American Nat. Bank v. Medved

CONCLUSION
We find no error in the evidentiary rulings challenged
on appeal. Further, the district court did not err when it
determined that, even if there had been a vehicular pursuit
under § 81-8,215.01(5), Kavan’s actions were not a proximate
cause of Cotton’s injuries. We affirm the district court’s order
entering judgment in favor of the State.
A ffirmed.
amerICaN Nat. baNK v. medved 	799
Cite as 281 Neb. 799
A mericAn nAtionAl BAnk , A nAtionAl BAnking AssociAtion,
Appellee And cross -Appellee , v. michAel medved,
An individuAl , AppellAnt, highwAy leAsing, llc,
A neBrAskA limited liABility compAny, And get
going , llc, doing Business As mpg cArriers ,
A neBrAskA limited liABility compAny,
Appellees , And lAurA medved,
Appellee And cross -AppellAnt.
801 N.W.2d 230
Filed July 1, 2011. 	Nos. S-10-611, S-10-616.
1. Jurisdiction: States. When there are no factual disputes regarding state contacts,
conflict-of-law issues present questions of law.
2. Judgments: Appeal and Error. an appellate court reviews questions of law
independently of the lower court’s conclusion.
3. Parties: Words and Phrases. an indispensable or necessary party to a suit is
one whose interest in the subject matter of the controversy is such that the con-
troversy cannot be finally adjudicated without affecting the indispensable party’s
interest, or which is such that not to address the interest of the indispensable party
would leave the controversy in such a condition that its final determination may
be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience.
4. Parties: Jurisdiction. If necessary parties to a proceeding are absent, the district
court has no jurisdiction to determine the controversy.
5. Contracts: Judgments: Merger. as a general rule, when a claim on a contract is
reduced to judgment, the contract between the parties is voluntarily surrendered
and canceled by merger in the judgment and ceases to exist.
6. Actions: Damages: Judgments: Merger. When a cause of action for the recov-
ery of money damages is merged in a valid and final judgment in favor of the
plaintiff, the cause of action is extinguished and a new cause of action on the
judgment is created.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:46 AM CST

7. Courts: Jurisdiction: States. before entangling itself in messy issues of conflict
of laws, a court ought to satisfy itself that there actually is a difference between
the relevant laws of the different states.
8. ____: ____: ____. In answering any choice-of-law question, the court first asks
whether there is any real conflict between the laws of the states.
9. Jurisdiction: States. In conflict-of-law analysis, an actual conflict exists when a
legal issue is resolved differently under the law of two states.
10. Interventions. the interest required as a prerequisite to intervention under Neb.
rev. Stat. § 25-328 (reissue 2008) is a direct and legal interest—an interest of
such character that the intervenor will lose or gain by the direct operation and
legal effect of the judgment which may be rendered in the action.
11. ____. to be filed as a matter of right, a petition in intervention under Neb. rev.
Stat. § 25-328 (reissue 2008) must be filed before the trial.
appeals 	from 	the 	district 	Court 	for 	douglas 	County:
gregory m. schAtz, Judge. affirmed.
Patrick r. Guinan and Heather b. veik, of erickson &
Sederstrom, P.C., and Paul Sala and Leslie Hendrix, of allen,
Sala & bayne, P.L.C., for appellant.
aaron d. Weiner and Nicole Seckman Jilek, of abrahams,
Kaslow & Cassman, L.L.P., for appellee american National
bank.
Steven e. achelpohl for appellee Laura medved.
heAvicAn, c.J., connolly, gerrArd, stephAn, mccormAck,
and miller-lermAn, JJ.
stephAn, J.
these consolidated appeals arise from actions taken by
american National bank (aNb) to execute on a judgment
against michael medved, an arizona resident with business
interests in Nebraska. medved’s wife, Laura medved (Laura),
unsuccessfully sought to intervene in an action aNb filed
against medved in the district court for douglas County. this
action resulted in the issuance of charging orders against
medved’s transferable interest in three Nebraska limited liabil-
ity companies. Laura also unsuccessfully sought to intervene in
an action filed in the district court for Sarpy County. the Sarpy
County action resulted in a garnishment of medved’s wages.
In medved’s appeals and Laura’s cross-appeals, they argue that
800 	281 NebraSKa rePOrtS

the Nebraska orders violated their rights under arizona com-
munity property law. We conclude that under either arizona
or Nebraska law, there was no error in the enforcement of
the judgment.
I. FaCtS
1. cAse no. s-10-611 (district court
for douglAs county)
In a 2008 complaint, aNb alleged that medved; Paul Gardner;
Highway Leasing, LLC (Highway); and Get Going, LLC, had
defaulted on various loans and guaranties. three of the loans
had been guaranteed by medved, Gardner, and Get Going
(collectively Highway Loans). medved and Gardner had also
guaranteed a loan for Get Going (Get Going Loan). In addition,
medved had allegedly defaulted on a personal loan evidenced
by a promissory note (medved Loan). approximately $2 mil-
lion was alleged due on the Highway Loans, $76,580 was
alleged due on the Get Going Loan, and $565,801 was alleged
due on the medved Loan. aNb sought judgments on all the
loans and recovery of costs and attorney fees.
On November 14, 2008, medved, Highway, and Get Going
entered into a stipulation to settle the litigation and to enter judg-
ment in the amounts agreed to be past due. the douglas County
district Court entered a judgment for aNb against medved,
Highway, and Get Going in the amount of $2,097,609.20 plus
interest for the Highway Loans (Highway Judgment). the court
entered a separate judgment for aNb against medved person-
ally in the amount of $574,068.38 plus interest for the medved
Loan (medved Judgment).
On april 20, 2010, aNb filed three applications for charg-
ing orders with the douglas County district Court.1 the appli-
cations sought to charge any transferable interest that medved
had in three limited liability companies—mmmm Holdings,
LLC; mm Finance, LLC; and medved Properties, LLC—
with payment of the judgments entered against medved. as
of that date, aNb alleged that medved owed $2,594,117.04
1 See Neb. rev. Stat. § 21-2654 (Supp. 2009).
amerICaN Nat. baNK v. medved 	801
Cite as 281 Neb. 799

on the Highway Judgment and $704,421.22 on the medved
Judgment.
medved filed a resistance to the applications. He alleged that
he alone, and not Laura, had signed the underlying promissory
note, guaranties, and stipulated judgment. He alleged that aNb
was not entitled to relief against his earnings and distributions
from the limited liability companies, because they were com-
munity property belonging to him and Laura and protected
under arizona law.
Laura sought to intervene in the action. In her interven-
tion complaint, she alleged that she was married to medved,
that both were residents of arizona, and that medved’s earn-
ings and distributions from the limited liability companies
were community property and, as such, were protected under
arizona law from satisfying medved’s sole and personal debt.
Laura asked for an order finding that the community property
assets could not be charged or executed upon to satisfy aNb’s
judgment and an order denying the applications for charging
orders. medved filed a motion to dismiss the applications,
alleging that the court lacked jurisdiction because aNb failed
to join Laura as a necessary party.
the district court conducted a hearing at which it received
evidence from aNb, medved, and Laura. aNb’s evidence
established that the medved Loan, the Highway Loans, and
all related guaranties were executed in Omaha, Nebraska, and
contained provisions stating that they would be governed by
Nebraska law. Laura stated in an affidavit that she and medved
had been married since 1987 and were residents of arizona at
all relevant times relating to the litigation and judgment. Laura
further stated that aNb did not name or serve her in either the
Nebraska litigation or “the domestication of the Nebraska judg-
ment in arizona,” which she referred to by a specific arizona
case number. during the hearing, aNb orally informed the
court that it was no longer seeking a charging order in rela-
tion to the guaranty judgment. aNb stated that it was pursuing
the charging order only with respect to the judgment for the
amount due on the medved Loan.
802 	281 NebraSKa rePOrtS

after the hearing, the district court entered an order denying
Laura’s motion to intervene. the court reasoned that Nebraska
law applied to all issues, that arizona law did not apply, and
that Laura had no interest affected by the action and was not an
indispensable or necessary party. In a separate order, the court
overruled medved’s motion to dismiss, again finding that Laura
was not an indispensable and necessary party, that Nebraska
law applied, and that the property sought to be charged was not
community property under arizona law.
the court then entered three charging orders directing
medved Properties, mmmm Holdings, and mm Finance to
transfer medved’s transferable interest to aNb. the charg-
ing orders referred only to the medved Judgment. medved
perfected 	a 	timely 	appeal 	from 	these 	orders, 	and 	Laura
cross-appealed.
2. cAse no. s-10-616 (district court
for sArpy county)
On april 22, 2010, aNb filed two praecipes and affida-
vits for garnishee summons, alleging that aNb had recovered
a judgment against medved in the amount of $574,068.38,
which with interest currently totaled $704,421.22. We under-
stand this amount to refer to the judgment on the medved
Loan entered by the district court for douglas County on
November 14, 2008. aNb alleged that both mmmm Holdings
and mm Finance had property of and were indebted to medved.
Summonses and orders of garnishment in aid of execution to
both companies were entered on april 23. medved requested
hearings and alleged that the funds asked for were exempt
from garnishment.
mm Finance submitted answers to interrogatories in which
it stated that it owed medved wages and that $1,982.11 was
subject to garnishment. mm Finance stated it did not have
any property belonging to medved. mmmm Holdings sub-
mitted answers to interrogatories in which it stated that it
did not owe medved any earnings, but that it held $30,000 in
retained earnings.
amerICaN Nat. baNK v. medved 	803
Cite as 281 Neb. 799

medved filed a motion to quash the summonses and orders
of garnishment. He alleged the same defenses he raised in the
douglas County proceeding on the applications for charging
orders. Laura filed a motion to intervene and quash summonses
and orders of garnishment in which she raised the same argu-
ments asserted in her intervention complaint and motion to
intervene in douglas County.
On may 28, 2010, the district court for Sarpy County
entered an order denying the intervention and sustaining the
motion to quash garnishment. the court found that a charg-
ing order is the sole method of attachment for limited liability
company distributions. aNb filed a motion to alter or amend,
arguing that the court’s ruling that a charging order is the
sole method of attachment to limited liability company dis-
tributions should apply only to the garnishment directed to
mmmm Holdings but not to the garnishment directed to mm
Finance, which sought to garnish wages. the court sustained
the motion to alter or amend to the extent that the previous
order should not apply to the garnishment of wages owed to
medved by mm Finance. medved filed a timely appeal, and
Laura cross-appealed.
II. aSSIGNmeNtS OF errOr
In case No. S-10-611, medved assigns, restated, that the
district court for douglas County erred in (1) denying his
motion to dismiss aNb’s applications for charging orders;
(2) entering charging orders against medved’s interests in
mmmm Holdings, mm Finance, and medved Properties; (3)
finding that the property which was the subject of the charging
orders was not community property under arizona law and that
arizona’s community property laws did not apply; (4) denying
Laura’s motion to intervene; and (5) finding that Laura had no
interest affected by the action and that she was not an indis-
pensable or necessary party to the action. In her cross-appeal,
Laura assigns the same errors.
In case No. S-10-616, medved assigns, restated, that the
district court for Sarpy County erred in (1) sustaining aNb’s
motion to alter or amend the judgment, (2) permitting aNb to
garnish wages owed to medved by mm Finance, (3) failing
804 	281 NebraSKa rePOrtS

to apply arizona’s community property laws, and (4) denying
Laura’s motion to intervene. In her cross-appeal, Laura assigns
the same errors.
III. StaNdard OF revIeW
[1,2] When there are no factual disputes regarding state
contacts, conflict-of-law issues present questions of law.2 an
appellate court reviews questions of law independently of the
lower court’s conclusion.3
Iv. aNaLYSIS
1. contrActuAl choice - of -lAw provision
the medveds argue that enforcement of aNb’s judgment
would violate their rights under the community property law
of arizona, where they reside. aNb argues that arizona law
does not apply, because the promissory note signed by medved
specifically provided that it is to be governed by Nebraska law.
We begin by addressing the applicability and scope of the con-
tractual choice-of-law provision.
the 	promissory 	note 	executed 	solely 	by 	medved 	on
November 13, 2006, reflects his arizona address but makes no
reference to arizona law. Under the heading “GOverNING
LaW,” the note provides: “this Note will be governed by fed-
eral law applicable to Lender and, to the extent not preempted
by federal law, the laws of the State of Nebraska without regard
to its conflicts of law provisions. this Note has been accepted
by Lender in the State of Nebraska.”
We have recognized that persons residing in different states
may select the law of either state to govern their contract and
that the parties’ choice of law will govern.4 this principle is
consistent with restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
§ 187,5 which provides:
2 Erickson v. U-Haul Internat., 278 Neb. 18, 767 N.W.2d 765 (2009);
Christian v. Smith, 276 Neb. 867, 759 N.W.2d 447 (2008).
3 In re Margaret Mastny Revocable Trust, ante p. 188, 794 N.W.2d 700
(2011).
4 See Vanice v. Oehm, 247 Neb. 298, 526 N.W.2d 648 (1995).
5 restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187 at 561 (1971).
amerICaN Nat. baNK v. medved 	805
Cite as 281 Neb. 799

(1) the law of the state chosen by the parties to gov-
ern their contractual rights and duties will be applied
if the particular issue is one which the parties could
have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement
directed to that issue.
(2) the law of the state chosen by the parties to govern
their contractual rights and duties will be applied, even
if the particular issue is one which the parties could not
have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement
directed to that issue, unless either
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to
the parties or the transaction and there is no other reason-
able basis for the parties’ choice, or
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would
be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has
a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the
determination of the particular issue and which, under the
rule of § 188, would be the state of the applicable law in
the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties.
We adopt § 187 and conclude that pursuant to the explicit
choice-of-law provision of the promissory note, aNb’s action
against medved on the note was governed by Nebraska law.
[3,4] that being so, we find no merit in Laura’s argument
that she was an indispensable or necessary party to the action
and that the court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate medved’s
liability on the note because she was not joined. an indispens-
able or necessary party to a suit is one whose interest in the
subject matter of the controversy is such that the controversy
cannot be finally adjudicated without affecting the indispens-
able party’s interest, or which is such that not to address the
interest of the indispensable party would leave the controversy
in such a condition that its final determination may be wholly
inconsistent with equity and good conscience.6 If necessary
parties to a proceeding are absent, the district court has no
6 Koch v. Cedar Cty. Freeholder Bd., 276 Neb. 1009, 759 N.W.2d 464
(2009); In re Adoption of Kenten H., 272 Neb. 846, 725 N.W.2d 548
(2007).
806 	281 NebraSKa rePOrtS

jurisdiction to determine the controversy.7 Laura was not a
comaker on the note and therefore could have no joint and
several liability on the note.8 Her presence as a party was not
necessary to determine medved’s liability on the note under
Nebraska law.
[5,6] but this does not end the inquiry, because these are
not appeals from the judgment on the promissory note but
from orders entered to enforce the judgment. as a general
rule, “[w]hen a claim on a contract is reduced to judgment, the
contract between the parties is voluntarily surrendered and can-
celed by merger in the judgment and ceases to exist.”9 applying
this principle, the New mexico Supreme Court held that a
choice-of-law provision in a promissory note does not apply in
proceedings to enforce a judgment entered on the note, because
the note merged into the judgment and it constitutes a new
obligation.10 We agree with this reasoning, which is consistent
with the statement found in restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws § 95 that when a cause of action for the recovery of
money damages is merged in a valid and final judgment in
favor of the plaintiff, “the cause of action is extinguished and a
new cause of action on the judgment is created.”11
because the promissory note merged into the judgment, the
choice-of-law provision in the note does not control the ques-
tion of whether the law of Nebraska or that of arizona should
apply to aNb’s attempt to enforce its judgment against medved,
an arizona resident with property situated in Nebraska.
2. lAw A pplicABle to enforcement of Judgment
[7-9] the medveds argue that because arizona is the matri-
monial domiciliary state and the Nebraska judgment was
domesticated there, its law should apply to aNb’s attempts to
7 Pestal v. Malone, 275 Neb. 891, 750 N.W.2d 350 (2008).
8 See Neb. U.C.C. § 3-116 (reissue 2001).
9 46 am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 459 at 750 (2006). See, also, Glissman v.
Orchard, 152 Neb. 500, 41 N.W.2d 756 (1950).
10 Huntington Nat. Bank v. Sproul, 116 N.m. 254, 861 P.2d 935 (1993).
11 restatement, supra note 5, § 95, comment c. at 283.
amerICaN Nat. baNK v. medved 	807
Cite as 281 Neb. 799

enforce its judgment in Nebraska. We have noted that before
entangling itself in messy issues of conflict of laws, a court
ought to satisfy itself that there actually is a difference between
the relevant laws of the different states.12 thus, in answer-
ing any choice-of-law question, the court first asks whether
there is any real conflict between the laws of the states.13 an
actual conflict exists when a legal issue is resolved differently
under the law of two states.14 enforcement of aNb’s judgment
against medved through charging orders and wage garnishment
is clearly permissible under Nebraska law. We must therefore
determine whether the result would be different if arizona law
were applied.
(a) absence of Laura’s Signature
on Promissory Note
the medveds pled the applicability of two arizona stat-
utes, ariz. rev. Stat. ann. §§ 25-214 and 25-215 (2007), and
we take judicial notice of them pursuant to Neb. rev. Stat.
§ 25-12,101 (reissue 2008). ariz. rev. Stat. ann. § 25-214
provides as follows:
A. each spouse has the sole management, control and
disposition rights of each spouse’s separate property.
B. the spouses have equal management, control and
disposition rights over their community property and have
equal power to bind the community.
C. either spouse separately may acquire, manage, con-
trol or dispose of community property or bind the com-
munity, except that joinder of both spouses is required in
any of the following cases:
1. any transaction for the acquisition, disposition or
encumbrance of an interest in real property other than an
unpatented mining claim or a lease of less than one year.
12 Christian v. Smith, supra note 2; Malena v. Marriott International, 264
Neb. 759, 651 N.W.2d 850 (2002).
13 Erickson v. U-Haul Internat., supra note 2; Yoder v. Cotton, 276 Neb. 954,
758 N.W.2d 630 (2008).
14 Erickson v. U-Haul Internat., supra note 2; Heinze v. Heinze, 274 Neb.
595, 742 N.W.2d 465 (2007).
808 	281 NebraSKa rePOrtS

2. 	any 	transaction 	of 	guaranty, 	indemnity 	or
suretyship.
3. to bind the community, irrespective of any person’s
intent with respect to that binder, after service of a peti-
tion for dissolution of marriage, legal separation or annul-
ment if the petition results in a decree of dissolution of
marriage, legal separation or annulment.
ariz. rev. Stat. ann. § 25-215 provides:
A. the separate property of a spouse shall not be liable
for the separate debts or obligations of the other spouse,
absent agreement of the property owner to the contrary.
B. the community property is liable for the premarital
separate debts or other liabilities of a spouse, incurred
after September 1, 1973 but only to the extent of the value
of that spouse’s contribution to the community property
which would have been such spouse’s separate property
if single.
C. the community property is liable for a spouse’s
debts incurred outside of this state during the marriage
which would have been community debts if incurred in
this state.
D. except as prohibited in § 25-214, either spouse may
contract debts and otherwise act for the benefit of the
community. In an action on such a debt or obligation the
spouses shall be sued jointly and the debt or obligation
shall be satisfied: first, from the community property, and
second, from the separate property of the spouse contract-
ing the debt or obligation.
For purposes of our analysis, we assume that medved’s
Nebraska wages and his transferable interests in the Nebraska
limited 	liability 	companies 	constitute 	community 	property
under arizona law. medved argues that because he alone
signed the promissory note, the judgment could not bind the
community property. but he cites no arizona law in support
of his argument. ariz. rev. Stat. ann. § 25-214(C) specifically
provides that either spouse may separately bind the community
except in certain circumstances, none of which include the exe-
cution of a promissory note. We do not understand this arizona
statute to require the signature of both spouses on a promissory
amerICaN Nat. baNK v. medved 	809
Cite as 281 Neb. 799

note in order to bind the marital community. In National Union
Fire Ins. Co. v. Greene,15 an arizona court upheld the enforce-
ability against community property of a New York judgment on
a promissory note executed by only one spouse. We conclude
that under arizona law, the absence of Laura’s signature on the
promissory note would not bar the enforcement of a judgment
on the note against community property.
(b) effect of Failure to Join Laura
in Nebraska action
the medveds argue that even if Laura was not a necessary
party, aNb’s failure to join her in its action on the promissory
note precludes enforcement of the resulting judgment against
their community property. their argument is based on the
provision of ariz. rev. Stat. ann. § 25-215(d), which requires
that “the spouses shall be sued jointly” in an action on a debt
or obligation contracted by either of them. the question before
us is whether, under arizona law, this provision would preclude
the enforcement of a judgment entered by a court of another
state in an action where both spouses were not joined.
although we have not been directed to any authority from
the arizona Supreme Court on this point, several arizona
appellate courts have considered it. the medveds primarily
rely on two cases, Vikse v. Johnson16 and C & J Travel, Inc. v.
Shumway.17 Vikse, decided in 1983, involved an arizona pro-
ceeding to enforce a judgment entered by a minnesota court
against two arizona residents. after the judgment was domes-
ticated in arizona, the judgment debtors resisted enforcement
on the ground that the joinder requirement of ariz. rev. Stat.
ann. § 25-215(d) had not been met, because their spouses
were not named as parties in the minnesota action. the court
reasoned that the judgment could not be enforced, because
15 National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Greene, 195 ariz. 105, 985 P.2d 590 (ariz.
app. 1999).
16 Vikse v. Johnson, 137 ariz. 528, 672 P.2d 193 (ariz. app. 1983).
17 C & J Travel, Inc. v. Shumway, 161 ariz. 33, 775 P.2d 1097 (ariz. app.
1989).
810 	281 NebraSKa rePOrtS

“[t]he obvious purpose of joining the spouses is to give each
notice and an opportunity to defend.”18 In C & J Travel, Inc.,19
decided in 1989, the same division of the arizona Court of
appeals relied on Vikse in holding that a New Hampshire judg-
ment against an arizona resident was unenforceable in arizona
because his spouse had not been joined in the New Hampshire
proceeding.
aNb relies on three more recent decisions from a differ-
ent division of the arizona Court of appeals which reach a
different result. In Oyakawa v. Gillett,20 the court held that
a California judgment could be enforced against community
property in arizona notwithstanding the fact that the judgment
debtor’s spouse had not been a party to the California suit. the
court reasoned that California community property law differed
from that of arizona with respect to the necessity for joinder
and that the judgment was therefore not tainted by the fact that
the spouse had not been joined and was entitled to full faith
and credit in the arizona courts.
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Greene21 involved the enforce-
ability of a judgment on a promissory note entered by a New
York state court and subsequently domesticated in arizona,
where the judgment debtor and his wife had moved after entry
of the judgment. the promissory note included a provision that
it was to be governed by the law of New York. rejecting a
claim that the judgment was unenforceable in arizona because
the judgment debtor’s spouse had not been joined in the New
York lawsuit, the court concluded that failure to comply with
ariz. rev. Stat. ann. § 25-215(d) in the New York litigation
was not a proper ground to refuse to honor the New York
judgment. Noting that the original suit had no connection with
arizona, the court concluded that “[a]n arizona court may not
impress arizona procedural law upon a foreign judgment and
refuse to recognize that judgment merely because arizona law
18 Vikse v. Johnson, supra note 16, 137 ariz. at 530, 672 P.2d at 195.
19 C & J Travel, Inc. v. Shumway, supra note 17.
20 Oyakawa v. Gillett, 175 ariz. 226, 854 P.2d 1212 (ariz. app. 1993).
21 National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Greene, supra note 15.
amerICaN Nat. baNK v. medved 	811
Cite as 281 Neb. 799

was not followed in obtaining it.”22 this principle was cited by
the court in Alberta Securities Com’n v. Ryckman23 in support
of its holding that a judgment entered by a Canadian court was
enforceable against the defendant’s community property in
arizona notwithstanding the fact that his spouse had not been
joined in the Canadian lawsuit.
In Gagan v. Sharar,24 a federal appellate court considered
whether a judgment entered by a federal court in Indiana could
be enforced against arizona community property where only
the husband had been a party to the original suit. the court
first noted that the Indiana court had personal jurisdiction over
the husband, but not his wife, and that therefore she was not
personally liable on the judgment. but the court rejected the
wife’s argument that the judgment was unenforceable against
community property because of noncompliance with ariz. rev.
Stat. ann. § 25-215(d). based upon its review of the arizona
appellate court decisions discussed above, the court concluded
that the arizona Supreme Court would most likely adopt the
approach taken in the three more recent cases.
We reach the same conclusion here. although we acknowl-
edge that this case differs from National Fire Union Ins.
Co. and Alberta Securities Com’n in that the medveds were
residents of arizona at the time the underlying action was
commenced, we do not think that this fact dictates a different
result. despite the medveds’ arizona residence, the action on
the promissory note was governed by Nebraska law, and that
law did not require that Laura be joined as a party. there would
have been no reason for the district court to apply arizona law
with respect to joinder, and we therefore conclude that non-
compliance with the joinder provisions of ariz. rev. Stat. ann.
§ 25-215(d) would not render the judgment unenforceable
against community property under arizona law.
22 Id. at 108, 985 P.2d at 593.
23 Alberta Securities Com’n v. Ryckman, 200 ariz. 540, 30 P.3d 121 (ariz.
app. 2001).
24 Gagan v. Sharar, 376 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2004).
812 	281 NebraSKa rePOrtS

(c) Laura’s right to due Process
In National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Greene,25 the arizona
appellate court held that while due process did not require
prejudgment joinder of the arizona spouse in the action pros-
ecuted in New York, the spouse was entitled, as a matter of due
process, to notice and an “‘opportunity to be heard at a mean-
ingful time and in a meaningful manner’” before she could be
deprived of her interest in community property. Laura argues
that she was deprived of this right because she was not joined
in the proceedings to enforce the judgment.
but Laura clearly had notice of the proceedings, because
she appeared through counsel and sought to intervene. In the
douglas County proceeding, she filed a motion to intervene
and an intervention complaint setting forth the basis for her
contention that the charging orders would violate her rights
under arizona’s community property law. at a hearing which
preceded the issuance of the charging orders, Laura’s counsel
offered and the court received Laura’s affidavit in support of
her contentions. the district court heard argument from her
counsel with respect to her interests under arizona community
property law. Similarly, Laura filed a motion to intervene in the
garnishment proceedings in the district court for Sarpy County.
the court received evidence and heard argument from Laura’s
counsel regarding her position that the proceedings would vio-
late her community property rights under arizona law. based
on these records, we conclude that Laura was afforded a mean-
ingful opportunity to be heard in both proceedings regarding
her contention that enforcement of the judgment would deprive
her of community property rights under arizona law.
(d) existence of Community debt
as noted, we assume for purposes of our analysis that the
property against which aNb seeks to enforce its Nebraska
judgment in Nebraska constitutes community property under
arizona law, which provides that “neither the community
25 National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Greene, supra note 15, 195 ariz. at 110,
985 P.2d at 595, quoting Huck v. Haralambie, 122 ariz. 63, 593 P.2d 286
(1979).
amerICaN Nat. baNK v. medved 	813
Cite as 281 Neb. 799

property of spouses nor the separate property of one spouse is
liable for the separate debts incurred by the other during mar-
riage.”26 but when only one of the spouses incurs a debt during
the marriage, “it does not necessarily follow that the debt is
the separate obligation of that spouse. debt incurred by one
spouse while acting for the benefit of the marital community
is a community obligation whether or not the other spouse
approves it.”27 this is so “irrespective of pecuniary benefit to
the community.”28
thus, under arizona law, “debts incurred during marriage
are presumed to be community debts, and the party who con-
tends otherwise has the burden of overcoming the presumption
by clear and convincing proof.”29 and pursuant to ariz. rev.
Stat. ann. § 25-215(C), “community property is liable for a
spouse’s debts incurred outside of [arizona] during the mar-
riage which would have been community debts if incurred
in [arizona].”
the medveds have made no allegation or offered any proof
that medved’s indebtedness on the promissory note which
formed the basis of the judgment is not a community debt
under arizona law. thus, we find no basis in the record for the
medveds’ argument that the community property against which
aNb seeks to enforce its judgment is somehow exempt under
arizona’s community property law.
(e) domestication of Judgment in arizona
the medveds argue that the Nebraska judgment was improp-
erly domesticated in arizona, citing noncompliance with ariz.
rev. Stat. ann. §§ 12-1701 to 12-1708 (2003) and 25-215(d).
We see no relevance to this argument, in that aNb seeks to
26 Lorenz-Auxier Financial Group v. Bidewell, 160 ariz. 218, 220, 772 P.2d
41, 43 (ariz. app. 1989). See ariz. rev. Stat. ann. § 25-215(a) and (b).
27 Lorenz-Auxier Financial Group v. Bidewell, supra note 26, 160 ariz. at
220, 772 P.2d at 43.
28 Id. See Donato v. Fishburn, 90 ariz. 210, 367 P.2d 245 (1961).
29 Lorenz-Auxier Financial Group v. Bidewell, supra note 26, 160 ariz. at
220, 772 P.2d at 43. See, also, Schlaefer v. Financial Management Service,
196 ariz. 336, 996 P.2d 745 (ariz. app. 2000).
814 	281 NebraSKa rePOrtS

enforce the original Nebraska judgment, not a domesticated
arizona judgment. and to the extent that the medveds’ argu-
ment on this point incorporates their position that failure to
join Laura in the original action voids the judgment or bars its
enforcement under ariz. rev. Stat. ann. § 25-215(d), we reject
the argument for the reasons discussed above.
(f) denial of motions to Intervene
Pursuant to Neb. rev. Stat. § 25-328 (reissue 2008),
[a]ny person who has or claims an interest in the mat-
ter in litigation, in the success of either of the parties to
an action, or against both, in any action pending or to be
brought in any of the courts of the State of Nebraska, may
become a party to an action between any other persons
or corporations, either by joining the plaintiff in claiming
what is sought by the complaint, or by uniting with the
defendants in resisting the claim of the plaintiff, or by
demanding anything adversely to both the plaintiff and
defendant, either before or after issue has been joined in
the action, and before the trial commences.
[10,11] the interest required as a prerequisite to interven-
tion under § 25-328 is a direct and legal interest—an interest
of such character that the intervenor will lose or gain by the
direct operation and legal effect of the judgment which may
be rendered in the action.30 to be filed as a matter of right, a
petition in intervention under § 25-328 must be filed before
the trial.31
the interest upon which Laura sought to intervene was the
same as that upon which her husband resisted enforcement of
the judgment—a claim that under arizona’s community prop-
erty law, aNb is barred from enforcing the judgment against
medved’s wages and transferable interest in the Nebraska
limited liability companies. For the reasons discussed, we
conclude that this argument is without merit, and the judgment
on the promissory note is enforceable against the Nebraska
30 Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. 0001 v. Johanns, 269 Neb. 664, 694 N.W.2d 668
(2005).
31 Meister v. Meister, 274 Neb. 705, 742 N.W.2d 746 (2007).
amerICaN Nat. baNK v. medved 	815
Cite as 281 Neb. 799

property, which we assume to be community property, regard-
less of whether Nebraska or arizona law is applied to the
Nebraska enforcement proceedings. accordingly, denial of
Laura’s motions to intervene did not deprive her of a substan-
tial right32 and was therefore not prejudicial error.
v. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, we affirm the judgments of the
district court in each of the consolidated appeals.
A ffirmed.
wright, J., not participating.
32 See Emery v. Mangiameli, 218 Neb. 740, 359 N.W.2d 83 (1984).
816 	281 NebraSKa rePOrtS