Nebraska Republican Party v. Gale

and regulations.37 Martha, Karlie’s grandmother, wishes to care
for and ultimately adopt Karlie. The record shows that Martha
is physically, financially, and in all other ways able to care for
Karlie on a permanent basis, and we are not convinced by the
State’s arguments otherwise. Karlie’s best interests are served
by placement with Martha.
V. CONCLUSION
We conclude that the juvenile court’s order was a final,
appealable order. And in our de novo review of the record,
we find that the placement of Karlie with her grandparents
is in her best interests. We affirm the judgment of the juve-
nile court.
A ffirmed.
37 390 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 7, § 004.01A (2000).
NebrAskA republicAN pArty, AppellANt, v.
JohN A. GAle , secretAry of stAte of the
stAte of NebrAskA, Appellee , ANd
bob kerrey, iNterveNor-Appellee .
812 N.W.2d 273
Filed March 26, 2012. 	No. S-12-237.
Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: steveN
d. burNs, Judge. Appeal dismissed.
Steve Grasz, of Husch Blackwell, L.L.P., and, of Counsel,
Bobby R. Burchfield and Brandon H. Barnes, of McDermott,
Will & Emery, L.L.P., for appellant.
Andre 	R. 	Barry, 	of 	Cline, 	Williams, 	Wright,
Johnson 	& 	Oldfather, 	L.L.P., 	and 	Alan 	E. 	Peterson 	for
intervenor-appellee.
Robert F. Bartle and Jeffry D. Patterson, of Bartle & Geier
Law Firm, for appellee.
596 	283 NEBRASKA REPORTS
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:43 AM CST

heAvicAN, 	c.J., 	coNNolly, 	mccormAck , 	and 	miller-
lermAN, JJ.
per curiAm.
This is an appeal from a March 21, 2012, order of the
district court for Lancaster County in a special proceeding
brought pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-624 (Reissue 2008).
That order dismissed with prejudice a “Petition for Review of
Secretary of State Determination Opinion” filed by appellant,
the Nebraska Republican Party, against the Nebraska Secretary
of State, John A. Gale.
The district court proceeding arose from a March 6, 2012,
objection filed by appellant with the Nebraska Secretary of
State in which it challenged, pursuant to § 32-624, the candi-
date filing of Bob Kerrey for the U.S. Senate. On March 16,
the Secretary of State issued his determination opinion con-
cluding that Kerrey’s name could appear on the May 15, 2012,
primary election ballot.
On March 20, 2012, appellant herein filed its petition in
the district court for review of the Secretary of State’s deter-
mination opinion. Section 32-624 permits a “political party
committee or other interested party” to file an “application”
for a summary review of the Secretary of State’s decision to
“a judge of the county court, district court, Court of Appeals,
or Supreme Court.” The petition filed in this case avers that
pursuant to § 32-624, the “statutory deadline for reversing a
finding by Secretary Gale is fifty-five days prior to the primary
election, or March 21, 2012.” An expedited summary adjudica-
tion was sought in the district court. A judgment was filed by
the district court at 7:18 p.m. on March 21, 2012, with the case
being dismissed with prejudice.
Upon filing of that March 21, 2012, judgment, the Nebraska
Republican Party electronically filed a notice of appeal and
docket fee in the district court on that same date. On March
22, the district court for Lancaster County electronically filed
the appeal with the Clerk of the Supreme Court, and the appeal
was then docketed in the Nebraska Court of Appeals on March
22. This court thereafter, on its own motion, moved the appeal
NEBRASKA REPUBLICAN PARTy v. GALE 	597
Cite as 283 Neb. 596

to its docket pursuant to its authority under Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 24-1106(3) (Reissue 2008).
For the sake of completeness, the court notes that appel-
lant filed in this court a notice pursuant Neb. Ct. R. App. P.
§ 2-109(E) (rev. 2008) and asserts therein that this is an appeal
which “involves the constitutionality of Nebraska statutes.”
Appellant’s brief on appeal fails to assign as error an issue
regarding the unconstitutionality of any specific state statute.1
This court finds that this is not an appeal involving the consti-
tutionality of a Nebraska statute.
This court entered an order to show cause on March 22,
2012, directing that the parties address its jurisdiction in this
matter. Further, the parties were ordered to address the issue of
whether § 32-624, which requires that an order shall be made
by a judge “‘on or before the fifty-fifth day preceding the elec-
tion’” in order to reverse a decision of the Secretary of State,
would prohibit this court from granting relief to appellant
after that 55-day limitation period had run, because such relief
would violate the legislative mandate of § 32-624.
In response to the order to show cause, all parties responded
to the court’s order and the issues raised therein.
Past reported decisions of the Nebraska Supreme Court sup-
port the view that appellate jurisdiction seems to exist in this
“§ 32-624” type of proceedings, albeit under the predecessor
statutes to current Nebraska law, at least where such appeal is
taken from a judge of the district court.2
1 See Alegent Health Bergan Mercy Med. Ctr. v. Haworth, 260 Neb. 63, 615
N.W.2d 460 (2000) (where brief contains no assignment of error based
upon alleged unconstitutionality of statute, argued error will not be con-
sidered by appellate court).
2 See, State, ex rel. Quinn, v. Marsh, 141 Neb. 436, 3 N.W.2d 892 (1942);
State, ex rel. Meissner, v. McHugh, 120 Neb. 356, 233 N.W. 1 (1930)
(single-justice opinion); Porter v. Flick, 60 Neb. 773, 84 N.W. 262 (1900).
But see State ex rel. Chambers v. Beermann, 229 Neb. 696, 428 N.W.2d
883 (1988) (special proceeding resulting in October 18, 1988, order of
Acting Chief Justice Boslaugh denying appeal to full court from order of
single justice of Supreme Court under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-517 (Reissue
1984), predecessor statute to § 32-624, stating “[n]o procedure for appeal
to this or any other court is authorized by [§ 32-517]”).
598 	283 NEBRASKA REPORTS

Despite the uncertainty in our case law and orders of this
court in appeals from such proceedings, we will assume with-
out deciding that subject matter jurisdiction does exist in the
matter before this court today. But the relief sought by appel-
lant is not available under the election scheme as provided for
by the Legislature.
A court may have subject matter jurisdiction in a matter over
a certain class of case, but it may nonetheless lack the author-
ity to address a particular question or grant the particular relief
requested.3 We have stated:
Subject matter jurisdiction is a court’s power to hear
and determine a case in the general class or category to
which the proceedings in question belong and to deal
with the general subject involved in the action or proceed-
ing before the court and the particular question which it
assumes to determine. But the question of a court’s sub-
ject matter jurisdiction does not turn solely on the court’s
authority to hear a certain class of cases. It also involves
determining whether a court has authority to address a
particular question that it assumes to decide or to grant
the particular relief requested.4
Section 32-624 directs that a decision of the Secretary of
State shall become final unless an order shall be made by a
judge “on or before the fifty-fifth day preceding the election”
changing that decision. An order by any court made after that
time period would violate such legislative mandate, and no
relief may be afforded to the party from such an order after the
55th day.
In election cases, this court has no authority to grant relief
where the Legislature has established by statute strict deadlines
which must be met in order to guarantee that the state’s elec-
tion process is safeguarded against uncertainty and disruption.
3 In re Interest of Trey H., 281 Neb. 760, 798 N.W.2d 607 (2011). See, also,
In re Estate of Hockemeier, 280 Neb. 420, 786 N.W.2d 680 (2010).
4 In re Interest of Trey H., supra note 3, 281 Neb. at 766, 798 N.W.2d at
613. See, State ex rel. Lamm v. Nebraska Bd. of Pardons, 260 Neb. 1000,
620 N.W.2d 763 (2001); Ryan v. Ryan, 257 Neb. 682, 600 N.W.2d 739
(1999).
NEBRASKA REPUBLICAN PARTy v. GALE 	599
Cite as 283 Neb. 596

Section 32-624 and Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-801 (Reissue 2008)
are such statutes. As stated in the affidavit of the Secretary
of State, attached to his response to this court’s order to
show cause,
[i]n reliance on Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-624, and on the
Order of the District Court for Lancaster County entered
March 21, 2012, [he] began certification of the May 15,
2012 primary election ballot at approximately noon on
Thursday, March 22, and completed the process of ballot
certification on that same day for all 93 Nebraska coun-
ties at approximately 1:30 p.m.
That certification duty is imposed upon the Secretary of State
by § 32-801, and no one asserts he should disregard that statu-
tory obligation.
Thus, for the reasons stated above, this court determines that
under the statutory procedure established by the Legislature,
it lacks authority to grant the relief sought by appellant. This
appeal is therefore dismissed.
A ppeAl dismissed.
WriGht and stephAN, JJ., not participating.
stAte of NebrAskA, Appellee , v.
tyler W. britt, AppellANt.
813 N.W.2d 434
Filed March 30, 2012. 	No. S-10-998.
1. Constitutional Law: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews de novo a
trial court’s determination of the protections afforded by the Confrontation Clause
and reviews the underlying factual determinations for clear error.
2. Constitutional Law: Hearsay. Where testimonial statements are at issue, the
Confrontation Clause demands that such out-of-court hearsay statements be
admitted at trial only if the declarant is unavailable and there had been a prior
opportunity for cross-examination.
3. ____: ____. Statements that are nontestimonial can be admitted without further
Confrontation Clause analysis.
4. ____: ____. The initial step in a Confrontation Clause analysis is to deter-
mine whether the statements at issue are testimonial in nature and subject to
a Confrontation Clause analysis. If the statements are nontestimonial, then no
further Confrontation Clause analysis is required.
600 	283 NEBRASKA REPORTS