy any injunction, while Sarpy asserts that
all the annexations were improper and thatp apillion should
have been enjoined from enforcing any portion of any of
the ordinances.
adJacency
[4-6]p apillion is a municipal corporation, or city, of the
first class. A municipal corporation has no power to extend or
change its boundaries otherwise than as provided by constitu-
tional enactment or as it is empowered by thel egislature by
statute to do.5 The power delegated to municipal corporations
2 Id.
3 County of Sarpy v. City of Gretna, 267 Neb. 943, 678 N.W.2d 740
(2004).
4 Id.
5 Doolittle v. County of Lincoln, 191 Neb. 159, 214 N.W.2d 248 (1974).
COuNTyOFSA rpy v.CIT yOF pApIllION 	835
Cite as 277 Neb. 829

to 	annex 	territory 	must 	therefore 	be 	exercised 	in 	strict
accord with the statute conferring it.6 The burden is on one
who attacks an annexation ordinance, valid on its face and
enacted under lawful authority, to prove facts to establish
its invalidity.7
[7] Cities of the first class are given authority under chapter
16 of the Nebraskar evised Statutes, and specifically § 16-117,
to extend their city limits, subject to certain limitations.8 Sarpy
argues that ordinances Nos. 1526, 1527, and 1529 are invalid
in their entirety because the land described was not substan-
tially adjacent to the city as required by § 16-117, but instead
contained unlawful “strip” annexations.9p apillion generally
denies this characterization and argues that the conclusions
of its expert witness were unrebutted by Sarpy. We note at
the beginning that we give no weight tob eccard’s conclu-
sions as to whether the annexation areas were “adjacent” as
required by § 16-117(1) or whether they were “tracts” of land
as also described by chapter 16.r ather, we agree with Sarpy
that the maps speak for themselves, and it is up to the courts
to determine whether the areas shown by the maps, and other-
wise physically described by expert testimony, satisfy the legal
requirements set forth by chapter 16.
Section 16-117(1) states generally that the mayor and city
council of a city of the first class may, by ordinance, “at any
time include within the corporate limits of such city any con-
tiguous or adjacent lands, lots, tracts, streets, or highways as
are urban or suburban in character and in such direction as may
be deemed proper.” (emphasis supplied.) The city is specifi-
cally prohibited from annexing “agricultural lands which are
rural in character.”10 Contiguity or adjacency is also not specifi-
cally defined by statute, but Neb.r ev. Stat. § 16-118 (reissue
6 County of Sarpy v. City of Gretna, 273 Neb. 92, 727 N.W.2d 690 (2007).
7 See SID No. 57 v. City of Elkhorn, 248 Neb. 486, 536 N.W.2d 56 (1995),
disapproved on other grounds, Adam v. City of Hastings, 267 Neb. 641,
676 N.W.2d 710 (2004).
8 § 16-117.
9 brief for appellee at 12.
10 § 16-117(1).
836 	277N ebrASkA repOrTS

2007) states that “[l]ands, lots, tracts, streets, or highways shall
be deemed contiguous although a stream, embankment, strip,
or parcel of land not more than two hundred feet wide lies
between the same and the corporate limits.”
[8-12] We have held that the terms contiguous and adjacent
in annexation statutes are synonymous.11 The terms mean
“adjoining,” “touching,” and “sharing a common border.”12 We
have also explained that in order to satisfy the requirements of
§ 16-117, the entirety of the connecting boundary need not be
touching. Instead, the boundaries must be sufficiently or sub-
stantially joined together.13 We have held that “‘[s]ubstantial
adjacency’” between a municipality and annexed territory
exists when a substantial part of the connecting boundary of
the annexed land is adjacent to a segment of the boundary
of the city or village.14 A municipality may annex several
tracts as long as one tract is substantially adjacent to the
municipality and the other tracts are substantially adjacent to
each other.15
[13] We have explained that the root of the adjacency
requirement is the idea that a city, both by name and use, is
one entity, a collective body of people gathered together in one
mass, not separated into distinct masses, and having a commu-
nity of interest because they are residents of the same place.16
So, as to territorial extent, the idea of a city is one of unity,
not of plurality; of compactness or contiguity, not separation
or segregation.17
[14] So-called “strip” or corridor” annexations do not com-
port with either adjacency requirements or the idea of a unified
11 See, e.g., Cornhusker Pub. Power Dist. v. City of Schuyler, 269 Neb. 972,
699 N.W.2d 352 (2005).
12 Concise Oxford American Dictionary 11, 196 (2006).
13 See Wagner v. City of Omaha, 156 Neb. 163, 55 N.W.2d 490 (1952).
14 Swedlund v. City of Hastings, 243 Neb. 607, 611, 501 N.W.2d 302, 305
(1993).
15 City of Elkhorn v. City of Omaha, supra note 1.
16 Village of Niobrara v. Tichy, 158 Neb. 517, 63 N.W.2d 867 (1954). See,
also, Johnson v. City of Hastings, 241 Neb. 291, 488 N.W.2d 20 (1992).
17 Id.
COuNTyOFSA rpy v.CIT yOF pApIllION 	837
Cite as 277 Neb. 829

municipal entity. In Johnson v. City of Hastings,18 the city
annexed a 120-foot-wide strip of highway to reach a larger tract
of land containing a community college campus. The annexed
tract was shaped like a “saucepan,” with the handle attached
perpendicular to the city. We explained that the annexation
of a portion of a highway extending beyond the border of a
municipality, connected only by the width of that highway, was
an invalid strip or corridor annexation.19 Since the boundaries
of the tract sought to be annexed were not substantially adja-
cent to the city’s corporate limits, the annexation was improper
and the ordinance was null and void.
likewise, 	in 	Cornhusker 	Pub. 	Power 	Dist. 	v. 	City 	of
Schuyler,20 we concluded that the city’s annexation ordinance
was null and void when it sought to annex au -shaped strip as
it wrapped around a large county industrial tract until the strip
could reach and annex a 26-acre rectangular tract on the other
side of the county tract. While the approximately 30-foot-wide
strip began parallel and adjacent to the boundaries of the city, it
continued past the city limits for some length, changing direc-
tions and continuing even farther away from the city, and then
turned up, running parallel to the city on the other side of the
industrial tract. The 26 acres then bulged out from the final
length of the strip like a flag on a flagpole. In total, the strip
was approximately 11⁄4 miles long. We explained that there was
insufficient adjacency between any of the annexed tracts and
the existing corporate limits of the city to uphold the validity
of any portion of the ordinance.
Most recently, in County of Sarpy v. City of Gretna,21 we
found two ordinances void when each only sought to annex
strips of highway running perpendicular away from the city
limits. The city argued that these were not unlawful strip
annexations because the annexed strips were not just a means to
18 Johnson v. City of Hastings, supra note 16. See, also, Witham v. City of
Lincoln, 125 Neb. 366, 250 N.W. 247 (1933).
19 Johnson v. City of Hastings, supra note 16.
20 Cornhusker Pub. Power Dist. v. City of Schuyler, supra note 11.
21 County of Sarpy v. City of Gretna, supra note 6.
838 	277N ebrASkA repOrTS

reach a larger, sought-after property. We rejected this argument,
however, explaining: “The invalidity of a strip annexation is
not based upon the existence of a larger tract at the distal end
of the strip, but, rather, upon the lack of substantial adjacency
where the proximal end meets the corporate limits of the
city.”22 We also stated that the shape of the tract to be annexed
was not, in itself, determinative of whether it can be lawfully
annexed, but that the lack of substantial adjacency was. Despite
recognizing that the city may have had legitimate reasons to
annex the highways for its planning and land-use control objec-
tives, we found that there was not substantial adjacency when
the connecting points consisted “merely of the width of the
highway right-of-way.”23
but so long as a substantial part of the connecting boundary
touches the corporate limits, an annexation will not be void
simply because parts of the connecting side do not touch the
city or because portions of the annexed territory are narrower
than the rest. In Swedlund v. City of Hastings,24 for instance,
we rejected the property owners’ argument that the annexa-
tion of a larger residential tract was improperly reached by a
“narrow strip” and that the annexation was void for its failure
to be adjacent to the city limits.25 While the abutting property
may have been narrower than the other properties connecting
to it, we explained that this narrower corridor was, in fact,
approximately six blocks wide and was therefore not a “strip”
at all. Moreover, the entire boundary of the width of the cor-
ridor was adjoining the preannexation corporate boundary. The
other properties annexed were, in turn, contiguous to different
parts of the six-block-wide corridor. Thus, considering the
annexation area as a whole, we found that it satisfied the con-
tiguity and adjacency requirements of the applicable annexa-
tion statute.
22 Id. at 98, 727 N.W.2d at 695.
23 Id.
24 Swedlund v. City of Hastings, supra note 14.
25 Id. at 611, 501 N.W.2d at 305-06.
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Cite as 277 Neb. 829

Sarpy does not contest the contiguity of the main bodies
of the two annexation areas identified in the appendix A map,
section A of 1527 and sectione 	of 1526.b ut it argues that in
addition to the 4-mile tail along Highway 370, parts of sections
A and C of 1526 are unlawful where they fail to touch the city
limits. Sarpy also argues that under Wagner v. City of Omaha,26
the court should have found the entirety of ordinance No. 1526
void, because the sectionb 	tail identified in the map was not
severable from the rest of the ordinance.
As for the arms of sections A and C of 1526, we agree
with the district court that Sarpy has failed to show how these
defeat the annexation’s contiguity to the city. The arms radi-
ate out from either side of a larger area that is touching the
city almost the entirety of two sides of its roughly rectangular
shape. The arms then run flush alongside the city, with an
approximately one-third length of nontouching “bridge” on
the Highway 370 arm and an approximately one-half length
of nontouching “bridge” on the 96th Street arm.b ut in both
instances, the “bridges” run parallel to some part of the city
and are no more than approximately 1,250 feet from that paral-
lel border.
The apparent object of these arms is to further the contiguity
and unity of the city’s borders by filling in gaps of the city’s
irregular shape. Through the annexations, the city also seeks
domain over easily identifiable lengths of road, rather than
disparate smaller lengths. These arms connect the city together
and make it more cohesive. The simple fact that there is some
length of nontouching highway right-of-way does not make an
annexation invalid for failure to be substantially adjacent to the
city. Viewed together with the larger tracts annexed by ordi-
nance No. 1526 and the points before and after these parallel
“bridges” which reconnect with the city, we do not find these
areas to be in violation of § 16-117.
but we agree with Sarpy and the district court that the tails
created by each ordinance, section F of 1526 and sectionb
of 1527, are inconsistent with the contiguity and adjacency
26 Wagner v. City of Omaha, supra note 13.
840 	277N ebrASkA repOrTS

requirements of § 16-117 and cannot be considered part of
the cohesive whole otherwise created by these annexations.
papillion points out that, unlike other cases considered by our
court, the ordinances do not seek to annex simply the road
corridors or reach out to a larger target of the annexation.b ut
the fact remains that these strips are attached perpendicularly
to the newly annexed larger corporate boundaries merely by
their width. Furthermore, they stretch away from the city. As
we explained in City of Gretna,27 when a long strip runs per-
pendicularly away from the city attached by only the width
of one end, it cannot be considered substantially adjacent.
This understanding of what is substantially adjacent is not
changed by the fact that the strip attaches to a larger area of
land annexed by the same ordinance, regardless of whether
papillion’s experts call this a single tract or not. On the maps
of the annexations, these two strips stick out from the corporate
boundaries like sore thumbs.e ven viewed together with the
other areas annexed, section F of 1526 and sectionb 	of 1527
clearly violate § 16-117. The question then becomes whether
these violations invalidate the entirety of the ordinances allow-
ing for them.
seveRability
[15,16] Generally, the partial invalidity of an ordinance does
not necessarily make the remaining provisions of the ordinance
ineffective.28 If a city ordinance contains valid and invalid
provisions, the valid portion will be upheld if it is a complete
law, capable of enforcement, and is not dependent upon that
which is invalid.29 In other words, the valid part may be carried
into effect if what remains after the invalid part is eliminated
contains the essential elements of a complete ordinance.30 A
27 County of Sarpy v. City of Gretna, supra note 6.
28 See Arrigo v. City of Lincoln, 154 Neb. 537, 48 N.W.2d 643 (1951).
29 Dell v. City of Lincoln, 170 Neb. 176, 102 N.W.2d 62 (1960); Arrigo v.
City of Lincoln, supra note 28.
30 Zimmerer v. Stuart, 88 Neb. 530, 130 N.W. 300 (1911); In re Langston, 55
Neb. 310, 75 N.W. 828 (1898).
COuNTyOFSA rpy v.CIT yOF pApIllION 	841
Cite as 277 Neb. 829

severability clause is not necessary to maintain the partial
validity of a law under these standards.31
Section 16-117(2) specifically attempts to clarify that the
partial invalidity of an annexation ordinance will not invalidate
the whole. It provides that “[t]he invalidity of the annexation of
any tract of land in one ordinance shall not affect the validity
of the remaining tracts of land which are annexed by the ordi-
nance and which otherwise conform to state law.” A “tract of
land” is not specifically defined in chapter 16 or in any relevant
case law.
In the case cited by Sarpy, Wagner v. City of Omaha,32
a single ordinance sought to annex 490 acres of land. It is
unclear how the ordinance described the 490 acres. We noted
that while a large part of the area had been platted and was
strictly residential or urban agricultural, there were also two
unplatted tracts containing between 90 and 103 acres of agri-
cultural lands rural in character. As such, we concluded that
by including these rural lands, the city had exceeded its statu-
tory authority. We further concluded that this error invalidated
the entirety of the annexation ordinance, explaining that “‘the
drawing of boundary lines is a legislative act’”33 and that as
such, “we have no authority to revise the boundary line of the
city, as extended by the ordinance.”34
In the more recent case of Swedlund v. City of Hastings,35
we considered whether the annexed property was adjacent to
the city and whether it was rural in character. We noted that
the land annexed was described by a single metes and bounds
description. And we stated in dicta that if any portion of the
land violated the requirements of § 16-117, then the entire
ordinance would be invalid.36
31 See Robotham v. State, 241 Neb. 379, 488 N.W.2d 533 (1992).
32 Wagner v. City of Omaha, supra note 13.
33 Id. at 170, 55 N.W.2d at 495, quoting State, ex rel., v. City of Largo, 110
Fla. 21, 149 So. 420 (1933).
34 Id.
35 Swedlund v. City of Hastings, supra note 14.
36 Id.
842 	277N ebrASkA repOrTS

We determine that the fundamental issue is whether the
offending tails in thep apillion ordinances are described in such
a place and manner in the ordinances that they can be redacted,
leaving intact the essential elements of a complete ordinance
without the necessity of any redrawing of boundary lines. We
agree with the district court that this can be done for ordinance
No. 1526, but not for ordinance No. 1527. In ordinance No.
1526, the 4-mile-long Highway 370 tail is described in a sepa-
rate paragraph containing its own metes and bounds descrip-
tion, which in no way affects the descriptions of the other areas
sought to be annexed.
but in ordinance No. 1527, not only is the entirety of the
property described in a single metes and bounds description,
but within that description, the 84th Street corridor is set
forth from the beginning point of the entire annexation area
straight to the northerly right-of-way line of Capehartr oad. It
is not possible to simply redact the language that creates this
unlawful appendage and leave a coherent metes and bounds
description behind. In other words, when the invalid portion
of the ordinance is removed, there are no longer the essen-
tial elements of a valid ordinance. The invalidity of the tail
in ordinance No. 1527 causes the ordinance to be invalid in
its entirety.
null and void veRsus
peRmanent inJunction
The district court was thus correct in issuing a permanent
injunction as to the entirety of ordinance No. 1527 and as to
only the 4-mile Highway 370 tail described in the second para-
graph of ordinance No. 1526, which is section F of the appen-
dix A map. We find no merit to Sarpy’s assignment of error that
the district court failed to specifically declare these attempted
annexations null and void. In fact, the district court states in its
order: “[T]his Court concludes thatp apillion’s ‘strip’ or ‘cor-
ridor’ annexation attempts sought through Ordinances #1526
and #1527 are invalid, and therefore must be declared null and
void.” As to ordinance No. 1527, the court later states the entire
ordinance must be “struck down.” As to ordinance No. 1526,
the court concluded that only the second full paragraph needed
COuNTyOFSA rpy v.CIT yOF pApIllION 	843
Cite as 277 Neb. 829

to be “struck” and that the ordinance would be “invalidated” as
to that provision. We conclude it to be of no consequence that
the court failed to state in its order after the sentence beginning
with “It is Therefore Ordered and Adjudged” that these provi-
sions were “null and void.” The remedy for an annexation in
violation of § 16-117 is a permanent injunction, and that is the
remedy Sarpy received.
CONCluSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
is affirmed.
affiRmed.
(See page 845 for appendix A.)
844 	277N ebrASkA repOrTS

AppeNDIX A
F
A
A
B
B
C
D
E
GILES RD
GILES RD
1ST ST
CAPEHART RD
156TH ST
114TH ST
108TH ST
84TH ST
72ND ST
96TH ST
1526
1527
Legend
Annexation
City Limits - Pre-Annexation
COuNTyOFSA rpy v.CIT yOF pApIllION 	845
Cite as 277 Neb. 829