In re Estate of Odenreider

480 	286 NEBRASKA REPORTS
allegations suggest the existence of the elements required to
show both a due process and an equal protection violation.
Further, the factual allegations raise a reasonable expectation
that discovery will reveal evidence of these two constitutional
claims. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s dismissal
of Sherman’s constitutional claims and remand the cause for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
CONCLUSION
As Sherman failed to argue before the district court that
Karyn waived the statute of limitations defense and, as such,
the district court erred in dismissing his paternity action,
Sherman’s first assignment of error is meritless. We also find
that Sherman does not have standing to challenge the dismissal
of Karyn’s counterclaim. Thus, Sherman’s second assignment
of error is meritless. Finally, as noted above, based upon the
record before us, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of
Sherman’s constitutional claims and remand the cause for fur-
ther proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
A ffirmed in pArt, And in pArt reversed And
remAnded for further proceedings.
in re estAte of inA Wegner odenreider, deceAsed.
christy L. neeL, AppeLLee, v. robert
Wegner et AL., AppeLLAnts.
837 N.W.2d 756
Filed August 16, 2013. 	No. S-12-579.
1. Decedents’ Estates: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews probate cases
for error appearing on the record made in the county court.
2. Decedents’ Estates: Judgments: Appeal and Error. When reviewing questions
of law in a probate matter, an appellate court reaches a conclusion independent of
the determination reached by the court below.
3. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law
that an appellate court independently reviews.
4. Trial: Waiver: Appeal and Error. A litigant’s failure to make a timely objection
waives the right to assert prejudicial error on appeal.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:38 AM CST

IN RE ESTATE OF ODENREIDER 	481
Cite as 286 Neb. 480
5. Decedents’ Estates: Wills. Chapter 30, article 24, of the Nebraska Revised
Statutes addresses the probate and administration of wills and provides the
rules in Nebraska for both informal and formal probate of wills, including the
rules for supervised administration. This chapter is based upon the Uniform
Probate Code.
6. Decedents’ Estates: Pleadings. Pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2441(a) (Reissue
2008), the filing of a petition for supervised administration stays action on any
informal application then pending or thereafter filed.
7. Decedents’ Estates: Courts. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2440 (Reissue 2008) provides
when a probate court may grant a petition for supervised administration.
8. ____: ____. Once supervised administration is ordered, a probate court is granted
liberal authority to direct the supervised personal representative.
9. Decedents’ Estates: Wills: Courts. The probate or annulment of a will and the
administration of a decedent’s estate are reserved to state probate courts.
10. Property: Sales. It is impossible to sell an interest in property one does not own.
Appeal from the County Court for Dodge County: K enneth
vAmpoLA, Judge. Affirmed.
Robert A. Mooney, of Gross & Welch, P.C., L.L.O., for
appellants.
William J. Bianco, of Bianco Stroh, L.L.C., for appellee.
heAvicAn, c.J., Wright, connoLLy, stephAn, mccormAcK,
miLLer-L ermAn, and cAsseL, JJ.
heAvicAn, c.J.
I. INTRODUCTION
This appeal involves the probate of the estate of Ina Wegner
Odenreider (Ina). Robert Wegner, Mark Wegner, and Laura
Sherman (collectively appellants) petitioned this court for
bypass of the Nebraska Court of Appeals, contending this
case presented a novel legal question involving the Nebraska
Probate Code. We granted appellants’ petition to bypass.
We conclude that the probate court had jurisdiction to deter-
mine the matters at issue in this estate. We further determine
that the probate court did not err in ordering supervised admin-
istration of the estate and ordering the personal representative
to amend the proposed distribution based upon our de novo
review explained below. We affirm the order of the pro-
bate court.

482 	286 NEBRASKA REPORTS
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Robert is one of Ina’s two sons and the personal representa-
tive of her estate. Mark and Sherman are Robert’s children.
Ina’s other son, Joel Wegner, had three children.
Ina was married to Willis Wegner. Willis passed away in
1990. Relevant to this appeal are five parcels of land that Ina
and Willis owned at the time of Willis’ death. All were owned
by Ina and Willis as tenants in common. Upon Willis’ death,
he left his one-half interest in one parcel to Ina outright.
Through a trust, Willis left Ina a life estate in his one-half
interest in the remaining four parcels, with certain remainder
interests vested in Robert and Joel and the children of Robert
and Joel.
In 1998, one of Joel’s children, Christy L. Neel (Christy),
filed for chapter 7 bankruptcy. She listed as one of her assets
her contingent interest in Willis’ trust, as noted above. Mark
purchased that interest at a bankruptcy auction. The description
of the interest sold at auction was not specific, but instead was
described as whatever interest Christy had in the trust.
In 2005, Ina executed her last will and testament. Via a trust,
she left her interest in all five parcels to Robert and Joel. If
either Robert or Joel had died, his children would take Willis’
half; if both had died, the trust would terminate and the assets
would be distributed one-half to the children of Robert and
one-half to the children of Joel. In fact, Joel predeceased Ina.
In her will, Ina also bequeathed Christy $25,000. She did not
gift a cash amount to any of her other grandchildren.
Ina died in June 2010. Robert was named personal rep-
resentative in Ina’s will and, as such, in July 2010, filed
an “Application for Informal Probate of Will and Informal
Appointment of Personal Representative,” pursuant to Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 30-2414 (Reissue 2008). This section allows for
appointment of a personal representative to administer an
estate under a will without formal litigation. Upon receipt of
such application, the registrar must validate the completeness
of the application and accept or deny the request for appoint-
ment of a personal representative.1 The registrar’s findings in
1 See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 30-2414 through 30-2424 (Reissue 2008).

IN RE ESTATE OF ODENREIDER 	483
Cite as 286 Neb. 480
informal probate proceedings are conclusive as to all persons
until superseded by a formal testacy proceeding.2
In December 2010, Robert filed an inventory of estate
property as required by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2467 (Reissue
2008) and filed an amended inventory in July 2011. A pro-
posed schedule of distribution was filed on September 6. This
schedule listed Mark as having Christy’s interest in Ina’s prop-
erty. The schedule did not list the $25,000 left to Christy in
Ina’s will.
On September 9, 2011, Christy filed an “Objection to
Determination of Inheritance Tax and Motion for Supervised
Administration.” The 	inheritance 	tax 	objection 	was 	later
withdrawn and is not relevant to this appeal. Christy pro-
vided in her motion for supervised administration that she
did “not agree with the Personal Representative’s handling
of this case and believe[d] it would be in the best interests
of all beneficiaries that the estate be supervised since correct
and proper administration will affect the distribution to all
beneficiaries.”
A hearing was held on Christy’s objection and motion on
October 17, 2011, at which Christy argued that the estate
was not being handled properly and that she would like a
court-administered personal representative appointed. Christy
asserted that pursuant to Ina’s will, she was left an interest in
Ina’s land that would go to a trust, but that Robert, as the cur-
rent personal representative, did not include this interest in the
schedule of distribution for Ina’s estate. Robert had expressed
to Christy that he believed Christy’s interest in Ina’s land was
sold during Christy’s bankruptcy auction. Christy also noted
that the personal representative did not include the $25,000
amount left to Christy under Ina’s will.
At the hearing, Robert did not necessarily object to a super-
vised administration of the estate, but did object to the appoint-
ment of a new personal representative. In response to Christy’s
contentions, Robert argued that Christy should have filed an
objection to the schedule of distribution pursuant to Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 30-24,104(b) (Reissue 2008) of the Nebraska Probate
2 § 30-2415(a).

484 	286 NEBRASKA REPORTS
Code. Robert further argued that the bankruptcy court was the
proper forum to determine what Christy had sold as a part of
her bankruptcy.
After considering the parties’ arguments, the probate court
ordered the filing of any supplemental motions and scheduled
an evidentiary hearing for December 15, 2011. Primarily at
issue during the December 15 hearing was what interest was
sold to Mark at Christy’s bankruptcy auction. In addition,
Christy filed a motion with the bankruptcy court to consider
that same question. The latter motion was denied by the bank-
ruptcy court, with that court concluding the probate court was
better positioned to determine that question.
At a subsequent hearing before the probate court on April
9, 2012, the probate court addressed the question of whether
Christy’s objection to final distribution was outside of the
time period to file that motion. The probate court, citing
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2441(a) (Reissue 2008), found that
Christy’s objection was timely, because her September 9, 2011,
motion for supervised administration stayed the informal pro-
bate proceedings.
On May 23, 2012, the probate court entered an order con-
cluding that Christy’s interest in Ina’s share of the land was not
transferred to Mark via the trustee deed following the bank-
ruptcy sale. The probate court also approved Christy’s motion
for supervised administration. The probate court concluded that
the personal representative had made various errors related to
the distribution of the estate. Accordingly, the probate court
ordered that the personal representative should (1) be super-
vised by the court and (2) amend the schedule of distribution
to correct the errors the court found.
III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Appellants assign that the probate court (1) erred in fail-
ing to find that Christy failed to provide proper notice of her
motion for supervised administration; (2) erred in finding that
the motion for supervised administration tolled Christy’s dead-
line to object to the distribution; (3) exceeded its jurisdiction
in concluding that certain property was not sold in Christy’s
bankruptcy; and (4) erred in relying on parol evidence to

IN RE ESTATE OF ODENREIDER 	485
Cite as 286 Neb. 480
determine the interest sold at the bankruptcy auction, and in
ignoring contemporaneous writings evidencing the sale of her
further contingent interest.
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1-3] An appellate court reviews probate cases for error
appearing on the record made in the county court.3 When
reviewing questions of law in a probate matter, an appellate
court reaches a conclusion independent of the determina-
tion reached by the court below.4 Statutory interpretation
presents a question of law that an appellate court indepen-
dently reviews.5
V. ANALYSIS
1. motion for supervised
A dministrAtion
(a) Labeling and Notice Issue
[4] Appellants first argue that the probate court erred as a
matter of law when it considered and granted Christy’s motion
for supervised administration without requiring Christy to
follow the mandatory procedures set forth in the Nebraska
Probate Code. Specifically, appellants contend that Christy
needed to file a separate “petition” for supervised administra-
tion rather than a “motion” for supervised administration and,
further, that Christy failed to serve notice of her motion to
all interested parties pursuant to the probate code. Although
appellants assert these arguments on appeal, they did not
advance these arguments before the probate court and the
probate court did not rule on these issues. We have held that a
litigant’s failure to make a timely objection waives the right to
assert prejudicial error on appeal.6 Thus, we will not address
3 In re Estate of Fries, 279 Neb. 887, 782 N.W.2d 596 (2010).
4 Id.
5 Rosberg v. Vap, 284 Neb. 104, 815 N.W.2d 867 (2012).
6 Ford v. Estate of Clinton, 265 Neb. 285, 656 N.W.2d 606 (2003). See,
also, State v. Nadeem, 284 Neb. 513, 822 N.W.2d 372 (2012); Farmers
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kment, 265 Neb. 655, 658 N.W.2d 662 (2003).

486 	286 NEBRASKA REPORTS
these arguments on appeal. Appellant’s first assignment of
error is without merit.
(b) Motion for Supervised Administration’s
Effect on Informal Probate Proceeding
Appellants next contend that the probate court erred in
finding Christy’s motion for supervised administration filed
pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2439 (Reissue 2008) tolled
Christy’s 30-day deadline to object to the distribution of assets
set forth in the schedule of distribution in the informal probate
of Ina’s estate. In order to address this assignment of error, we
must review the sections of the Nebraska Probate Code rel-
evant to this appeal.
[5] Chapter 30, article 24, of the Nebraska Revised Statutes
addresses the probate and administration of wills and provides
the rules in Nebraska for both informal and formal probate of
wills, including the rules for supervised administration. This
chapter is based upon the Uniform Probate Code. Section
30-24,104(b) provides that in informal probate:
After the probable charges against the estate are known,
the personal representative may mail or deliver a proposal
for distribution to all persons who have a right to object
to the proposed distribution. The right of any distributee
to object to the proposed distribution on the basis of the
kind or value of asset he is to receive, if not waived ear-
lier in writing, terminates if he fails to object in writing
received by the personal representative within thirty days
after mailing or delivery of the proposal.
It is undisputed that Christy received the personal repre-
sentative’s proposed schedule of distribution on September
1, 2011. The personal representative filed the schedule of
distribution on September 6. Christy filed her motion for
supervised administration on September 9, after reviewing
the proposed schedule of distribution with counsel. Christy’s
motion for supervised administration was scheduled for hear-
ing on September 26. The hearing was postponed, however,
until October 17, because counsel for the personal representa-
tive had a scheduling conflict. On November 8, Christy filed an
objection to the proposed distribution.

IN RE ESTATE OF ODENREIDER 	487
Cite as 286 Neb. 480
Appellants argue that Christy’s objection was untimely pur-
suant to § 30-24,104(b) because this section requires that a
beneficiary object to the schedule of distribution in an informal
probate matter within 30 days of receiving the proposed dis-
tribution. Here, Christy received the proposed distribution on
September 1, 2011. Although she filed her motion for super-
vised administration on September 9, in which she alleged the
estate was not being properly handled regarding distribution to
the beneficiaries, she did not file her objection to final distribu-
tion in the informal probate until November 8. Thus, pursuant
to the plain language of § 30-24,104(b), Christy’s objection
was indeed untimely.
In addressing this issue of untimeliness, the probate court,
relying on § 30-2441(a), found that Christy’s motion for super-
vised administration filed September 9, 2011, stayed action
related to the informal probate proceeding. Because of this, the
probate court found Christy’s objection was timely filed.
Section 30-2441 explains a petition for supervised adminis-
tration’s effect on other proceedings:
(a) The 	pendency 	of 	a 	proceeding 	for 	supervised
administration of a decedent’s estate stays action on any
informal application then pending or thereafter filed.
(b) If a will has been previously probated in informal
proceedings, the effect of the filing of a petition for super-
vised administration is as provided for formal testacy
proceedings by section 30-2425.
(c) After he has received notice of the filing of a peti-
tion for supervised administration, a personal representa-
tive who has been appointed previously shall not exercise
his power to distribute any estate. The filing of the peti-
tion does not affect his other powers and duties unless the
court restricts the exercise of any of them pending full
hearing on the petition.
[6] Pursuant to § 30-2441(a), the filing of a petition for
supervised administration stays action on any informal applica-
tion then pending or thereafter filed. Here, however, the appli-
cation had been previously probated. Thus, § 30-2441(a) was
inapplicable to the facts of this case. Because the will had been

488 	286 NEBRASKA REPORTS
previously probated in informal proceedings, § 30-2441(b) was
instead applicable.
Section 30-2441(b) provides that “the effect of the filing
of a petition for supervised administration is as provided for
formal testacy proceedings by section 30-2425.” (Emphasis
supplied.) Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2425 (Reissue 2008) provides
in part:
A petition may seek formal probate of a will without
regard to whether the same or a conflicting will has been
informally probated. A formal testacy proceeding may,
but need not, involve a request for appointment of a per-
sonal representative.
During the pendency of a formal testacy proceeding,
the registrar shall not act upon any application for infor-
mal probate of any will of the decedent or any application
for informal appointment of a personal representative of
the decedent.
Unless a petition in a formal testacy proceeding also
requests confirmation of the previous informal appoint-
ment, a previously appointed personal representative,
after receipt of notice of the commencement of a for-
mal probate proceeding, must refrain from exercising
his power to make any further distribution of the estate
during the pendency of the formal proceeding. A peti-
tioner who seeks the appointment of a different personal
representative in a formal proceeding also may request an
order restraining the acting personal representative from
exercising any of the powers of his office and requesting
the appointment of a special administrator. In the absence
of a request, or if the request is denied, the commence-
ment of a formal proceeding has no effect on the powers
and duties of a previously appointed personal representa-
tive other than those relating to distribution.
Pursuant to § 30-2425, a petition for supervised adminis-
tration may be filed without regard to whether the same or
a conflicting will has been informally probated. And once a
petition for supervised administration is filed, the previously
appointed personal representative must refrain from exercising
his power to make any further distribution of the estate during

IN RE ESTATE OF ODENREIDER 	489
Cite as 286 Neb. 480
the pendency of the formal proceeding. Thus, we conclude
that, although the will at issue in this case had been previously
probated in informal proceedings, Christy had the right to file
a motion for supervised administration with the probate court.
The filing of this motion prevented Robert, as the current
personal representative, from making any distribution under
Ina’s will.
[7] We must, therefore, consider whether Christy’s con-
cerns about the distribution were properly addressed through
Christy’s motion for supervised administration. Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 30-2440 (Reissue 2008) provides when a probate court may
grant a petition for supervised administration:
A petition for supervised administration may be filed
by any interested person or by a personal representative
at any time . . . . If not previously adjudicated, the court
shall adjudicate the testacy of the decedent and questions
relating to the priority and qualifications of the personal
representative in any case involving a request for super-
vised administration, even though the request for super-
vised administration may be denied. [T]he court shall
order supervised administration of a decedent’s estate . . .
if the court finds that supervised administration is neces-
sary under the circumstances.
This section mandates that once a petition for supervised
administration is filed, a probate court must adjudicate the
testacy of the decedent and questions relating to the priority
and qualifications of the personal representative if these issues
have not been previously adjudicated, even though the motion
may end up being denied. In this case, the probate court held
a hearing on October 17, 2011, adjudicating the testacy of Ina
and addressing the questions relating to the priority and quali-
fications of Robert as the personal representative. After hold-
ing such hearing, § 30-2440 allows a probate court to order
supervised administration “if the court finds that supervised
administration is necessary under the circumstances.” In our de
novo review of the record, we find the probate court did not
err in ordering supervised administration in this case, because
it found that the personal representative had made errors in the
proposed distribution.

490 	286 NEBRASKA REPORTS
[8] And once supervised administration is ordered, a pro-
bate court is granted liberal authority to direct the supervised
personal representative. Section 30-2439 provides that “[a]
supervised personal representative is responsible to the court,
as well as to the interested parties, and is subject to directions
concerning the estate made by the court on its own motion
or on the motion of any interested party.” Thus, pursuant to
§ 30-2439, the probate court was well within its province to
order, on its own motion, the personal representative to adjust
the proposed distribution to correct the errors concerning the
estate. A proper result will not be reversed merely because
it was reached for the wrong reason.7 We conclude that
although the probate court erred in its reasoning, it neverthe-
less had the authority to order supervised administration and
to direct the personal representative to amend the proposed
distribution. Appellants’ second assignment of error is with-
out merit.
2. Jurisdiction
Appellants 	next 	assign 	that 	the 	probate 	court 	did 	not
have jurisdiction to resolve the question of what was sold at
Christy’s 1998 bankruptcy auction. Appellants claim that the
federal bankruptcy court had exclusive jurisdiction to address
this matter.
Christy’s claim of supervised administration involves the
administration of an estate and the probate of a will. Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 24-517 (Cum. Supp. 2012) provides that each
county court shall have the following jurisdiction: Exclusive
original jurisdiction of all matters relating to decedents’
estates, including the probate of wills and the construction
therefor. Furthermore, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2211 (Cum. Supp.
2012) grants the county courts jurisdiction over all subject
matter relating to estates of decedents, including the determi-
nation of heirs and successors of decedents. Ultimately, this
case deals with the construction and probate of Ina’s will and
the inheritance of her heirs, in light of Christy’s prior bank-
ruptcy filing.
7 See, e.g., Boettcher v. Balka, 252 Neb. 547, 567 N.W.2d 95 (1997).

IN RE ESTATE OF ODENREIDER 	491
Cite as 286 Neb. 480
[9] As discussed in the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Marshall v. Marshall,8 the probate or annulment of a will
and the administration of a decedent’s estate are reserved
to state probate courts. Marshall further discussed in dicta
instances in which conflicts over the same property may arise
both in federal bankruptcy proceedings and in state probate
proceedings, and discussed instances in which federal courts
may have “exclusive jurisdiction” over the subject matter.9
Nothing in Marshall compels this court to conclude that the
federal bankruptcy court had exclusive jurisdiction over the
matters at issue in this case. And in any case, Christy filed
a motion with the bankruptcy court to determine what inter-
est was sold to Mark at the bankruptcy auction. That motion
was denied by the bankruptcy court, with that court conclud-
ing the probate court was better positioned to determine
the question.
For the above reasons, we find the probate court had
jurisdiction to hear this matter as it related to Ina’s estate.
Appellants’ third assignment of error is without merit.
3. pAroL evidence
Finally, appellants assign that the probate court erred in
relying on parol evidence to determine the interest sold at
the bankruptcy auction and in ignoring contemporaneous
writings evidencing the sale of Christy’s contingent interest
in Ina’s land. Specifically, appellants claim the probate court
erred in relying on the testimony of a bankruptcy trustee
and his recollection of what Christy sold and by ignoring
the written auction notice related to the sale. At the hear-
ing, the trustee stated that the assets in Christy’s bankruptcy
estate included “[a]ll the assets, tangible and intangible . . .
that existed as of the moment of the filing of the bankruptcy
case.” The auction notice provides in part: “We are selling a
remainder interest (1/6th total) and buyer will receive their
[sic] interest upon death or transfer or current life estate.”
8 Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 126 S. Ct. 1735, 164 L. Ed. 2d 480
(2006).
9 Id.

492 	286 NEBRASKA REPORTS
According to appellants, the “1/6th total” represents Christy’s
fractional interest in both Willis’ and Ina’s land, and thus
they claim that both of these interests were sold at the bank-
ruptcy auction.
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2006), a bankruptcy estate
includes any interest in property if such interest had been an
interest of the debtor on the date of the filing of the petition
and the debtor “acquires or becomes entitled to acquire within
180 days after such date” by bequest, devise, or inheritance.
Christy filed for bankruptcy on May 13, 1998. At that point in
time, Christy had an interest in Willis’ land; however, Christy
had no interest in Ina’s land. The Nebraska law of wills has
long provided that a devisee acquires no interest in property
by the mere execution of a will. It is an elementary rule that
the provisions of a will take effect and become operative at
the time of the death of the testator.10 The will always speaks
from the date of the testator’s death, and speaks conclusively
as of that particular date.11 We have stated the same principles
another way. A will is, according to law, of an ambulatory
character, and no person can have any rights in it until the
testator is dead.12 Thus, Christy did not “acquire” or “become
entitled to acquire” any interest in Ina’s land until Ina’s death
in June 2010. Even if federal bankruptcy law, during the testa-
tor’s lifetime, would treat a devisee as one “entitled to acquire”
the subject of the devise, Christy had no such interest at the
time of her bankruptcy in 1998. Ina signed the first version of
her will on January 3, 2001. The final version of the will was
executed in 2005. The 180-day period specified in 11 U.S.C.
§ 541(a)(5) had long expired by the time Ina signed the first
version of her will.
We note that after the probate court issued its final order
in this case, appellants filed a motion for rehearing, present-
ing the 2001 will mentioned above and a version of Ina’s will
purportedly drafted in 1993. The 1993 will, however, was not
10 Smullin v. Wharton, 83 Neb. 328, 119 N.W. 773 (1909).
11 In re Estate of Dimmitt, 141 Neb. 413, 3 N.W.2d 752 (1942).
12 Muse v. Stewart, 173 Neb. 520, 113 N.W.2d 644 (1962).

IN RE ESTATE OF ODENREIDER 	493
Cite as 286 Neb. 480
signed by Ina, and there was no evidence presented that it was
ever executed. We therefore disregard this evidence, just as the
probate court did.
We find the probate court did not consider “parol evidence”
or fail to give proper weight to the auction notice. The deed
at issue in this case was silent as to the fractional interest in
land sold at the bankruptcy auction. Thus, the probate court
reviewed the evidence presented by the parties to determine
what was sold pursuant to this deed. Although the probate
court noted the trustee’s testimony in its order, its decision
regarding what was sold pursuant to Christy’s bankruptcy
was not based solely upon that testimony. Instead, the probate
court’s decision was ultimately based upon the facts that Ina’s
will did not exist at the time of the sale and also that Ina was
not deceased at the time of the sale. Based upon this evidence,
the probate court appropriately disregarded the notice and
concluded that the “1/6th total” interest written on the notice
appeared to be inaccurate.
[10] As Christy’s interest in Ina’s land did not arise before
Christy’s bankruptcy filing on May 13, 1998, or within 180
days after the filing, the probate court found such interest did
not fall within the confines of and was not part of Christy’s
bankruptcy estate. Only Christy’s interest in Willis’ share of
the land was conveyed to Mark via the deed. No part of Ina’s
interest in the property was conveyed to Mark at that point.
Thus, we agree with the probate court’s finding. It is impossi-
ble to sell an interest in property one does not own.13 As such,
we find that the probate court made the correct determination
regarding what Christy was entitled to through Ina’s estate.
Appellants’ final assignment of error is without merit.
VI. CONCLUSION
The order of the probate court is affirmed.
A ffirmed.
13 Cf. State ex. rel. Counsel for Dis. v. Phillips, 284 Neb. 940, 824 N.W.2d
376 (2012).