Latham v. Schwerdtfeger

the sentence is vacated, and the district court is directed on
remand to resentence Huff on that conviction consistent with
this opinion.
A ffirmed in pArt, And in pArt vAcAted
And remAnded for resentencing.
latHam v. scHwerdtfeger 	121
cite as 282 Neb. 121
teri A. LAthAm , AppeLLAnt, v. susAn rAe
schwerdtfeger , AppeLLee .
802 N.w.2d 66
filed august 26, 2011. 	No. s-10-742.
1. Child Custody: Visitation: Appeal and Error. child custody determinations,
and visitation determinations, are matters initially entrusted to the discretion of
the trial court, and although reviewed de novo on the record, the trial court’s
determination will normally be affirmed absent an abuse of discretion.
2. Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error. an appellate court will affirm a lower
court’s granting of summary judgment if the pleadings and admitted evidence
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts or as to the ultimate
inferences that may be drawn from those facts and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
3. Standing: Jurisdiction. standing relates to a court’s power, that is, jurisdiction,
to address issues presented and serves to identify those disputes which are appro-
priately resolved through the judicial process.
4. Standing. Under the doctrine of standing, a court may decline to determine the
merits of a legal claim because the party advancing it is not properly situated to
be entitled to its judicial determination.
5. Standing: Jurisdiction. standing requires that a litigant have such a personal
stake in the outcome of a controversy as to warrant invocation of a court’s
jurisdiction and justify exercise of the court’s remedial powers on the liti-
gant’s behalf.
6. Standing: Claims: Parties. to have standing, a litigant must assert the litigant’s
own rights and interests.
7. Parent and Child: Words and Phrases. a person standing in loco parentis to
a child is one who has put himself or herself in the situation of a lawful parent
by assuming the obligations incident to the parental relationship, without going
through the formalities necessary to a legal adoption, and the rights, duties, and
liabilities of such person are the same as those of the lawful parent.
8. Parent and Child. the primary determination in an in loco parentis analysis is
whether the person seeking in loco parentis status assumed the obligations inci-
dent to a parental relationship.
9. Parent and Child: Intent. the assumption of the parental relationship is largely
a question of fact which should not lightly or hastily be inferred.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:44 AM CST

10. Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error. In reviewing a summary judgment, an
appellate court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against
whom the judgment is granted and gives such party the benefit of all reasonable
inferences deducible from the evidence.
appeal 	from 	the 	district 	court 	for 	douglas 	county:
mArLon A. poLk, Judge. reversed and remanded for further
proceedings.
tyler c. Block and elizabeth stuht Borchers, of marks,
clare & richards, for appellant.
angela dunne tiritilli and susan a. Koenig, of Koenig &
tiritilli, P.c., l.l.O., for appellee.
Kelle westland, of raynor, rensch & Pfeiffer, for amicus
curiae National center for lesbian rights.
heAvicAn, c.J., connoLLy, gerrArd, stephAn, mccormAck ,
and miLLer-L ermAn, JJ.
miLLer-L ermAn, J.
NatUre Of tHe case
appellant, 	teri 	a. 	latham, 	and 	appellee, 	susan 	rae
schwerdtfeger, were in a relationship from 1985 until 2006.
after discussing having a child, schwerdtfeger became preg-
nant by in vitro fertilization. In January 2001, schwerdtfeger
gave birth to P.s. latham, schwerdtfeger, and the minor child
lived together from 2001 until 2006, when the parties separated
and latham moved out of the home. latham continued to have
visitation with P.s. until 2009. Visitation was thereafter reduced
for reasons in dispute.
after visitation stopped, latham brought an action in the dis-
trict court for douglas county seeking custody and visitation.
latham alleged that she had standing based on the doctrine of
in loco parentis. schwerdtfeger moved for summary judgment.
In its order of dismissal filed July 2, 2010, the district court
concluded that “the in loco parentis doctrine does not apply”
and dismissed the case with prejudice. latham appeals. we
conclude that the district court erred when it concluded that
the doctrine of in loco parentis did not apply to these facts.
122 	282 NeBrasKa rePOrts

we further determine based on essentially undisputed facts that
latham has standing to seek custody and visitation of P.s. and
that there are genuine issues of material fact whether latham
should be granted custody and/or visitation of P.s. we reverse
the order granting summary judgment in favor of schwerdtfeger
and the order dismissing latham’s complaint, and we remand
the cause for further proceedings.
statemeNt Of facts
latham and schwerdtfeger met in college and moved in
together in 1985. at that time, the parties began sharing their
finances. after several years of living together, the parties dis-
cussed having a child. they ruled out adoption, and instead, it
was decided that schwerdtfeger would be the birth parent of
the child. the parties chose a sperm donor, and after several
unsuccessful attempts at artificial insemination, schwerdtfeger
underwent in vitro fertilization, which was successful. the cost
of these procedures was shared by both parties.
Both parties attended doctors’ appointments, and both par-
ties were present at the birth of P.s. the parties are not mar-
ried. latham took maternity leave to care for schwerdtfeger
and the baby.
after the birth, latham continued her role as coparent,
helping to raise the minor child and supporting him both emo-
tionally and financially. latham claims that P.s. identified her
as “mom” and that she would assist P.s. in getting ready for
school, was involved in disciplining P.s., took P.s. to medical
appointments, and helped him with his homework.
In 2005, latham and schwerdtfeger separated, and latham
moved out of the family home in 2006. latham claims that
even though she was not living in the home, she continued her
role as coparent to the minor child. latham states that in 2006,
schwerdtfeger was cooperative in allowing her to see P.s. and
she spent one-on-one time parenting P.s. three to five times per
week at her home and at schwerdtfeger’s home. latham states
that she continued to take P.s. to medical appointments and
support him financially and that schwerdtfeger and she shared
finances through the summer of 2007.
latHam v. scHwerdtfeger 	123
cite as 282 Neb. 121

schwerdtfeger claims that after latham moved out, latham
primarily saw P.s. on thursday afternoons after school until
dinnertime. schwerdtfeger further states that since the clos-
ing of the combined checking account in 2007, latham has
not contributed monthly financial support for P.s., stating that
latham does not pay for the minor child’s medical expenses
or educational expenses. latham does not pay child support.
Both parties agree that after latham moved out of the fam-
ily home, there was no set parenting schedule agreed upon by
the parties.
latham claims that beginning in 2007, schwerdtfeger began
to arbitrarily cut down on latham’s parenting time with P.s.
latham claims that she saw P.s. only two times per week
but that she continued to attend many of P.s.’ activities out-
side of her scheduled parenting time with him, continued
to support him emotionally and financially, and participated
in discipline.
schwerdtfeger stated that in 2008 and 2009, P.s. spent a
total of four overnights with latham. schwerdtfeger stated
that latham did not attend parent-teacher conferences for P.s.
in 2007, 2008, or 2009 and that she attended only one parent-
teacher conference for P.s.’ preschool class. schwerdtfeger
further stated that the only time latham took P.s. to the doc-
tor since she moved out of the residence was on one occa-
sion in 2007, at which time she took P.s. to the doctor at
schwerdtfeger’s request.
latham stated that beginning in October 2009, schwerdtfeger
significantly restricted latham’s parenting time, and that since
October 2009, latham has been able to spend in-person parent-
ing time with P.s. on only three occasions. latham contends
that she has continued to try to reach out to P.s. schwerdtfeger
stated that P.s. does not miss latham and does not want to
spend time with her.
On december 14, 2009, latham filed a complaint for cus-
tody and visitation in the district court for douglas county. On
January 7, 2010, latham filed a motion for parenting time. On
february 12, schwerdtfeger filed a motion for summary judg-
ment. On february 26, a hearing was held on the motion for
summary judgment. after the hearing, the court overruled the
motion from the bench. the court awarded latham telephonic
124 	282 NeBrasKa rePOrts

parenting time with P.s. for 30 minutes, three times per week.
the court ordered the parties to submit briefs on the issue of
the in loco parentis status of latham and scheduled an in cam-
era interview with P.s. the court conducted the interview with
P.s. on march 23.
On July 2, 2010, the court filed an order of dismissal. In
its order, the district court determined that “the in loco paren-
tis doctrine does not apply” to latham and that “there is no
genuine issue [as] to a material fact as related to” latham’s
standing. the district court reversed its prior ruling, granted
schwerdtfeger’s motion for summary judgment, and ordered
that latham’s complaint for custody and visitation “should be
dismissed with prejudice.” latham appeals.
assIgNmeNts Of errOr
latham claims, restated and summarized, the district court
erred when it determined that the doctrine of in loco parentis
does not apply, that there were no genuine issues of material
fact, and that latham lacked standing to seek custody and visi-
tation of the minor child.
staNdard Of reVIew
[1] child custody determinations, and visitation determina-
tions, are matters initially entrusted to the discretion of the
trial court, and although reviewed de novo on the record, the
trial court’s determination will normally be affirmed absent an
abuse of discretion. Farnsworth v. Farnsworth, 276 Neb. 653,
756 N.w.2d 522 (2008).
[2] an appellate court will affirm a lower court’s granting
of summary judgment if the pleadings and admitted evidence
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts or
as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those
facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Wilson v. Fieldgrove, 280 Neb. 548, 787 N.w.2d
707 (2010).
aNalYsIs
Standing.
latham claims the district court erred when it concluded
that the doctrine of in loco parentis did not apply, that there
latHam v. scHwerdtfeger 	125
cite as 282 Neb. 121

were no genuine issues of material fact, and that latham lacked
standing to seek custody and visitation of the minor child.
[3-6] standing relates to a court’s power, that is, jurisdiction,
to address issues presented and serves to identify those disputes
which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process.
In re Interest of Meridian H., 281 Neb. 465, 798 N.w.2d 96
(2011). Under the doctrine of standing, a court may decline
to determine the merits of a legal claim because the party
advancing it is not properly situated to be entitled to its judicial
determination. the focus is on the party, not the claim itself.
Id. standing requires that a litigant have such a personal stake
in the outcome of a controversy as to warrant invocation of a
court’s jurisdiction and justify exercise of the court’s remedial
powers on the litigant’s behalf. Id. to have standing, a litigant
must assert the litigant’s own rights and interests. see Central
Neb. Pub. Power Dist. v. North Platte NRD, 280 Neb. 533, 788
N.w.2d 252 (2010).
One court has explained that “[i]n the area of child custody,
principles of standing have been applied with particular scru-
pulousness . . . .” J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 453 Pa. super. 78, 86, 682
a.2d 1314, 1318-19 (1996). It has been further observed that
“‘[t]he in loco parentis basis for standing recognizes that the
need to guard the family from intrusions by third parties and
to protect the rights of the natural parent must be tempered by
the paramount need to protect the child’s best interest. . . .’”
T.B. v. L.R.M., 567 Pa. 222, 230, 786 a.2d 913, 917 (2001).
thus, as explained below, any argument that a nonparent can-
not seek custody or visitation because to do so would interfere
with a parent’s rights to parent is unavailing where the evi-
dence shows that the primary consideration, the best interests
of the child, are served by recognizing the standing of a non-
parent to seek custody or visitation. Id. see Bethany v. Jones,
2011 ark. 67, 378 s.w.3d 731 (2011). see, also, e.g., State
on behalf of Combs v. O’Neal, 11 Neb. app. 890, 662 N.w.2d
231 (2003).
No Statutory Basis for Standing.
we have recognized that a child has a “‘right to be raised
and nurtured by a biological or adoptive parent. . . .’” In re
126 	282 NeBrasKa rePOrts

Guardianship of D.J., 268 Neb. 239, 246, 682 N.w.2d 238,
244 (2004) (quoting Uhing v. Uhing, 241 Neb. 368, 488
N.w.2d 366 (1992)). as a corollary, a biological or adoptive
parent has a right to seek custody and visitation of his or her
minor child. latham is neither a biological nor an adoptive
parent. accordingly, we must ascertain what authority, if any,
affords latham a basis to seek custody and visitation of the
minor child. we look initially for statutory authority as a basis
for standing.
In Nebraska, various statutes establish a means for seeking
custody and visitation of a minor child. these statutes include
dissolution actions pursuant to Neb. rev. stat. §§ 42-341 to
42-381 (reissue 2008 & cum. supp. 2010); paternity actions
pursuant to Neb. rev. stat. §§ 43-1401 to 43-1418 (reissue
2008); 	juvenile 	proceedings 	pursuant 	to 	Neb. 	rev. 	stat.
§§ 43-245 to 43-2,130 (reissue 2008 & supp. 2009); guard-
ianship proceedings pursuant to Neb. rev. stat. §§ 30-2601
to 30-2616 (reissue 2008 & cum. supp. 2010); adoption
proceedings pursuant to Neb. rev. stat. §§ 43-101 to 43-165
(reissue 2008 & cum. supp. 2010); and actions under the
Uniform child custody Jurisdiction and enforcement act,
Neb. rev. stat. §§ 43-1226 to 43-1266 (reissue 2008 & cum.
supp. 2010).
latham conceded at oral argument that she did not have
standing pursuant to any of the above-referenced provisions.
after reviewing these statutory authorities, we agree with
latham that there is no explicit statutory basis to support her
claim of standing. accordingly, we examine Nebraska com-
mon law to determine whether there is a basis for latham’s
standing.
Common-Law Right to Standing Based on
the Doctrine of In Loco Parentis.
In her complaint for custody and visitation, latham alleged
that she was in loco parentis to P.s. However, the district court
concluded that the in loco parentis doctrine did not apply and
dismissed the case. latham challenges this ruling on appeal.
we find merit to this assignment of error. contrary to the dis-
trict court’s conclusion, we conclude that the doctrine of in
latHam v. scHwerdtfeger 	127
cite as 282 Neb. 121

loco parentis applies and that latham has demonstrated stand-
ing to seek custody and visitation.
although latham is neither a biological nor an adoptive
parent of P.s., and although we have concluded no statutory
authority directly confers standing on latham, a review of our
jurisprudence indicates that the legislature did not intend that
statutory authority be the exclusive basis of obtaining court-
ordered visitation. as explained below, we have long applied
the common-law doctrine of in loco parentis to afford rights
to nonparents where the exercise of those rights is in the best
interests of the child. we conclude that the doctrine of in loco
parentis applies to the facts of this case.
[7] we have explained the doctrine of in loco parentis, stat-
ing that
a person standing in loco parentis to a child is one who
has put himself or herself in the situation of a lawful
parent by assuming the obligations incident to the paren-
tal relationship, without going through the formalities
necessary to a legal adoption, and the rights, duties, and
liabilities of such person are the same as those of the law-
ful parent.
Weinand v. Weinand, 260 Neb. 146, 152-53, 616 N.w.2d 1, 6
(2000) (emphasis omitted).
In Hickenbottom v. Hickenbottom, 239 Neb. 579, 477 N.w.2d
8 (1991), we determined that the doctrine of in loco parentis,
although not enumerated in the statutes, is a proper consider-
ation when determining stepparent visitation with due consid-
eration to the best interests of the child. similarly, in Weinand
v. Weinand, supra, we explained that in the absence of a statute,
child support may properly be imposed in cases where a step-
parent has voluntarily taken the child into his or her home and
acted in loco parentis. In State on behalf of Combs v. O’Neal,
11 Neb. app. 890, 622 N.w.2d 231 (2003), the Nebraska court
of appeals affirmed an order granting custody of a minor to
the grandmother based on the doctrine of in loco parentis,
notwithstanding a claim of parental preference urged by the
biological father.
Other courts have applied similar reasoning and deter-
mined that standing exists and custody and visitation may be
128 	282 NeBrasKa rePOrts

considered although not explicitly provided for in statutes. see,
e.g., T.B. v. L.R.M., 567 Pa. 222, 230, 786 a.2d 913, 917-18
(2001) (where nonparent invoked common-law doctrine of in
loco parentis, court rejected “contention that [nonparent] lacks
standing because the statutory scheme does not encompass
former partners or paramours of biological parents”); In re
Parentage of L.B., 155 wash. 2d 679, 706-07, 122 P.3d 161,
176 (2005) (stating “state’s current statutory scheme reflects
the unsurprising fact that statutes often fail to contemplate all
potential scenarios which may arise in the ever changing and
evolving notion of familial relations”); Custody of H.S.H.-K.,
193 wis. 2d 649, 682-83, 533 N.w.2d 419, 431 (1995) (explain-
ing “[i]t is reasonable to infer that the legislature did not
intend the visitation statutes to bar the courts from exercising
their equitable power to order visitation in circumstances not
included within the statutes but in conformity with the policy
directives set forth in the statutes”). thus, in the absence of
direct statutory authority, but with due regard for existing statu-
tory directives, we must consider whether latham has standing
to seek custody and visitation of the minor child under our
jurisprudence applying the doctrine of in loco parentis.
as noted, Nebraska appellate courts have applied the doc-
trine of in loco parentis in the cases of stepparents and grand-
parents. see, e.g., Weinand v. Weinand, supra; Hickenbottom
v. Hickenbottom, supra; State on behalf of Combs v. O’Neal,
supra. Because we have not used the doctrine in a case such
as the one presently before us, we turn to other jurisdictions
that have applied the doctrine in cases similar to the one under
consideration in which a nonbiological parent seeks custody
and visitation and examine the reasoning of these courts. see
Mullins v. Picklesimer, 317 s.w.3d 569, 575 (Ky. 2010) (stat-
ing “[s]everal of our sister states have found that the nonpar-
ent has standing to seek custody and visitation of the child
when the child was conceived by artificial insemination with
the intent that the child would be co-parented by the parent
and her partner”) (cases collected). as other courts have done,
we have also considered scholarly articles in this area. see
A.C. v. C.B., 113 N.m. 581, 829 P.2d 660 (N.m. app. 1992)
(articles collected).
latHam v. scHwerdtfeger 	129
cite as 282 Neb. 121

the courts that have applied the doctrine of in loco parentis
in cases such as ours have looked to the purpose of the doc-
trine and noted that the focus of an in loco parentis analysis
must be on the relationship between the child and the party
seeking in loco parentis status. It has been stated that, simply
put, the focus of the doctrine of in loco parentis “should be on
what, if any, bond has formed between the child and the non-
parent.” Bethany v. Jones, 2011 ark. 67, 11, 378 s.w.3d 731,
737 (2011).
In J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 453 Pa. super. 78, 88, 682 a.2d 1314,
1319-20 (1996), the court explained:
the in loco parentis basis for standing recognizes the
need to guard the family from intrusions by third parties
and to protect the rights of the natural parent must be
tempered by the paramount need to protect the child’s
best interest. thus, while it is presumed that a child’s
best interest is served by maintaining the family’s privacy
and autonomy, that presumption must give way where the
child has established strong psychological bonds with a
person who, although not a biological parent, has lived
with the child and provided care, nurture, and affection,
assuming in the child’s eye a stature like that of a parent.
where such a relationship is shown, our courts recognize
that the child’s best interest requires that the third party
be granted standing so as to have the opportunity to liti-
gate fully the issue of whether that relationship should be
maintained even over a natural parent’s objection.
the court in J.A.L. went on to state that when the doctrine of
in loco parentis is viewed in the context of standing principles
in general, its purpose is to ensure that actions are brought only
by those with a genuine substantial interest. accordingly, the
doctrine must be applied flexibly and is dependent upon the
particular facts of each case. Id. Noting that because “a wide
spectrum of arrangements [have filled] the role of the traditional
nuclear family, flexibility in the application of standing prin-
ciples is required in order to adapt those principles to the inter-
ests of each particular child.” Id. at 89-90, 682 a.2d at 1320.
In J.A.L., the court concluded that based on the relationship
130 	282 NeBrasKa rePOrts

between the nonbiological parent and the child, the doctrine of
in loco parentis conferred standing on the nonbiological parent
seeking partial custody, and the cause was remanded for a full
hearing on whether awarding partial custody in favor of the
individual with in loco parentis status was in the best interests
of the minor child.
In Bethany v. Jones, supra, the arkansas supreme court
determined that the doctrine of in loco parentis applied because
the focus of the in loco parentis analysis is on the relationship
between the nonparent adult and the child, not on the relation-
ship between the biological parent and the nonparent adult.
therefore, the court in Bethany determined that it was obligated
to look at the relationship between the party seeking standing
based on in loco parentis status and the child to determine if
such relationship met the definition of in loco parentis.
similarly, in In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 193 wis. 2d 649,
533 N.w.2d 419 (1995), the wisconsin supreme court, in a
case not relying explicitly on the doctrine of in loco paren-
tis but instead looking to whether a parent-like relationship
existed, determined that a trial court may determine whether
visitation with the nonbiological parent is in the best inter-
ests of a child, if the individual could establish that she had
a parent-like relationship with the child and that there was a
triggering event by which the biological parent substantially
interfered with the parent-like relationship.
[8] we agree with the reasoning of these courts and conclude,
contrary to the district court, that the doctrine of in loco paren-
tis applies to this case. Because the purpose of the doctrine
of in loco parentis is to serve the best interests of the child,
it is necessary to assess the relationship established between
the child and the individual seeking in loco parentis status.
the primary determination in an in loco parentis analysis is
whether the person seeking in loco parentis status assumed
the obligations incident to a parental relationship. application
of the doctrine protects the family from allowing intervention
by individuals who have not established an intimate relation-
ship with the child while at the same time affording rights to a
person who has established an intimate parent-like relationship
latHam v. scHwerdtfeger 	131
cite as 282 Neb. 121

with a child, the termination of which would not be in the best
interests of the child. see J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 453 Pa. super. 78,
682 a.2d 1314 (1996).
the district court erred when it concluded that the doctrine
of in loco parentis did not apply to this case. the undisputed
facts show that latham has rights which are entitled to con-
sideration and has standing based on the doctrine of in loco
parentis. we reverse the order of dismissal, which was based on
the incorrect conclusions that the doctrine of in loco parentis
did not apply and that latham lacked standing.
Application of the Law to This Case.
Having concluded that the doctrine of in loco parentis is
applicable to the standing analysis in this case and that latham
has standing, we examine the record made at the summary
judgment hearing to determine whether latham is entitled to
custody or visitation as one who stands in loco parentis. If
latham can establish that she has met the standard our juris-
prudence has set forth for granting relief to one who stands
in loco parentis, there is no reason to exclude this case from
the benefits of the doctrine afforded to stepparents and grand-
parents who have created similar relationships with a minor
child. we determine that there are genuine issues of material
fact which preclude entry of summary judgment and that the
district court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor
of schwerdtfeger. we reverse the order granting summary judg-
ment in favor of schwerdtfeger.
In its consideration of the merits of the custody and visi-
tation issue, the district court indicated in its remarks that
although before 2006, the parties could have been considered
to be in a coparenting relationship, as of 2006, at the time of
the termination of the relationship between the parties, latham
could not be considered by the court as assuming all the
obligations incident to the parental relationship and a parent
who was discharging those obligations. therefore, the court
indicated that, even if the doctrine of in loco parentis applied,
latham did not have in loco parentis status with P.s. at the time
of the hearing. On the record presented, we believe that this
determination is premature and that there are genuine issues of
132 	282 NeBrasKa rePOrts

material fact regarding latham’s continuing relationship with
P.s., all of which bear on whether custody and/or visitation by
latham is in the best interests of P.s.
[9,10] In Weinand v. Weinand, 260 Neb. 146, 616 N.w.2d 1
(2000), we stated that the assumption of the parental relation-
ship is largely a question of fact which should not lightly or
hastily be inferred. further, in reviewing a summary judgment,
an appellate court views the evidence in a light most favorable
to the party against whom the judgment is granted and gives
such party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible
from the evidence. Freedom Fin. Group v. Wooley, 280 Neb.
825, 792 N.w.2d 134 (2010).
Bearing these principles in mind, and viewing the facts
of this case in a light most favorable to latham, we are per-
suaded that latham has raised genuine issues of material fact
for trial concerning her continuing relationship with the minor
child and what outcome will best serve the child’s interests. In
reviewing the district court’s discussion of this case, it appears
that the district court focused on the relationship between the
parties and the end of that relationship, rather than placing
the emphasis on the relationship between the minor child and
latham and, thus, the best interests of P.s.
the facts taken in a light most favorable to latham show
that she was involved in the decision to conceive the minor
child, was present at his birth, spent the first 4 years of his life
in the home with him, and took part in parental duties such
as feeding, clothing, and disciplining him. when the parties
separated, the facts of latham’s involvement and relationship
with the minor child become less clear. But viewing the facts
in this record in a light most favorable to latham, for at least
11⁄2 years after the separation, she had regular visits with the
minor child three to five times per week and participated in
his extracurricular activities. latham and schwerdtfeger shared
their finances through the summer of 2007. therefore, latham
continued to assist in supporting P.s. financially until that time.
It appears that latham’s visitations with P.s. diminished in
2007 and 2008 and that latham had, on average, visitation with
P.s. two times a week. recently, visitation between latham
and P.s. has evidently become nonexistent. the amount of
latHam v. scHwerdtfeger 	133
cite as 282 Neb. 121

visitation latham has been afforded does not appear to reflect
a lack of desire on her part to be an active part of P.s.’ life;
rather, that fact appears to be the result of the relationship
between the parties and a result of schwerdtfeger’s apparent
decision to end latham’s visitation with P.s.
the 	relationship 	between 	latham 	and 	schwerdtfeger,
however, is not the deciding factor. the record is clear that
schwerdtfeger consented to latham’s performance of parental
duties. schwerdtfeger encouraged latham to assume the status
of a parent and acquiesced as latham carried out day-to-day
care of P.s. latham did not assume a parenting role against
the wishes of schwerdtfeger. It has been observed that “a bio-
logical parent’s rights do not extend to erasing a relationship
between her partner and her child which she voluntarily created
and actively fostered simply because after the parties’ separa-
tion she regretted having done so.” T.B. v. L.R.M., 567 Pa. 222,
232, 786 a.2d 913, 919 (2001).
there are material questions of fact concerning the amount
of time latham spent with P.s. and the nature and extent
of the relationship between latham and P.s. after latham
and schwerdtfeger separated. whether and to what extent
latham’s participation in P.s.’ life are in his best interests must
await trial.
cONclUsION
the primary issue in this appeal is one of standing based on
the well-established common-law doctrine of in loco parentis.
a determination of standing simply implies that a party has a
substantial interest in the subject matter of the litigation and
that the interest is direct, immediate, and not a remote conse-
quence. we conclude that latham has standing based on the
doctrine of in loco parentis and that the district court erred
when it concluded that the doctrine of in loco parentis did not
apply to this case. Our opinion does not speak to latham’s
chance of success on the merits, but it merely affords her
the opportunity to fully litigate the issues. latham has made
a meritorious claim of standing to seek enforcement of her
claimed right to custody and visitation of P.s.
134 	282 NeBrasKa rePOrts

the district court erred when it concluded that the doc-
trine of in loco parentis did not apply and dismissed the case.
latham has standing to seek custody and visitation of P.s., but
there remain genuine issues of material fact bearing on whether
she should be granted relief and whether the relief she seeks is
in the best interests of P.s. accordingly, we reverse the ruling
granting summary judgment in favor of schwerdtfeger and the
order of dismissal, and remand for further proceedings consist-
ent with this opinion.
reversed And remAnded for
further proceedings.
wright, J., not participating.
latHam v. scHwerdtfeger 	135
cite as 282 Neb. 121