Doe v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.

486 	287 NEBRASKA REPORTS
State nor trial counsel for Alfredson believed the courthouse
discussion constituted a formal offer. Without a formal offer
being made, trial counsel could not have been deficient in fail-
ing to disclose it to Alfredson. Alfredson has failed to present
sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption that his trial
counsel acted reasonably.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
district court.
A ffirmed.
CAssel, J., not participating.
JAne doe, AppellAnt And Cross -Appellee, v.
firemAn’s fund insurAnCe C ompAny,
Appellee And Cross -AppellAnt.
843 N.W.2d 639
Filed February 21, 2014. 	No. S-13-075.
1. Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error. An appellate court will affirm a lower
court’s grant of summary judgment if the pleadings and admitted evidence show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts or as to the ultimate infer-
ences that may be drawn from the facts and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
2. ____: ____. In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court views the
evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment was
granted, and gives that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible
from the evidence.
3. Bankruptcy: Judgments: Appeal and Error. Whether the automatic stay pro-
visions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2006 & Supp. III 2009) have been violated is a
question of law. An appellate court reaches a conclusion regarding questions of
law independently of the trial court’s conclusion.
4. Judgments: Final Orders. To constitute a judgment under Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 25-1301 (Reissue 2008), a judge’s decision must be both rendered and entered.
Appeal from the District Court for Red Willow County:
dAvid urbom, Judge. Affirmed.
Vincent M. Powers, of Vincent M. Powers & Associates,
for appellant.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:36 AM CST

DOE v. FIREMAN’S FUND INS. CO. 	487
Cite as 287 Neb. 486
Patrick Q. Hustead and Christopher J. Shannon, of Hustead
Law Firm, P.C., and Stephen L. Ahl and Krista M. Carlson, of
Wolfe, Snowden, Hurd, Luers & Ahl, L.L.P., for appellee.
H eAviCAn, C.J., WrigHt, C onnolly, stepHAn, mCC ormACk,
miller-lermAn, and CAssel, JJ.
H eAviCAn, C.J.
INTRODUCTION
Under federal law, the filing of a petition in bankruptcy
operates as an automatic stay of the commencement or con-
tinuation of any action or proceedings against the debtor or
the recovery of a claim against the debtor which arose prior
to the filing of bankruptcy.1 This appeal asks us to determine
whether the entry of a default judgment announced prior to
the filing of bankruptcy, but signed and file stamped after, was
stayed under federal law. We conclude that it was and, accord-
ingly, affirm the Red Willow County District Court’s order
granting the motion for summary judgment of Fireman’s Fund
Insurance Company (Fireman’s).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The plaintiff, Jane Doe, allegedly was sexually assaulted
on August 31, 2004. The perpetrator was employed by Red
Willow Dairy, L.L.C., which was owned and operated by Jim
Huffman and Ann Huffman. On October 23, 2009, Doe sued
Red Willow Dairy and the Huffmans in Lancaster County
District Court, alleging that they failed to investigate the
background of Doe’s assaulter and failed to properly supervise
him. Doe’s amended complaint was filed on October 28. Red
Willow Dairy and the Huffmans did not respond to the lawsuit
in the district court, and a motion for default judgment was
filed on December 14, 2009.
A hearing on the motion for default judgment was held
on December 18, 2009. The judges’ notes for the case were
included in one of the exhibits in the instant case. The notes
show that at the December 18 hearing, the court sustained the
motion for default judgment and directed Doe’s attorney to
1 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. III 2009).

488 	287 NEBRASKA REPORTS
submit a proposed order within 7 days. Although the subse-
quent signed order does not show on its face when it was signed
by the court, the judges’ notes show an entry on December 22,
stating, “For order on default judgment see file. (default).” The
signed order granting the default judgment was file stamped by
the Lancaster County clerk of the district court on December
22. The day before, on December 21, Red Willow Dairy and
the Huffmans had filed for chapter 7 bankruptcy.
During the bankruptcy proceedings, Doe was listed as a
creditor to Red Willow Dairy and the Huffmans. Doe eventu-
ally settled her claim in return for an assignment of all rights
to any and all causes of action that Red Willow Dairy and
the Huffmans might have against Fireman’s for its action
or inaction with respect to the Lancaster County District
Court lawsuit.
Doe then filed this action against Fireman’s in Red Willow
County District Court. Doe alleged that Fireman’s had a duty to
defend Red Willow Dairy and the Huffmans and had breached
that duty.
Fireman’s first filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied.
Fireman’s then filed a motion for partial summary judgment
on the issue of coverage, which the district court granted, con-
cluding that the operative insurance policy excluded claims for
sexual molestation.
Doe then filed her own motion for summary judgment, and
Fireman’s filed two more motions—one arguing that the entry
of the default judgment order violated the bankruptcy stay
and another arguing that because there was no coverage under
the policy, there was no duty to defend. The district court
later granted summary judgment to Fireman’s, reasoning that
the default judgment entry violated the automatic bankruptcy
stay. The district court also denied Doe’s motion for sum-
mary judgment.
Doe appeals, and Fireman’s cross-appeals.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
On appeal, Doe assigns that the district court erred in find-
ing that the filing of the default judgment on December 22,
2009, violated the automatic stay of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court

DOE v. FIREMAN’S FUND INS. CO. 	489
Cite as 287 Neb. 486
and, as such, erred in granting summary judgment in favor
of Fireman’s.
On cross-appeal, Fireman’s assigns, restated, that the district
court erred in not also granting it summary judgment for the
reason that because there was no coverage under the policy,
Fireman’s had no duty to defend.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1,2] An appellate court will affirm a lower court’s grant
of summary judgment if the pleadings and admitted evidence
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts
or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from the
facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.2 In reviewing a summary judgment, an appel-
late court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the
party against whom the judgment was granted, and gives that
party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from
the evidence.3
[3] Whether the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(a) have been violated is a question of law.4 We reach
a conclusion regarding questions of law independently of the
trial court’s conclusion.5
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Doe assigns that the district court erred in con-
cluding that the default judgment entered against Red Willow
Dairy and the Huffmans violated the automatic stay of the
bankruptcy court.
In this case, the district court orally pronounced the grant-
ing of default judgment in Doe’s favor on Friday, December
18, 2009, as reflected by the court’s minute entry. The min-
ute entry also shows that the court directed Doe’s counsel to
submit a proposed order within 7 days. Red Willow Dairy
2 Churchill v. Columbus Comm. Hosp., 285 Neb. 759, 830 N.W.2d 53
(2013).
3 Id.
4 Eskanos & Adler, P.C. v. Leetien, 309 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 2002).
5 Churchill v. Columbus Comm. Hosp., supra note 2.

490 	287 NEBRASKA REPORTS
and the Huffmans filed for bankruptcy on December 21. On
Tuesday, December 22, the court made another minute entry
referring to the order on default judgment. In context, it is
perfectly clear that the court signed the order on December
22. And the parties agree that the order granting Doe’s motion
for default judgment was file stamped by the court clerk on
December 22.
Doe directs this court to In re Soares6 and argues that we
should adopt a ministerial act exception to the bankruptcy
stay. Doe argues that this court should conclude that both the
rendition of the order by the judge on December 22, 2009,
and the entry of the order by the court clerk, who file stamped
and dated the order on December 22, were merely ministerial.
Thus, Doe argues it was the oral pronouncement and journal
entry on December 18 that is the pertinent time to consider
with respect to the bankruptcy stay.
In In re Soares, the First Circuit defined a ministerial act
as one that is essentially clerical in nature: “Thus, when an
official’s duty is delineated by, say, a law or a judicial decree
with such crystalline clarity that nothing is left to the exer-
cise of the official’s discretion or judgment, the resultant act
is ministerial.”7 The First Circuit concluded that when the
judicial function is complete—i.e., when the judicial deci-
sion is made—those acts done in “obedience to the judge’s
peremptory instructions or [are] otherwise precisely defined
and nondiscretionary”8 are ministerial and not violative of the
automatic stay even if undertaken after an affected party files
for bankruptcy.
But we decline to adopt such an exception because it is
inconsistent with Nebraska law. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1301
(Reissue 2008) sets forth the relevant statutory provisions
for the rendition and entry of judgments in Nebraska courts.
Section 25-1301(2) provides that the “[r]endition of a judg-
ment is the act of the court, or a judge thereof, in making and
6 In re Soares, 107 F.3d 969 (1st Cir. 1997).
7 Id. at 974.
8 Id.

DOE v. FIREMAN’S FUND INS. CO. 	491
Cite as 287 Neb. 486
signing a written notation of the relief granted or denied in an
action.” And § 25-1301(3) provides that the “entry of a judg-
ment . . . occurs when the clerk of the court places the file
stamp and date upon the judgment.”
Our current version of § 25-1301 replaced an earlier ver-
sion which provided multiple methods for the entry of judg-
ment, thus leading to confusion about when an order was
entered and therefore final.9 Under the prior statute, rendi-
tion of a judgment was defined as “the act of the court, or a
judge thereof, in pronouncing judgment, accompanied by the
making of a notation on the trial docket, or one made at the
direction of the court or judge thereof, of the relief granted
or denied in an action.”10 And the time for appeal under the
former statute began to run with the “rendition” of the judg-
ment.11 This frequently resulted in uncertainty regarding the
commencement of the time for appeal. We decline to adopt
the ministerial exception advocated by Doe, because to do
so would be contrary to the intent behind the 1999 revisions
to § 25-1301, which sought to instill certainty in the ques-
tion of when a judgment was entered. After the 1999 revi-
sions, the pronouncement of judgment and making of a trial
docket entry no longer play any role in the “rendition” of
a judgment.
[4] To constitute a “judgment” under § 25-1301, a judge’s
decision must be both rendered and entered.12 In this case,
the rendering of the district court’s grant of summary judg-
ment could not have occurred when the first minute entry was
made on December 18, 2009, because the minute entry was
not signed by the judge. Until the judge signed the order on
December 22, he had not “rendered” the judgment within the
meaning of § 25-1301. Even if the entry of the judgment by
the court clerk was purely ministerial, the judge’s signing of
9 Introducer’s Statement of Intent, L.B. 622, Committee on Judiciary, 96th
Leg., 1st Sess. (Mar. 19, 1999) (amended into 1999 Neb. Laws, L.B. 43).
10 See § 25-1301(2) (Reissue 1995).
11 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1912(1) (Reissue 1995).
12 See Kilgore v. Nebraska Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 277 Neb. 456,
763 N.W.2d 77 (2009).

492 	287 NEBRASKA REPORTS
the order was not; rather, it was an essential part of the judi-
cial function of the “rendition” of the judgment. Moreover, the
entry of that judgment plainly did not occur until December 22,
when “the clerk of the court place[d] the file stamp and date”
upon a written notation of that decision.
Thus, by the time the order granting default judgment was
signed by the court (rendition) and file stamped and dated by
the clerk (entry) on December 22, 2009, Red Willow Dairy
and the Huffmans had the day before filed for bankruptcy.
And, as is provided by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), “a petition filed
. . . operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of . . . (1)
the commencement or continuation . . . of a judicial . . . pro-
ceeding against the debtor.” This stay is applicable regardless
of notice.13
As of December 21, 2009, the order in the underlying action
between Doe and Red Willow Dairy and the Huffmans had
not been rendered or entered, and thus was not a judgment.
The filing of the bankruptcy stayed any further proceed-
ings, preventing the rendition and entry of the default judg-
ment on December 22. Because neither rendition nor entry
of the default judgment was accomplished before the filing
of the bankruptcy action, Fireman’s could not have breached
any duty it might have to defend Red Willow Dairy and the
Huffmans. And the underlying action between Doe and Red
Willow Dairy and the Huffmans was discharged in the bank-
ruptcy action.
We are aware of the comments in the dissent suggesting that
it was “the court’s judgment when pronounced” and that the
entry was ministerial. The dissent relies in part on language
in Luikart v. Bredthauer.14 But the confusion engendered by
cases like Luikart was addressed in the 1999 amendments to
§ 25-1301 which, contrary to the dissent’s view, were not lim-
ited to the issue of when to take an appeal, although they were
in aid of it. So too, our use of the word “ministerial,” though
perhaps ill chosen, in Kilgore v. Nebraska Dept. of Health &
13 See, e.g., Constitution Bank v. Tubbs, 68 F.3d 685 (3d Cir. 1995); 9B Am.
Jur. 2d Bankruptcy § 1725 (2006).
14 See Luikart v. Bredthauer, 132 Neb. 62, 271 N.W. 165 (1937).

DOE v. FIREMAN’S FUND INS. CO. 	493
Cite as 287 Neb. 486
Human Servs.,15 upon which the dissent relies, was in the con-
text of appealability.
Because the trial court has inherent authority to modify its
oral ruling before its entry, we do not agree with the reason-
ing of the dissent to the effect that the judgment occurs when
orally pronounced and that the entry of judgment on December
22, 2009, was merely ministerial. Moreover, we do not endorse
execution of judgment based on the oral pronouncement in
this case. Our reasoning is not at odds with federal law under
§ 362(a)(1), but simply applies it to the facts of this case.
To adopt the reasoning of the dissent would be a setback for
Nebraska procedural jurisprudence and trivialize the entry of
the judgment.
Doe’s assignment of error is without merit. We need not reach
the assignment of error on cross-appeal filed by Fireman’s.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the district court granting summary judg-
ment to Fireman’s is affirmed.
A ffirmed.
15 See Kilgore v. Nebraska Dept. of Health & Human Servs., supra note 12.
C onnolly, J., dissenting.
I believe that the majority opinion has incorrectly focused
on whether an order is final for purposes of an appeal instead
of whether a court’s act is ministerial under § 362 of the fed-
eral bankruptcy code.1 Federal courts hold, and legal commen-
tators agree, that postpetition ministerial acts do not violate the
automatic stay of proceedings against the debtor under § 362. I
would remand the cause for the court to decide the issue raised
by the insurer’s cross-appeal.
C ourt’s order did not violAte
tHe bAnkruptCy stAy
Upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, § 362(a)(1) treats
the petition as an automatic stay of the commencement or con-
tinuation of any judicial, administrative, or other proceedings
1 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. III 2009).

494 	287 NEBRASKA REPORTS
against the debtor. I agree that any action that violates an auto-
matic stay is void.2 But under federal law, the district court’s
official entry of its default judgment was a ministerial act, not
the continuation of a proceeding. And whether an action consti-
tutes the “commencement or continuation” of a proceeding is a
question of federal bankruptcy law—not state law.3
It is true that we are not bound by appellate circuit courts’
interpretation of a federal statute,4 but those decisions are,
of course, strong persuasive authority. And federal courts,
in analyzing whether a court’s action is ministerial, do not
focus on whether an order is final for the purpose of an
appeal in state court. Instead, the purpose of § 362 is to
balance the interests of debtors and creditors in bankruptcy
proceedings.5 And in considering whether a court’s postpeti-
tion action violates an automatic stay, federal courts have
drawn the line at ministerial acts. That is, acts that are merely
ministerial (essentially clerical) after a court has decided a
case will not violate the automatic stay. The First Circuit is
not the only federal court to have concluded that postpeti-
tion ministerial acts do not violate the automatic stay when
the court pronounced judgment—in a written order or from
the bench—before the debtor filed a bankruptcy petition.6
2 See, e.g., Acands, Inc. v. Travelers Cas. and Sur. Co., 435 F.3d 252 (3d
Cir. 2006); In re Integrated Technology Solutions, Inc., 417 B.R. 643
(D.N.M. 2009).
3 Compare In re Williams, 703 F.2d 1055 (8th Cir. 1983).
4 See Strong v. Omaha Constr. Indus. Pension Plan, 270 Neb. 1, 701 N.W.2d
320 (2005), abrogated on other grounds, Kennedy v. Plan Administrator
for DuPont Sav. and Investment Plan, 555 U.S. 285, 129 S. Ct. 865, 172
L. Ed. 2d 662 (2009).
5 See, e.g., In re Pettit, 217 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2000).
6 See, e.g., Rexnord Holdings, Inc. v. Bidermann, 21 F.3d 522 (2d Cir.
1994); In re Knightsbridge Development Co. Inc., 884 F.2d 145 (4th
Cir. 1989); In re Heaviside, 433 B.R. 749 (E.D. Mo. 2010); In re
Aultman, 223 B.R. 481 (W.D. Pa. 1998); 2 Michael Baccus & Howard
J. Steinberg, Bankruptcy Litigation § 12:11 (2013), available at Westlaw
BKRLIT. See, also, In re Pettit, supra note 5; In re Carver, 828 F.2d 463
(8th Cir. 1987). Compare In re Vierkant, 240 B.R. 317 (B.A.P. 8th Cir.
1999).

DOE v. FIREMAN’S FUND INS. CO. 	495
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And Nebraska’s entry of judgment statute should not affect
that result.
It is true that in 1999, the Legislature amended Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 25-1301 (Reissue 1995) in two ways to clarify when a
party can appeal. First, the amendment provided that a court
renders a judgment or order when the judge signs a written
notation of its determination of the relief granted or denied.
Second, the court enters the judgment or final order when the
court’s clerk places the file stamp and date on the judgment or
final order.7
But through these amendments, the Legislature was clari-
fying the start date for the appeal period. This purpose is
shown by the introducer’s statement of intent8 and the state-
ments of the judges who testified that the previous version
of § 25-1301 had caused confusion about the deadline for
filing an appeal. The same bill also amended Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 25-1912 (Reissue 1995) to change the start date for the
30-day appeal period from the date that the trial court rendered
its judgment or final order to the date that the court entered it.9
Finally, the Legislature amended § 25-1301(3) to specifically
provide that “[f]or purposes of determining the time for appeal,
the date stamped on the judgment, decree, or final order shall
be the date of [the judgment’s] entry.”
In sum, the 1999 amendments are ministerial and solely
related to the filing of an appeal. So they should not affect the
efficacy of the court’s judgment when pronounced. To hold
otherwise will encourage parties to take actions contrary to the
court’s judgment before it is officially entered. And we have
long recognized that a judgment is effective when pronounced
even if a party may not use it for some purposes until the court
has entered it:
“The rendition of a judgment is the judicial act of the
court in pronouncing the sentence of the law upon the
7 See, 1999 Neb. Laws, L.B. 43 § 3; § 25-1301(2) and (3) (Reissue 2008).
8 See, Introducer’s Statement of Intent, L.B. 622, Judiciary Committee, 96th
Leg., 1st Sess. (Mar. 19, 1999) (amended into L.B. 43); Hearing, 96th
Leg., 1st Sess. 30-41 (Mar. 19, 1999).
9 See L.B. 43, § 8.

496 	287 NEBRASKA REPORTS
facts in controversy as ascertained by the pleadings and
the verdict. The entry of a judgment is a ministerial act,
which consists in spreading upon the record a statement
of the final conclusion reached by the court in the mat-
ter, thus furnishing external and incontestable evidence
of the sentence given, and designed to stand as a per-
petual memorial of its action. It is the former, therefore,
that is the effective result of the litigation. In the nature
of things, a judgment must be rendered before it can be
entered. And not only that, but though the judgment be
not entered at all, still it is none the less a judgment. The
omission to enter it does not destroy it, nor does its vital-
ity remain in abeyance until it is put upon the record. . . .”
. . . “. . . ‘There are certain purposes, however, for which
a judgment is required to be duly entered before it can
become available or be attended by its usual incidents.
Thus, . . . this is prerequisite to the right to appeal. And
so a judgment must commonly be docketed before it can
create a lien upon land . . . . But with these exceptions,
a judgment is independent of the fact of its entry. And in
all cases, the distinction between rendition and entry is
substantial and important.’”10
Under this reasoning, I disagree that the 1999 amendments
alter when a court’s substantive judgment of the parties’
rights and obligations has effect. Even after the 1999 amend-
ments, we have specifically characterized a court’s signing
and file stamping of a judgment or order as ministerial acts
required for an appeal.11 In short, I believe that the majority
opinion confuses the issues. Whether an order is appealable
is not the same as whether a court’s act is ministerial for
the purpose of violating the automatic stay in federal bank-
ruptcy proceedings.
10 Luikart v. Bredthauer, 132 Neb. 62, 65-66, 271 N.W. 165, 167 (1937),
quoting 1 Henry Campbell Black, A Treatise on the Law of Judgments
§ 106 (2d ed. 1902).
11 See Kilgore v. Nebraska Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 277 Neb. 456,
763 N.W.2d 77 (2009).

DOE v. FIREMAN’S FUND INS. CO. 	497
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Here, we are not deciding whether a creditor can enforce
a judgment after the debtor has filed a bankruptcy petition.12
We are deciding only whether a court can enter a postpeti-
tion judgment that it pronounced before the debtor filed the
petition. Federal courts specifically intended the exception for
ministerial acts to prevent court actions like this one from vio-
lating the automatic stay. In contrast, the rule that the opinion
sets out, if adopted by federal courts, would encourage debtors
to try to defeat prepetition judgments against them by rac-
ing to the bankruptcy court before the court officially enters
its judgment.
This case illustrates the potential problems of the rule that the
majority opinion adopts. The trial court sustained Jane Doe’s
motion for a default judgment on Friday, December 18, 2009.
Red Willow Dairy, L.L.C., and Jim Huffman and Ann Huffman
filed for bankruptcy on the following Monday, December 21,
before the court entered its judgment on Tuesday, December
22. If the court had entered its judgment on Monday, would
we require parties to prove the times that the court entered
its judgment and the debtor filed the bankruptcy petition? If
a creditor claimed that the court improperly delayed the entry
of judgment, would that claim require the judge to testify as
a witness?
Because the federal rule avoids these problems, I find it
more persuasive. I would hold that the district court erred in
concluding that the Lancaster County District Court’s entry
of the default judgment violated the automatic stay of § 362
and was therefore void. This conclusion leads me to the issue
raised by the insurer’s cross-appeal: whether the court erred
in failing to dismiss Doe’s complaint or to grant Fireman’s
Fund Insurance Company (Fireman’s Fund) summary judg-
ment on Doe’s claim that it breached its duty of good faith and
fair dealing.
12 See, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6); Eskanos & Adler, P.C. v. Leetien, 309 F.3d
1210 (9th Cir. 2002).

498 	287 NEBRASKA REPORTS
CAuse sHould be remAnded
for C ourt to deCide
C ross -A ppeAl issue
As the majority opinion states, Doe was a creditor in the
bankruptcy proceeding. She entered into a settlement agree-
ment with Red Willow Dairy and the Huffmans to assign to
Doe any claims they had against Fireman’s Fund in exchange
for her promise not to pursue any claims against them in
bankruptcy court. The record shows that Doe notified the
bankruptcy court of the settlement, and for deciding this
appeal, I assume that the bankruptcy court approved the
settlement.13 But we cannot decide the issue raised by the
insurer’s cross-appeal because the district court has not yet
ruled on it.
In its cross-appeal, Fireman’s Fund argues that it did not
breach its duty of good faith and fair dealing in failing to
defend Red Willow Dairy and the Huffmans against Doe’s
claim because it had good reason to deny their claim for cover-
age. Fireman’s Fund argues that its policy’s exclusion for the
risk presented by Doe’s claim was undebatable. As the majority
opinion states, the court agreed, and Doe does not assign error
to that ruling on appeal.
Instead, Doe argues that Firemen’s Fund is estopped from
denying coverage because it knew about Doe’s claim and her
motion for a default judgment. Yet, it took no steps to protect
its insureds from a default judgment or to notify them that it
would not defend them before the court entered the default
judgment. Doe argues that an insurer cannot lead an insured
to believe that it will assume responsibility for a defense and
then leave the insured liable for a default judgment. Fireman’s
Fund responds that none of its actions could have led a reason-
able insured to believe that it was assuming a defense. Leaving
aside that the parties dispute the relevant facts, we generally
do not consider issues that the trial court has not decided.14
And Fireman’s Fund incorrectly argues that the court erred in
13 See 10 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 9019.01 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J.
Sommer eds., 15th ed. rev. 2009).
14 See Conley v. Brazer, 278 Neb. 508, 772 N.W.2d 545 (2009).

DOE v. FIREMAN’S FUND INS. CO. 	499
Cite as 287 Neb. 486
failing to decide whether it had breached the duty of good faith
and fair dealing.
In April 2012, Doe moved for summary judgment on the
insurer’s liability. Fireman’s Fund then moved for summary
judgment on its defense that the default judgment was void
because it violated the automatic stay in the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding. Later, Fireman’s Fund moved for a summary judg-
ment that it could not be liable for breaching a duty of good
faith and fair dealing because it had no duty to defend Red
Willow Dairy and the Huffmans.
The court considered these motions at the same time. It con-
cluded that the default judgment violated the automatic stay
and was void and that Fireman’s Fund was therefore entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court over-
ruled Doe’s motion for summary judgment and did not reach
the issue whether Fireman’s Fund had breached a duty of good
faith and fair dealing.
The court obviously concluded that its ruling on the bank-
ruptcy issue mooted Doe’s claim and Fireman’s Fund’s alterna-
tive defense. And the majority opinion relies on this reasoning
in declining to address the cross-appeal: “Because neither
rendition nor entry of the default judgment was accomplished
before the filing of the bankruptcy action, Fireman’s [Fund]
could not have breached any duty it might have to defend Red
Willow Dairy and the Huffmans.” So the trial court’s ruling
completely disposed of the subject matter of the litigation, and
it was not error for the court to withhold a ruling on a moot
issue.15 But because I disagree with the court’s ruling regarding
the effect of the automatic stay, I would remand the cause for
the court to decide the issue raised by the cross-appeal.
15 See Big John’s Billiards v. State, 283 Neb. 496, 811 N.W.2d 205 (2012).