In re Interest of Jorge O.

of discretion constitute reversible error. Therefore, we reverse,
and remand the cause for a new trial.
R eveRsed and Remanded foR a new tRial .
in Re inteRest of JoRge o., a child undeR 18 yeaRs of age .
state of nebRaska , appellee , v. JoRge o., appellee ,
and nebRaska depaRtment of health and
human seRvices , appellant.
in Re inteRest of deng m., a child undeR 18 yeaRs of age .
state of nebRaska , appellee , v. deng m., appellee ,
and nebRaska depaRtment of health and
human seRvices , appellant.
786 N.W.2d 343
Filed July 30, 2010. 	Nos. S-09-966, S-09-983.
1. Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews juvenile cases
de novo on the record and reaches its conclusions independently of the juvenile
court’s findings.
2. Statutes: Appeal and Error. To the extent an appeal calls for statutory interpre-
tation or presents questions of law, an appellate court must reach an independent
conclusion irrespective of the determination made by the court below.
3. Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction: Statutes. As a statutorily created court of limited
and special jurisdiction, a juvenile court has only such authority as has been con-
ferred on it by statute.
4. Administrative Law. Agency regulations properly adopted and filed with the
Secretary of State of Nebraska have the effect of statutory law.
Appeals from the Separate Juvenile Court of Lancaster
County: R eggie l. RydeR, Judge. Affirmed in part, and in
part vacated.
Eric 	M. 	Stott, 	Special Assistant Attorney 	General, 	for
appellant.
Dennis R. Keefe, Lancaster County Public Defender, for
appellees Jorge O. and Deng M.
Valerie R. McHargue and Yohance L. Christie, 	Deputy
Lancaster County Public Defenders, for appellee Jorge O.
iN RE iNTEREST OF JORGE O. 	411
Cite as 280 Neb. 411
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:47 AM CST

Jennifer 	M. 	Houlden, 	Deputy 	Lancaster 	County 	Public
Defender, for appellee Deng M.
John C. McQuinn, Chief Assistant Lincoln City Attorney, for
appellee State of Nebraska in No. S-09-983.
heavican, 	c.J., 	wRight, 	connolly, 	geRRaRd, 	stephan,
mccoRmack, and milleR-leRman, JJ.
milleR-leRman, J.
NATURE OF CASE
in these consolidated appeals, the Nebraska Department
of Health and Human Services (DHHS) appeals portions of
the orders of the separate juvenile court of Lancaster County
committing Jorge O. in case No. S-09-966 and Deng M. in
case No. S-09-983 to the custody of DHHS’ Office of Juvenile
Services (OJS) for placement at the Youth Rehabilitation and
Treatment Center (YRTC) in Kearney, Nebraska. in each case,
the court order indicated that the juvenile court rather than
OJS would determine whether to discharge the juvenile from
YRTC. DHHS asserts on appeal that the orders exceeded the
juvenile court’s statutory authority. We affirm the commitments
to YRTC but vacate the orders to the extent they placed author-
ity to discharge the juveniles from YRTC in the juvenile court
rather than in OJS.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
in case No. S-09-966, Jorge was adjudicated in October
2008 to be under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction pursuant to
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247(1) (Reissue 2008) after he admit-
ted leaving the scene of a motor vehicle accident in violation
of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-696(1)(a) (Cum. Supp. 2008). At that
time, he was released to the custody of his mother under cer-
tain conditions, and the violation of those conditions could
result in a more restrictive placement. After an evaluation by
OJS, the juvenile court committed Jorge to the custody of OJS
for inhome placement. On July 24, 2009, the juvenile court
approved a request for a more restrictive placement in a group
home. OJS later filed a motion to transfer Jorge to a more
restrictive placement at YRTC. in an order filed September 1,
the juvenile court sustained the motion to transfer and ordered
412 	280 NEbRASKA REPORTS

Jorge to be placed at YRTC. in the September 1 order, the
court ordered that Jorge not be discharged without the court’s
approval and that subsequent to Jorge’s discharge from YRTC,
a review hearing be scheduled.
in case No. S-09-983, Deng was adjudicated in September
2009 to be under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction pursuant to
§ 43-247(1) after he answered no contest to charges he had
possessed stolen property and had committed an assault in
violation of municipal ordinances of the city of Lincoln. in
an order entered on September 14, the juvenile court ordered
that Deng be committed to the custody of OJS for placement
at YRTC. in the September 14 order, the court ordered that
Deng not be discharged without the court’s approval and that
subsequent to Deng’s discharge from YRTC, a review hearing
be scheduled.
DHHS appeals the September 1, 2009, order regarding Jorge
in case No. S-09-966 and the September 14 order regarding
Deng in case No. S-09-983. We granted DHHS’ motions to
consolidate the two appeals.
ASSiGNMENTS OF ERROR
in each case, DHHS asserts that the juvenile court erred by
entering an order that indicates that the juvenile court rather
than OJS would determine whether to discharge the juvenile
from YRTC and that a review hearing would be held subse-
quent to the juvenile’s discharge from YRTC.
STANDARDS OF REViEW
[1] An appellate court reviews juvenile cases de novo on the
record and reaches its conclusions independently of the juve-
nile court’s findings. In re Interest of Dakota M., 279 Neb. 802,
781 N.W.2d 612 (2010).
[2] To the extent an appeal calls for statutory interpretation
or presents questions of law, an appellate court must reach an
independent conclusion irrespective of the determination made
by the court below. Id.
ANALYSiS
in each of these appeals, DHHS claims that under the
controlling statutes and rules, the juvenile court was without
iN RE iNTEREST OF JORGE O. 	413
Cite as 280 Neb. 411

statutory authority to make the decision whether to discharge
the juvenile from YRTC. The language in the court’s orders
in cases Nos. S-09-966 and S-09-983, to which objection is
made, reads as follows: “iT iS FURTHER ORDERED that the
minor child shall not be discharged from [OJS] without the
approval of this Court.” DHHS also objects to the additional
language in each order to the effect that upon the juvenile’s
discharge, a review hearing purportedly pursuant to Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 43-408 (Reissue 2008) should be scheduled.
in case No. S-09-966, counsel for all parties join in DHHS’
argument seeking reversal for the reason that under the Health
and Human Services, Office of Juvenile Services Act (OJS
Act), Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 43-401 through 43-423 (Reissue 2008),
OJS rather than the juvenile court is empowered to decide
without juvenile court approval when the juvenile should be
discharged from YRTC. in case No. S-09-983, counsel for the
juvenile, the Lancaster County public defender, agrees with
DHHS; however, the Lincoln City Attorney, on behalf of the
State, argues that the juvenile court’s order in that case should
be affirmed, because the order was within the juvenile court’s
general authority under the Nebraska Juvenile Code to exercise
continuing jurisdiction.
We have considered the relevant statutes and conclude
that to the extent there is a conflict between the OJS Act and
the Nebraska Juvenile Code on the subject matter at issue,
the OJS Act, which is the specific statute, controls over the
general statute, the juvenile code. See R & D Properties v.
Altech Constr. Co., 279 Neb. 74, 776 N.W.2d 493 (2009). We
therefore agree with the arguments tendered by DHHS, and
in particular hold that under the statutory scheme established
by the Legislature in the OJS Act, it is the responsibility
of OJS to determine the discharge of juveniles commit-
ted to YRTC, and the juvenile court erred when it ruled to
the contrary.
[3] We have observed that as a statutorily created court of
limited and special jurisdiction, a juvenile court has only such
authority as has been conferred on it by statute. In re Interest
of Dakota M., supra; In re Interest of Dustin S., 276 Neb. 635,
756 N.W.2d 277 (2008). The statutes and rules and regulations
414 	280 NEbRASKA REPORTS

quoted below are relevant to our resolution of the breadth of
the juvenile court’s statutory authority in these cases. in con-
sidering these statutes, we note that the general statutes per-
taining to juveniles are found in the Nebraska Juvenile Code,
Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 43-245 to 43-2,129 (Reissue 2008), whereas
the particular statutes pertaining to OJS which control our dis-
position of these cases are found in the OJS Act at §§ 43-401
to 43-423.
OJS is a division within DHHS that is charged with the
oversight, administration, and control of state juvenile correc-
tional facilities and programs for juveniles who have violated
the law. See § 43-404. Section 43-405(4) of the OJS Act pro-
vides that included in “[t]he administrative duties of [OJS]” is
the duty to “[a]dopt and promulgate rules and regulations for
the levels of treatment and for management, control, screen-
ing, evaluation, treatment, rehabilitation, parole, transfer, and
discharge of juveniles placed with or committed to [OJS].”
(Emphasis supplied.)
The administrative code pertaining to juveniles commit-
ted to YRTC, 401 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 8, § 003 (1998),
and entitled “Parole or institutional Discharge of Committed
Youth,” provides:
A team comprised of institutional treatment staff, the
assigned Juvenile and Family Services Worker, and other
designated persons involved with the case shall periodi-
cally review the youths’ progress and submit recommen-
dations for release to parole or institutional discharge to
the Chief Executive Officer. The Chief Executive Officer
shall review the team’s recommendation and, if he or
she concurs, authorize the release of the youth to parole
supervision or effect an institutional discharge of a youth
from the state’s custody. if there is disagreement between
the Chief Executive Officer and the team concerning
a release recommendation, the Chief Executive Officer
and team will discuss concerns and attempt to reach
agreement. if the two parties cannot reach consensus,
the matter shall be referred to the Protection and Safety
Administration for resolution.
(Emphasis supplied.)
iN RE iNTEREST OF JORGE O. 	415
Cite as 280 Neb. 411

Section 43-412(2) of the OJS Act provides that “[t]he dis-
charge of any juvenile pursuant to the rules and regulations
or upon his or her attainment of the age of nineteen shall
be a complete release from all penalties incurred by convic-
tion or adjudication of the offense for which he or she was
committed.”
Section 43-408(2) of the OJS Act provides:
The committing court shall order the initial level of treat-
ment for a juvenile committed to [OJS]. Prior to deter-
mining the initial level of treatment for a juvenile, the
court may solicit a recommendation regarding the initial
level of treatment from [OJS]. Under this section, the
committing court shall not order a specific placement for
a juvenile. The court shall continue to maintain jurisdic-
tion over any juvenile committed to [OJS] until such time
that the juvenile is discharged from [OJS]. The court
shall conduct review hearings every six months, or at the
request of the juvenile, for any juvenile committed to
[OJS] who is placed outside his or her home, except for a
juvenile residing at a [YRTC]. The court shall determine
whether an out-of-home placement made by [OJS] is in
the best interests of the juvenile, with due consideration
being given by the court to public safety. if the court
determines that the out-of-home placement is not in the
best interests of the juvenile, the court may order other
treatment services for the juvenile.
Section 43-247 of the Nebraska Juvenile Code pertains to
the juvenile courts and their jurisdiction. The city attorney
directs our attention to the following language of § 43-247:
Notwithstanding any disposition entered by the juvenile
court under the Nebraska Juvenile Code, the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction over any individual adjudged to be
within the provisions of this section shall continue until
the individual reaches the age of majority or the court
otherwise discharges the individual from its jurisdiction.
in its appellate briefs, DHHS summarizes its argument as
follows:
if the Legislature intended for the juvenile court to
have the authority to require its approval for discharge
416 	280 NEbRASKA REPORTS

of juveniles committed to a YRTC, the OJS Act would
have been written to include such authority. As the [OJS]
Act is currently written, OJS has the authority to provide
treatment to the juveniles in accordance with the court’s
orders and to discharge the juveniles in accordance with
OJS’ rules and regulations.
briefs for appellant at 13.
in its briefs filed on behalf of the juveniles, the public
defender agrees with DHHS and states that there are only
two possible statuses the juvenile may have following release
from YRTC, parole or discharge, both of which preclude the
subsequent involvement of the juvenile court in an OJS case.
The public defender observes that the instant cases involve
discharge. in its briefs, the public defender states that “if [the
juvenile] were to be institutionally discharged, he would have a
‘complete release’ from all penalties incurred from the Juvenile
Court adjudication and OJS commitment, including a complete
release from the continuing jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-412.” briefs for appellees Jorge and Deng
at 3. Consistent with the foregoing, the public defender cor-
rectly notes that the appellate courts have recently concluded
that only OJS has the authority to revoke a juvenile’s parole. In
re Interest of Sylvester L., 17 Neb. App. 791, 770 N.W.2d 669
(2009). See § 43-416.
in response, and contrary to the position of DHHS and
the public defender, the city attorney relies on certain cases
and further argues that the juvenile court continues to main-
tain jurisdiction over the juvenile while at YRTC under the
Nebraska Juvenile Code’s general continuing jurisdiction pro-
vision in § 43-247 and also under § 43-408(2). The city attor-
ney argues that the continuing jurisdiction language implies
that the juvenile court possesses the authority to determine the
juvenile’s discharge from YRTC, notwithstanding the court’s
having committed the juvenile to OJS. We disagree with the
city attorney’s reading of the statutes.
[4] included in the administrative duties of OJS under
§ 43-405(4) of the OJS Act is the duty of OJS to “[a]dopt
and promulgate rules and regulations for the . . . discharge
of juveniles placed with or committed to [OJS].” Such rules
iN RE iNTEREST OF JORGE O. 	417
Cite as 280 Neb. 411

and regulations governing “Parole or institutional Discharge
of Committed Youth” are found at 401 Neb. Admin. Code, ch.
8, § 003. Under these rules dealing with juveniles committed
to YRTC, an assigned team reviews the committed juvenile’s
“progress and submit[s] recommendations for . . . institutional
discharge to the Chief Executive Officer [to] effect an institu-
tional discharge of a youth from the state’s custody.” Agency
regulations properly adopted and filed with the Secretary of
State of Nebraska have the effect of statutory law. Swift &
Co. v. Nebraska Dept. of Rev., 278 Neb. 763, 773 N.W.2d 381
(2009). Finally, § 43-412(2) of the OJS Act provides that “[t]he
discharge of any juvenile pursuant to the rules and regulations
. . . shall be a complete release from all penalties incurred by
conviction or adjudication of the offense for which he or she
was committed.”
Taking these provisions together, it is clear that although
the juvenile court initially commits the juvenile to YRTC, once
the juvenile is under OJS authority at YRTC, the decision to
discharge is placed with OJS pursuant to the OJS Act and rules
promulgated thereunder, and the OJS decision to discharge is
a complete release from the juvenile court system with respect
to the offense which occasioned the adjudication. The chal-
lenged juvenile court orders impede the institutional discharge
power specifically placed in OJS by the OJS Act, and such
orders attempting to place the decision to discharge in the
juvenile court exceeded the juvenile court’s statutory author-
ity. As we have observed, the power of the juvenile court must
be strictly construed from the applicable statutes and the court
must therefore defer to the Legislature. In re Interest of Dustin
S., 276 Neb. 635, 756 N.W.2d 277 (2008). Thus, the specific
OJS statutory scheme outlined above, rather than the statutory
general continuing jurisdiction language, controls the outcome
of these cases.
For completeness, we note that in In re Interest of Tamantha
S., 267 Neb. 78, 672 N.W.2d 24 (2003), we endorsed the appli-
cation of the continuing jurisdiction language where the juve-
nile was in inhome placement. To the extent In re Interest of
Tamantha S. is inconsistent with our disposition of the present
cases, it is disapproved. However, consistent with our resolution
418 	280 NEbRASKA REPORTS

of the discharge issue in these cases, we note that the appellate
courts have held, as in In re Interest of Sylvester L., supra, that
the decision to parole a juvenile from YRTC belongs to OJS.
Under similar reasoning, as we now hold, the decision to dis-
charge the juvenile from YRTC under the controlling statutes
and rules and regulations belongs to OJS.
DHHS also takes issue with the portions of the challenged
orders in which the juvenile court set review hearings subse-
quent to the juveniles’ discharge from YRTC. We agree with
DHHS that these orders were improper.
in ordering the review hearings, the juvenile court referred
to § 43-408. A reading of § 43-408(2), however, shows there is
no support for the juvenile court’s orders setting review hear-
ings under that provision. To the contrary, although § 43-408(2)
provides for “review hearings every six months” for juveniles
committed to OJS, the statute specifically exempts “a juvenile
residing at a [YRTC]” from these periodic hearings. Further,
under § 43-412(2), we conclude that the discharge from YRTC
is a “complete release” precluding the exercise of juvenile
court authority with respect to the case giving rise to the
placement at YRTC. The juvenile court exceeded its statutory
authority when it ordered the review hearings after discharge
from YRTC.
CONCLUSiON
The juvenile court did not err when it ordered Jorge and
Deng committed to OJS for placement at YRTC, and we affirm
this aspect of the orders. However, the juvenile court exceeded
its statutory authority to the extent that it ordered that the juve-
nile court rather than OJS had the authority to determine the
discharge of the juveniles from YRTC and further erred when it
ordered review hearings subsequent to discharge. We therefore
vacate these portions of the orders.
affiRmed in paRt, and in paRt vacated.
iN RE iNTEREST OF JORGE O. 	419
Cite as 280 Neb. 411