Corona de Camargo v. Schon

Finally, we determine that under the facts of this case, there
is no basis for an award of prejudgment interest to BSB. The
district court’s decision is affirmed in all respects.
A ffirmed.
StephAn, J., not participating.
corona de camargo v. Schon 	1045
cite as 278 neb. 1045
mAriA O feliA COrOnA de CAmArgO, AS perSOnAl
repreSentAtive Of the eStAte Of JOAquin
CAmArgO-mArtinez , Sr ., AppellAnt, v.
A rthur J. SChOn, An individuAl ,
et Al ., AppelleeS.
mAriA O feliA COrOnA de CAmArgO, AS perSOnAl
repreSentAtive Of the eStAte Of C riStObAl
CAmArgO-COrOnA, AppellAnt, v.
A rthur J. SChOn, An individuAl ,
et Al ., AppelleeS.
776 n.W.2d 1
Filed december 4, 2009. 	nos. S-09-166, S-09-167.
1. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation is a matter of law, in con-
nection with which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent,
correct conclusion irrespective of the determination made by the court below.
2. Limitations of Actions: Appeal and Error. Which statute of limitations applies
is a question of law that an appellate court must decide independently of the
conclusion reached by the trial court.
3. Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error. In reviewing a summary judgment, an
appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against
whom the judgment was granted, giving that party the benefit of all reasonable
inferences deducible from the evidence.
4. Summary Judgment: Motions to Dismiss: Rules of the Supreme Court:
Pleadings. Under neb. ct. r. Pldg. § 6-1112(b)(6), when a matter outside the
pleadings is presented by the parties and accepted by the trial court, a defendant’s
motion to dismiss must be treated as a motion for summary judgment.
5. Summary Judgment: Motions to Dismiss: Notice. When receiving evidence
which converts a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, it is
important for the trial court to give the parties notice of the changed status of
the motion.
6. Wrongful Death: Damages. Wrongful death recovery is limited to the loss suf-
fered by a decedent’s next of kin, and it provides no basis upon which to recover
a decedent’s own damages.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:49 AM CST

7. Wrongful Death. The next of kin may recover in a wrongful death action only
those losses sustained after the injured party’s death by reason of being deprived
of what the next of kin would have received from the injured party from the date
of his or her death, had he or she lived out a full life expectancy.
8. ____. The pain and suffering of the deceased is not an element that may be recov-
ered under the wrongful death statutes.
9. Constitutional Law: Legislature: Intent. The Legislature had mandated that
nebraska adopt only so much of the common law of england as is applicable
and not inconsistent with the constitution of the United States, with the organic
law of this state, or with any law passed or to be passed by the Legislature of
this state.
10. Actions: Constitutional Law: Decedents’ Estates. Under the nebraska
constitution, a cause of action exists for personal injury that neither expressly
nor by necessary implication requires the institution of a suit prior to the injured
person’s death as a condition precedent to recovery by his or her administrator,
nor in any manner conditions the remedy it provides on that fact.
11. Actions: Abatement, Survival, and Revival: Wrongful Death. neb. rev. Stat.
§ 25-1401 (reissue 2008) is applicable in establishing a survival claim as a
proper cause of action, separate and distinct from the wrongful death statutes,
because a survival claim is an action which survives at common law.
12. Limitations of Actions: Abatement, Survival, and Revival: Wrongful Death.
a survival claim is not governed by the 2-year statute of limitations applicable to
wrongful death claims.
13. Judgments: Appeal and Error. Where the record adequately demonstrates that
the decision of the trial court is correct, although such correctness is based on a
ground or reason different from that assigned by the trial court, an appellate court
will affirm.
14. Summary Judgment: Proof. a prima facie case for summary judgment is shown
by producing enough evidence to demonstrate that the movant is entitled to a
judgment in its favor if the evidence were uncontroverted at trial.
15. Summary Judgment: Evidence: Proof. after the movant for summary judgment
makes a prima facie case by producing enough evidence to demonstrate that the
movant is entitled to judgment if the evidence was uncontroverted at trial, the
burden to produce evidence showing the existence of a material issue of fact that
prevents judgment as a matter of law shifts to the party opposing the motion.
16. Negligence. a legal duty on the part of a defendant to protect the plaintiff from
injury is an essential element to an actionable negligence claim.
appeals from the district court for douglas county: JOSeph
S. trOiA, Judge. affirmed in part, and in part reversed.
Jason m. Finch and Kevin J. mccoy, of Smith, gardner,
Slusky, Lazer, Pohren & rogers, L.L.P., for appellant.
1046 	278 neBraSKa rePorTS

Thomas a. grennan, elizabeth m. callaghan, and Francie
c. riedmann, of gross & Welch, P.c., L.L.o., for appellees
arthur J. Schon, mary e. Schon, Schon enterprises, Inc., and
Sara gonzalez.
Lawrence e. Welch, Jr., of Welch Law Firm, P.c., for appellee
general Fire & Safety equipment company of omaha, Inc.
gregory g. Barntsen and marvin o. Kieckhafer, of Smith
Peterson Law Firm, L.L.P., for appellee multi-Vest realty co.
heAviCAn, 	C.J., 	Wright, 	COnnOlly, 	gerrArd, 	StephAn,
mCCOrmACk, and miller-lermAn, JJ.
mCCOrmACk, J.
naTUre oF caSe
The principal issue in these consolidated appeals is whether
the 2-year statute of limitations for wrongful death actions gov-
erns personal injury actions brought on behalf of the victims’
estates to recover for the pain and suffering they experienced
before death. We hold that it does not.
FacTS
on 	august 	1, 	2006, 	a 	fire 	occurred 	in 	the 	colonial
apartments building, killing Joaquin camargo-martinez, Sr.,
and cristobal camargo-corona. The building was owned by
arthur J. Schon and mary e. Schon. general Fire & Safety
equipment company of omaha, Inc. (general Fire), allegedly
installed, maintained, and/or inspected the fire protection sys-
tem for the colonial apartments.
maria ofelia corona de camargo is the personal representa-
tive of the decedents’ estates. cristobal was her son, and Joaquin
was her husband. on august 4, 2008, maria filed complaints
against the Schons; the Schons’ company, Schon enterprises,
Inc.; Sara gonzalez, the manager of the colonial apartments
building; and general Fire. She also filed suit against multi-
Vest realty co. (multi-Vest). maria and general Fire have
since entered into a settlement agreement, and general Fire is
no longer a party to this appeal.
corona de camargo v. Schon 	1047
cite as 278 neb. 1045

maria alleged two causes of action: (1) personal injury of
the victims, including their physical and mental pain and suf-
fering, fear or apprehension of imminent death, or other men-
tal anguish from the time they became aware of the fire until
their deaths, and (2) wrongful death recovery for maria’s loss
of love, support, services, comfort, solace, protection, society,
companionship, counseling, advice, and guidance.
The defendants the Schons, Schon enterprises, the building
manager, and general Fire moved to dismiss maria’s com-
plaints as barred by the wrongful death 2-year statute of limita-
tions. at a hearing in connection with the motions, the court
considered various exhibits offered by the defendants establish-
ing the date of the fire and the victims’ deaths.
defendant multi-Vest filed motions for summary judgment
on the ground that multi-Vest lacked any ownership or other
duties in relationship to the colonial apartments. according
to an affidavit signed by mary, as president of multi-Vest,
multi-Vest paid the building manager’s wages, but she was
on loan to Schon enterprises. Schon enterprises reimbursed
multi-Vest for all of its wage payments to the building manager
during the time she worked as the manager of the colonial
apartments. mary further testified that multi-Vest had no
ownership interest or managerial duties in connection with the
colonial apartments. multi-Vest also introduced into evidence
the rental agreement demonstrating that maria rented from
Schon enterprises, and not from multi-Vest.
at the hearing on the motions, multi-Vest argued that in
addition to having no duty, maria’s actions were barred by
the 2-year statute of limitations. The 2-year bar was raised in
multi-Vest’s answers to maria’s complaints.
The district court dismissed all of maria’s claims as barred
by the 2-year statute of limitations. In so doing, the court
characterized all of the parties’ motions as motions to dismiss.
The court did not specifically address whether summary judg-
ment was proper as to multi-Vest on the alternative ground
that it lacked any duty. on appeal, maria admits the wrongful
death claims were barred because the claims were filed more
than 2 years after the incident, but she argues that the personal
injury actions are governed by the 4-year statute of limitations
1048 	278 neBraSKa rePorTS

applicable to tort action.1 It is not disputed that the claims were
filed within 4 years of the incident.
aSSIgnmenT oF error
maria asserts that the district court erred in concluding that
the personal injury actions brought by the victims’ estates was
barred by the statute of limitations.
STandard oF reVIeW
[1] Statutory interpretation is a matter of law, in connection
with which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an
independent, correct conclusion irrespective of the determina-
tion made by the court below.2
[2] Which statute of limitations applies is a question of law
that an appellate court must decide independently of the con-
clusion reached by the trial court.3
[3] In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court
views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party
against whom the judgment was granted, giving that party
the 	benefit 	of 	all 	reasonable 	inferences 	deducible 	from
the evidence.4
anaLYSIS
We begin by noting that although the district court character-
ized all the motions as motions to dismiss, they should in fact
be considered motions for summary judgment. multi-Vest’s
motions never purported to be anything other than motions for
summary judgment, and a hearing was held in which the par-
ties referred to the motions as motions for summary judgment
and considered evidence in support of the motions.
[4] as for the remaining defendants, although they referred
to their motions as motions to dismiss, they offered several
exhibits at the hearing, including an affidavit by the fire cap-
tain demonstrating the date of the fire and death certificates
1 See neb. rev. Stat. § 25-207 (reissue 2008).
2 Olsen v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 259 neb. 329, 609 n.W.2d 664 (2000).
3 Id.
4 Johnson v. Anderson, ante p. 500, 771 n.W.2d 565 (2009).
corona de camargo v. Schon 	1049
cite as 278 neb. 1045

demonstrating the dates cristobal and Joaquin died. When a
matter outside the pleadings is presented by the parties and
accepted by the trial court, a defendant’s motion to dismiss
must be treated as a motion for summary judgment.5
[5] It is true that when receiving evidence which converts
a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, it
is important for the trial court to give the parties notice of the
changed status of the motion.6 It does not appear that maria was
given such notice. however, the purpose of the notice is to give
the party sufficient opportunity to discover and bring forward
factual matters which may become relevant in the summary
judgment context, as distinct from the dismissal context.7 and
maria was given a reasonable opportunity to present argument
and evidence relevant to the statute of limitations issue. Indeed,
maria now concedes the underlying facts pertinent to this issue
are not in dispute, i.e., that her claims were made more than 2
years after the occurrence. Thus, while the motions to dismiss
were converted into motions for summary judgment without
notice to maria, there was no prejudice, because the motions
presented an issue of law of which maria was notified in the
motions to dismiss.8
We now determine whether, as a matter of law, the decedents’
pain and suffering claims are governed by the 2-year wrong-
ful death statute of limitations. We also determine whether,
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to maria, there
is a material issue of fact that multi-Vest owed no duty to
the decedents.
StAtute Of limitAtiOnS
The defendants do not dispute that a cause of action for
pain and suffering will generally survive a victim’s death. The
5 neb. ct. r. Pldg. § 6-1112(b)(6); Nebraska Coalition for Ed. Equity v.
Heineman, 273 neb. 531, 731 n.W.2d 164 (2007).
6 See Doe v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 273 neb. 79, 727 n.W.2d 447 (2007).
7 See Ichtertz v. Orthopaedic Specialists of Neb., 273 neb. 466, 730 n.W.2d
798 (2007). See, also, Doe v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., supra note 6.
8 See id.
1050 	278 neBraSKa rePorTS

dispute is whether such a claim is encompassed by a cause of
action for wrongful death—or at least by the wrongful death
statute of limitations.9 We conclude that a claim on behalf of
the victim’s estate for the victim’s predeath pain and suffering
is separate and distinct from a wrongful death action brought
on behalf of the next of kin for his or her damages incurred
as a direct result of the victim’s death. accordingly, claims
for predeath pain and suffering are not governed by the 2-year
statute of limitations.
Section 30-809(1) sets forth a wrongful death action:
Whenever the death of a person . . . is caused by the
wrongful act, neglect, or default of any person, company,
or corporation, and the act, neglect, or default is such as
would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the person
injured to maintain an action and recover damages in
respect thereof, then, and in every such case, the person
who, or company or corporation which, would have been
liable if death had not ensued, is liable in an action for
damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured,
and although the death was caused under such circum-
stances as amount in law to felony.
The defendants argue that this provision plainly created but a
single cause of action for wrongful death which encompasses
any actions for damages the persons injured would have had
but for the fact that death ensued.
The defendants misread the statute. The focus of the broad
language of § 30-809(1) is to list who may be sued. While
§ 30-809(1) refers broadly to “an action for damages,” we dis-
agree with the defendants’ contention that this implies wrong-
ful death actions are the only means to recover any and all
damages relating to the event causing the victims’ deaths.
[6-8] In addition, § 30-809(1) must be read in conjunction
with § 30-810. Section 30-810 states in relevant part:
[The action] shall be brought by and in the name of
the person’s personal representative for the exclusive
benefit of the widow or widower and next of kin. The
9 See neb. rev. Stat. §§ 30-809 and 30-810 (reissue 2008).
corona de camargo v. Schon 	1051
cite as 278 neb. 1045

verdict or judgment should be for the amount of damages
which the persons in whose behalf the action is brought
have sustained.10
In Nelson v. Dolan,11 we explained that this language limits a
wrongful death recovery to the loss suffered by a decedent’s
next of kin and that it provides no basis upon which to recover
a decedent’s own damages. The next of kin may recover in
a wrongful death action only those losses sustained after the
injured party’s death by reason of being deprived of what
the next of kin would have received from the injured party
from the date of his or her death, had he or she lived out a
full life expectancy.12 consistent with the fact that wrongful
death recovery is for injuries suffered solely by the next of
kin, § 30-810 allows that “[s]uch amount shall not be subject
to any claims against the estate of such decedent.” In Nelson,
we specifically held that the pain and suffering of the deceased
is not an element that may be recovered under the wrongful
death statutes.13
although not covered by the wrongful death statutes, we
also held in Nelson that a claim for predeath pain and suffering
survived as a separate cause of action.14 We cited to neb. rev.
Stat. § 25-1401 (reissue 2008) of the survival and abatement
statutes to conclude that such a claim endures. In particular, we
indicated that predeath pain and suffering was an injury to a
“personal estate” as referred to in § 25-1401. Section 25-1401
states in full:
10 § 30-810 (emphasis supplied).
11 See Nelson v. Dolan, 230 neb. 848, 434 n.W.2d 25 (1989).
12 See, id.; Hindmarsh v. Sulpho Saline Bath Co., 108 neb. 168, 187 n.W.
806 (1922).
13 See Nelson v. Dolan, supra note 11. See, also, Weatherly v. Blue Cross
Blue Shield, 2 neb. app. 669, 513 n.W.2d 347 (1994).
14 Nelson v. Dolan, supra note 11. See, Wilfong v. Omaha & C. B. Street R.
Co., 129 neb. 600, 262 n.W. 537 (1935); Weatherly v. Blue Cross Blue
Shield, supra note 13. See, also, Brandon v. County of Richardson, 252
neb. 839, 566 n.W.2d 776 (1997); Muller v. Thaut, 230 neb. 244, 430
n.W.2d 884 (1988).
1052 	278 neBraSKa rePorTS

In addition to the causes of action which survive at
common law, causes of action for mesne profits, or for
an injury to real or personal estate, or for any deceit or
fraud, shall also survive, and the action may be brought,
notwithstanding the death of the person entitled or liable
to the same.
[9] The defendants argue that our jurisprudence holding that
predeath pain and suffering is a distinct cause of action under
§ 25-1401 is wrong. They argue that pain and suffering cannot
be an injury to a “personal estate” and that, at common law, an
action for pain and suffering abated with a victim’s death. But
defendants fail to recognize that in Wilfong v. Omaha & C. B.
Street R. Co.,15 we clearly held that under the organic law of
this state, the right to bring a personal injury action survives
the death of the victim. While it was the rule under english
common law that such claims abate upon the victim’s death,
the Legislature had mandated that nebraska adopt only “[s]o
much of the common law of england as is applicable and not
inconsistent with the constitution of the United States, with the
organic law of this state, or with any law passed or to be passed
by the Legislature of this state . . . .”16 We found the english
common-law rule to be, by many accounts, the least rational
of its rules. moreover, the english rule was in part justified
by the need to quell the vindictive and quasi-criminal nature
of suits brought by the decedent’s estate, and we said that this
policy was inapplicable in nebraska because we do not allow
for punitive damages.
[10] Finally, we concluded that the english rule was con-
trary to the nebraska constitution, which mandates that “every
person . . . shall have a remedy by due course of law.”17
We stated:
In view of the obvious evil sought to be prevented or
remedied by the constitutional provision quoted, so far as
15 Wilfong v. Omaha & C. B. Street R. Co., supra note 14.
16 neb. rev. Stat. § 49-101 (reissue 2008).
17 neb. const. art. I, § 13.
corona de camargo v. Schon 	1053
cite as 278 neb. 1045

“personal injuries” are concerned, the purport of its lan-
guage is to wholly invalidate and destroy the legal effect
and force of the [english] common-law maxim, viz., actio
personalis moritur cum persona.18
Thus, we held that under our constitution, a cause of action
existed for personal injury that “neither expressly nor by
necessary implication requires the institution of a suit prior
to the injured person’s death as a condition precedent to
recovery by his administrator, nor in any manner conditions
the remedy it provides on that fact.”19 “[T]he amount that the
injured person would be entitled to recover in his lifetime
would amount to damages to his personal estate, which on
his death would go to his next of kin to be distributed as
personal estate.”20
[11] Perhaps some of the defendants’ confusion about the
state of our common law stems from the fact that we have
distinguished these “survival actions”21 from revival of actions
brought by the decedent prior to death, which, under our com-
mon law, do abate upon the victim’s death.22 also, we have
said somewhat obliquely that an action “for the death of a
human being” did not exist at common law.23 This statement,
however, refers only to the cause of action which is based on
damages stemming from the death itself. That cause of action
inures solely to the next of kin, and exists only by virtue of
18 Wilfong v. Omaha & C. B. Street R. Co., supra note 14, 129 neb. at 609,
262 n.W. at 541.
19 Id. at 611, 262 n.W. at 542.
20 Id.
21 22 am. Jur. 2d Damages § 429 (2003).
22 See Wilfong v. Omaha & C. B. Street R. Co., supra note 14 (and cases
cited therein).
23 Wilson v. Bumstead, 12 neb. 1, 3, 10 n.W. 411, 412 (1881). See, also,
Smith v. Columbus Community Hosp., 222 neb. 776, 387 n.W.2d 490
(1986); Rhein v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 210 neb. 321, 314 n.W.2d 19
(1982); Luckey v. Union P. R. Co., 117 neb. 85, 219 n.W. 802 (1928);
Swift v. Sarpy County, 102 neb. 378, 167 n.W. 458 (1918); Warren v.
Englehart, 13 neb. 283, 13 n.W. 401 (1882).
1054 	278 neBraSKa rePorTS

the wrongful death statutes.24 We conclude that § 25-1401 is
applicable in establishing a “survival claim” as a proper cause
of action, separate and distinct from the wrongful death stat-
utes, because a survival claim is an action “which survive[s] at
common law.”25 and, as we explained in Hindmarsh v. Sulpho
Saline Bath Co.,26 a claim for predeath pain and suffering may
be either prosecuted independently or joined with a wrongful
death action.
[12] While we have never directly addressed the applicable
statute of limitations for a survival claim, we find no logical
reason to conclude that a survival claim falls under the wrong-
ful death statute of limitations. This is especially true when
we have heretofore taken pains to distinguish survival claims
from claims for wrongful death. We find the case of Rhein v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co.27 instructive. The personal representa-
tive in Rhein had filed suit more than 2 years after an accident
which had killed the victim, but the personal representative
sought to distinguish the action from a wrongful death action
by seeking recovery for damages which the decedent would
have been entitled to recover had he lived, including decedent’s
alleged loss of future earning capacity and enjoyment of life.
In affirming the district court’s dismissal for failure to bring
the claim within 2 years, we did not state that all damages
stemming from any tortious incident resulting in death would
be encompassed by the wrongful death statute of limitations.
Instead, we explored in great detail the facts of the case in order
to determine whether there were any injuries that occurred to
the decedent prior to and apart from the death itself. We con-
cluded that because the facts were undisputed that the decedent
died instantaneously, such damages did not exist.
The nebraska court of appeals once stated succinctly that a
decedent’s survival claim had “nothing to do with the wrongful
24 See, e.g., Nelson v. Dolan, supra note 11; Smith v. Columbus Community
Hosp., supra note 23; Wilson v. Bumstead, supra note 23.
25 § 25-1401.
26 See Hindmarsh v. Sulpho Saline Bath Co., supra note 12.
27 Rhein v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., supra note 23.
corona de camargo v. Schon 	1055
cite as 278 neb. 1045

death statutes.”28 We agree. We accordingly find no reason to
apply the wrongful death statute of limitations.
There being no particular statute of limitations set forth for
survival actions described in § 25-1401, we conclude that the
applicable statute of limitations is the 4-year period set forth
in § 25-207. Since the evidence is that maria filed her survival
actions within 4 years, the district court erred in dismissing
those claims as barred by the statute of limitations. It did not
err, however, in dismissing maria’s wrongful death claims.
multi-veSt
[13] multi-Vest argues that regardless of whether any of
maria’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations, the court
properly dismissed multi-Vest as a party defendant because
it owed no duty to the decedents. although this was not the
reason stated by the district court, where the record adequately
demonstrates that the decision of the trial court is correct,
although such correctness is based on a ground or reason dif-
ferent from that assigned by the trial court, an appellate court
will affirm.29
[14,15] a prima facie case for summary judgment is shown
by producing enough evidence to demonstrate that the mov-
ant is entitled to a judgment in its favor if the evidence
were uncontroverted at trial.30 after the movant for summary
judgment makes a prima facie case by producing enough
evidence to demonstrate that the movant is entitled to judgment
28 Weatherly v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, supra note 13, 2 neb. app. at 672,
513 n.W.2d at 351. See, also, e.g., Peters v. Columbus Steel Castings
Co., 115 ohio St. 3d 134, 873 n.e.2d 1258 (2007); Georgia Pacific v.
Benjamin, 394 md. 59, 904 a.2d 511 (2006); Ratka v St. Francis Hosp.,
44 n.Y.2d 604, 378 n.e.2d 1027, 407 n.Y.S.2d 458 (1978) (superseded by
statute as stated in Adelman v. Adelman, 191 misc. 2d 281, 741 n.Y.S.2d
841 (2002)); Blackstone v. Blackstone, 282 ga. app. 515, 639 S.e.2d 369
(2006); Gibbs v. Magnolia Living Center, Inc., 870 So. 2d 1111 (La. app.
2004).
29 See Harvey v. Nebraska Life & Health Ins. Guar. Assn., 277 neb. 757, 765
n.W.2d 206 (2009).
30 Kline v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 277 neb. 874, 766 n.W.2d 118 (2009).
1056 	278 neBraSKa rePorTS

if the evidence was uncontroverted at trial, the burden to pro-
duce evidence showing the existence of a material issue of fact
that prevents judgment as a matter of law shifts to the party
opposing the motion.31
[16] In this case, multi-Vest presented a prima facie case
that it had no ownership interest in the colonial apartments, or
any other duty in relation to the fire that caused the decedents’
pain and suffering prior to their deaths. maria presented no
evidence at the summary judgment hearing to rebut this prima
facie case and, indeed, does not argue on appeal how multi-
Vest had a duty to the decedents. a legal duty on the part of
a defendant to protect the plaintiff from injury is an essential
element to an actionable negligence claim.32 We therefore
affirm the district court’s dismissal of both causes of action
against multi-Vest.
concLUSIon
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s
dismissal of defendant multi-Vest. as to the remaining defend-
ants, we affirm the dismissal of the wrongful death causes of
action, but reverse the dismissal of the survival actions.
A ffirmed in pArt, And in pArt reverSed.
31 Id.
32 See Anderson v. Nashua Corp., 246 neb. 420, 519 n.W.2d 275 (1994).
in re A dOptiOn Of COrbin J., A minOr Child.
ruSti m. And ilJA m., AppelleeS, v.
JOhn J., AppellAnt.
775 n.W.2d 404
Filed december 4, 2009. 	no. S-09-355.
1. Summary Judgment. Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and
evidence admitted at the hearing disclose no genuine issue as to any material fact
or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
2. Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error. In reviewing a summary judgment, an
appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against
In re adoPTIon oF corBIn J. 	1057
cite as 278 neb. 1057