In re Interest of Karlie D.

accrue on the judgment “from and after November 1, 2010,”
as ordered by the county court, but, rather, from and after July
8, 2013. We modify the judgment to that extent and affirm
as modified.
A ffirmed As modified.
iN re iNterest of karlie d. 	581
Cite as 283 Neb. 581
in re interest of KArlie d., A child
under 18 yeArs of Age .
stAte of nebrAsKA, AppellAnt, v. gAry d., Appellee ,
And mArthA d., intervenor-Appellee .
811 N.W.2d 214
filed March 23, 2012. 	No. s-11-616.
1. Juvenile Courts: Evidence: Appeal and Error. Juvenile cases are reviewed
de novo on the record, and an appellate court is required to reach a conclusion
independent of the juvenile court’s findings. However, when the evidence is in
conflict, an appellate court may consider and give weight to the fact that the
trial court observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts over
the other.
2. Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. in juvenile cases, as else-
where, it is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has jurisdiction
over the matter before it.
3. Juvenile Courts: Adoption: Child Custody. a juvenile court, except where
an adjudicated child has been legally adopted, may always order a change
in the juvenile’s custody or care when the change is in the best interests of
the juvenile.
4. Final Orders: Appeal and Error. Under Neb. rev. stat. § 25-1902 (reissue
2008), the three types of final orders which may be reviewed on appeal are (1)
an order which affects a substantial right and which determines the action and
prevents a judgment, (2) an order affecting a substantial right made during a spe-
cial proceeding, and (3) an order affecting a substantial right made on summary
application in an action after judgment is rendered.
5. Final Orders: Words and Phrases. a substantial right is an essential legal right,
not a mere technical right.
6. Final Orders: Appeal and Error. a substantial right is affected if an order
affects the subject matter of the litigation, such as diminishing a claim or defense
that was available to the appellant prior to the order from which the appeal
is taken.
7. Juvenile Courts: Final Orders: Constitutional Law: Parent and Child. the
substantial right of a parent in juvenile proceedings is a parent’s fundamental,
constitutional right to raise his or her child.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:42 AM CST

8. Juvenile Courts: Words and Phrases. the state’s right in juvenile cases
is derived from its parens patriae interest in the proceedings. this means, in
essence, that the state has a right to protect the welfare of its resident children.
9. Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction. the purpose of the adjudication phase of a
juvenile proceeding is to protect the interests of the child. this same purpose
forms the foundation for the state’s parens patriae interest; thus, once the child
is adjudicated, the state’s interest in protecting the child becomes greater and
more necessary.
10. Statutes: Time. Procedural amendments to statutes are ordinarily applicable to
pending cases, while substantive amendments are not.
11. Statutes: Words and Phrases. a procedural amendment simply changes the
method by which an already existing right is exercised, while a substantive
amendment creates a right or remedy which did not previously exist.
12. Juvenile Courts: Minors. the foremost purpose and objective of the Nebraska
Juvenile Code is to promote and protect the juvenile’s best interests, and the code
must be construed to assure the rights of all juveniles to care and protection.
13. Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction: Child Custody. once a child has been adju-
dicated under Neb. rev. stat. § 43-247(3) (reissue 2008), the juvenile court
ultimately decides where a child should be placed. Juvenile courts are accorded
broad discretion in determining the placement of an adjudicated child and to
serve that child’s best interests.
14. Juvenile Courts: Child Custody. the Nebraska Juvenile Code clearly expresses
a preference for placement with blood relatives.
appeal from the separate Juvenile Court of douglas County:
vernon dAniels, Judge. affirmed.
donald 	W. 	kleine, 	douglas 	County 	attorney, 	amy
schuchman, and sarah Breen, senior Certified law student,
for appellant.
Christine P. Costantakos for intervenor-appellee.
heAvicAn, c.J., Wright, connolly, stephAn, mccormAcK,
and miller-lermAn, JJ.
mccormAcK, J.
the issue in this case is where karlie d., a minor child, should
live. karlie’s mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights
to karlie. While termination proceedings against the biological
father were pending, he died. the Nebraska department of
Health and Human services (department) placed karlie in fos-
ter care. But karlie’s paternal grandmother, Martha d., moved
to have karlie placed with her and her husband and to become
582 	283 NeBraska rePorts

karlie’s guardian. the juvenile court adopted a transition plan,
against the department’s recommendation, which permanently
moved karlie to live with her grandparents. Because the court’s
order affected a substantial right of the state, the order was
final and appealable. and because Martha is fully capable of
caring for karlie, has established a relationship with her, and is
her grandmother, we conclude it is in karlie’s best interests to
be placed with Martha. We affirm.
i. BaCkGroUNd
karlie was born in august 2007 to kara B. the state imme-
diately petitioned the juvenile court to adjudicate karlie, and
moved for her to be placed in the department’s temporary
custody, because karlie tested positive for drugs at birth. the
juvenile court granted temporary custody of karlie to the
department, who placed her in foster care a few days after her
birth. at the time, the father’s identity was unknown.
on september 10, 2007, Gary d. moved to intervene in
the proceedings, claiming that he was karlie’s father. Gary
also asked for karlie to be placed with him. the juvenile
court adjudicated karlie under Neb. rev. stat. § 43-247(3)(a)
(Cum. supp. 2006), with temporary custody to remain with
the department. the juvenile court ordered that karlie remain
in the department’s custody, and thus with her foster parents,
because Gary had not yet established that he was karlie’s
father. However, Gary was granted visitation, and Martha would
sometimes get to accompany Gary during his visits.
following a positive paternity test and in light of success-
ful supervised visitation, the juvenile court placed karlie with
Gary in august 2008. at the time, Gary was working second
shift, from 3 p.m. to 1:30 a.m., 6 days a week. He was unable to
find a daycare which was open until 2 a.m., so he arranged for
Martha to watch karlie while he was at work. the department
knew of this arrangement and approved it. if the weather was
poor, karlie would stay overnight at Martha’s home. the
department never expressed any concern over karlie’s staying
with Martha.
on March 23, 2009, the department discovered that Gary
had tested positive for methamphetamines. a test of karlie’s
iN re iNterest of karlie d. 	583
Cite as 283 Neb. 581

hair also came back positive for methamphetamines. karlie’s
first caseworker asked Martha whether it would be all right if
karlie stayed with her for a few days until a safety assessment
could be completed. Martha said yes. Gary likewise agreed to
this arrangement, and karlie was sent to live with Martha on a
temporary basis.
But just a few days later, on March 26, 2009, the department
removed karlie from Martha’s home and placed her back
with her foster parents. karlie’s current caseworker testified
that the department removed karlie from Martha’s home
because of the earlier positive drug tests. But Martha testified
that the department removed karlie because it had received
a call accusing karlie’s uncle of having sexually molested
karlie. at the time, karlie’s uncle lived in Martha’s basement
apartment. although the basis for the removal is disputed, it
is undisputed that someone made a sexual abuse allegation
against karlie’s uncle, that the allegation was false, and that
the department’s investigation of the allegation lasted no more
than a few days.
Martha further testified that the department did not notify
her that the investigation had been resolved until several months
after karlie had been removed. at that point, Martha asked the
department to return karlie to her, but the department refused.
the department explained that it did not wish to further trau-
matize karlie with another home change. Martha then asked
for visitation with karlie, which was granted. Martha’s visita-
tion included two mornings each week and two overnight visits
each month.
in November 2009, Martha filed a motion to intervene in
the juvenile proceedings, which the juvenile court granted.
afterward, the state moved to terminate Gary’s parental rights
to karlie. Martha then moved to have karlie placed with her.
the juvenile court proceeded to trial on both issues; namely,
whether to place karlie with Martha and whether to terminate
Gary’s parental rights. over the course of several days during
2010, the juvenile court heard testimony and received exhibits,
which will be discussed in more detail below. during these
proceedings, Martha filed an amended motion to also be named
as karlie’s guardian.
584 	283 NeBraska rePorts

following the hearings, but before the court’s ruling, Gary
died. as a result, the state moved to dismiss its motion to
terminate Gary’s parental rights to karlie, which the court
granted. this left pending before the court only Martha’s
motion to have karlie placed in her home and to be named as
karlie’s guardian.
on March 31, 2011, the juvenile court entered its order. the
juvenile court determined that it could not
find by a preponderance of the evidence that it would be
inconsistent with the best interest, safety, and welfare of
karlie if permanency occur[red] with Martha . . . . By a
preponderance of the evidence, the court finds Martha . . .
to be a reputable citizen of good moral character. . . .
However, before the court removes the department as
the guardian, the department shall submit a transition
plan to the court by May 15, 2011. also, by May 15,
2011, the department shall assess whether a subsidy or
Medicaid coverage for the care of karlie is consistent
with karlie’s best interests, safety, and welfare.
a hearing on the above was scheduled for June 16, 2011.
the state appealed the March 31, 2011, order. While that
appeal was pending before the Nebraska Court of appeals,
the juvenile court held the scheduled June 16 hearing. at the
hearing, the department presented its transition plan to the
court. the transition plan set forth a graduated, increasing
visitation schedule between Martha and karlie which, over the
course of about 11⁄2 months, ended with karlie’s permanently
living with Martha. that same day, the court ordered that the
transition plan be adopted, although the court did not remove
karlie from the department’s custody or appoint Martha as
her guardian.
the state also appealed the June 16, 2011, order. later, the
Court of appeals determined that the juvenile court’s March 31
order was not a final, appealable order and dismissed the case.1
it is the appeal of the second order, issued on June 16, which
is before us now.
1 see In re Interest of Karlie D., 19 Neb. app. 135, 809 N.W.2d 510
(2011).
iN re iNterest of karlie d. 	585
Cite as 283 Neb. 581

ii. assiGNMeNt of error
the state assigns, restated, that the juvenile court erred in
finding that karlie’s best interests were served by permanent
placement with Martha.
iii. staNdard of reVieW
[1] Juvenile cases are reviewed de novo on the record, and
an appellate court is required to reach a conclusion independent
of the juvenile court’s findings. However, when the evidence is
in conflict, an appellate court may consider and give weight to
the fact that the trial court observed the witnesses and accepted
one version of the facts over the other.2
iV. aNalYsis
1. Jurisdiction
[2] in juvenile cases, as elsewhere, it is the duty of an
appellate court to determine whether it has jurisdiction over
the matter before it.3 Martha argues that for an order to be
final and appealable, it must affect a substantial right of the
appealing party, and that no substantial right of the state was
affected by this order. this is because the order left karlie in
the department’s custody and did not remove the department
as karlie’s guardian. furthermore, although the court adopted
the transition plan, Martha asserts that the court could still
“change its mind and stop the process at any . . . point” upon a
showing that such a change would be in karlie’s best interests.4
for those reasons, Martha claims that the order is not final and
appealable and that we lack jurisdiction to reach the merits of
this case.5
[3] at the outset, we note that a juvenile court, except where
an adjudicated child has been legally adopted, may always
order a change in the juvenile’s custody or care when the
2 see In re Interest of Hope L. et al., 278 Neb. 869, 775 N.W.2d 384
(2009).
3 In re Interest of Thomas M., 282 Neb. 316, 803 N.W.2d 46 (2011).
4 Brief for intervenor-appellee at 2.
5 see In re Adoption of David C., 280 Neb. 719, 790 N.W.2d 205 (2010).
586 	283 NeBraska rePorts

change is in the best interests of the juvenile.6 obviously, this
would include the juvenile’s placement. But the court’s ability
to do so has no bearing on whether the court’s order is final
and appealable, despite Martha’s argument to the contrary.
Concluding otherwise would result in no orders of the juve-
nile courts’ being final and appealable, since the court could
always “change its mind.” We reject Martha’s argument in
that regard.
[4] Under Neb. rev. stat. § 25-1902 (reissue 2008), the
three types of final orders which may be reviewed on appeal
are (1) an order which affects a substantial right and which
determines the action and prevents a judgment, (2) an order
affecting a substantial right made during a special proceeding,
and (3) an order affecting a substantial right made on summary
application in an action after judgment is rendered.7
We recognize that our final order jurisprudence is difficult
to follow—it has been criticized in the past for a lack of clar-
ity,8 and understandably so. Here, only the second type of final
order—an order affecting a substantial right made during a
special proceeding—is at issue. We have long held that juvenile
court proceedings are special proceedings.9 so we are tasked
with determining whether the juvenile court’s order affected a
substantial right.
[5,6] We have defined a “substantial right” in various ways.
for example, we have stated that a substantial right is an
essential legal right, not a mere technical right.10 We have also
explained that a substantial right is affected if an order affects
the subject matter of the litigation, such as diminishing a claim
or defense that was available to the appellant prior to the order
from which the appeal is taken.11 But the application of these
6 see Neb. rev. stat. § 43-295 (reissue 2008).
7 see In re Adoption of David C., supra note 5.
8 see John P. lenich, What’s So Special About Special Proceedings? Making
Sense of Nebraska’s Final Order Statute, 80 Neb. l. rev. 239 (2001).
9 see In re Adoption of David C., supra note 5.
10 Id.
11 Id.
iN re iNterest of karlie d. 	587
Cite as 283 Neb. 581

definitions in juvenile cases—where the best interests of the
child are the primary concern—is not always clear. Most of our
cases dealing with the finality of juvenile court orders involve
the substantial right of a parent.12 Here, it is the substantial
right of the state, if any, which is at issue. for purposes of this
analysis, the department and the state are one and the same
because the department is a state agency.
[7,8] the substantial right of a parent in juvenile proceed-
ings is a parent’s fundamental, constitutional right to raise his
or her child.13 the state’s right in juvenile cases, however, is
derived from its parens patriae interest in the proceedings.14
this means, in essence, that the state has a right to protect the
welfare of its resident children.15 We have addressed the scope
of the state’s parens patriae interest in juvenile proceedings
before. in In re Interest of Anthony G.,16 we held that an order
denying continued detention of a juvenile pending adjudication
did not affect a substantial right of the state.
We explained that the filing of an abuse and neglect pro-
ceeding pursuant to § 43-247(3) subjected the juvenile to the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court but did not automatically con-
fer custody rights upon the state.17 furthermore, the denial of
a request for temporary custody pending adjudication did not
affect any then-existing right of the state. rather, such a find-
ing indicated only that removal of the juvenile from parental
custody, pending adjudication, was not warranted on the facts
12 see, e.g., id.; In re Interest of Ty M. & Devon M., 265 Neb. 150, 655
N.W.2d 672 (2003); In re Guardianship of Rebecca B. et al., 260 Neb.
922, 621 N.W.2d 289 (2000); In re Interest of Sarah K., 258 Neb. 52,
601 N.W.2d 780 (1999); In re Interest of Tabatha R., 255 Neb. 818, 587
N.W.2d 109 (1998).
13 see, In re Interest of Anthony G., 255 Neb. 442, 586 N.W.2d 427 (1998);
In re Interest of R.G., 238 Neb. 405, 470 N.W.2d 780 (1991), disapproved
on other grounds, O’Connor v. Kaufman, 255 Neb. 120, 582 N.W.2d 350
(1998).
14 see In re Interest of Anthony G., supra note 13.
15 see In re Interest of R.G., supra note 13.
16 In re Interest of Anthony G., supra note 13.
17 Id.
588 	283 NeBraska rePorts

before the juvenile court. We said that the order did not fore-
close the state, in its parens patriae role, from pursuing adjudi-
cation and disposition, nor did it foreclose the state from tak-
ing other measures to protect the child pending adjudication.18
in short, the order in In re Interest of Anthony G. did not confer
any custody right on the state, it did not end or foreclose a dis-
crete phase of the juvenile proceeding, and it did not affect any
then-existing right of the state. for those reasons, the order did
not affect a substantial right of the state.19
But those factors we found lacking in In re Interest of
Anthony G. are present in this case. karlie has been adjudicated
under § 43-247(3); the juvenile court granted the department,
and thus the state, custody of karlie; and by statute, the
department became karlie’s guardian.20 as karlie’s guardian
and custodian, the department had the right to recommend
where karlie should live21 and had already placed karlie in
state-sponsored foster care. so the order permanently moving
karlie to live with her grandparents did affect an existing right
of the state.
furthermore, the order, in effect, terminated the disposi-
tional phase of the juvenile proceeding. While a juvenile court
may always change the care or custody of an adjudicated child
when such a change is in the child’s best interests,22 it can
be assumed that no such change would be ordered absent a
material change in the child’s circumstances. logically, once
the juvenile court has found that one living arrangement is in
a child’s best interests, that finding would remain the same
unless the original circumstances had changed. in that sense,
then, the dispositional order moving karlie to permanently
live with her grandmother put an end to the dispositional
phase of the juvenile proceedings. thus, the order is final, as
that term is ordinarily understood, and explains why we have
18 see id.
19 see id.
20 Neb. rev. stat. § 43-285(1) (reissue 2008).
21 Id.
22 § 43-295.
iN re iNterest of karlie d. 	589
Cite as 283 Neb. 581

previously stated that, as a rule, dispositional orders are final
and appealable.23
[9] While we have not yet addressed a factual situation
similar to the one before us now, the Court of appeals has. in
In re Interest of Tanisha P. et al.,24 the state appealed from a
decision of a juvenile court which approved the return of the
adjudicated child, tanisha P., to the home of her grandmother
and legal guardian. the Court of appeals distinguished its case
from In re Interest of Anthony G. and explained that tanisha
had already been adjudicated as a juvenile under § 43-247(3)
at the time of the order. the purpose of the adjudication
phase of a juvenile proceeding is to protect the interests of
the child.25 this same purpose forms the foundation for the
state’s parens patriae interest; thus, once the child is adju-
dicated, the state’s interest in protecting the child becomes
greater and more necessary.26 the Court of appeals explained
that the order was “entered subsequent to tanisha’s adjudica-
tion and her placement in state-sponsored foster care, [which]
affected an existing right of the state.”27 therefore, the Court
of appeals determined that the order affected a substantial
right of the state and was final and appealable.28 We approve
of this reasoning.
We conclude that the juvenile court’s order on June 16,
2011, affected a substantial right of the state, making its
23 see, In re Interest of Taylor W., 276 Neb. 679, 757 N.W.2d 1 (2008); In
re Interest of Jeremy T., 257 Neb. 736, 600 N.W.2d 747 (1999); In re
Interest of R.A. and V.A., 225 Neb. 157, 403 N.W.2d 357 (1987), overruled
on other grounds, State v. Jacob, 242 Neb. 176, 494 N.W.2d 109 (1993);
In re Interest of V.T. and L.T., 220 Neb. 256, 369 N.W.2d 94 (1985). see,
also, lenich, supra note 8 (arguing that order which ends distinct phase of
multifaceted special proceeding, such as juvenile proceeding, ought to be
treated as final order).
24 In re Interest of Tanisha P. et al., 9 Neb. app. 344, 611 N.W.2d 418
(2000).
25 Id. see In re Interest of Amber G. et al., 250 Neb. 973, 554 N.W.2d 142
(1996).
26 see In re Interest of Tanisha P. et al., supra note 24.
27 Id. at 351, 611 N.W.2d at 423.
28 see In re Interest of Tanisha P. et al., supra note 24.
590 	283 NeBraska rePorts

order final and appealable. the state’s interest in this case is
greater than in In re Interest of Anthony G., because karlie
has been adjudicated and placed in the department’s custody
and the department is karlie’s guardian. the order denied the
department, as karlie’s guardian and custodian, its recom-
mended placement. and the court’s order ended the disposi-
tional phase of the juvenile proceeding. for these reasons, we
conclude that the juvenile court’s order is final and appealable.
We have jurisdiction to reach the merits of this appeal.
2. best interests A nAlysis
(a) Burden of Proof
at the time of these proceedings, recommendations made by
the department were legally presumed to be in the best inter-
ests of the child over other possible courses of action.29 But
that changed in august 2011, when l.B. 648 came into effect.
Before l.B. 648, § 43-285(2) contained the following sentence:
“if any other party . . . proves by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the department’s plan is not in the juvenile’s best
interests, the court shall disapprove the department’s plan.”
l.B. 648 struck that sentence from the statute.30 the Court of
appeals has concluded that this change shifted the burden of
proof to the state to show that the department’s proposed action
was in the best interests of the juvenile.31 We agree. someone
must have the burden of proof. the legislature decreed that it
shall not be on those opposed to the department’s plan; logi-
cally, then, the burden is now on the state. the initial question
is whether l.B. 648 applies to this case on appeal.
[10,11] Procedural amendments to statutes are ordinarily
applicable to pending cases, while substantive amendments
are not.32 a procedural amendment simply changes the method
by which an already existing right is exercised, while a sub-
stantive amendment creates a right or remedy which did not
29 see § 43-285(2) (Cum. supp. 2010).
30 2011 Neb. laws, l.B. 648.
31 see In re Interest of Ethan M., 19 Neb. app. 259, 809 N.W.2d 804
(2011).
32 Harris v. Omaha Housing Auth., 269 Neb. 981, 698 N.W.2d 58 (2005).
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Cite as 283 Neb. 581

previously exist.33 the amendment to § 43-285(2) did not cre-
ate a new right or remedy, but only altered the way an exist-
ing right is exercised. thus, this was a procedural amendment
which is applicable here on our de novo review. it is the state’s
burden to show that its plan is in karlie’s best interests.
(b) Merits
the state argues that karlie’s placement with Martha is not
in karlie’s best interests and that karlie should remain with
her foster parents. specifically, the state claims that Martha’s
advanced age and deteriorating health make her unable to
care for a growing child. the state also asserts that karlie
suffered behavioral problems as a result of her contact with
Martha and that karlie has already bonded with her foster
parents. We recognize that Martha is older, but that alone
is not enough to disqualify her as a potential caretaker for
karlie. furthermore, the record is insufficient to conclude that
Martha’s health is deteriorating or that karlie’s behavioral
problems were caused by contact with Martha. and while we
recognize that karlie is affectionate toward her foster parents,
the record also supports a finding that karlie has established
a bond with Martha. We therefore affirm the juvenile court’s
placement order.
[12,13] the foremost purpose and objective of the Nebraska
Juvenile Code is to promote and protect the juvenile’s best
interests, and the code must be construed to assure the rights
of all juveniles to care and protection.34 once a child has been
adjudicated under § 43-247(3), the juvenile court ultimately
decides where a child should be placed.35 Juvenile courts are
accorded broad discretion in determining the placement of an
adjudicated child and to serve that child’s best interests.36
We do not doubt that karlie’s foster parents have been good
to her and wish to adopt her. But the juvenile court exercised
its discretion in this case and determined that karlie should
33 see id.
34 see In re Interest of Veronica H., 272 Neb. 370, 721 N.W.2d 651 (2006).
35 see § 43-285(2) (supp. 2011).
36 see In re Interest of Veronica H., supra note 34.
592 	283 NeBraska rePorts

live with Martha. in doing so, the court made numerous factual
findings which, after our de novo review, we find to be amply
supported by the record.
the state does not contest that Martha is a reputable citizen
of good moral character. Nor does the state question Martha’s
motive—it is undisputed that Martha wishes to have karlie
placed with her, because Martha loves karlie and believes
that karlie should remain with family. Martha is interested in
adopting karlie. evidence also indicates that Martha is able to
financially provide for karlie.
even so, the state claims that Martha’s advanced age and
deteriorating health make her a poorer choice to care for karlie
than karlie’s foster parents. in our de novo review, we are
unwilling to exclude Martha as a viable caretaker for karlie
because of her age. While being older may create some diffi-
culties in raising a child, it also has its advantages. Martha has
a wealth of experience to draw upon in raising karlie. indeed,
the record shows that Martha has raised 6 children and has 14
grandchildren. she has also successfully provided foster care
for two other children, including one of her other grandchil-
dren. Certainly, Martha’s advanced age means that she may
not live as long as younger individuals like karlie’s foster
parents. But that is not enough to disqualify her as a caretaker
for karlie. Nothing in life is certain, least of all whether a
person will be around tomorrow, and this is true regardless of
age. We do not view Martha’s age with the same trepidation as
the state.
Nor are we convinced that health problems detrimentally
affect Martha’s ability to care for karlie. there was no expert
medical testimony detailing any current health issues that
Martha (or her husband) may have had. While the record shows
that Martha has had a number of surgeries in the past, all of the
testimony at trial indicated that she was fully recovered and fit.
and while her husband, karlie’s grandfather, might have health
concerns as well, there is no indication that he is unable to care
for karlie. in fact, the record shows that he was employed as a
nighttime security guard.
the state claims karlie’s behavior was negatively affected
by her visits with her grandparents. But the juvenile court
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Cite as 283 Neb. 581

specifically found no causal link between karlie’s behavioral
problems and those visits. the evidence presented was that
karlie had sleeping problems, some difficulty in her rela-
tionship with her foster parents’ other child, and a speech
impairment. the only evidence of causation was her foster
mother’s testimony that these behaviors occurred or worsened
upon karlie’s return from staying with her grandparents. But,
as noted by the juvenile court, there could be many causes
for this behavior, and we cannot attribute these behavioral
changes to the grandparents without more definitive proof
of causation.
the state also argues that karlie has bonded with her foster
parents, and so karlie should remain in their home. We do not
doubt that karlie has bonded with her foster parents. she has
lived with them for a significant time, and the evidence shows
that karlie feels affection for her foster parents. karlie’s cur-
rent caseworker opined that karlie should remain with her
foster parents for that reason. But the evidence also shows that
karlie has a strong bond with her grandparents. Martha has
been involved with karlie since her birth and has had consist-
ent visitation with karlie, including overnight visits. Martha
testified that those visits have gone well and that karlie is a
“happy little girl.” this is reinforced by numerous photographs
admitted into evidence which depict karlie obviously enjoying
her time with her grandparents.
the state also argues that its expert testimony showed that
karlie should remain with her foster parents. Notably, amanda
schraut, a therapist and early childhood consultant, opined that
it was in the best interests of karlie to remain with her foster
parents. this was based on her evaluation of karlie’s individual
interaction with her grandparents and foster parents, along with
collateral interviews and other background information regard-
ing karlie. the juvenile court gave this testimony little weight,
and, after our de novo review of the record, we likewise give
little weight to this testimony.
schraut conducted a parent-child relationship assessment.
the purpose of the assessment was to make recommenda-
tions regarding karlie’s permanency planning and to identify
any therapy treatment that karlie might need. the record
594 	283 NeBraska rePorts

demonstrates that the assessment, as a whole, lacked reliabil-
ity, and the resulting recommendations were suspect at best.
Notably, schraut was not provided with all of the informa-
tion she requested to conduct the assessment. schraut did
not receive home studies for each family, Child Protective
services investigation records, court reports, or case plans.
schraut testified that such information is helpful in complet-
ing the assessment because it provides a better picture of the
family situation and the child’s history. schraut never observed
karlie within each of the homes, but only in a neutral setting.
furthermore, the study does not account for the many variables
that come with dealing with a toddler. for example, on cross-
examination, schraut testified that she did not know where
karlie stayed the night before the examination, when she went
to bed, or whether she had eaten beforehand. schraut testi-
fied that those variables could all affect karlie’s mood and the
resulting analysis.
the juvenile court also questioned schraut as to the repeat-
ability of the assessment’s results; in other words, whether the
results would remain the same or fluctuate from day to day.
schraut testified that the scores used in her assessment could
fluctuate from day to day depending on the maturity, mood,
and activity of the child. and, as noted on cross-examination,
because karlie had been living with her foster parents on a
full-time basis, and had only relatively sparse visitation with
Martha, the foster parents had an inherent advantage in this
assessment. as a result, we give little weight to schraut’s rec-
ommendations in our analysis.
[14] the Nebraska Juvenile Code clearly expresses a prefer-
ence for placement with blood relatives. for example, under
Neb. rev. stat. § 43-246(5) (Cum. supp. 2010), when separa-
tion from the juvenile’s home is necessary, relatives are to be
considered “as a preferred potential placement resource.” and
Neb. rev. stat. § 43-533 (reissue 2008) lists a number of prin-
ciples to guide the actions of state government and its depart-
ments and agencies, one of which, stated in subsection (4), is
“to give preference to relatives as a placement resource” when
a child cannot remain with his or her parents. that preference
is also expressed in the department’s own administrative rules
iN re iNterest of karlie d. 	595
Cite as 283 Neb. 581

and regulations.37 Martha, karlie’s grandmother, wishes to care
for and ultimately adopt karlie. the record shows that Martha
is physically, financially, and in all other ways able to care for
karlie on a permanent basis, and we are not convinced by the
state’s arguments otherwise. karlie’s best interests are served
by placement with Martha.
V. CoNClUsioN
We conclude that the juvenile court’s order was a final,
appealable order. and in our de novo review of the record,
we find that the placement of karlie with her grandparents
is in her best interests. We affirm the judgment of the juve-
nile court.
A ffirmed.
37 390 Neb. admin. Code, ch. 7, § 004.01a (2000).
596 	283 NeBraska rePorts