State v. Clausen

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. CLAUSEN
Cite as 318 Neb. 375
State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
Chad R. Clausen, appellant.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed January 24, 2025. 	No. S-23-960.
1. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a question
of law that an appellate court resolves independently of the trial court.
2. Convictions: Evidence: Appeal and Error. In reviewing a criminal
conviction for sufficiency of the evidence, whether the evidence is
direct, circumstantial, or a combination thereof, the standard is the same:
An appellate court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on
the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence; such matters are
for the finder of fact. The relevant question is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.
3. Statutes: Intent. A word or phrase repeated in a statute will bear
the same meaning throughout the statute, unless a different inten-
tion appears.
4. Statutes. The absurd results doctrine allows a court to deviate from a
statute’s plain language if application of the language would lead to
manifest absurdity.
5. Statutes: Legislature: Intent. A court may depart from statutory plain
language based on the absurd results doctrine only if the result is so
absurd that the Legislature could not possibly have intended it.
6. Statutes. It is not within the province of the courts to read meaning
into a statute that is not there or to read anything direct and plain out of
a statute.
7. Courts: Legislature: Intent. Courts are bound to respect not only
the purposes a legislative body has selected, but also the means it has
deemed appropriate, and prescribed, for the pursuit of those purposes.
8. Convicted Sex Offender: Words and Phrases. “Working days,” as
used in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-4001.01(6), refers to Mondays, Tuesdays,
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/14/2026 08:09 AM CDT

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. CLAUSEN
Cite as 318 Neb. 375
Wednesdays, Thursdays, and Fridays, unless one of those days is a
legal holiday.
Petition for further review from the Court of Appeals, Pirtle,
Chief Judge, and Riedmann and Bishop, Judges, on appeal
thereto from the District Court for Washington County, John
E. Samson, Judge. Judgment of Court of Appeals reversed and
vacated.
Adam J. Sipple, of Sipple Law, for appellant.
Michael T. Hilgers, Attorney General, and Nathan A. Liss
for appellee.
Funke, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, and Papik, JJ.
Papik, J.
Nebraska’s Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) requires
individuals subject to the act to register with authorities if they
establish a “new address, temporary domicile, or habitual liv-
ing location.” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-4004 (Reissue 2016). The
State charged Chad R. Clausen with violating this requirement
after an investigation revealed he had been intermittently stay-
ing at his fiance’s house without notifying authorities. After a
bench trial, the district court found Clausen guilty of violating
SORA. The district court determined that Clausen had estab-
lished a habitual living location and temporary domicile at his
fiance’s house and had failed to register. Clausen appealed his
conviction, arguing, among other things, that the State failed
to prove he established a habitual living location or tempo-
rary domicile. The Nebraska Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction. See State v. Clausen, 33 Neb. App. 12, 9 N.W.3d
247 (2024). We granted Clausen’s petition for further review.
Because we find the State failed to introduce sufficient evi-
dence that Clausen established a habitual living location or
temporary domicile, we reverse his conviction and vacate
his sentence.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. CLAUSEN
Cite as 318 Neb. 375
BACKGROUND
Statutory Background.
Because certain provisions of SORA are central to the issues
presented in this case, we begin by reviewing them. Section
29-4004(3) provides that if an individual subject to SORA has
“a new address, temporary domicile, or habitual living location
in a different county in this state,” the individual must inform
the sheriff of the county in which he or she resides within 3
working days “before the address change.” The same subsec-
tion also requires such an individual to register with the county
sheriff of “his or her new county of residence . . . within three
working days after the address change.”
SORA provides definitions for both “habitual living loca-
tion” and “temporary domicile.” A “habitual living location”
is defined as “any place that an offender may stay for a period
of more than three days even though the sex offender main-
tains a separate permanent address or temporary domicile.”
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-4001.01(3) (Reissue 2016). A “temporary
domicile” is defined as “any place at which the person actu-
ally lives or stays for a period of at least three working days.”
§ 29-4001.01(6).
District Court Proceedings.
The State initiated criminal proceedings against Clausen,
alleging that he failed to comply with the registration require-
ments of § 29-4004. After Clausen filed an unsuccessful
motion to quash on the grounds that the terms “habitual liv-
ing location” and “temporary domicile” were void for vague-
ness, the case was tried to the district court. At trial, the State
introduced evidence that Clausen had a prior sexual assault
conviction that made him subject to SORA. The State also
introduced evidence that during the time relevant to the case,
Clausen was registered under SORA at an address in Douglas
County, Nebraska.
Most 	of 	the 	evidence 	introduced 	at 	trial 	focused 	on
Clausen’s presence at a residence owned by his fiance in
Washington County, Nebraska. The State introduced evidence

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
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STATE v. CLAUSEN
Cite as 318 Neb. 375
that law enforcement in Washington County began investigat-
ing Clausen in October 2022 after receiving an anonymous tip
that he was residing at a Washington County address. A law
enforcement officer visited that address on October 18 and
spoke with Virginia Guerrero, Clausen’s fiance’s mother.
Guerrero testified that at the time of the officer’s visit, she
and her daughter lived at the Washington County residence.
When asked if Clausen was also living at the residence at
the time of the officer’s visit, Guerrero responded that he had
been “staying there for the past 3-4 months.” Guerrero later
testified that Clausen had been living at the residence “[o]ff
and on.”
The State also called as a witness the law enforcement offi-
cer who spoke to Guerrero. He testified that Guerrero told him
Clausen had been residing at the Washington County residence
for approximately 6 months. The district court ruled that it
was receiving that testimony only for purposes of impeaching
Guerrero’s testimony.
The officer also testified that later in the day on October 18,
2022, he spoke with Clausen by telephone. The officer testi-
fied that he asked Clausen if he was living at the Washington
County residence and that Clausen responded that “he was
living out there for three days, and then he resides back at his
residence in [Douglas County] for three days.” The officer tes-
tified that he then “confronted” Clausen with the information
Guerrero provided and that Clausen then told him that “he was
staying [at the Washington County residence] most nights,”
after which Clausen apologized and “asked . . . if he was going
to go to jail.”
The officer also testified that prior to October 18, 2022,
Clausen never reported to the Washington County Sheriff’s
Department that he was living at the Washington County
residence. On cross-examination, the officer admitted that his
investigation did not address whether Clausen was staying at
the Washington County residence “on weeknights versus week-
ends or holidays.”

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STATE v. CLAUSEN
Cite as 318 Neb. 375
After trial, the district court entered a written order finding
Clausen guilty of violating SORA’s registration requirements.
The district court found that the evidence showed that Clausen
had established both a “temporary domicile” and a “habitual
living location” in Washington County. The district court sen-
tenced Clausen to 2 to 4 years’ imprisonment with credit for
time already served.
Clausen appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Court of Appeals’ Opinion.
Clausen assigned on appeal that there was insufficient evi-
dence introduced at trial that he established a “temporary
domicile” or “habitual living location” under SORA. Clausen
also assigned that the definitions of “habitual living location”
and “temporary domicile” were unconstitutionally vague.
In support of his sufficiency of the evidence argument,
Clausen relied on Doe v. Nebraska, 734 F. Supp. 2d 882
(D. Neb. 2010), a decision of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Nebraska in which the registration requirements of
SORA were challenged as unconstitutionally vague. The fed-
eral district court rejected that challenge. In doing so, it inter-
preted the phrase “period of at least three working days” in the
definition of “temporary domicile” set forth in § 29-4001.01(6)
to refer to 3 consecutive weekdays, excluding holidays. With
respect to the definition of “habitual living location,” the fed-
eral district court rejected the challengers’ suggestion that the
definition included any place a person covered by SORA might
happen to stay for a period of more than 3 days. Instead, the
court stated, “[I]t is evident the statute only requires a regis-
trant to report his or her intended relocations.” Doe, supra,
734 F. Supp. 2d at 924. Pointing to the interpretations adopted
in Doe, supra, Clausen argued that the State had failed to
introduce evidence that he established a temporary domicile
(by actually staying at the Washington County residence for
a period of 3 consecutive weekdays) or a habitual living loca-
tion (by actually staying or intending to stay at the Washington
County residence for more than 3 consecutive days).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. CLAUSEN
Cite as 318 Neb. 375
The Court of Appeals rejected Clausen’s sufficiency of the
evidence challenge. Before addressing the evidence introduced
at trial, the Court of Appeals noted that because the State
did not dispute the interpretations of habitual living location
and temporary domicile adopted in Doe, supra, the Court of
Appeals would use those definitions.
As for the evidence, the Court of Appeals stated that “there
is no evidence to indicate whether Clausen stayed at the
Washington County residence on weekdays, weekends, or
both.” State v. Clausen, 33 Neb. App. 12, 17, 9 N.W.3d 247,
251 (2024). However, it held that, viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could
have found that Clausen stayed at the Washington County resi-
dence for 3 consecutive weekdays or for more than 3 consecu-
tive days. In the Court of Appeals’ view, Clausen’s admission
that he was staying at the Washington County residence “most
nights” permitted such a conclusion.
The Court of Appeals then stated:
Furthermore, it would be an absurd result to allow a reg-
istered sex offender to stay at a residence other than his
registered one for 3 days out of every week, as long as
one of those days was a weekend. See State v. Hochstein
and Anderson, 262 Neb. 311, 632 N.W.2d 273 (2001)
(stating penal statutes are given sensible construction in
context of object sought to be accomplished, evils and
mischiefs sought to be remedied, and purpose sought to
be served). This would frustrate the purpose of SORA,
which is to protect communities from sex offenders who
present a high risk to reoffend by providing information
about where previous offenders live, work, and attend
school. See State v. Wilson, 306 Neb. 875, 947 N.W.2d
704 (2020).
Id. at 18, 9 N.W.3d at 252.
The Court of Appeals did not reach Clausen’s constitutional
challenge because he failed to file a timely notice under Neb.
Ct. R. App. P. § 2-109(E) (rev. 2023).
We granted Clausen’s petition for further review.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. CLAUSEN
Cite as 318 Neb. 375
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Clausen assigns on further review that the Court of Appeals
erred (1) in its interpretation of the definition of temporary
domicile and (2) by finding the evidence sufficient that Clausen
established a temporary domicile or habitual living location at
the Washington County residence.
Clausen also assigns that the Court of Appeals erred in
relying on evidence that was admissible only for impeach-
ment purposes, but his petition for further review included no
argument on this point. Accordingly, we will not address this
assignment. See State v. Taylor, 286 Neb. 966, 840 N.W.2d
526 (2013) (petition for further review and supporting memo-
randum brief must specifically set forth and discuss any error
assigned to Court of Appeals).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law that
an appellate court resolves independently of the trial court.
Bogue v. Gillis, 311 Neb. 445, 973 N.W.2d 338 (2022).
[2] In reviewing a criminal conviction for sufficiency of the
evidence, whether the evidence is direct, circumstantial, or a
combination thereof, the standard is the same: An appellate
court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the
credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence; such mat-
ters are for the finder of fact. State v. Haynie, 317 Neb. 371,
9 N.W.3d 915 (2024). The relevant question is whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prose-
cution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
ANALYSIS
Clausen challenges both the Court of Appeals’ interpretation
of the definition of temporary domicile and its conclusion that
there was sufficient evidence that he established a habitual liv-
ing location and temporary domicile. Because the sufficiency
of the evidence analysis depends on the meaning of the statute,
we take up his statutory interpretation argument first.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. CLAUSEN
Cite as 318 Neb. 375
Statutory Interpretation.
Clausen argues that the Court of Appeals incorrectly inter-
preted the definition of “temporary domicile” set forth in
§ 29-4001.01(6). As mentioned above, that subsection defines
“temporary domicile” to mean “any place at which the person
actually lives or stays for a period of at least three working
days.” § 29-4001.01(6). Clausen understands the Court of
Appeals to have interpreted this language to mean any place
at which a person subject to SORA actually lives or stays for
any 3-day period. In support of this reading of the Court of
Appeals’ opinion, Clausen points to the Court of Appeals’
statement that “it would be an absurd result” and “frustrate
the purpose of SORA” to “allow a registered sex offender to
stay at a residence other than his registered one for 3 days
out of every week, as long as one of those days was a week-
end.” State v. Clausen, 33 Neb. App. 12, 18, 9 N.W.3d 247,
252 (2024).
It is not completely clear to us how the Court of Appeals
interpreted the language defining “temporary domicile.” On
one hand, the Court of Appeals stated early in its sufficiency
of the evidence analysis that it would follow the definitions
adopted in Doe, supra, and in that case, the federal district
court clearly interpreted “working days” to refer to Mondays
through Fridays with the exception of legal holidays. In addi-
tion, when explaining why it found there was sufficient evi-
dence to find that Clausen established a temporary domicile,
the Court of Appeals said that a reasonable trier of fact could
find that Clausen stayed at the Washington County residence
“3 consecutive weekdays.” State v. Clausen, supra, 33 Neb.
App. at 18, 9 N.W.2d at 252. On the other hand, however,
the Court of Appeals appeared to later suggest that tempo-
rary domicile should be interpreted to include places a per-
son covered by SORA stays for any 3-day period, because it
would both be “an absurd result” and “frustrate the purpose of
SORA” to excuse such a person from registering just because
the 3-day period included a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holi-
day. Id.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
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STATE v. CLAUSEN
Cite as 318 Neb. 375
To the extent the Court of Appeals interpreted temporary
domicile to mean a place that a person covered by SORA stays
for any 3-day period without regard to whether those days are
Saturdays, Sundays, or legal holidays, we disagree. We explain
why below.
As always, statutory interpretation begins with the text. See
Espinoza v. Job Source USA, 313 Neb. 559, 984 N.W.2d 918
(2023). The text of SORA clearly requires persons covered
by the statute to notify authorities if they establish a tem-
porary domicile. And SORA specifically defines “temporary
domicile.” That definition, however, uses the phrase “working
days,” without further definition. When terms in a statute are
not specifically defined, those terms are generally given their
plain and ordinary meaning. See Brown v. State, 315 Neb. 336,
996 N.W.2d 56 (2023). See, also, Schuyler Apt. Partners v.
Colfax Cty. Bd. of Equal., 279 Neb. 989, 993, 783 N.W.2d 587,
591 (2010) (“[a]bsent a statutory indication to the contrary,
words in a statute will be given their ordinary meaning”).
In Doe v. Nebraska, 734 F. Supp. 2d 882 (D. Neb. 2010), the
federal district court concluded that the term “working days,”
in the context of § 29-4001.01(6), would ordinarily be under-
stood to refer to Mondays, Tuesdays, Wednesdays, Thursdays,
and Fridays, unless the day in question is a legal holiday.
Several other courts have similarly concluded that the term
“working days” carries the same plain and ordinary meaning.
See, e.g., State v. Nerz, 587 N.W.2d 23, 25 (Minn. 1998) (con-
cluding plain meaning of “working days” does “not include
Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays”); Abbott v. Ryan, 964
So. 2d 1087 (La. App. 2007) (same); Bennett v. Fier, No.
97-CA-116, 1998 WL 350538 (Ohio App. July 2, 1998). We
agree that in the context of § 29-4001.01(6), the plain and ordi-
nary meaning of “working days” excludes Saturdays, Sundays,
and legal holidays.
[3] This interpretation of “working days” is also sup-
ported by the usage of the phrase “working days” elsewhere
in SORA. The phrase appears several times in § 29-4004

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STATE v. CLAUSEN
Cite as 318 Neb. 375
where it is used to set deadlines by which persons subject
to the act must inform county sheriffs if they establish a
new address, temporary domicile, or habitual living location,
along with changes in employment or school attendance. See,
e.g., § 29-4004(2) to (6). Presumably, SORA sets notifica-
tion deadlines in terms of “working days” because in some
cases it would be difficult or impossible for persons covered
by SORA to provide the required notification on Saturdays,
Sundays, or legal holidays. And if “working days” excludes
Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays for purposes of regis-
tration deadlines under SORA, it can be assumed the phrase
carries the same meaning when defining temporary domicile.
A word or phrase repeated in a statute will bear the same
meaning throughout the statute, unless a different intention
appears. Doty v. West Gate Bank, 292 Neb. 787, 874 N.W.2d
839 (2016). See, also, Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner,
Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 170 (2012)
(discussing “presumption of consistent usage”).
The Court of Appeals did not point to any textual indicator
suggesting that “working days” should be interpreted to mean
something other than weekdays minus legal holidays. Instead,
it invoked two other ideas: absurd results and statutory pur-
pose. Although both ideas can play a role in statutory interpre-
tation in some instances, they do not here.
[4,5] Take first the absurd results doctrine. We have recog-
nized that doctrine allows a court to deviate from a statute’s
plain language if application of the language would lead to
“manifest absurdity.” Parks v. Hy-Vee, 307 Neb. 927, 945,
951 N.W.2d 504, 518 (2020). The bar of manifest absur-
dity, however, is not easily cleared. Id. We have said that a
court may depart from statutory plain language based on the
absurd results doctrine only if the result is “so absurd that the
Legislature could not possibly have intended it.” Thomas v.
Peterson, 307 Neb. 89, 97, 948 N.W.2d 698, 705 (2020). See,
also, Scalia & Garner, supra at 234-39.

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STATE v. CLAUSEN
Cite as 318 Neb. 375
The high hurdle of manifest absurdity is not cleared here.
We do not deny that one could make a policy argument
that someone previously convicted of sex offenses should be
required to inform authorities if he or she stays somewhere for
any 3-day period. But the question, for purposes of the absurd
results doctrine, is whether the Legislature could have pos-
sibly intended to require registration only if a person covered
by SORA stays somewhere for a period of 3 working days,
as that term is ordinarily understood. Some line drawing by
the Legislature as to the duration a person subject to SORA
should be able to stay at a location before being required to
register there is unavoidable. We are unable to say that the
Legislature could not have possibly intended to draw the line
at 3 working days. The absurd results doctrine has no applica-
tion here.
[6] To the extent the Court of Appeals invoked statutory pur-
pose to interpret “working days” to simply mean “days,” that
too was unwarranted in this case. Although courts can consider
the purpose of a statute when deciding between multiple tex-
tually permissible readings of a statute, courts are merely to
give effect to the text when the meaning of the text is plain,
direct, and unambiguous. See State ex rel. Peterson v. Shively,
310 Neb. 1, 963 N.W.2d 508 (2021). See, also, Barr v. S.E.C.,
114 F.4th 441 (5th Cir. 2024) (explaining when statutory text
is plain and unambiguous, statutory purpose is not to be con-
sidered); U.S. v. Polk, 61 F.4th 1277 (10th Cir. 2023) (same).
As we often say, it is not within the province of the courts to
read meaning into a statute that is not there or to read anything
direct and plain out of a statute. Rogers v. Jack’s Supper Club,
304 Neb. 605, 935 N.W.2d 754 (2019).
[7] One of SORA’s purposes undoubtedly is, as the Court of
Appeals observed, “to protect communities from sex offend-
ers who present a high risk to reoffend by providing informa-
tion about where previous offenders live, work, and attend
school.” State v. Clausen, 33 Neb. App. 12, 18, 9 N.W.3d 247,
252 (2024). But while statutes are passed to achieve policies

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STATE v. CLAUSEN
Cite as 318 Neb. 375
and purposes, they do so through legislatively selected means.
See In re Guardianship of Eliza W., 304 Neb. 995, 938
N.W.2d 307 (2020). See, also, Rodriguez v. Lasting Hope
Recovery Ctr., 308 Neb. 538, 955 N.W.2d 707 (2021) (Papik,
J., concurring). And if courts can identify and enforce what
they believe to be the general purpose or policy behind legis-
lation rather than the details actually enacted in the text, they
are selecting their own means rather than respecting those
chosen by the legislative branch. See id. Courts are bound to
respect not only the purposes a legislative body has selected,
but also the means it has deemed appropriate, and prescribed,
for the pursuit of those purposes. In re Guardianship of Eliza
W., supra. It is thus a mistake to assume that anything that
furthers a statute’s primary purpose is the law and that any-
thing that does not perfectly do so is not. Id. Applying these
principles here, a court cannot invoke SORA’s general pur-
poses as a reason to depart from the plain meaning of “work-
ing days” discussed above.
[8] At oral argument, the State offered the theory that the
Court of Appeals’ observations regarding absurd results and
statutory purpose were merely dicta. We acknowledge the
possibility that the Court of Appeals was merely offering its
impression that it seems counter to the purposes of SORA
if someone covered by SORA could consistently stay at a
location for 3-day periods without being obligated to regis-
ter there. While such an observation may be of interest to
the Legislature going forward, it does not license courts to
ignore the current statute’s use of the phrase “working days”
in the definition of temporary domicile. We hold that “work-
ing days,” as used in § 29-4001.01(6), refers to Mondays,
Tuesdays, Wednesdays, Thursdays, and Fridays, unless one of
those days is a legal holiday.
Sufficiency of Evidence.
This leaves Clausen’s argument that there was insufficient
evidence that he established a temporary domicile or habitual
living location at the Washington County residence such that

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STATE v. CLAUSEN
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he could be convicted of violating SORA by failing to register
there. Because Clausen would have been required to notify
authorities if he had established either a temporary domicile or
a habitual living location in Washington County, we analyze
whether there was sufficient evidence at trial that he estab-
lished either, beginning with temporary domicile.
As we have discussed, temporary domicile is defined as
“any place at which the person actually lives or stays for a
period of at least three working days,” § 29-4001.01(6), and,
in this context, “working days” refers to Mondays, Tuesdays,
Wednesdays, Thursdays, and Fridays that are not legal holi-
days. Additionally, in Doe v. Nebraska, 734 F. Supp. 2d 882
(D. Neb. 2010), the federal district court interpreted the lan-
guage “a period of at least three working days” to require
that a person live or stay somewhere for 3 consecutive days
to establish a temporary domicile. On appeal, the State does
not contest that interpretation. Clausen, for his part, does not
suggest that a person must remain physically present at an
address for 72 hours straight to establish a temporary domicile.
Instead, Clausen focuses on the absence of evidence as to the
days of the week he was present at the Washington County
residence. He argues that without such evidence, a rational
trier of fact could not have found that he established a tempo-
rary domicile there.
Clausen 	is 	correct 	that 	there 	was 	no 	direct 	evidence
introduced at trial as to specific days he had stayed at the
Washington County residence. In fact, the testifying officer
admitted that he had not investigated whether Clausen was
staying at the Washington County residence “on weeknights
versus weekends or holidays.” Even so, the Court of Appeals
found that Clausen’s admission that he was staying at the
Washington County residence “most nights,” combined with
Guerrero’s testimony that he had been staying there “[o]ff and
on,” would have allowed a rational trier of fact to find beyond
a reasonable doubt that Clausen stayed there for 3 consecutive
weekdays. Citing a dictionary definition that defined “most”

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Cite as 318 Neb. 375
as “the majority of,” the Court of Appeals concluded that if
Clausen stayed at the Washington County residence a majority
of the time, a reasonable trier of fact could have found that
he stayed there 3 consecutive weekdays. State v. Clausen, 33
Neb. App. 12, 18, 9 N.W.3d 247, 252 (2024) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
The Court of Appeals apparently concluded that Clausen’s
admission that he stayed at the Washington County residence
more often than not was circumstantial evidence that permitted
the district court to infer that he had stayed there 3 consecu-
tive weekdays. There is no question that the State can prove
a criminal offense by using circumstantial evidence; indeed,
we have recognized that a conviction can be based solely on
circumstantial evidence. See State v. Warlick, 308 Neb. 656,
956 N.W.2d 269 (2021). Further, it is generally recognized that
triers of fact may rely on logic as well as their own experience
and common sense to draw inferences based on circumstantial
evidence. See, e.g., U.S. v. Torres-Laranega, 476 F.3d 1148
(10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Ramos, 788 Fed. Appx. 842
(3d Cir. 2019); State v. Otero, 49 Conn. App. 459, 715 A.2d
782 (1998). At the same time, however, our law recognizes that
a criminal conviction cannot be based upon speculation. See
Warlick, supra.
In this case, even when we view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, as our standard of review
requires, we find that there was not evidence that would allow
a rational trier of fact to find, without engaging in speculation,
that Clausen stayed at the Washington County residence for 3
consecutive weekdays. Although, as the State emphasizes, there
was evidence that Clausen had been staying at the Washington
County residence “[o]ff and on” and “most nights,” we do
not understand how the district court could have, from that
evidence, used other evidence, logic, experience, or common
sense to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that Clausen
stayed at the residence for 3 consecutive weekdays.

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STATE v. CLAUSEN
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The evidence in this case did not allow for a proper infer-
ence based on circumstantial evidence. Compare this case to
the oft-used hypothetical in which a person enters a building
with a wet raincoat and a wet umbrella, and it is reasonably
inferred that it was raining outside. See, e.g., Ramos, supra.
In that example, it is reasonable to conclude that rain had
fallen because experience and common sense tell us that
people entering a building wearing wet raincoats and carrying
wet umbrellas have usually been out in the rain. But we fail
to see, and neither has the State explained, how logic, experi-
ence, or common sense would allow one to infer that a person
who had stayed at a location more nights than not had ever
spent 3 consecutive weekdays there. Rather, one would have
to engage in speculation to conclude that because Clausen
stayed at the Washington County residence most of the time,
he must have stayed there 3 consecutive weekdays.
We acknowledge that there was also evidence that Clausen
admitted that he was staying at the Washington County resi-
dence for 3 days and then staying at his address in Douglas
County for 3 days. We also acknowledge that if Clausen fol-
lowed that exact pattern for several weeks, he would inevita-
bly stay at the Washington County residence for 3 consecutive
weekdays. But even if Clausen admitted to following such
an exact pattern, there was no evidence as to the length of
time he had been following such a pattern. And without such
evidence, the trier of fact again would have had to engage
in speculation to conclude that Clausen had stayed at the
Washington County residence for 3 consecutive weekdays. We
find there was insufficient evidence that Clausen established a
temporary domicile in Washington County.
The Court of Appeals also determined there was sufficient
evidence that Clausen established a habitual living location
at the Washington County residence. Before assessing the
evidence on this question, we note that the definitions of
habitual living location and temporary domicile differ in mul-
tiple respects. One key difference is that temporary domicile

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is defined as a place at which the person covered by SORA
“actually lives or stays,” § 29-4001.01(6), for the enumerated
period, while habitual living location is defined as a place that
the person covered by SORA “may stay,” § 29-4001.01(3),
for the enumerated period. As discussed above, in Doe v.
Nebraska, 734 F. Supp. 2d 882, 924 (D. Neb. 2010), the
federal district court found that the definition of habitual liv-
ing location was not unconstitutionally vague, because “‘may
stay’” did not refer to literally anywhere a person might hap-
pen to stay, but only to “intended relocations.”
Even with the benefit of the federal district court’s opinion
in Doe, supra, it is not immediately obvious to us what trig-
gers the establishment of a habitual living location under the
statute. If, in fact, a person establishes a habitual living loca-
tion at the moment he or she forms an intent to stay at another
location for more than 3 days, that appears to raise some dif-
ficulties. So understood, it seems the statute could be read to
require such a person to notify the sheriff of the county in
which he or she resides 3 working days before that intent was
formed. See, e.g., § 29-4004(3) (requiring persons covered by
SORA to inform sheriff “if he or she has a new address, tem-
porary domicile, or habitual living location . . . within three
working days before the address change”). It is certainly pos-
sible for an individual to provide notice several days before he
or she actually moves somewhere, but it is not so clear to us
how a person would know to provide notice several days prior
to forming an intent to relocate.
We need not, however, answer our questions as to how one
establishes a habitual living location based on intent alone. The
State attempted to show that Clausen established a habitual
living location at the Washington County residence, not based
solely on his intent to stay there, but based on its contention
that he actually stayed there for more than 3 days. We presume
for purposes of our analysis in this case that a person covered
by SORA establishes a habitual living location if he or she
actually stays at a place for more than 3 consecutive days.

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STATE v. CLAUSEN
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Even so, we find that the trier of fact would have to engage
in speculation to conclude that Clausen actually stayed at
the Washington County residence for more than 3 consecu-
tive days. Again, there was evidence that Clausen admitted to
staying at the Washington County residence for 3-day periods
and most nights. But, for reasons similar to those explained
above, one would have to engage in speculation to conclude
from those pieces of evidence that Clausen actually stayed at
the Washington County residence for more than 3 consecu-
tive days.
Like the Court of Appeals, we recognize that it is SORA’s
purpose “to protect communities from sex offenders who pre-
sent a high risk to reoffend by providing information about
where previous offenders live, work, and attend school.” State
v. Clausen, 33 Neb. App. 12, 18, 9 N.W.3d 247, 252 (2024).
But the Legislature has chosen to pursue that purpose by
requiring those subject to SORA to provide notification when
they have established a habitual living location or temporary
domicile. The Legislature chose to specifically define those
concepts in terms of the number of days, and in the case of
temporary domicile, the types of days the individual stays at a
location. Although there was evidence that Clausen was regu-
larly staying at the Washington County residence, the State
failed to introduce evidence that would show he was staying
at the Washington County residence for the requisite length
or types of days that would trigger an obligation to notify
authorities. In the absence of such evidence, the State failed to
prove that Clausen violated SORA’s requirements.
We emphasize that our decision in this case is not a return
to “‘accused’s rule,’” a rule once applied by this court in
reviewing the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence. See State
v. Olbricht, 294 Neb. 974, 986, 885 N.W.2d 699, 708 (2016).
That rule had the effect of requiring the State to “disprove
every hypothesis of nonguilt in order to convict” using cir-
cumstantial evidence. State v. Pierce, 248 Neb. 536, 545,
537 N.W.2d 323, 329 (1995). We rejected that rule and have

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declined several invitations to return to it. See, e.g., State v.
Stack, 307 Neb. 773, 950 N.W.2d 611 (2020); Olbricht, supra.
We find the evidence insufficient in this case not under the
“accused’s rule,” but under our current standard for reviewing
challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence recited above.
Because the State failed to introduce sufficient evidence that
Clausen established a temporary domicile or habitual living
location in Washington County, it failed to prove that he vio-
lated SORA. Accordingly, we reverse his conviction and vacate
his sentence.
CONCLUSION
To the extent the Court of Appeals held that a person subject
to SORA can establish a temporary domicile for purposes of
§ 29-4001.01(6) by staying at a location for any 3-day period,
we disagree. We interpret “working days” in § 29-4001.01(6)
to refer to Mondays, Tuesdays, Wednesdays, Thursdays, and
Fridays with the exception of legal holidays. Further, because
the State failed to introduce sufficient evidence that Clausen
established either a temporary domicile or a habitual living
location in Washington County, we find that the State failed to
prove that Clausen was required to register there. Accordingly,
we reverse his conviction for violating SORA and vacate
his sentence.
Reversed and vacated.
Freudenberg, J., not participating.